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Abstract  
Since the collapse of the communist system, transition economies (TEs) have 
witnessed significant growth in fiscal decentralisation (FD). In order to meet the needs 
of the new decentralised system and adapt to new political changes such as the EU 
accession, these countries started to reform their governance system by devolving 
greater power to subnational governments. The ongoing intergovernmental fiscal 
relations and territorial reforms during these twenty-eight years of transition have 
demonstrated that decentralisation in general, and FD in particular, is an ongoing 
process, continually evolving and contributing to democracy, economic efficiency and 
ultimately economic development (Bird, 1993; Bird et al., 1995). Given the variation 
in FD during transition and the attention it has received especially amongst developed 
TEs, this dissertation aims to assess the relationship between FD and economic growth 
in the context of the transition process. First, it contributes to the current theoretical 
literature by critically reviewing the existing theories on this relationship and 
exploring new potential (direct and indirect) channels of transmission from FD to 
economic performance. Also, this thesis contributes to the current empirical literature 
on FD by providing an empirical investigation of the impact of FD on economic 
growth for selected transition economies, taking into account the relevance of 
important factors such as the level of analysis (national vs subnational levels), the stage 
of economic transition, the geographical location and the size of countries - factors 
that have not been sufficiently investigated in previous studies. The previous empirical 
studies were unable to provide conclusive evidence concerning the impact of FD on 
economic performance. By shedding light on the factors that contribute to the FD-
economic growth relationship and using statistical methods that are appropriate to the 
analysis of this relationship, this thesis provides some explanation for the inconclusive 
nature of previous studies. Using data for TEs in Europe and the former Soviet Union, 
the empirical results suggest that the economic effects of FD are sensitive to the FD 
measures used and, more importantly, to the economic and institutional reforms 
implemented in these countries. The thesis shows that while FD may have an 
insignificant effect on countries in early stages of transition, it can be employed with 
beneficial effects by countries at relatively advanced stages of transition. In this sense, 
this thesis confirms the theoretical claim, ignored up to now, that FD is a “normal 
good”. Exploring the FD-economic growth relationship on a more homogenous 
dataset and at subnational level, this thesis concludes that the economic effect of FD 
is more visible at regional level, while being moderated by the country size and other 
characteristics of countries involved. The empirical evidence has potentially useful 
policy implications for the ongoing decentralisation reforms in transition economies 
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1 
 
Shortly after the breakup of the socialist system, many countries began the process of 
transition from a centrally planned to a market economy which was also accompanied 
by extensive decentralisation. The process of decentralisation emerged in these 
countries in all its dimensions (political, administrative, fiscal and/or market), partly 
as a reaction to the failure of the centralised system and partly due to the belief that 
decentralisation is accompanied by increased efficiency (Smoke, 2001; Rodriguez-
Pose and Kroijer, 2009). Whilst each of the dimensions of decentralization are 
important topics of analysis and research, here we are only concerned  with fiscal 
decentralization (FD) and its impact on economic growth.  
FD was promoted as a tool to consolidate democracy, build and strengthen the local 
capacity, provide better public services at local level, promote economic development 
and contribute to the resolution of ethnic conflicts (Bird, 1993; Bartlett et al., 2013). 
The process of FD in particular has received a growing interest among different actors 
(governments, development agencies, etc.) to further decentralise TEs as a tool to 
promote economic development (Bruno and Pleskovic, 1996; Rodriguez-Pose and 
Kroijer, 2009). In spite of continuous emphasis on the importance of FD for a 
country’s democracy and development process, FD has differed widely throughout 
transition economies (TEs) in terms of not only its progress but also its outcomes. TEs 
have witnessed considerable variation in the pace and commitment to FD, despite 
starting from the same initial conditions where subnational governments operated as 
administrative units with no or little fiscal responsibility. These countries have 
successfully overcome the initial fundamental problems of legacies of the centralised 
system. Though, challenges of accountability, clarity of roles and lack of capacity to 
provide adequate local goods and services still remain present, especially in Southern 
Europe and Southern Caucasus.  
Whilst facing many challenges in successfully implementing the existing FD reforms 
or undertaking new reforms of intergovernmental fiscal systems, (Prud’homme, 
1995), the process of transition in these countries raises particular issues in terms of 
FD and its implications for economic development. Despite the dominat view in TEs 
that FD is a tool to increase economic development rather than the more traditional 
objective of efficient delivery of public goods and services (Rodriguez-Pose and Gill, 
2 
 
2005), there is however little empirical evidence in these countries to support the 
economic benefits of FD.  
Given the variation in FD during transition and the attention it has received especially 
amongst developed TEs, this thesis explores the concept of FD and its impact on 
economic growth TEs. It, tackles the relationship between FD and economic growth 
by drawing extensively on the existing theoretical and particularly empirical studies 
in order to investigate this relationship in a transition context. 
 
1.1 Definition of (fiscal) decentralisation  
While FD represents a broad multifaced concept, its definition and measurement still 
remain rather unclear. Defined broadly, decentralisation refers to the process of 
transferring authority and responsibility from national/central government to regional 
or subnational governments (intermediate and local level), quasi-independent 
government organisations and/or the private sector (World Bank, 1999; 2011). In this 
regard, decentralisation does not involve only a public-sector reform. Rather, it 
encompasses the relationships between multiple agents whether private sector, civil 
society or governmental entities. The transfer of authority from national to subnational 
levels involves the four broad dimensions of political, administrative, market and 
fiscal decentralisation.  
Political decentralisation consists of constitutional or statutory reforms, the creation 
and development of pluralistic political parties and support for democratisation at local 
level by giving citizens or their representative more power in the public decision-
making process (Rondinelli, 1999, p.12; World Bank, 1999). Administrative 
decentralisation is the process of redistribution of responsibility for planning, 
financing and managing public functions from the central government and its agencies 
to subordinate levels of government or units and semi-autonomous governmental 
authorities (Rondinelli et al., 1983; Rondinelli, 1999, p.12; World Bank, 1999; 
Schneider, 2003). Third, market decentralisation refers to the transfer of responsibility 
for public functions from public to the private sector represents (Rondinelli, 1990; 
1999; World Bank, 1999).  
3 
 
Fiscal decentralisation addresses the financial relationship between national and 
subnational governments. More specifically, fiscal decentralisation represents the 
devolution of authority for public finances and the responsibility for public services to 
lower levels of government (Tanzi, 1995). This dimension of decentralisation 
encompasses four main interrelationships between levels of government, also known 
as the pillars of FD, focusing on: (i) expenditure decisions, (ii) revenue and tax-raising 
powers, (iii) intergovernmental transfers and (iv) subnational borrowing (Vo, 2010, 
p.657).  
The first pillar refers to the assignment of expenditure responsibilities (public 
functions) among different levels of governments. The second refers to the shift of 
financial resources (local taxes, fees, user-charges, share of national indirect taxes) 
among different levels of government. The third represents the transfer of finances 
(conditional and unconditional grants) from central to subnational governments. The 
last pillar refers to the capacity of subnational governments to borrow money when 
the central governments are unable to meet their expenditure responsibilities with their 
own revenue (Feruglio and Anderson, 2008). 
1.2 Fiscal decentralisation in transition economies 
In order to identify and analyse the key features of FD during the transition process, a 
cross-country comparison of measures of FD that take into account the 
multidimensional nature of FD is required. Following extensive debate on the 
appropriate measures of FD1, there is general agreement on the following three 
measures: (i) the expenditure decentralisation measured by the share of the subnational 
government expenditure as a share of total expenditure, (ii) revenue decentralisation 
measured by the share of the subnational government revenue as a share of total 
government revenue and (iii) the vertical imbalance measured by the share of the 
intergovernmental transfers to subnational revenues.2  
Figure 1.1 shows the expenditure decentralisation in TEs, more precisely  the Central 
and Eastern European countries (CEEC), the Baltic countries (Baltics) and the 
                                                          
1 A more detailed discussion will be provided in Section 4.2.2 and 5.2.2. 
2 An alternative measure of vertical imbalance is the share of intergovernmental transfers to 
subnational expenditure (World Bank, 1999). 
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Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS).3 Whilst significant change can be 
observed during the initial stage of transition, at least in countries for which data is 
available, in general, the development of FD appears to be stable with no extreme 
fluctuations (IMF, 2017).4 A breakdown of the expenditure decentralisation by group 
of countries (CEEC, Baltics and CIS), as presented in Figure 1.1, shows that countries 
within the same group experience different trends of FD. The Baltics seem to be 
among the countries that have decentralised expenditure the most on average terms 
compared to the CEE and CIS, with an average of 26%, 20% and 25%, respectively. 
In general, the degree of expenditure decentralisation in TEs reflects the country 
characteristics (size, population, diversity etc.), though some countries, especially 
within the same group of countries, do not always match the expectations.5 
 
 
(a) CEEC 
 
                                                          
3 Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Croatia, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, 
Lithuania, the Former Yugoslav Republic (FYR) of Macedonia, Montenegro, Poland, Romania, 
Serbia, Slovak Republic,  Kosovo, Slovenia, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Georgia, Kazakhstan, 
Kyrgyz Republic, Moldova, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Ukraine, Uzbekistan. 
It should be noted that Russia was excluded from our datasets, although the data availability and the 
accuracy of the data did not seem to be a problem. This is because these two countries stand out as 
extreme outliers regarding all indicators of decentralisation, large part owing to its federation status 
and large geographical size. Given that these two countries were excluded in our empirical research, 
they were also excluded from this section. 
4 The data limitation during the initial stage of transition (1990-1995) means that for a majority of 
countries, the trend of expenditure decentralisation, revenue decentralisation and intergovernmental 
transfers cannot be shown in this period. 
5 Although Belarus is a relatively homogenous and small country, it has a high level of expenditure 
and revenue decentralisation. 
0%
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(b) Baltics     (c) CIS 
 
Figure 1.1 Expenditure decentralisation (subnational government expenditure as a 
percentage of total government expenditure) by group of countries, 1996-2016 
Source: IMF (2017) 
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ETEs with expenditure decentralisation varying from 20% to 30%, with Poland 
leading the group.6  On the contrary, Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina and Croatia 
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public goods (Alibegović and Slijepčević, 2012; NASLA, 2016). From the CIS group, 
only Belarus, Kazakhstan and Ukraine seem to stand out in terms of their success in 
increasing local decision-making authority over expenditure and embarking on 
ambitious processes of reform. Despite being unitary governments, the above 
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6 See Levitas (2017) for a detailed explanation on the success of FD in Poland.  
7 FYR Macedonia, Kosovo and Montenegro, although not included in Figure 1.1 because of the lack 
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advanced reformers, despite the fragility shown in the financial crisis of 2008, which 
caused a sharp decrease in the same year, as shown in Figure 1.1, (panel c). However, 
a note of caution is in order when referring to expenditure decentralisation in 
Kazakhstan. Having no formally shared responsibilities for subnational governments, 
and with assignments changing each year based on the willingness of the central 
government (Luong, 2004), the situation often resembles administrative rather than 
fiscal decentralisation.  
Moving on to the second measure of FD, the revenue decentralisation, it seems that 
on average TEs appear to be less revenue than expenditure decentralised (Figure 1.2). 
Lower levels of revenue decentralisation, both in terms of degree and speed over the 
years, can be observed across all TEs, irrespective of the geographical location (the 
Baltics, CEE or CIS). In general, in the early years of transition, the process of revenue 
assignment was non-transparent and unstable.  However, in the later period, TEs made 
strides to enhance fiscal autonomy with some countries resembling the level of 
revenue and tax decentralisation of the EU28 and OECD countries. Referring to the 
IMF data (2017), the extremes of revenue decentralisation were recorded in CIS, with 
the highest in Belarus (41.1%) and the lowest in Armenia (7.9%). In contrast, the 
CEEC and the Baltics show less extreme values (27.2% in the Czech Republic and 
9.8% in Bosnia and Herzegovina). However, there is still a huge gap between countries 
that have advanced their FD reforms fast and the ones that are slow in reforming their 
revenue decentralisation. While the first group of countries have almost finalised the 
transformation process and have joined the EU, many countries from the slow 
reformers are still lagging behind in terms of their FD reforms as well as the 
transformation process, reflected in their low values of revenue decentralisation.  
Despite this progress, the mismatch between expenditure assignments and adequate 
revenues to meet the related responsibilities is a major challenge of decentralisation 
across all TEs.  The absence of sufficient revenue basis (taxes, other revenues and 
intergovernmental transfers) in some of the countries, mostly in CIS, led to undesirable 
consequences regarding the quality and quantity of local public goods (Urinboyev, 
2015). The lack of a sound financial revenue base, accompanied by effective tax 
autonomy, has hampered the implementation of revenue assignments. Whilst for the 
Baltics and the CEEC the development of the genuine local fiscal autonomy has not 
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been a priority, in the CIS, local budget planning remained highly centralised, with 
local governments being unable to set the tax rate and base independently, while 
highlighting their dependence from intergovernmental transfers. In general, all local 
governments in CIS, except Moldova and Uzbekistan at a certain extent, are deprived 
from the right to develop their own budget planning (Bektemirov and Rahimov, 2001; 
Urinboyev, 2015). 
 
 
 
(a) CEEC 
 
 
(b) Baltics      (c) CIS 
 
Figure 1.2 Revenue decentralisation (subnational government revenue as a 
percentage of total government revenue) by group of countries, 1996-2016 
Source: IMF (2017) 
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A breakdown of the revenue decentralisation by country and sources of revenue, as 
presented in Figure 1.2, shows noticeable differences within countries of the same 
groups. Similar to the expenditure decentralisation, the Czech Republic, Hungary, 
Latvia and Poland are amongst the advanced reformers of the tax autonomy in the 
CEEC and the Baltics, while Belarus, Kazakhstan and Ukraine have decentralised 
more revenue to local governments than their counterparts in Southern Caucasus. 
Despite the increased decentralisation over years, the TEs still struggle in creating self-
sufficient and accountable subnational governments with limited local taxes, while 
minimising the dependency on intergovernmental transfers. Augmenting the revenue 
autonomy in general and the tax autonomy in particular remains one of the main 
challenges facing TEs. 
A disaggregation of local government revenues into revenue sources (tax revenues, 
grants revenue, social contributions and other revenues), based on the IMF 
classification and data, shows that local governments in TEs have limited subnational 
autonomy and depend to a large extent on intergovernmental sources of revenue 
(conditional and unconditional grants). Using tax decentralisation (measured as the 
share of local government tax revenues in general government revenues) instead of 
revenue decentralisation still highlights the diverse trends of FD across TEs. While 
Belarus, Kazakhstan, Czech Republic, Latvia and Poland (on average having a tax 
decentralisation index of 28%, 24%, 14.5%, 11.5%, 10%, respectively (IMF, 2017) 
appear to be the top five countries with self-sufficient local governments, Azerbaijan, 
Slovakia, Armenia, Romania and Albania (with 0.1%, 2.5%, 3.5%, 4%, 4.1%, 
respectively (IMF, 2017)) seem to be positioned at the lower end of the ranking. 
However, it is worth noting that countries in the CEE and Baltics show an increasing 
trend of fiscal autonomy, unlike CIS countries which have shown a concerning 
tendency to centralise tax revenue. Despite the relatively higher tax decentralisation 
in the CIS and the increasing trends in the CEE and Baltics, local governments across 
TEs lack real capacity to address the local needs through their own revenues (tax 
revenues and other revenues), while being highly dependent on intergovernmental 
transfers to meet local expenditure responsibilities. 
An important concern in TEs is the shared taxes (personal income tax, corporate tax, 
VAT, etc.) which, being totally decided on by the central government, creates 
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fluctuations in the local revenues (Dabla-Norris, 2006; Krivorotko, 2007). Whilst for 
some countries, especially those that have joined EU, the clarification of roles and 
shares received by subnational governments from shared taxes is already established, 
for others these issues continue to remain unclear. 
As for the third measure of decentralisation, i.e., vertical imbalance (the 
intergovernmental transfers as a percentage of subnational governmentrevenue) is 
concerned, here too there have been large discrepancies.  Whilst in the early stages of 
transition TEs experimented with the degree of vertical imbalance and the formula to 
distribute grants from central to local governments, in the last decade the share of 
intergovernmental transfers to subnational revenues has been stable with no drastic 
changes across years. However, evident differences in vertical imbalance exist 
between countries. According to the IMF data, displayed in Figure 1.3, the highest 
average vertical imbalance in 2016, as the most recent year for which the data is 
available, was recorded in the Baltic region (Lithuania with 86.3%), whereas the 
lowest in the CEE (Bosnia and Herzegovina with 4%). Important improvements 
regarding the dependency of local governments to the central government have been 
observed especially among the CEEC (i.e. Albania, while the Baltics and the CIS 
countries in general show a negative trend (i.e. Estonia, Lithuania, Ukraine, Moldova 
etc.).  
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Figure 1.3 Vertical imbalance (intergovernmental grants as a share of subnational 
revenues) by country, 2016 
Source: IMF (2017) 
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Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Slovak Republic, Slovenia, Belarus, 
Kazakhstan, Ukraine. The intermediate group consists of countries that have 
decentralised at a lower pace compared to the advanced decentralisers and face limited 
fiscal autonomy, efficient delivery of public goods and relatively high dependency on 
intergovernmental transfers. This group includes Albania, Bulgaria, Romania, 
Moldova, Serbia, Kyrgyz Republic, Moldova. The third group of countries includes 
the slow reformers of FD – Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Georgia, Tajikistan, 
Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan – that have been the least successful in devolving 
expenditures and taxes, strengthening accountability and clarifying the transfer system 
(Valdivieso, 1998; Dabla-Norris, 2006). 
In conclusion, it is important to note that in spite of the progress in FD reforms in TEs, 
these countries have witnessed large variations in terms of different dimensions of FD 
(expenditure, revenue/tax and intergovernmental transfers), which complicates the 
analysis of FD-economic growth relationship from an empirical perspective. Hence, it 
is important to consider the varying features of FD across TEs and incorporate them 
in the main research questions of this thesis. 
1.3 Aims and objectives of the thesis   
Promoted as a tool to increase the efficiency of the public sector and to promote 
economic development (Bird, 1993), TEs considered decentralisation in general and 
FD in particular as essential to the economic and institutional reforms. Whilst the 
investigation of the economic effect of FD is primarily motivated by the theoretical 
justification where, according to Oates Theorem (Oates, 1993), economic growth as a 
measure of economic development is the ultimate output of FD, there are also other 
reasons for choosing to assess the relationship between FD and economic growth. The 
investigation of the economic effects of FD has special importance in the context of 
transition economies not only for the way FD was promoted, but also because of the 
very low levels of GDP per capita of these countries at the beginning of the process of 
FD (Svejnar, 2002) and their need to use this tool to boost economic growth. 
 
12 
 
Despite the reviving debate on the well-functioning nature of intergovernmental fiscal 
relations, various forms of decentralisation, and the prevalence of FD in TEs, the 
investigation of the economic effect of FD in these countries has been somewhat 
scarce. Motivated by this scarcity and the specificities of the economic effect of FD in 
a transition context, this thesis aims to investigate the relationship between FD and 
economic growth. In order to explore the economic effect of FD, the following specific 
objectives have been developed: 
1. To provide a comprehensive and critical review of the FD-economic growth 
theories with particular emphasis on the channels of transmission; 
2. To critically review the empirical literature related to the relationship between 
FD and economic performance, highlighting the differences in economic 
development, measures of FD and other methodological differences as 
possible explanation of the contradictory and mixed empirical results; 
3. To quantitively analyse the results of previous empirical literature whether an 
authentic effect of FD on economic growth is present in previous research; 
4. To explore whether different characteristics of the original studies can explain 
the contradictory results of the empirical research; 
5. To adapt the FD-growth model to the transition context by taking into account 
the stages of transition; 
6. To empirically evaluate the economic effect of FD in TEs, and its nature based 
on the income elasticity and geography; 
7. To empirically evaluate the economic effect of FD in selected ETEs from a 
sub-national perspective and examine the moderating role of country size; 
8. To provide policy recommendations to better utilise the benefits of FD as a 
development tool.  
1.4 The structure of the thesis 
The remainder of this thesis is structured as follows.  
Chapter 2 reviews the main theoretical and empirical literature on the FD-economic 
growth relationship. In order to address the first objective, this chapter starts by 
outlining the major theoretical contributions underlying the FD-economic growth 
relationship from the perspectives of neoclassical and endogenous growth theories. In 
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critically reviewing these theories on this relationship, particular attention is paid to 
the channels of transmission from FD to economic performance, including new 
channels, both direct and indirect. The second part of this chapter addresses the second 
objective by reviewing the empirical research, elaborating the complexity of defining 
FD and focusing on the differences in economic development amongst transition 
countries and the levels of investigation (national vs subnational levels). Whilst the 
empirical findings appear mixed and contradictory, the categorisation into national and 
subnational level sheds some light on this relationship by showing the insignificance 
of the effect of FD on economic growth at national level, but relatively significant 
effect if the investigation is disaggregated to lower levels. The theoretical review 
together with the discussion of the shortcomings of the current empirical literature 
serves as the conceptual framework for the later empirical chapters of the thesis. 
Chapter 3 addresses the third and fourth objective of this thesis by examining the 
robustness of empirical findings by employing a Meta-regression analysis in order to 
go beyond the ambiguity of empirical research. This analysis provides a quantitative 
assessment of the accumulated empirical evidence on the effect of FD on economic 
performance, while also modelling the heterogeneity of the econometrics literature. 
The first research questions addressed in this chapter is: “Does the FD-economic 
growth relationship have an authentic effect and/or publication bias?”. To assess the 
severity of contamination from publication bias and identify the presence of a genuine 
effect, the MRA synthesises the previous empirical literature and provides an average 
of the estimated results. Subsequently, the next research question addressed by MRA 
is: “What are the causes of the extensive empirical heterogeneity in the FD-economic 
growth literature?” By synthesising the extant empirical literature, the MRA provides 
a discussion on the characteristics of the original studies that could explain the 
differences in the empirical results, by stressing the importance of choosing 
appropriate measures of FD. 
Based on the discussion of the theoretical framework in Chapter 2 and the elaboration 
of the empirical studies through the MRA in Chapter 3, Chapter 4 (related to the fifth 
and sixth objective) conducts an empirical investigation to address the question: “Does 
FD affect economic growth in TEs?” This chapter starts by discussing in detail the 
importance of using appropriate measures of FD in the context of TEs, followed by a 
discussion of potential problems when estimating a growth model. Specific attention 
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is paid to the previously neglected issues in the empirical investigations such as the 
cross-sectional correlation, slowly-changing variables and the endogenous nature of 
the FD. In the presence of evident differences between countries in different 
geographical locations (European vs Southern Caucasus TEs), the other research 
question addressed in this chapter is whether FD could be described as a “normal 
good”, i.e., one which is increasingly employed as countries incomes rises). To answer 
this question, the level of development and the geographical location are included in 
the baseline model, thus introducing a new dimension to empirical research on the 
relationship between FD and economic growth. 
Building on the empirical investigation at national level, Chapter 5 (related to 
Objective 7) disaggregates the investigation to subnational level to further explore and 
better understand the economic effect of FD. More precisely, this chapter examines 
the economic effect of FD from a regional perspective in selected ETEs by addressing 
the question of: “Does the economic effect of FD become more visible at regional 
level?” In addition to the static models, a dynamic system GMM model is also used in 
order to capture the dynamic nature of FD and address some potential problems of 
misspecification associated with estimating a growth model (omitted variables bias, 
endogeneity, slowly-moving or time-constant variables and cross-sectional 
correlation). In order to shed more light on the relationship between FD and regional 
growth, this chapter considers the ‘country size’ as a moderator and lead us to the next 
research question: “Does country size matter?” 
The concluding chapter, Chapter 6 (related to the eighth objective), summarises the 
main findings of this thesis, while highlighting its contributions to knowledge, from 
both theoretical and empirical perspectives. The chapter concludes with presenting 
some policy implications on FD and some suggestions on the limitations of this 
research and how this research programme can be further extended.
  
 
 
Chapter 2 
 
THE EFFECT OF FISCAL DECENTRALISATION ON ECONOMIC 
GROWTH: A REVIEW OF LITERATURE 
 
2.1 Introduction .......................................................................................................... 16 
2.2 Economic growth models incorporating the effect of FD .................................... 17 
2.2.1 Neoclassical growth models .......................................................................... 18 
2.2.2 Endogenous growth models .......................................................................... 25 
2.2.3 Critical appraisal of the FD-growth models .................................................. 31 
2.3 Channels of transmission ..................................................................................... 35 
2.3.1 Direct effects of FD ....................................................................................... 36 
a) Consumer perspective ................................................................................. 36 
b) Producer perspective ................................................................................... 38 
2.3.2 Indirect effects of FD..................................................................................... 47 
2.4. Review of the Empirical Literature ..................................................................... 52 
2.4.1 Empirical Literature at National Level .......................................................... 52 
(i) Development level of a country and FD measures used ................................ 56 
(ii) Theoretical framework followed................................................................... 65 
(iii) Methodology ................................................................................................ 66 
2.4.2 Empirical Literature at Subnational Level .................................................... 68 
(i) Development level of a country and FD measures used ................................ 71 
(ii) Theoretical framework followed................................................................... 77 
(iii) Methodology ................................................................................................ 78 
2.5 Conclusions .......................................................................................................... 78 
 
 
 
 
 
16 
 
2.1 Introduction 
The renewed focus on decentralisation and the growth experience of different 
economies has generated a growing strand of theoretical and empirical literature on 
the FD-growth relationship. Many countries have devoted themselves to 
decentralisation, driven by the Oates’ Decentralisation Theorem where devolution is 
expected to deliver greater efficiency in the provision of public goods and greater 
economic growth (Oates, 1993; 1995). However, the theory lacks clear economic 
arguments to explain the mechanism by which FD contributes to growth and specify 
whether this is a direct or indirect relationship. Arguably, it is still debatable whether 
the theoretical claim that FD contributes to economic growth is due to a better 
matching of public policies to local needs or other factors that are not fully explored 
in the theoretical literature. 
Whilst the FD-growth relationship is not one of the conventionally addressed issues 
in the growth or public finance literature, considerable empirical research has spurred 
on the relationship between FD and growth. Some studies provide evidence supporting 
the contribution of FD to economic growth (Lin and Liu, 2000, Behnisch et al., 2003), 
while others find a negative (Xie et al., 1999, Rodriguez-Pose and Kroijer, 2009) or 
no relationship at all (Thornton, 2007, Cantarero and Gonzales, 2009; Baskaran and 
Feld, 2009). These heterogenous empirical results lay emphasis on the lack of 
consensus in the literature concernin`g the FD-growth relationship, which in turn, 
highlights many open questions regarding the economic effect of FD such as: does the 
change of fiscal structure affect economic growth; are countries with a higher degree 
of FD economically more successful than centrally governed ones; is the economic 
effect of FD subject to the context of investigation, etc.  
To comprehensively review the literature, this chapter locates the present studies 
within the theoretical and empirical canvas of the relationship between FD and 
economic growth. Attention is drawn to the theoretical examination of potential 
transmission channels from FD to economic growth, by investigating and redesigning 
the existing channels and introducing new direct and indirect ones. Alternatively, to 
provide structured answers related to the empirical literature review, the emphasis 
shifts to the distinct levels of investigation, namely, at national and subnational levels. 
It is argued that such distinction might help in better understanding the ambiguity of 
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empirical results. Failing to distinguish between these two levels might hinder 
potential accumulation of the economic effect of FD from subnational up to the most 
aggregate (national) level. It is important to note that this division is not the same as 
reviewing single- and cross-country studies separately, as could be the case that the 
former investigates the FD-growth relationship at both levels or that cross-country 
studies focus on subnational growth. It is precisely this distinction that this dissertation 
wishes to analyse critically different from the other empirical literature review and 
uncover the sources of heterogeneity. The estimation approach, measures of FD, 
covered time horizon, type of study (single- or cross-country study), development 
stages and other study characteristics will be additionally considered to better uncover 
the differences in the empirical literature. 
To sum up, this chapter is organised as follows. Section 2 reviews the most important 
determinants of economic growth identified in the neoclassical and endogenous 
growth literature, while focusing on the FD-economic growth models. A critique of 
these models is also provided in this section. Next, Section 3 identifies and discusses 
the mechanism by which FD contributes to growth by elaborating the potential 
channels of transmission. Section 4 provides a critical review of the empirical 
literature by identifying the shortcomings and limitations related to the investigation 
of the FD-economic growth relationship, with particular focus on transition 
economies. The findings of the chapter are summarised in Section 5.  
2.2 Economic growth models incorporating the effect of FD 
Both theoretical and empirical research have devoted substantial attention to the 
determinants of economic growth. Though, there is little agreement on a universal 
economic growth model and the sources of growth. As Levine and Renelt (1992) 
argue, no model fully specifies the control variables when statistically testing the 
relationship between economic growth and an economic variable of interest. Whilst 
the neoclassical and endogenous growth theories have mainly focused on a narrow 
perspective regarding the determinants of growth (i.e. capital, labour and technology), 
the new theoretical and empirical basis have emphasized the relevance of socio-
economic and institutional characteristics, by considering economic performance as a 
multidimensional process (Pike et al., 2006; Ascani et al., 2012). Amongst other factors, 
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the devolution of power from central to local governments has been highlighted by the 
empirical research as a significant determinant of economic performance, though 
rarely articulated in the public finance theoretical literature. In the context of this 
thesis, it seems appropriate to understand the genesis and the evolution of the 
economic growth models, while rationalising the role of FD as a determinant of growth 
from the neoclassical and endogenous view, as it will be presented in Section 2.2.1 
and 2.2.2, respectively. Therefore, this section will be divided according to these two 
distinct views, while first providing an overview of the neoclassical and endogenous 
growth models and then focusing on FD as a determinant of growth.  
2.2.1 Neoclassical growth models 
a. Neoclassical growth model 
The starting point of the economic growth theories is the neoclassical model of Solow, 
which postulates stable equilibrium with a constant long-run income growth rate 
determined by an increase in factor endowments and technological progress (Mankiw 
et al., 1992).8 Initially, this model focused on a closed economy where output (Y) is 
produced by two factors of production, labour (L) and capital (K). In successive 
advanced models, human capital, government spending and measures of trade 
openness (Barro and Sala-i-Martin, 1995; 2004) are incorporated in the model as 
additional determinants of growth.  
The basic assumptions of Solow model are the constant returns to scale, diminishing 
marginal productivity of capital, a certain degree of substitution between capital and 
labour and an exogenously determined technological progress (Mankiw et al., 1992). 
The latter enters into Cobb-Douglas production function as labour-augmenting (also 
known as the effectiveness of labour (A)), as presented below9: 
Yt = F (Kt, AtLt) = 𝐾௧ఈ (𝐴௧𝐿௧)ଵିఈ 0<α<1   (2.1) 
                                                          
8 Some refer to this model as Solow-Swan model as both Solow (1956) and Swan (1956) analysed the 
consequences of capital accumulation and technological progress on growth. 
9This is also known as Harrod-neutral. If knowledge enters as capital-augmenting, technological 
progress is known as Solow-neutral. If knowledge enters as a multiplier of the production function by 
an increasing scale factor, technological progress is known as Hicks-neutral (Barro and Sala-i-Martin, 
2004). 
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where t denotes time, and α and 1-α denote the output elasticities of capital and labour, 
respectively. By dividing this production function, by the technology-augmented 
labour 1/AtLt, Equation (2.1) is transformed as follows10: 
𝑦௧= (
௄೟
஺೟௅೟
)ఈ= 𝑘௧௔      (2.2) 
where output per unit of effective labour 𝑦௧ is a function of capital per unit of effective 
labour kt. Considering the saving rate (s), the depreciation rate (δ), which determines 
the evolution of K, the rate of technological progress (g) and the growth rate of 
population (n), the balanced growth path of an economy (known as the steady state) 
can be found by condensing Equation (2.2) into a single differential equation in the 
per capita capital stock as presented below: 
?̇?௧= sf(kt) – (n + g + δ) kt     (2.3) 
where ?̇?௧ denotes the change of the capital per unit of effective labour. The steady 
state, which is found at ?̇?௧=0, shows that the current level of capital-effective labour 
ratio, the saving rate and the rate of population growth determine the change in capital-
labour ratio (Barro and Sala-i-Martin, 2004; Romer, 2011).11 The economy would 
converge to a steady state where output and the capital stock grow at the exogenous 
rate of population growth (after solving for k). Once the steady state is reached, the 
growth of per capita output (income) can occur only from technological progress 
which is exogenous and unexplainable by the model. Alternatively, an increase in the 
saving rate (or any other policy change to stimulate income) or population growth do 
not have a permanent effect on growth (Romer, 2011). Overall, the model underlines 
savings or investment ratio as important determinants of the short-run economic 
growth. Alternatively, the engine of long-run growth is deemed to be technological 
change, which is measured as the total factor productivity, and determined outside the 
model. 
The model is also utilised to assert the convergence process across economies to their 
steady states, while distinguishing between the absolute and conditional 
                                                          
10 This production function satisfies the Inada conditions where marginal product of each factor is very 
large when its amount is sufficiently small, and becomes very small when the amount becomes large. 
Further, the limit of the derivative towards zero is positive infinity and the limit of the derivative towards 
positive infinity is zero.  
11 For simplicity, hereinafter capital-labour ratio will denote the capital-effective labour ratio. 
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convergence.12 Namely, it is argued that poor economies will grow faster than rich 
ones in per capita terms if economies have the same steady state, but differ in the initial 
quantity of capital per person. However, if economies have different steady states, 
each economy’s speed of convergence will depend on the determinants of its own 
steady state. Thus, economies will grow faster the further they are from their steady 
state. Higher complexity of the Mankiw et al.’s model is reached by Islam (1995) by 
reformulating the equations, used to estimate convergence, into a dynamic panel data 
model with country effects, which reconfirms the compatibility of neoclassical growth 
in development economics.  
An important contribution to the neoclassical growth models is made by Mankiw et 
al. (1992) by augmenting the existing Solow model with human capital. As argued by 
the authors (p.417), the economy will still converge to a steady state, though the 
income per capita will now depend on population growth and physical and human 
capital accumulation. Further, Mankiw et al. (1995) argue that human capital 
accumulation will also increase the impact of physical capital accumulation on output.  
Another concern in the neoclassical growth model, and partly related to the focus of 
this thesis, is the question whether fiscal policy affects long-run growth. Given that 
economic growth is an effect of an external cause, such as technological progress, the 
impact of government policy in the neoclassical framework is limited only to the 
transitory effect of an economy towards its steady state (temporary effect), but not to 
the long-run growth (Hejidra and Van der Ploeg, 2002). Starting from this, the 
neoclassical theories further augment Mankiw et al.’s (1992) model by introducing 
public consumption or taxing systems (Sheehey, 1993) or more recently by 
introducing public physical capital and transfer payments (Bajo-Rubio, 2000). 
Overall, these theories claim that government contributes to economic growth and the 
economy moves towards the steady state by providing basic public goods. However, 
as government expands its scope, a greater government intervention would distort the 
incentives systems (Bajo-Rubio, 2000), while the likelihood that its activities lower 
economic efficiency grows (Sheehey, 1993).  
                                                          
12 From the empirical approach, the convergence between economies is investigated by regressing 
growth of per capita income on the initial level of per capita income. If the estimated coefficient has a 
negative sign, this indicates that regions/countries with low initial level of income per capita grow faster 
than regions/countries with high initial level of income per capita. 
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b. Neoclassical FD-growth models 
It has become widely accepted in the growth literature that the augmentation of the 
Solow model by fiscal policy in addition to (effective) labour and capital is a 
substantial contribution in a cross-country growth regression (Barro, 1990; Bajo-
Rubio, 2000). However, this traditional approach did not pay attention to the 
assignment of fiscal responsibilities to different levels of government. Eventually, 
both neoclassical and endogenous growth models on the FD-economic growth 
relationship have emerged. Although the neoclassical approach has been the starting 
point of all economic growth models, it has not been such regarding the FD-growth 
models; the endogenous theoretical framework in this literature has started earlier and 
advanced far more than the neoclassical model. In most of the cases, the latter have 
extended the Solow or the Mankiw et al.’s (1992) approach to account for efficiency, 
distinguish between the temporary and permanent effect of FD on economic growth, 
and investigate the (potential) transmission channels. The neoclassical growth models 
are considered as ad hoc, due to the absence of explicit theoretical references for 
including a presumed growth determinant. Different from the endogenous FD-growth 
model, which focuses on the direct economic effect of FD, the neoclassical models 
have emerged as consideration of the indirect/intermediate impact of FD.  
The first group of studies (Eller, 2004; Bodman and Ford, 2006; and Bodman et al., 
2009a), which employ neoclassical growth models, are based on Mankiw et al. (1992) 
and cross-country growth accounting. In the context of FD-growth relationship, the 
Cobb-Douglas production function accounts for different channels of the contribution 
of FD to economic growth, given their explicit motivation, as above mentioned, on the 
intermediate effect of FD on economic performance. The initial specification has the 
following form: 
 𝑦௧ = 𝐴 𝑘௧ఈ ℎ௧
ఉ   (0<α<1; 0<β<1 where β=1-α) (2.4) 
where y denotes the output labour ratio, k is the physical capital-labour ratio, h denotes 
the human capital-labour ratio, and A is the overall efficiency or the total factor 
productivity (TFP). By logging and taking the first-order differentiation with respect 
to time, Equation (2.5) is obtained: 
?̇?t = ?̇?t+ α?̇?t +𝛽ℎ̇t      (2.5) 
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This equation suggests that the growth rate of output labour ratio (output per capita) 
depends on the growth rate of capital-labour ratio and the rate of technological 
progress. Following Lin and Liu (2000), the term ?̇?(t) denotes not just the technology, 
but also the differences in resource endowments and institutions across countries and 
time. It is precisely this term that contains the FD variable along with other variables 
such as household responsibility system, fiscal capacity, the percent of rural 
population, etc. Further, the rate of change of TFP (?̇?(t)) is assumed to be determined 
by either the change or level of FD, as shown in Equations (2.6) and (2.7), 
respectively. 
?̇?t =γ0 + γ1 ∆FDt      (2.6) 
?̇?t= γ0 + γ1 FDt      (2.7) 
Following Eller (2004), the growth effects of FD might be observable either in the 
short-run as a temporary efficiency-led growth effect caused by a change in FD (∆FDt) 
or in the long-run as a permanent efficiency-led growth effect caused by a shift to a 
new level of FD (FDt).13 By substituting these two equations into (2.5), the temporary 
and the permanent decentralisation-induced efficiency-led growth hypothesis will be 
yielded as: 
?̇?t= γA0 + γA1∆FDt+ α ?̇?t + β ℎ̇t     (2.8) 
?̇?t= γA0 + γA1FDt+ α ?̇?t + β ℎ̇t     (2.9) 
 
The first basic analytical framework proposed by Thiessen (2003) is a growth 
accounting regression for country/region i and time t, which resembles that of the 
typical neoclassical growth model. Namely, their growth regression consists of 
regressing economic growth (?̇?t) on a list of country characteristics including the 
measures of FD, the initial level of GDP (GDP0) and a set of control variables 
                                                          
13 Since changes in FD affects also its level, the shifts from one level to the other of FD trigger an 
effect to economic growth (Eller, 2004; 36). 
23 
 
incorporated in X such as human capital, investment, trade openness, different 
measures controlling for institutional quality etc. 
?̇?t it= β0+ β1 FDit+ β2 Xit+ β3 GDPi0+uit,    (2.10) 
Regressing the rate of economic growth on the level of FD, amongst other 
determinants of growth, sheds light on two potential channels through which FD might 
affect economic growth: (i) capital formation and (ii) total factor productivity.  The 
first one regresses capital formation on FD and different macroeconomic 
disturbances.14 Whereas, the second equation regresses total factor productivity on FD 
measures (Thiessen, 2003). The former is known as Solow residual and denotes the 
part of growth that cannot be explained by Equation (2.10). However, a note of caution 
is required when commenting on these two channels. Unfortunately, there is no 
theoretical model provided in this approach to incorporate these two potential 
channels. To investigate these channels, the author suggests estimating separately 
Mankiw et al.’s (1992) growth model augmented by the FD measures, the equation of 
capital formation and the equation of productivity residual (total factor productivity 
growth also known as Solow residual). 
In a separate line of research, the third group of studies augment Mankiw et al.’s model 
by macroeconomic stability and FD variables to explicitly investigate how 
decentralisation may affect economic growth indirectly through its impact on 
macroeconomic stability. More specifically, Martinez-Vazquez and McNab (2003; 
2006) assume a model in which technological progress is disaggregated into 
exogenous technical progress, the direct impact of FD on growth and the indirect 
impact of FD on economic growth.  The augmented growth model, assumed to be a 
Cobb-Douglass production function, is as follows:  
𝑌௜௧ = 𝑉௜௧ 𝐾௜௧ఈ 𝐺௜௧
ఉ 𝐻௜௧
ఝ 𝐿௜௧ఏ   α, β, φ and θ > 0; α + β +φ + θ≥1  (2.11) 
where V is the level of technology and other institutional factors, L is the stock of 
labour, and K, G, and H, similarly as in Mankiw et al.’s model, are the stocks of 
private, public and human capital, respectively. Additionally, the model assumes that 
                                                          
14 Macroeconomic disturbance is measured by fiscal balance as a share of GDP, inflation, uncertainty 
of economic agents with regard to macroeconomic stability and dummy variables to capture the catch-
up effects of countries of countries with relatively low initial income. 
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V is a product of technical progress (A), decentralisation (D) and macroeconomic 
stability (MS): 
 𝑉௜௧ = 𝐴௜௧𝐷௜௧𝑀𝑆௜௧      (2.12) 
The authors (p.28) argue that this disaggregation of exogenous technological progress 
into decentralisation and macroeconomic stability, however, should not be interpreted 
as these variables affect economic growth indirectly through technological progress. 
Rather, they affect the physical inputs separately, which in turn denies the complex 
nature of technological progress as a function of decentralisation. However, it is the 
macroeconomic stability which is a composite function of decentralisation and other 
exogenous variables included in Xit: 
𝑀𝑆௜௧ = 𝑔(𝐷௜௧; 𝑋௜௧ )      (2.13) 
 This model uses the change in the Consumer Price Index (inflation rate). However, 
different measures of macroeconomic stability have been proposed in the literature 
such as the M2 growth, fiscal balance and a combination between inflation and 
unemployment (Fukasaku and De Mello, 1998; Iqbal and Nawaz, 2010). 
Following the neoclassical assumption, the model shows that the steady-state per 
capita output is determined by the accumulation of capital, stock of technology, direct 
and indirect impact of decentralisation on output. 
𝑙𝑛𝑦௜௧∗ = 𝑙𝑛 𝐴௜௧ + 𝑙𝑛 𝐷௜௧ + 𝑙𝑛 𝑀𝑆௜௧ +  
ఈ
ଵିఈିఉିఝ
𝑙𝑛 𝑖௜௧௞ +
ఉ
ଵିఈିఉିఝ
𝑙𝑛 𝑖௜௧
௚ +
ఝ
ଵିఈିఉିఝ
𝑙𝑛 𝑖௜௧௛ +
ఈାఉାఝ
ଵିఈିఉିఝ
ln(𝑛 + 𝑔 + 𝜑)   (2.14) 
where ik, ig and ih denote the fraction of output in private, public and human capital, 
respectively. Once the steady state is achieved, the long-run growth can be increased 
only by enhancing capital productivity and increasing the level of decentralisation. 
Also, it is argued that decentralisation will affect growth directly through its effect on 
growth and indirectly through the macroeconomic stability channel.  
Similar approach as in Martinez-Vazquez and McNab (2003) was also followed by 
Bodman et al. (2009a) in which they assume FD to be a composite function of 
federalism dummy, subnational government units, number of subnational tiers of 
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government and subnational central government employee ratio. Whilst Martinez-
Vazquez and McNab (2003) does not provide any justification of the economic effect 
of FD through macroeconomic stability, Bodman et al. (2009a, p.7) argue that if the 
macroeconomic shocks are not equally distributed across the country, subnational 
governments might be better situated than central government to provide counter-
cycle policies. However, the authors (p.8) also argue that subnational governments’ 
competition for revenue might destabilise national fiscal policy objectives by 
contributing further to the macroeconomic instability (more details on the effect of FD 
on economic growth through macroeconomic stability will be provided in Section 
2.3.2). 
 
2.2.2 Endogenous growth models 
a. Overview of endogenous growth models 
The endogenous growth models developed different from the neoclassical growth 
models, provide an endogenous mechanism for long-run growth either by relaxing the 
assumption of diminishing returns to capital or by explaining technological change 
due to specific actions. By escaping from the diminishing marginal productivity of 
capital assumption, the endogenous growth theory allows capital accumulation, which 
eventually is escalated into an unlimited growth (Barro and Sala-i-Martin 2004).  
There are two waves of endogenous growths model in the literature: (i) the AK model 
(where A represents the total factor of productivity and K represents the capital) and 
(ii) the innovation based theory. Although the latter model is an important wave in the 
endogenous growth model as it links innovation and economic growth through either 
new (not necessarily improved) varieties of products or innovations that render old 
products obsolete through creative destruction (Schumpeter, 1942; Romer, 1990), in 
the context of this thesis, however, importance will be drawn only to the AK model 
and the introduction of fiscal policy in this model. The AK model, proposed by Romer 
(1986), Barro (1990) and Rebelo (1991), in its most rudimentary form, assumes a 
production function with only one production factor: capital. Based on the overview 
of Barro and Sala-i-Martin (2004), the AK model in the absence of diminishing 
marginal returns to capital is: 
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Yt = AKt      (2.15) 
where A is a positive constant that denotes the level of technology (productivity level), 
and K is the capital in which the physical capital, human capital and the stock of 
knowledge are embedded. By following the neoclassical approach to use the per capita 
terms and deriving the growth path, this theory claims that economic growth, in the 
long run, will be equal to the growth rate of capital: 
?̇?t = ?̇?t= sA – (n + δ)      (2.16) 
The AK model in per capita terms predicts positive long-run per capita growth without 
any technological progress (Barro and Sala-i-Martin 2004, p.64). This is because sA 
is greater than (n + δ) due to non-restrictions of diminishing marginal productivity of 
capital, implying a constant increase in k at a steady state rate. Hence, development 
will be enhanced by any policy that increases investment, for instance, an increase in 
saving rate. Such positive long-run per capita growth will occur without any 
technological progress, as argued in the neoclassical approach. Though, the model 
does not imply convergence as by definition if economies start out with different initial 
stocks of capital, then the gap becomes larger across time. Likewise, the model does 
not predict any transitional dynamics because of the constant increase of capital stock. 
An essential contribution to the endogenous growth theories is the Barro’s (1990) 
model, which focuses on the implications of government intervention on economic 
growth. As previously stated in the AK model, anything that changes the baseline 
technology A will also impact the long-run per capita growth rate. In the same vein, it 
is argued that the government’s choice about public goods and services will affect the 
growth rate of an economy. By assuming constant returns in the aggregate production 
function, this model introduces a significant mechanism through which the 
government can affect the output level and its rate of growth. More specifically, it is 
argued that the per capita income depends on the public expenditure of a public good 
g, which is financed by a proportional tax on income and capital τ. The production 
function is presented as follows: 
𝑦௧= A𝑘௧ଵିఈ𝑔௧ఈ       (2.17) 
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In this simple endogenous model, the effect of increased government spending on 
economic growth is considered as non-monotonic depending on the size of the 
government. In a small size government, the productivity effect dominates the 
distortionary effects of taxes, which in turn generates a positive relationship between 
growth and the size of the government. However, as the government becomes larger, 
the distortionary effect of the taxes, raised to finance the expenditures, dominates 
while generating a negative relationship between growth and the size of the 
government.  
To compound this problem further, additional attention in the Barro’s model is given 
to the effects of different types of government spending on growth. Distinction is made 
between productive and non-productive public expenditures (Lee, 1992 and Devarajan 
et al., 1996). Productive spending includes expenditures on infrastructure, legal 
system, education, and training, whereas, non-productive spending comprises 
expenditures on national defence, national parks, and social programs, to mention a 
few. Based on this distinction, Barro’s model shows that the long-run economic 
growth depends, amongst others, on the composition of public spending (Barro, 1992; 
Devajaran et al., 1996). Higher complexity is reached when different types of taxes 
(distortionary and non-distortionary) are included in the model while emphasising the 
vital role of taxes in financing growth enhancement expenditure.15 
 
b. Overview of endogenous FD-growth models 
Inspired by the explicit recognition that the endogenous growth model gave to the 
effect of economic policies on growth, the first endogenous FD-growth model was 
introduced relatively late in 1998 by Davoodi and Zou (1998). Accordingly, a Cobb-
Douglas production function based on the endogenous growth model of Barro (1990) 
is used by incorporating both private capital and public spending. Whilst the 
influential study of Barro (1990) describes a nonlinear relationship between 
government spending and growth (where the former is an input to the production 
function), the model of Davoodi and Zou (1998) departs from Barro (1990) by 
assuming that public spending is carried out by three distinct levels of government, 
more precisely at federal, state and local level. The same logic would apply in case of 
                                                          
15 See Kneller et al. (1999) for a detailed review. 
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a unitary government, where different from the federal government, the public 
spending would be carried out only by the central and local government. However, 
since Davoodi and Zou’s model incorporates three layers of government, we would 
follow their approach and shift to the unitary case when needed. The Cobb-Douglas 
production function is: 
y= F (k, f, s, l) =𝑘ఈ𝑓ఉ𝑠ఊ𝑙ఠ 1>α>0; 1>β>0; 1>γ>0; 1>ω>0  (2.18) 
where y represents the per capita output, k denotes the level of private per capita capital 
stock which can be considered as a measure of both human and physical capital (or 
separated in an empirical work  as argued by Xie et al. (1999, p.230)), f, s and l 
represent the  government spending at the central/federal level, intermediate/state level 
and local level, respectively. The model assumes that the allocation of consolidated or 
total government spending depends on the share of each level of government such as 
 𝜃௙𝑔 = 𝑓; 𝜃௦𝑔 = 𝑠 and 𝜃௟𝑔 = 𝑙, while β, γ and ω denote their respective output 
elasticities. Whilst the output elasticity of capital remains the same as in Equation 
(2.1), the constant returns to scale assumption implies that the sum of the output 
elasticities of all inputs shall equal 1 (α + β + γ + ω = 1). Irrespective of the level at 
which the spending is carried out, the total government spending is assumed to be 
financed by a constant tax rate τ, such that: 
τy= f + s + l       (2.19) 
By assuming a representative agent with CES utility functions and a dynamic budget 
constraint as shown in Equation (2.16) and (2.17), respectively, the choice of 
consumption is determined by maximizing (2.16) subject to (2.17) and the 
government’s budget allocation (Davoodi and Zou, 1998, p. 246). 
U = ∫ ௖
భష഑ିଵ
ଵିఙ
𝑑𝑡ஶ଴       (2.20) 
ௗ௞
ௗ௧
 = (1-τ) y -c = (1-τ) 𝑘ఈ𝑓ఉ𝑠ఊ𝑙ఠ-c    (2.21) 
Where c denotes the per capita private consumption, 𝜌 denotes the time discount rate 
and 𝜎 is the coefficient of relative risk aversion. Consequently, maximization of the 
utility function subject to the budget constraint yields the following long-run growth 
path of the economy: 
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g(i) = ௗ௬/ௗ௧
௬
 = ଵ
ఙ
቞(1 − 𝜏)𝜏
భషഀ
ഀ 𝛼 𝜃௙
ഁ
ഀ 𝜃௦
ം
ഀ 𝜃௟
ഘ
ഀ −  𝜌቟   (2.22) 
Equation (2.18), which forms the theoretical foundation for including FD measures 
into a growth production function, shows that the long-run growth rate of per capita 
output depends on the tax rate and the shares of expenditure by different levels of 
government. In this context, growth-aiming shares of each level of government can be 
found by maximising the growth path of the economy with respect to each level of 
government as shown below:  
𝜃௙∗ =  
ఉ
ఉାఊାఠ
       (2.23) 
𝜃௦∗ =  
ఊ
ఉାఊାఠ
       (2.24) 
𝜃௟∗ =  
ఠ
ఉାఊାఠ
       (2.25) 
By analysing the above solutions, it is argued that for a given share of total government 
expenditure in GDP, a reallocation of public spending through different levels of 
government can lead to higher economic growth if the existing allocation is different 
from growth-maximising expenditure shares . 
Higher complexity is reached in Zhang and Zou’s (1998), Xie et al.’s (1999) and 
Zhang and Zou’s (2001) models, though following the same approach as in Davoodi 
and Zou (1998). Whilst these models are quite similar to each other, this thesis will 
focus only on the Xie et al.’s approach because it may be considered as one of the 
most comprehensive and sophisticated models in the FD-economic growth theoretical 
literature. More precisely, this model departs from the Davoodi and Zou’s model by 
assuming a CES production function, which is not necessarily a Cobb-Douglas 
function, and a different definition for the shares of federal, state and local 
governments as presented in Equations (2.26) and 2.27), respectively.16 
𝑦 = ൣ 𝛼𝑘థ + 𝛽𝑓థ +  𝛾𝑠థ +  𝜔𝑙థ൧
ଵ/థ
   (2.26) 
                                                          
16 Please note that we used another symbol for shares because Xie et al. (1999) used a different 
definition for governments’ shares. 
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𝜑௙ =
௙
௚
 ; 𝜑௦ =
௦
௚
 ; 𝜑௟ =
௟
௚
      (2.27) 
The Cobb-Douglas function in Davoodi and Zou (1998) represents a special case of 
Equation (2.26) where 𝜙 = 0. Also, as argued before, the sum of all these shares shall 
be equal to 1. By solving the growth-maximization problem with respect to the three 
shares of government expenditure, Xie et al. (1999, p.230-232) shows that these shares 
are as below: 
𝜑௙∗ =
ఉభ/(భషഝ)
గ
      (2.28) 
𝜑௦∗ =
ఊభ/(భషഝ)
గ
      (2.29) 
𝜑௦∗ =
ఠభ/(భషഝ)
గ
      (2.30) 
Where Π=β1/(1-ϕ) + γ1/(1-ϕ) + ω1/(1-ϕ), also interpreted by Xie et al. (1999, p.232) as the 
overall productivity of government spending at all levels. Overall, the model suggests 
that the growth-maximising shares of each level of government can be found as a share 
of individual productivity over the overall productivity of government public 
spending. It is important to note that if the production function is assumed to be a 
Cobb-Douglas technology as in Davoodi and Zou’s model, namely substituting 𝜙 =0, 
the growth-maximising shares would be identical to those in Equations (2.23) to 
(2.25). Overall, it is clearly suggested by the model that if the actual spending shares 
do not correspond to the growth-maximising ones, reallocation of resources among 
the three levels (or two levels in case of unitary government) would be growth 
enhancing (Xie et al., 1999, p.232). 
Another important contribution in the FD-growth models is an extension of Zhang and 
Zou (2001) which investigates the growth impact of the allocation of public 
expenditures among multiple sectors (such as health, education, transportation etc.) 
with multiple levels of government. The theoretical analysis (p.60-64) shows that the 
growth rate in a decentralised country is determined by the allocation of public 
spending among different levels of government and sectors, the tax rate used to finance 
the public spending, and all the other exogenous variables commonly used in an 
endogenous growth model. Whilst the conclusions seem to be similar to those of Xie 
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et al. (1999), where the growth-maximising allocation shares for public expenditure 
are determined by the individual and total productivity of government spending, the 
implication with regard to FD-growth relationship appears slightly different. More 
specifically, Zhang and Zou (2001) contradict the existing claims of a positive 
relationship between FD and growth. Instead, they point towards an optimal degree of 
FD, above which there is no growth-enhancement effect of further reallocation of the 
budget at subnational level. However, any level of FD below the optimal share would 
be growth-increasing and, at the same time, welfare-increasing. 
Further, Akai et al. (2007), based on Nishimura (2001), extended the above model by 
introducing differences in the quality of public goods and the structure of 
complementarity in global and local levels. Different from the other literature, 
complementarity denotes the inter- and intra-jurisdictional spillovers of the public 
goods on the national economy (p.343).  Despite their additions, the theoretical 
implication of their model appears to be similar to those above, by emphasising the 
role of the fiscal decentralisation on economic growth, while focusing on intra-
regional (local) and inter-regional (global) complementarity. The authors also provide 
explanations on the hump-shaped of the FD-growth relationship showing that this 
relationship depends on the complementarity structures in the economy. 
 
2.2.3 Critical appraisal of the FD-growth models 
Despite the theoretical contribution of the aforementioned FD-growth models, there is 
hitherto no clear, automatic and unique theoretical framework which would justify the 
inclusion of FD in a growth model and thus, guide empirical research. Incorporation 
of FD into a growth model (neoclassical or endogenous approach) often appears to be 
arbitrary and lacks explicit theoretical rationale based on an underlying relationship 
between FD and economic growth. This is because of a critical overlap between the 
orthodox fiscal federalism theory focusing on efficiency and distributive 
consequences of FD and the empirical framework of FD-growth models being unable 
to measure efficiency in a growth model. The problem is mostly attributed to the 
difficulty in quantifying efficiency in the allocation of fiscal resources (Rodriguez-
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Pose et al., 2007; Arze del Granado et al., 2012), which is barely testable in the 
empirical framework (Feld et al., 2004).  
Whilst the efficiency-FD relationship has gone untested, the focus of the empirical 
research has switched to the investigation of the FD-growth relationship. Economic 
growth is seen as an objective of decentralisation and public-sector efficiency (Breuss 
and Eller, 2004), where higher efficiency is likely to lead to higher economic growth. 
The literature argues that economic growth is used as an indirect measure of efficiency 
(Rodriguez-Pose et al., 2007; Eller, 2004; Feld et al., 2004; Feld et al., 2009a; 2009b). 
Hence, the exclusion of efficiency is justified through the inclusion of FD measures 
capturing the efficiency arising from decentralisation.  Nevertheless, there is still 
vagueness on the mechanism between FD, efficiency and economic growth.  
Despite the attempt of Eller (2004) and Bodman and Ford (2006) to implicitly 
introduce efficiency into a growth model via the decentralisation-induced efficiency-
led economic growth effect of FD, there is still no clear conclusion on whether FD 
enhances consumption, production or both consumption and production efficiency. 
Unfortunately, both neoclassical and endogenous FD-growth models have so far been 
unable to distinguish between these two types of efficiency. Recalling the last section 
where the models assume that all levels of government produce the same amount 
and/or quality of public goods for a representative consumer, it is impossible to 
account for the growth effect influenced by higher/lower consumption efficiency17 and 
higher/lower production efficiency18 (Thiessen, 2003). In most cases, FD is measured 
as the share of subnational spending and/or revenue in total national spending/revenue, 
which does not measure efficiency in the public sector.  
Another critique addressed to both growth models is the lack of the Tiebout 
mechanism (a demand revealing the mechanism for local public goods), where greater 
efficiency in public service provision is likely to be achieved through the increased 
mobility and sorting of the population in locations under decentralized governments 
(Tiebout 1956). Further, none of the models takes into account individuals with 
different preferences and different levels of government producing different quality 
                                                          
17 By assuming several agents with different preferences for public goods 
18 By assuming different levels of government producing different amount and/or quality of public 
goods subject to a given amount of public expenditure 
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and amount of public goods and services (Thiessen 2003; Bodman and Ford 2006). 
This process of matching local public goods provision to preferences is empirically 
neglected because the assumptions of Tiebout mechanism do not necessarily hold and 
thus local expenditure and revenue patterns due to “vote with their feet” process cannot 
be observable and incorporated in the growth model. Nevertheless, in both cases 
(whether these assumptions hold or not) this process affects the efficiency of local 
public goods, which is not explicitly incorporated into the FD-growth models. Another 
weakness of both models is the failure to account for economies of scale and 
externalities (Stegarescu, 2004), which might weaken the validity of FD-growth 
effect.  
An important concern in both models might be the assumption of tax revenues via flat 
tax rate, which surprisingly has gone indisputable.19 Revenue decentralisation might 
be as relevant as the expenditure side, which requires attention from the theoretical 
perspective. Arguably, this might be linked to the well-known weakness of both FD-
growth models from the empirical perspective: the inability to agree on the appropriate 
FD measures, leading to diverse designs for decentralisation-economic growth 
relationship. These critics are merely addressed to the earlier empirical investigations 
(i.e. Davoodi and Zou, 1998), which included limited FD measures. Alternately, the 
neoclassical FD-growth models are criticised to a lesser extent as they were 
moderately able to address this drawback. The use of only one measure of FD, 
expenditure decentralisation20, is criticised by arguing on the inability of this measure 
to capture the “true” level of decentralisation considering the multidimensionality of 
this process, especially when investigating cross-country studies. Thus, it is required 
to consider additional measures such as revenue decentralisation, tax autonomy and 
transfer decentralisation (Triesman, 2002; Feld et al., 2004) as important dimensions 
of FD. The expenditure decentralisation is not likely to reflect accurately the 
subnational government’s autonomy in expenditure decision making. The decisions at 
local level may be constrained by the central government especially in developing and 
transition economies where local governments are mostly acting as administrative 
                                                          
19 See Equation 2.19. 
20 Although Iimi (2005), Enkilopov and Zhuraskaya (2007) incorporate a measure of political freedom, 
still this measure does not represent a measure of fiscal decentralisation but a measure of political 
decentralisation. When referring to fiscal decentralisation, one should take into account possible 
measures of revenue decentralisation, revenue autonomy, transfer decentralisation, vertical imbalance 
etc. 
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agents of national government. Moreover, the use of solely expenditure 
decentralisation ignores the potential effects of revenue decentralisation and the 
importance of intergovernmental income transfer by central government to 
subnational governments. Expenditure decentralisation without corresponding 
revenue decentralisation and an indication of the “common pool” resources such as 
grants and revenue-sharing will tend to bias the true level of decentralisation (Rodden, 
2003). Intergovernmental transfers should be additionally considered as a relevant 
measure of FD as it incorporates the difference between revenue-raising power and 
spending responsibilities. Overall, expenditure, revenue, and transfer are various 
dimensions of decentralisation, as such, no single indicator can capture and precisely 
estimate the real level of FD (Stegarescu, 2005; Sacchi and Salotti, 2011). 
A note of caution is required when comparing growth models considering one or all 
dimensions of FD. Whilst in the former there might be some argument on the nonlinear 
economic effect of FD as in the endogenous FD-growth models, there is vagueness in 
the literature when referring to multiple measures of FD. In fact, the optimal size 
would be challenging and perhaps impossible for expenditure, revenue and 
intergovernmental transfers simultaneously. As Martinez-Vazquez and McNab (2003, 
p.1601) argue instead of single optimum, the relationship between FD and economic 
growth might offer multiple optimal sizes, which in turn dims the nonlinearity 
arguments. Either way, the FD-growth models provide little discussion on the 
appropriate measure and specification. 
Although the latest studies (Gemmell et al., 2013) have addressed a major part of the 
abovementioned drawbacks of FD-growth models, what requires attention is the 
general specification proposed by FD-growth models. First, there are no substantial 
differences between the endogenous and exogenous FD-growth model, while pointing 
towards ad hoc growth regressions with no strong theoretical foundations. This is 
because both approaches face almost the same abovementioned problems. Second, 
there is still work lagging behind regarding the channels of transmission from FD to 
economic growth, which weakens the proposed framework and the validity of 
empirical results. There are some attempts from the exogenous approach to indirectly 
investigate the channels of transmission (i.e. macroeconomic channel, a total factor of 
productivity), although these are considered insufficient in detangling the economic 
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effect of FD. First, the lack of theoretical justification regarding the impact of FD on 
economic growth via macroeconomic stability might inflate the real effect of FD. 
Second, the inclusion of decentralisation (D) and public-sector expenditure (G) in the 
same model (see Equations 2.12 and 2.13) appear to be optimistic regarding the 
duplication of functions of local governments in these two variables. 
Summing up, undertaking research in identifying the potential channels of 
transmission of FD-growth effect is challenging, while there are theoretical and as well 
empirical gaps waiting to be filled. Though, it is necessary to detangle the relationship 
between FD and economic growth from different perspectives by shedding light on 
different channels of transmission. 
2.3 Channels of transmission 
The review of FD-growth models showed the lack of a universal theoretical 
framework in linking the well-known Oates’ Decentralisation Theorem on increased 
efficiency (in consumption and production), greater competition between local 
governments and mobility of consumer with enhanced economic growth. Both 
exogenous and endogenous models vaguely justified the inclusion of FD measure(s) 
into a growth production function, while basing their rationale mostly on empirical 
purposes (Thiessen, 2003; 2005). Hitherto, no clear and comprehensible economic 
arguments are provided on the mechanism and transmission channels of FD to 
economic growth, and the expected economic effect under different settings (i.e. 
different structure of governance, level of investigation, possible externalities etc.). 
Despite strenuous efforts by the existing literature on these issues, there is still 
uncertainty on the generally-accepted channels, which demands further investigations 
on (new) avenues through which decentralisation in general and FD in particular 
impact economic performance. Reformulation of existing channels and introduction 
of new ones, followed by a novel classification, are presented in this section by 
considering the FD-growth relationship as a complex and manifold relationship. 
Accordingly, the channels of transmission are divided into two main categories: (i) 
direct effect of FD on economic growth and (ii) indirect effect of FD on economic 
growth.  
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Direct effects in the context of FD-growth relationship are considered changes in 
which the economic performance is altered due changes induced by local governments 
on public policies or behaviour of economic agents (i.e. efficiency of provision of 
public goods, the pro-business agenda and the composition of public expenditures). 
Indirect effects are considered changes induced by socio-economic factors (i.e. 
macroeconomic stability, the degree of institutional development, size of the public 
sector, political innovation, and corruption) that are likely to be affected by FD, which 
in turn, might influence economic performance.  
  
2.3.1 Direct effects of FD 
As argued in the previous section, the central argument used to justify the contribution 
of FD to economic growth is the increased overall efficiency induced by 
decentralisation. Oates (1993) argues that, intuitively, the static preposition that FD 
increases consumption and production efficiency should have a parallel in a dynamic 
setting of economic growth. Based on this theorem, where the relationship between 
FD and economic growth is twofold, our proposed channels of transmission are 
classified subject to the consumption and producer perspective. Within the second 
category, channels of transmission are further classified into (i) existing channels of 
transmissions and (ii) new proposed channels of transmission. As to the first category, 
this thesis relies on the existing channels of transmission with no new channels of 
transmission introduced. 
a) Consumer perspective 
Starting from the consumer perspective, it is argued that the potential economic 
efficiency benefits from higher devolution of power towards subnational level stem 
from the informational advantage of subnational governments, as argued in the Oates’ 
Decentralisation Theorem (Jin et al., 2005; Oates, 1999). Because of this advantage, 
local governments are likely to be more pro-consumer welfare than central 
government, by offering goods and services that best suit their preferences, contrary 
to the homogenous goods and services provided nationally. Such tailoring of outputs 
to local needs is assumed to increase the consumption efficiency and net welfare, 
which might be additionally boosted in the presence of greater individuals’ mobility 
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(Tiebout, 1956; Klugman, 1994). The expenditure and revenue side of FD would be 
altered accordingly and, eventually, induce greater welfare at individual level and 
greater welfare/growth at aggregate level. This increase in the welfare and economic 
growth, by adapting local government policies to fulfill the citizens’ demand, is termed 
by the existing literature (Martinez-Vazquez and McNab, 2003; Feld et al., 2009b) as 
the consumer heterogeneity channel. 
Whilst the above arguments are considered insufficient to explain the ultimate effect 
of FD on economic growth, several new arguments, trying to detangle this relationship 
from different perspectives, are at play. Martinez-Vazquez and McNab (2003, p.1604) 
argue that better tailoring of preferences might produce secondary effects on work 
effort and savings, eventually expected to impact growth. More specifically, if for 
instance spending at local government is efficiently spent on goods and services 
affecting the education and health of the individuals (or any other goods and services 
which could be embodied by the consumer), the effect is likely to be visible through 
the labour force and eventually impact growth. Intuitively, the better educated and 
healthier labour force (who are also consumers of public goods), in the presence of 
additional goods and services that facilitates its commute, will experience an increase 
in productivity. Eventually, this would result in greater economic growth in the future. 
Also, the authors (p.1604) mention other secondary effect induced by increased 
efficiency from devolution such as increased savings and investment.  Summing up, 
the existing literature stresses that allowing for consideration of heterogeneous 
demand for public goods, FD is likely to affect economic growth through the 
consumer heterogeneity channel, very likely embodied by consumers.  
However, it would be utopian to a priori accept this channel as an explicit transmission 
mechanism. First, it seems difficult to quantify the efficiency either through the better 
matching of consumers’ preferences or embedded goods and services. We argue that 
is exactly this reason, the inability to quantify efficiency, which interrupts the 
dynamics of the Oates’ Decentralisation Theorem from consumption efficiency to 
economic growth. From a microeconomic perspective, it is relatively easier to test 
these embodiments from local goods and services through a utility function estimation. 
Though, it seems difficult to justify this channel from a macroeconomic perspective, 
by incorporating it into a growth model. Further, in the presence of the hypothetical 
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secondary effect, it seems that the economic effect of FD should not be investigated 
only directly through the consumer heterogeneity channel, but also indirectly through 
the quantity and quality of inputs (i.e. education). Second, the efficiency criteria do 
not inevitably arise in a decentralised system. Prud’homme (1995) and Frenkel (1986) 
contradict the efficiency criteria claiming that it might be inappropriate and 
insufficient to explain the effect of FD on growth as this criteria works only in the 
presence of externalities and spillovers effects due to the provision of public goods 
(Bardhan, 2002). Lack of clearly defined responsibility and weak accountability may 
challenge efficiency and make local policies less effective. Taking into account this 
trade-off, decentralisation will work only if devolution of power and responsibility is 
associated with higher efficiency.  
b) Producer perspective 
Alternatively, from the production perspective, the channels of transmission appear to 
be less intuitive. However, the existing channels are still insufficient and, in many 
ways, incapable to fully explain the mechanism by which FD affects growth. In the 
light of this discussion, this thesis explains the existing channels of transmission and 
introduces new arguments, which gives rise to new potential channels of transmission. 
Before presenting all these channels, a graphical presentation of the existing and new 
direct channels of transmission is presented in Figure 2.1. 
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 Figure 2.1  Graphical presentation of the existing and new channels of 
transmission from    the producer perspective.  
 
(i) Existing Channels of Transmission 
The FD-growth theories rely on the ‘productivity enhancement hypothesis’, which 
stresses that FD, through raising production efficiency, is growth enhancing. 
Production efficiency, defined in terms of cost, quantity, and quality of local 
governments, is hypothesised to be affected by competition, labeled under the market-
preserving channel (Jin et al., 2000; Martinez-Vazquez and McNab, 2003; Thiessen, 
2003).   
In the presence of limited tax base and funds available, local governments are likely 
to compete to better tailor the preferences to public goods provision (Brennan and 
Buchanan, 1980; Thiessen, 2003), which becomes indispensable with the increasing 
sensitivity and vulnerability of local governments to factor and residential mobility 
(Sato, 2001). When taxpayers (citizens and business) “vote with their feet”, local 
governments are faced with additional urges to provide more and better efficient 
policies (Tiebout, 1956; Martinez-Vazquez and McNab, 2003; Rodriguez-Pose and 
Ezcurra, 2009). Local participation is further promoted by decentralisation, which also 
helps in building the social capital and “bring the state closer to the people” (Larson, 
2002).  Also, it might be argued that a better-informed subnational government 
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regarding local needs is also likely to face lower planning and decision-making costs 
than central government (Lutz and Linder, 2004), which in turn would contribute to 
the overall performance of the provision of local goods and services. This 
manifestation of subnational governments to competition, is viewed as a way of 
reducing the monopolistic power of central government and its market-obstructing 
impulse (Rodden and Rose-Ackerman, 1997; Rodden and Wibbels, 2002). In turn, this 
type of vertical competition might favour the economic efficiency at lower level of 
governance. Overall, better reallocation of resources, lower decision-making costs, 
better information on local needs would contribute to an efficient provision of public 
goods and services, in terms of greater quantity, quality or lower cost of output with a 
given budget constraint (Feld et al., 2004), which are likely to determine the 
development path of regions and entire economy. 
Another argument regarding competition between local governments concerns the 
capacity for innovation. A subnational government, triggered by competition, can 
serve as a “laboratory” (Oates, 1999) in which new policy solutions (i.e. reallocation 
of specific funds, provision of certain public goods, change of tax rate) promoting 
innovations and cost-effectiveness are tested without the threat to harm the whole 
country. In this context, these incumbent local governments are better equipped in 
designing regional economic policies to the necessities of regional jurisdictional 
(Martinez-Vazquez and McNab, 2003; 2006) and contributes to a more appropriate 
business environment, while providing opportunities for enhanced economic 
efficiency.  The existing literature on the channels of transmission accentuates 
precisely the competition between subnational governments (horizontal competition) 
as the underpinning force behind the relationship between FD and economic growth, 
while labelling it under the market-preserving federalism concept (Qian and Weingast, 
1997; Weingast, 2006). 
Similar to the consumer heterogeneity channel, the existing literature appears to be 
indefinite and unclear in uncovering the full transmission process from devolution to 
economic growth, with many steps being optimistically presumed. Further, the tribute 
only to the positive side of tax competition, without acknowledging the potential 
drawbacks or insufficiencies, might be considered prejudiced and inappropriate 
regarding the economic effect of FD through market-preservation channel. To provide 
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a more comprehensive view than the existing literature, this thesis questions the 
existing arguments on the market-preserving channel, while complementing it with 
new arguments. For this reason, it is important to distance our discussions from the 
traditional market-preservation federalism. This becomes of special relevance in the 
presence of local governments that are moving fast from its traditional role of 
providing goods and services to new functions of enabling and facilitating the business 
community to produce and lead the local economic development.  (Preteceille, 1990; 
Goldsmith, 1992; Zhu, 1999).  
With regards to the market-preserving channel, there are several incomplete and 
biased arguments pro-efficiency that need to be questioned. As argued above, local 
governments have strong incentives to compete, which rises naturally from the need 
to attract the scarce mobile factors (Yao and Zhang, 2008). However, it might be 
argued that forcing local governments to compete is not necessarily associated with 
the desired outcomes. This competition can lead to a “race to the bottom”, while 
forcing local governments to reduce tax rates to avoid further erosion of tax base 
(Wilson, 1999). Further, tax competition can as well lead to a “race to the top” when 
certain local governments are unable to enter the competition because of tight budget 
constraint. In the light of this discussion, local governments might be exposed to 
predatory tax practices (Yao and Zhang, 2008), which questions the reliability of the 
market-preserving channel.  
On the negative side of the innovative local government, it is argued that this approach 
does not always result in successful outcomes.  Arguing that the policy-related 
knowledge generated by decentralization experiments is available at no cost to any 
free rider, an expected tendency for local governments is to wait and watch, rather 
than actively experiment. Whilst this tendency might be justified by the extinction of 
the first mover advantage, there are still some arguments on the reluctance of local 
governments to engage in risky political experiments (Schnellenbach, 2007). 
Overall, it may be argued that the market-preserving channel approach is not wrong, 
but, in many ways, it has been invaluable in fully detangling the FD-economic growth 
relationship from different perspectives. In the light of this discussion, this thesis 
introduces new arguments, which later gives rise to new potential channels, which will 
be elaborated in the next section.  
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(ii) New Channels of Transmission 
The first contribution of this thesis regarding the channels of transmission relates to 
the pro-business environment argument, while considering local government as a 
“helping hand” to the economy. Before jumping to the argument, it might be helpful 
to provide a discussion regarding the superiority of local government in tailoring 
business development policies in comparison to the central government. 
The complex and dynamic process of globalisation, characterised by increasing 
competitive pressure of international markets, exposes economic development to local 
challenges which are considered to be, mostly, location-specific. This characteristic of 
regional development might also explain the difference of regions in triggering 
economic development, which becomes of special relevance in developing and 
transition countries, where only certain locations are leading growth, while other 
stagnate in perpetuity (Ascani et al., 2012; Parkinson et al., 2014). Whilst the 
traditional regional growth literature highlights geographical proximity between actors 
as favouring development at local level, the new stream of literature explain 
development as the occurrence of intangible and complex “untraded 
interdependencies” between economic agents (Rodriguez-Pose and Crescenzi, 2008; 
Ascani et al., 2012), such as social, political and institutional settings. 
Namely, the region-specific characteristics are the ones that determine the suitability 
of a certain economic policy to the region. In this framework, local government 
represents the capacity of heterogeneous regions to embrace a flexible-to-demand-
changes system (Amin, 1999; Ascani et al., 2012), which becomes pronounced with 
the increasing globalisation process. By being aware of endowment of natural 
resources, economic, social, political and institutional characteristics, (both formal and 
informal), local governments may encourage context-specific advantages of local 
agents by facilitating economic activities. Given that these characteristics are location-
specific, it becomes difficult to replicate the advantages and the local economic 
development in a different setting (Ascani et al., 2012, p.8).  
In this context, the bottom-up policies of central government (uniform for all regions) 
appear to be less suitable than the context-specific arrangements of problem-solving 
designed at local level. This becomes of special relevance for rich-resource regions 
which is very difficult to be covered by the bottom-up policy (Larson, 2002). 
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Alternatively, acknowledging the regional perspective of economic development, 
local features (socio-economic characteristics) appear important in shaping 
development trajectories, which highlights the importance of bottom-up policies 
instead of top-down (Crescenzi and Rodriguez-Pose, 2011). Given the density and 
peculiarity of interactions between economic agents at local level, it becomes apparent 
that “one size fits all” policies do not accurately address the local problems. Contrary, 
highlighting the local strength and alleviating the weakness is the only way to root 
economic activity in territories in a sustainable manner (Pike et al., 2006).  
A simple model by Zhuravskaya (2000) relates the strength of government fiscal 
incentives with the support for business growth and the efficiency of public goods and 
services provision. More specifically, the authors (p.351) argue that pro-business local 
policies and strategies can stimulate the entrepreneurial activity. In the presence of 
sufficient level of FD such as to alter the tax rate and tax base, fiscal incentives would 
be highly correlated with the speed of private business formation, which also would 
impact the efficiency of public spending. Similar arguments are also elaborated by Jin 
et al. (2005) for China, while emphasizing the focal contribution of local governments’ 
fiscal incentives in the development of non-state enterprises. It is exactly this scenario 
that might shed light on a new argument and potential channel of transmission, where 
local governments might be considered a facilitator of business objectives.  
At first sight, this might be considered a win-win situation. First, local governments 
through attracting new business in their area are directly increasing their tax base and 
consequently offering more goods and services that best suit the local preferences, 
while also, increasing their chances to be re-elected. On the other hand, local 
government policies, especially the business agenda, are considered vital regarding 
the businesses’ competitiveness and siting decision (locate or dislocate) or profitability 
(Fox and Murray, 1990). Infrastructure, education policy, property taxes, local 
business subsidies/taxes are some of the potential factors influencing the decisions of 
firms. Any variation in local policies and strategies will alter the perception of the 
firms’ profitability at a given location (Fox and Murray, 1990, p.426). Consequently, 
if this variation in local policies improves businesses’ competitiveness and increases 
local jobs, then eventually it might be argued on increased national economic 
efficiency and total output. Under greater FD, local governments might create a 
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friendly investment local environment, develop tax incentive policies, provide 
education and training programs that can attract and/ or help prepare a competitive 
workforce (which will affect firm performance) and/ or offer loans or credits to 
entrepreneurs (Jin et al., 2004; Feiock et al., 2008; Kwon et al., 2009). In light of this 
discussion, a new potential channel of transmission regarding the economic effect of 
FD might be introduced, the pro-business agenda channel. Interestingly, there is 
substantial research on jobs creation, productivity, and local government policies (see 
Bartik, 1991; 1994; Rauch and Schleicher, 2015), though no efforts have been made 
hitherto to formalise the pro-business agenda as a channel of FD to economic growth.  
However, a note of caution is required when simultaneously analysing the pro-
business agenda and the competition channels. Arguably, the competition between 
local governments may lead to an efficient local government but not necessarily 
consistent with a pro-business environment. Alternatively, it could be the case when 
local governments create a pro-business environment through different tax incentives 
as a result of a “race to the bottom”, but local governments are not efficient.21 Studies 
on tax competition highlight that FD might harm the economy by distorting the 
taxation system (Tanzi, 2000; Brueckner, 2004).  Local governments enter the 
competition with the expectation that there will be a boost in investments and local 
employment through job creation. Nevertheless, this competition may result in 
misallocation of resources, which in turn, might affect both public and private sectors, 
while signalling potential market failures. 
Taking the above caveats into account, a new potential channel can be introduced in 
the literature, which unfortunately has not been formally channelised into the FD-
growth relationship, though its effect has been recognized in different areas. So far, 
competition between local governments concerns only tax policy (change of tax rate 
and tax base), without considering the competition on the spending side and mostly 
the composition of the spending. In this context, we would like to aggregate both tax 
and spending side of FD into a possible channel named fiscal response. It is important 
to note that although this channel might coincide with and (maybe) duplicate the pro-
business agenda channel, conceptually they are not the same. Whilst the pro-business 
                                                          
21For instance, local governments through tax incentives might create a large asymmetry between 
local revenue and local expenditure, which creates higher budget deficits. 
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agenda channel targets only businesses, the fiscal response targets both business and 
consumers, while altering the local expenditure and taxes to maximise growth.  
Local governments may alter the combination of goods and services offered to each 
jurisdiction, contrary to a uniform package like the central government is forced to do. 
For instance, education might not be considered a priority of central government, or it 
is ensured at a minimum provision in all jurisdictions, local government might 
reallocate more funds on education. Additionally, higher revenue decentralisation 
would increase the percentage of revenues retained by local governments, which in 
turn will increase the marginal benefit of productive spending and thus, the efficiency 
in public spending will increase (Kappeler et al., 2012). Attention in the literature has 
been drawn to the infrastructure investment, while arguing that fiscal competition 
(induced by decentralisation) alters the composition of public investment towards 
more productive and notably infrastructure project (Estache and Sinha, 1995; 
Kappeler and Välilä, 2008). 
However, the reallocation of funds from local governments might lead to a wasteful 
duplication of expenditure functions among different levels of government in the 
presence of poor governance, which is likely to affect the overall efficiency, thereby 
the quality of public services. Thus, by altering the composition of spending, local 
governments (either by shifting from non-productive spending to productive ones or 
vice versa, or changing the reallocation of funds) affects the overall efficiency of local 
public spending.   
Further, the literature argues that decentralisation is likely to have a positive effect on 
growth if there is a shift of resources from current to capital expenditure (Rodriguez-
Pose et al., 2009). Orthodox wisdom suggests that capital expenditures will have a 
positive effect on growth, whereas, current expenditure will have no effect at all or a 
negative one (Barro, 1990; Kneller et al., 1999). However, the shift to different types 
of expenditures through FD does not necessarily lead to economic growth.  
Following the same logic, but on the revenue side, the FD-growth relationship per se 
does not provide guidance on whether the higher revenue decentralisation is growth 
enhancing, as presumed for the expenditure side. However, other disciplines, such as 
local taxation, provide meaningful insights into potential effects of local taxation, 
which could be linked to regional/national growth (Helms, 1985; Mofidi and Stone, 
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1990; Buss, 2001). In this regard, Helms (1985) and Mofidi and Stone (1990) argue 
that local taxes might reduce growth if revenues were to be devoted to transfer-
payment programs. Contrary, if taxes are used to finance public services, valued by 
local agents, the negative impact of taxation might be outweighed by the value of 
services provided, while resulting in a positive overall contribution to growth (Helms, 
1985, p.581). An advanced theoretical model by Hatfield (2015) shows that 
subnational governments tend to choose tax policies that maximise the private rate of 
return and growth, different from a centralized government which tends to maximise 
its own objective that does not coincide with growth maximisation level (p.123). 
Overall, when referring to all these channels simultaneously, there are two concerns 
that need to be clarified. These relate to the potential extinction of growth and 
economic efficiency at the aggregate level. With regards to the first one, Bartik (1991, 
p.13) argues that local economic development policies are not necessarily transferred 
among local government units or regions. In this regard, it is important to note that, 
especially in decentralisation, “one size does not fit all”, which means that a specific 
local government policy in one area does not necessarily have to be embraced by 
others. Consequently, the growth of a particular region might not have the same 
development trajectory as another region.  
Whilst the transferability of growth from one region to the other does not seem to be 
perplexing from the decentralisation perspective, what appears unclear is the 
presumed local and national economic efficiency. In this context, it is surprising (to 
some extent) that the efficiency criteria is positively prejudiced in the FD-growth 
literature. Despite the arguments provided in the beginning of this section, it is 
important to acknowledge that devolution might be also associated with lower 
efficiency because of the disadvantages from the economies of scale and scope of local 
governments when compared to the central government. Indeed, a central government 
is larger than subnational units. However, Ezcurra and Pascual (2008) argue that even 
under diseconomies of scale for local government (economies of scale for central 
government), additional benefits could be generated. Local delivery shortens supply 
chains and reduces some costs and risk associated with the loss of redistributive power 
by central government. 
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Confronting these two views on the advantages regarding the economies of scale and 
scope, Prud’homme (1995) suggests that increased efficiency from devolution occurs 
only in cases where local governments have a sufficient level of demography, 
geographical size and economic level. Otherwise, the benefits of devolution might not 
necessarily result in a positive outcome regarding economic efficiency and growth. In 
the light of this discussion, we favour the views of Ascani et al. (2012, p.15) who 
argue that the relationship between devolution and regional economic development 
depends on the initial level of efficiency in a country, structural characteristics of 
regions and countries, and modalities of FD process.  
 
2.3.2 Indirect effects of FD 
In general, our knowledge of understanding the economic effect of FD is limited only 
to the direct channels of transmission, with little acknowledgment of the indirect ones. 
Whilst the FD-growth literature has mainly emphasised the direct channels of 
transmission, potential indirect channels of transmission, such as macroeconomic 
stability, size of government and corruption, have been somehow neglected. 
Understanding and exploring the indirect effect of FD from multiple perspectives and 
dimensions might better shed light on the hypothesised economic gains of FD.  
(i) Existing Channels of Transmission 
Despite the lack of a clear triangular relationship between FD, macroeconomic 
stability, and economic performance, there is wide consensus that inadequately 
designed decentralisation policies might endanger macroeconomic stability 
(Prud’homme, 1995; Ter-Minassian, 1997), and in turn, retard growth. However, 
several contradicting arguments are at play before escalating to the economic growth 
effect.  
In the presence of soft-budget constraint and unclear vertical structure, local 
governments tend to overspend and overborrow without eventually facing the full cost 
of their increased expenditure (Rodden et al., 2003). The overspending effect and the 
increased tendency of financing expenditure with transfers from central government 
rather than local revenue (flypaper effect) may create a fiscal illusion problem. More 
specifically, increased local expenditure by oversupplying local goods or services, it 
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creates the perception that local expenditures are funded by non-residents. This creates 
misjudgment regarding the true benefits and costs of the local provision. Whilst this 
tendency is often driven by the politicians’ maximization chances of election, the fiscal 
illusion might negatively affect the efficiency of public spending (Vo, 2010). If not 
controlled, it might also cause unstable borrowing and undermine the credibility of 
central government not to bail out the high dependent regions (Rodden and Wibbels, 
2002, p.506). Following the same logic, the intergovernmental transfers might reward 
fiscal deficit (Shah, 1994), in cases where local governments are allowed to 
overborrow from local banks with little national oversight (Wibbels, 2000), as 
evidenced in many countries.22  
Alternatively, by allowing local governments to mobilise their revenue, local 
governments are likely to put less pressure on central government budgeting and lower 
the chances for larger national deficits, increased money supply and inflation 
(Martinez-Vazquez and McNab, 2006, p.43). In the same vein, Marlow (1988) states 
that in the absence of decentralisation, the central government might heavily rely on 
inflationary finance due to the exclusivity of printing money. 
A note of caution is required when considering FD and macroeconomic stability in 
times of crises or economic downturn. In times of crises, local governments’ fiscal 
policy might be different, even contradictory, with the one at central government 
(Prud’homee, 1995; Thiessen, 2003). This becomes problematic when local 
governments might be asked to reduce the expenditures and alter the tax base to mute 
economic shocks in synchrony with the central government. Local governments’ 
officials might be unwilling to respond accordingly to negative shocks (Rodden and 
Wibbels, 2002) and thus undermine policies at national level. In contrast, Sewell 
(1996) contradicts on the argument on the anticyclical nature of local government 
policies by claiming that local governments, mainly large ones, can play an essential 
role in the stabilisation policy as a response to business cycles. Due to diverse business 
cycles, the respond of local governments is likely to be more efficient than central 
government as for the latter it may be costly to differentiate the budget subject to 
diverse business cycles.   
                                                          
22 See Rodden and Wibbels (2002) and Rodden et al., (2003) for a detailed overview. 
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Returning to the triangular relationship, it seems that the debate on the relationship 
between FD, macroeconomic stability, and economic growth requires more attention 
both from the theoretical and empirical perspective, while considering a variety of 
fiscal and political factors such as the level of FD or political structure. Despite the 
formal incorporation of the macroeconomic stability into a growth production function 
(Martinez-Vazquez and McNab, 2003; 2006), the precise relationship between FD, 
macroeconomic stability, and economic growth has not yet been clarified (Rodden and 
Wibbels, 2002; Martinez-Vazques and McNab, 2003; 2006; Treisman, 2006; 2007). 
The existing literature (Martinez-Vazquez and McNab, 2003; 2006) is sceptic on the 
definite economic effect of FD through macroeconomic stability.  
De Mello (2000) argues that as far as FD promotes efficiency and accountability 
among local governments, FD can contribute to macroeconomic stability. Soft-budget 
constrained and debt-overhang problems (p.1) smooth the fiscal imbalances of local 
governments, which in turn help to better channelise the public resources into more 
growth-enhancing practices. Contrary, Eller (2004) disagrees with the ability of FD to 
affect growth through macroeconomic stability. As local governments cannot engage 
in expansionary policies due to soft-budget constraint, this channel of transmission is 
weakened as far as central government intervenes by controlling spending patterns at 
all levels (to match it with its cyclical efforts) and the size of subnational governments 
is considerably small to react to expansionary policies.  
Overall, the maintenance of fiscal discipline is considered as a severe challenge of FD, 
which drags this relationship in the opposite direction, especially in developing and 
transition economies (Martinez-Vazquez and McNab, 2003, p.1605). Further, Rodden 
and Wibbels (2002) argue that fiscal and monetary mismanagements are mostly 
observable among the federations (which are developing countries), rather than the 
unitary ones. The rationale behind the importance of federal political structures on 
macroeconomic management relates to the high level of devolution in these countries. 
Any attempts to ensure price stability, money growth and fiscal budget balance must 
be coordinated with all governing levels (p.500). However, there are weak incentives 
for local officials, which are self-interest driven, to coordinate their actions and create 
positive externalities for the whole country. 
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(ii) New Channels of Transmission 
Another potential indirect channel of transmission, though not explicitly recognised in 
the FD-growth literature, is the government size, which is linked to the well-known 
Leviathan theory. By focusing on the behaviour of political agents and the 
performance of the decentralised system based on the fiscal and political incentives 
faced by subnational officials (Weingast, 2006), the Leviathan theory  treats 
politicians as rent-seekers who tend to maximize rents extracted (strong incentives to 
stay in power, augment salaries, control more money and people) from the economy. 
This theory considers FD as a solution to the problems associated with rent-extraction 
via introducing competition among jurisdictions, which breaks the monopoly just as 
in the private sector (Porcelli, 2009). In this context, it is argued that local government 
officials tend to be more focused on their citizens’ objectives than central government 
politicians, due to their greater proximity to residents and the need to gain their 
approval for re-election.  
In the light of this theory, FD is considered as a tool to restrict (i) the provision of 
public goods under revenue constraint, which would prevent the oversupply by raising 
the x-inefficiency (Thiessen, 2003), and (ii) growth of government spending (Rodden 
2003), caused by competitive pressures at local level. Consequently, this would lead 
to a smaller government size at national level (Brennan and Buchanan, 1980). 
Alternatively, FD might increase the government size by better matching public goods 
and services to local preferences and enhancing citizens’ trust (Ligthart and Van 
Oudheusden, 2011). Whilst the local demand for goods and services would be 
increased by this bottom-up pressure, the overall public sector size would be ultimately 
greater.23 
Despite the contribution of Leviathan theory in linking the government size and FD, 
there is still vagueness on the causal mechanism of the economic effect of FD through 
this presumed indirect channel. However, we may hypothesise on potential 
associations between the change in the government size, FD (i.e. higher or lower 
subnational spending/revenue) and economic growth by using Barro’s (1990) model 
on the relationship between the government size and economic growth in a context of 
multi-tier government. Assuming a bottom-up approach, a change in subnational 
                                                          
23 Also, this might confirm the fiscal illusion hypothesis. 
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government size, as a reaction to horizontal or vertical competition, would also affect 
the overall public sector size. A smaller government at national and subnational level 
is likely to stimulate the intervention of the private sector (by creating market 
conditions that allow firms to exploit their competitive advantage (Porter, 1996)), 
which could promote local markets and in turn enhance regional and national 
economic performance (Smith, 1992; 1997).  Next, FD is assumed to affect economic 
growth through institutional failings, such as corruption, as the third potential indirect 
channel of transmission. It is well known that corruption, through bribes and 
kickbacks, distorts the allocation of resources and the composition of government 
expenditure (Martinez-Vazquez and McNab, 1997). According to Mauro (1996), this 
is a typical phenomenon in large capital investment project. In this concern, it is argued 
that central government, having power and budget, is more prone to be engaged in 
corruption schemes different from the local governments with limited fiscal power. 
Further, creating advantages by the pronounced distance from the public eye, central 
government, particularly in developing countries, have a tendency to be less 
accountable (Fisman and Gatti, 2002). Following the same logic but at local level, 
local governments are likely to be more directly accountable and observable by the 
public (p.328), which forces them to properly match the provision of public goods to 
local preferences.24 Opposing arguments are provided by Thiessen (2005), who alerts 
that proximity to local agents might, in contrast, favour the misuse of power from 
certain jurisdictions due to nepotism and clientelism.  
On the other side of the discussion, from the political perspective, Fisman and Gatti 
(2002) urge caution, especially for developing countries, on competence and 
bureaucratic “quality”. Local governments are less likely to attract high skilled 
bureaucrats given the low (economic and political) reward of politicians at local level 
in comparison to the central government. In this context, two opposing arguments are 
in place. Politicians at local levels tend to be less accountable due to the presence of 
lower monitoring, which might result in increased corruption. Alternatively, the low 
reward at local level, relative to central government, might demotivate politicians to 
engage in small benefit corruption practices.  
                                                          
24 The rationale is that local governments might be more directly accountable than central government 
because the former are responsible for certain task of the region different from central government 
which focuses on the overall country’s performance.  
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Irrespective of the direction of the effect of FD on corruption, the above discussion 
might point towards the relationship between local corruption and economic growth. 
Whilst this relationship is beyond the scope of this thesis, it is important to emphasise 
and introduce in the literature the concept of local corruption as a phenomenon induced 
by FD, which could hinder/boost regional and eventually national growth. However, 
the direction and the magnitude of this effect needs further theoretical and empirical 
investigation, while focusing on political decentralisation.  
2.4. Review of the Empirical Literature  
Reviewing the FD-economic growth literature is challenging, mostly due to the 
multidimensional nature of FD, disagreement on the appropriate FD measures and the 
lack of a solid theoretical justification on the inclusion of the latter into a growth 
model. Despite the limited theoretical guidance on the FD-economic growth 
relationship, as reviewed intensely in the previous sections, the empirical literature has 
widely spurred during the last two decades. The empirical research provides 
meaningful insights into various aspects of this relationship, though failing to agree 
on its nature and strength. Given the heterogeneity and diversity of the studies, this 
section will provide a review, organised as Section 2.2, based on the level of 
investigation/aggregation: national and subnational level. Subsequently, it will be 
easier to shed light on the differences between these two groups and heterogeneities 
within the same group such as the development stage, model specification, time 
horizon covered and the theoretical framework followed. Hence, the review presented 
below aims to analyse the empirical research at different levels of aggregation, while 
focusing also on the main heterogeneities which, for simplicity, can be grouped into: 
(i) development level of a country and FD measures used (ii) theoretical framework, 
and (iii) methodology employed. The first subsection will provide a review of studies 
at national level, proceeding with Section 2.4.2 at regional level.  
2.4.1 Empirical Literature at National Level 
Following the aforementioned structure, the results of the main studies conducted at 
national level have been first summarized in a tabular format. Table 2.1 summarises 
the key features of the empirical studies by providing details about their authors, 
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sample under analysis, period of investigation, measures of FD, methodology and 
main conclusions of the analysis. 
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Table 2.1 Summary of the review of main empirical literature on FD-economic growth relationship at national level 
Study Sample Period FD measure(s) Method(s) Main Conclusions 
Davoodi and Zou 
(1998) 
46 developing 
and developed 
countries 
1970-1989  Expenditure 
decentralisation 
OLS Negative, although weak effect in developing countries 
and none in developed countries.  
Xie et al. (1999) USA 1948-1994 Expenditure 
decentralisation 
OLS The existing local spending shares are consistent with 
growth maximization. Further decentralisation may be 
harmful to growth.  
Im and Lee (2001) 63 developing, 
semi-developed 
and developed 
countries 
1972-2007 Expenditure 
decentralisation and 
Political decentralisation 
Random Effect Model A significant negative relationship between FD and 
economic growth for the mixed sample, developing 
countries and semi-developed countries and an 
insignificant relationship for developed countries. 
Thiessen (2003) 21 OECD 
countries 
1973-1998 Expenditure 
decentralisation, Revenue 
decentralisation, Quadratic 
term of decentralisation, 
dummy variables for low, 
medium and high degree of 
decentralisation 
Generalised Least 
Squares 
Significant non-linear effect of FD on growth; there 
seems to be a point where no longer further 
decentralisation promotes growth, which suggests that 
medium degree of FD is growth enhancing. Extreme 
decentralisation (both low and high) may retard growth. 
Iimi (2005) 51 developed 
and developing 
countries  
1997-2001 Expenditure 
decentralisation, Political 
decentralisation 
OLS, IV Positive significant effect of FD on growth; FD is 
instrumental in promoting growth 
Bodman and Ford 
(2006) 
21 OECD 
countries 
1981-1998 Expenditure 
decentralisation, Revenue 
decentralisation, Taxation 
decentralisation, Vertical 
imbalance 
OLS  
 
No significant relationship between FD and growth in 
the cross-section analysis, whereas taxation 
decentralisation is suggested to affect negatively growth 
in the panel data analysis.  
Thornton (2007) 19 OECD 
countries 
1980-2000 Revenue decentralisation, 
Revenue autonomy over, 
the quadratic term of 
revenue autonomy 
 
OLS Insignificant effect when FD is limited to the revenue 
autonomy (revenues over which subnational 
governments has full autonomy). 
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Rodriguez-Pose 
and Kroijer (2009) 
16 Central and 
East European 
Countries 
1990-2004 Expenditure 
decentralisation, Revenue 
decentralisation, Vertical 
Imbalance 
Dynamic model 
(Fixed effects with 
different annual lags) 
 
Expenditure decentralisation and transfer from central 
government affect negatively growth. Revenue 
decentralisation initially correlates negatively with 
growth, after 6-year lag relates positively and 
significant. 
 
 
Behnisch et al. 
(2003) 
Germany 1950-1990 Expenditure 
decentralisation 
Time Series 
Analysis25 
 
Negative and significant association between 
expenditure decentralisation and growth 
 
Feltenstein and 
Iwata (2005) 
China 1952-1996 Economic decentralisation, 
fiscal decentralisation (tax, 
expenditure, revenue and 
transfers from central 
government)26 
Vector 
Autoregression 
(VAR) 
 
Positive and significant effect of economic 
decentralisation on economic growth. Other forms of 
decentralisation insignificant. 
Malik et al. (2006) Pakistan 1971-2005 Expenditure 
decentralisation, Revenue 
decentralisation, 
Subnational expenditure as 
a share of revenue (gap) 
Vector 
Autoregression 
(VAR) 
Mixed results; expenditure and revenue decentralisation 
have a significant contribution to growth, whereas the 
gap between expenditure and revenue has a negative 
effect on growth. 
Faridi (2011) Pakistan 1972-2009 Expenditure 
decentralisation, Revenue 
decentralisation 
OLS 
 
Positive and significant effect of both expenditure and 
revenue decentralisation on economic growth. 
Gemmell et al. 
(2013) 
23 OECD 
countries 
1972-2005 Expenditure 
decentralisation; Self-
expenditure 
decentralisation; Own-
revenue decentralisation; 
Tax decentralisation; 
Revenue decentralisation. 
Pooled Mean Group Negative effect of expenditure decentralisation on 
economic growth, but positive impact of revenue 
decentralisation on economic growth. 
 
                                                          
25 No detailed information on the methodology is provided in the paper.  
26Economic decentralisation is defined as the shift of economic activities from the state to non-state sector. 
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(i) Development level of a country and FD measures used 
Research has produced diverse and inconclusive results on the impact of FD on 
economic growth for mixed samples27, developed, developing and transition 
economies, primarily due to the wide range of FD measures adopted and country 
characteristics. 
Mixed Sample 
As to the mixed sample group of studies, some research provide evidence of a positive 
effect of FD on economic performance (Ebel and Yilmaz, 2002; Iimi, 2005; Enkilopov 
and Zhuravskaya, 2007), while others claim the detrimental (Davoodi and Zou, 1998; 
Im and Lee, 2001) or even insignificant impact (Martinez-Vazquez and McNab, 
2006). The first empirical study in the FD-economic growth relationship (also part of 
the mixed study group) Davoodi and Zou (1998), provides evidence of a negative 
economic effect of FD, measured by expenditure decentralisation, for a dataset of 46 
developed and developing countries. Whilst pooling countries of different stages of 
development appear to be less informative, a more detailed analysis of the two 
subsamples showed the importance of development stages in determining the 
economic effect of FD. A negative relationship between expenditure decentralisation 
and growth is found in developing countries, whereas no impact is exerted in 
developed economies. The authors attribute this negative relationship in developing 
economies to several factors such as: (i) the measurement of FD and its inability to 
capture the welfare effects of capital and current spending, (ii) the excessive current 
expenditures, which are unlikely to contribute positively to a higher economic growth, 
and (iii) the lack of financial resources and administrative capability, and the inability 
of local government to respond effectively to local needs especially in developing 
countries where the level of decentralisation is practically low.  
A similar study, conducted by Im and Lee (2001) for a sample of 62 countries, 
confirms the moderating role of development stage in the FD-economic growth 
relationship. More precisely, this investigation suggests a negative relationship 
between expenditure decentralisation and economic growth for the world sample, 
                                                          
27 A mixed sample consists of different countries with different level of income: developed, 
developing and transition economies. 
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semi-developed countries and developing countries and an insignificant effect for the 
developed ones.  
Alternatively, Iimi (2005), while addressing potential endogeneity in the FD-growth 
relationship through the use of an IV approach, report that FD (particularly 
expenditure decentralisation) is influential to economic growth, though no moderating 
role of stages of development is observed. In the same vein, Yilmaz (1999) and Ebel 
and Yilmaz (2002) claim that the economic effect of FD does not necessarily depend 
on the development stage of a country; it is the country’s governance structure that is 
more likely to influence this relationship. The estimated effects are more likely to be 
distorted by differences in the governance system due to the different meaning and 
impact of decentralisation in unitary and federal countries, which if not considered 
might produce problems of misspecification. To overcome this shortcoming, Yilmaz 
(1999) estimates the FD-economic growth relationship by distinguishing between 
unitary and federal states in a panel of 46 developed and developing countries. This 
study found that the decentralisation of expenditure has a positive effect on growth in 
unitary states, but none in federations. Instead, studies that used dummy variables to 
distinguish between these two distinct governance systems failed to find significant 
differences in the FD-growth effect (Thornton, 2007; Baskaran and Feld, 2009). When 
dividing the existing empirical literature subject to the governance system, little 
variation in the economic effect of expenditure decentralisation is observed, while 
suggesting that this characteristic does not prevail in a qualitative literature review. As 
the majority of studies focusing on national level are cross-country studies, variations 
appear to be larger across samples with different income level rather than across 
governance system (see Behnisch et al., 2003; Feltenstein and Iwata, 2005; Bodman 
et al., 2009a). 
Despite its widespread use and popularity, Davoodi and Zou’s (1998) research and the 
above succeeding studies have been criticized for neglecting the multidimensional 
nature of FD, namely using only expenditure decentralisation as a measure of FD.28 
No single indicator can capture and precisely estimate the real level of a country’s 
                                                          
28 Although Iimi (2005), Enkilopov and Zhuraskaya (2007) incorporate a measure of political freedom, 
still this measure does not represent a measure of fiscal decentralisation but a measure of political 
decentralisation. When referring to fiscal decentralisation, one should take into account possible 
measures of revenue decentralisation, revenue autonomy, transfer decentralisation, vertical imbalance 
etc. 
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decentralisation in general and FD in particular (Stegarescu, 2005; Sachi and Salotti, 
2011). A replication of Davoodi and Zou’s research by Ebel and Yilmaz (2002) reveal 
the sensitivity of empirical findings to the choice of FD measure. Once the FD measure 
changes from expenditure to revenue decentralisation, the estimation results change 
drastically from negative to positive, with contradictory consequences for 
policymaking. The authors explain that measuring expenditure decentralisation by 
subnational expenditure as a share of total expenditure does not accurately reflect the 
subnational government’s autonomy in expenditure decision making. The decisions at 
local level may be constrained by the central government, especially in developing 
and transition economies where local governments mostly act as administrative agents 
of national government (Rodden, 2003). Also, the use of solely expenditure 
decentralisation ignores the potential effects of revenue decentralisation and the 
importance of intergovernmental income transfer by central government to 
subnational governments. Expenditure decentralisation without corresponding 
revenue decentralisation (tax powers) and indication of the “common pool” resources 
such as grants and revenue-sharing will tend to bias the true level of decentralisation. 
Similarly, using only revenue shares to measure FD tends to produce biased (mostly) 
positive impact on economic growth (Zhang and Zou, 2001; Ebel and Yilmaz, 2002). 
Despite the incomplete argument on the predetermined economic impact of 
revenue/tax decentralisation, it is worth noting that no inference has been made by 
these studies on the channels of transmission from FD to economic performance, 
neither on the superiority of FD measures, which could shed light on the relative 
relationship between expenditure and revenue decentralisation and their distinct effect 
on growth. It should be noted that studies that consider either expenditure or revenue 
decentralisation to measure FD are incomplete and might reveal only half of the 
relationship between FD and growth. It is their simultaneous effect on economic 
growth that should better uncover the FD-economic growth relationship (Jin and Zou, 
2005). 
However, the results should still be interpreted with caution not only with respect to 
the coefficients of each measure, but also to the imbalance between expenditure and 
revenue decentralisation. An important dimension of FD, ignored in all the above 
studies, is the local financing in meeting the expenditure responsibilities (Rodriguez-
Pose and Kroijer, 2009). Ignoring the dependency of local governments to central 
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government might still blur the genuine relationship between FD and economic 
growth. To uncover all the dimensions of FD and their economic effect it is important 
to consider intergovernmental transfers as an additional measure of FD due to its 
superiority in measuring the difference between revenue-raising power and spending 
responsibilities (dependency of local government), impossible to be captured 
otherwise.  
Apart from the interesting insights and the popularity of the above research, the use of 
mixed samples might be considered as not much informative as it pools together 
countries with substantial differences in economic development, importance of 
decentralisation and many other socio-economic differences (e.g. institutions, culture, 
history). However, a study conducted on a more homogenous group of developed 
economies may not show conclusive evidence, with results that are highly sensitive to 
the FD measures used. 
Developed economies 
Some studies from developed countries suggest that expenditure decentralisation, 
independently of the additional measures used, affect negatively economic growth, 
contrary to the positive impact of revenue decentralisation (Behnisch et al., 2003; 
Bodman et al., 2009a; Rodriguez-Pose and Ezcurra, 2011; Gemmell et al., 2013).  
Alternatively, Bodman et al. (2009b) and Asatryan (2011) suggest that FD, measured 
by revenue decentralisation, affects negatively the growth of GDP per capita. These 
studies attribute the negative effect of FD (either measured by expenditure or revenue 
decentralisation) on growth to the lack of subnational governments’ ability to better 
tailor local preferences to public goods and services, lack of power to overcome issues 
regarding lower quality of governance and inconsistent and arbitrary use of FD 
measures. However, it should be noted that the majority of the studies from developed 
countries fail to find a significant relationship between FD and economic growth (Xie 
et al., 1999; Feld et al., 2004; Bodman and Ford, 2006; Thornton, 2007; Bodman et 
al., 2009a; Baskaran and Feld, 2009; Feld et al., 2009a; Asatryan and Feld, 2013). 
Likewise, empirical results concerning the impact of FD on economic growth for both 
cross-country and single-country studies grant clear evidence on neither the existence 
of this relationship nor its magnitude.  
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Baskaran and Feld (2009) attribute this insignificance to the fact that decentralisation 
in general and revenue decentralisation in particular are not related to economic 
growth as the former is quite sticky and rarely changing because is thought as a part 
of a country’s long-run institutional structure, which does not fluctuate very often. On 
the other hand, Xie et al. (1999) interpret the insignificant coefficient of FD as a 
growth-maximising level of FD, based on the FD-growth model presented in 
Equations (2.26-2.30). Others (Thiessen, 2005; Feld and Kirchgassner, 2004) argue 
that this insignificance might come from an erroneous assumption of a linear 
relationship between FD and economic growth. Pooling countries with distinct FD-
growth relationships in a cross-country study become impossible to find any 
significant relationship between FD and growth if the nonlinearity of this relationship 
is not taken into consideration. Some weak evidence is found regarding the nonlinear 
relationship between FD and growth at national level and the hypothesis that the 
medium degree of FD promotes growth (Xie et al., 1999; Thiessen, 2003, 2005; Eller, 
2004), however some fail to confirm the hump-shaped relationship between FD and 
growth (Bodman and Ford, 2006; Thornton, 2007; Rodriguez-Pose and Ezcurra, 
2011). These studies claim that decentralisation is not subject to the level of country’s 
income, as suggested by mixed samples; nevertheless, an optimal level of FD has to 
exist to be able to maximize economic growth. 
By using a cross-section and panel dataset of OECD countries from 1973 to 1998 and 
in a parallel panel dataset between 1981 and 1995, Thiessen (2003) suggests a non-
linear relationship between FD and economic growth, though no theoretical reasons 
are provided for the humped shape. Conventional and new FD measures were used 
such as the expenditure decentralisation, variables to account for a hump-shaped 
relationship, a measure of self-reliance and three dummy variables for low, medium 
and high degree of FD.29 The quadratic of the expenditure indicator and the dummy 
variables, also known as “spline” variables, were employed to test for the non-linear 
relationship between FD and growth, following the Calmfors and Driffill (1998) 
method.30 This study suggests that the successive increase of expenditure 
                                                          
29 Self-reliance is measured as the share of own revenues as a percentage of subnational total revenues.  
30 First, the countries are ranked for each period subject to their level of decentralisation: low, medium 
and high. Numbers are assigned to countries according to their ranking, where countries that have the 
lowest and highest level of decentralisation get the value of one. The next lowest and highest values of 
decentralisation get a higher value. This procedure goes on up to the medium degree of decentralisation 
that has the highest value.  
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decentralisation for countries with low degree of decentralisation may stimulate 
investment and improve technological progress, which is estimated as potential 
channels of transmission of FD on growth; consequently, enhance economic growth. 
However, beyond a certain point, FD has no longer positive effect on growth. Extreme 
decentralisation and centralization (high and low decentralisation, respectively) seem 
to create more disadvantages than advantages for a country’s growth. Long-term 
economic growth would be promoted only by an optimal degree of decentralisation, 
which would avoid the adverse effect on growth from either “too much” 
decentralisation (i.e. regional inequalities) and “too little” decentralisation (i.e. low 
fiscal autonomy) (Thiessen, 2005). The empirical findings reveal an inverted hump-
shaped relationship between FD and growth, where countries need to find the optimum 
(medium degree of decentralisation) to enhance growth. In the same vein, Eller (2004) 
in a similar panel data analysis of OECD countries suggests that extreme 
decentralisation does not necessarily hinder growth; high degree of FD does not 
impede growth, but so does the low degree of decentralisation. The author argues that 
low degree of FD is likely to affect negatively growth because of unconsidered 
preferences’ heterogeneity, which in turn causes inefficiencies in public goods and 
services provision.  
Thornton (2007), on the other hand, fails to provide any evidence of a hump-shaped 
relationship between FD and economic growth. In fact, the issue of the optimal size 
of FD becomes challenging when considering all dimensions of FD simultaneously. 
Reinforcing the argument made by Martinez-Vazquez and McNab (2006), as argued 
also in Section 2.2.3, instead of single optimum, the FD-economic growth relationship 
might be faced with multiple optimum which challenges the nonlinearity of this 
relationship. It is unclear whether all the dimensions of FD (expenditure, revenue and 
vertical imbalance) have an optimal level or only one/few of them. Moreover, the 
nonlinearity argument becomes less relevant in a cross-country context with 
supposedly many optimal degrees of FD, in general, of individual countries across 
many unknown optimal degree of individual measures of FD in particular. 
Developing countries 
A growing body of literature on developing countries investigating national growth 
has also emerged in recent years. However, empirical evidence at national level is 
62 
 
scarce. Within this limited number of empirical studies, evidence is mixed. Regarding 
the cross-country studies, Woller and Philips (1998), using a sample of 23 developing 
countries between 1974 and 1991, failed to find a significant contribution of FD 
(measured by expenditure and revenue decentralisation) to economic growth, though 
a weak inverse relationship is found only in long-run between revenue decentralisation 
and economic growth. Similar results were suggested by Martinez-Vazquez and 
McNab (2006), while some fragile evidence of an indirect relationship through the 
inflation channel is reported. 
Alternatively, the other studies conducted in developing countries at the national level 
are all single-country studies. Malik et al. (2006) provide mixed results when 
estimating the relationship between FD and growth for Pakistan during the period 
1971-2005. Some of the variables of decentralisation (expenditure decentralisation 
and the ratio of subnational government revenues fewer grants-in-aid to total 
government revenues) are found to be positively correlated to economic growth, 
whereas other measures correlate either negatively or insignificantly to growth 
(revenue decentralisation). Overall, the study suggests that FD accelerates economic 
growth. With a similar dataset (period 1972-2009), Faridi (2011) estimates the 
economic effect of FD on national growth. Through a time-series analysis, the author 
confirms Malik et al.’s (2006) results, although the FD measures are limited only to 
expenditure and revenue decentralisation. Both measures employed are positively 
correlated with economic growth. On the other hand, Philip and Isah (2012) failed to 
find a significant relationship between FD and growth for Nigeria, whereas Khattak et 
al. (2010) contradicts the positive relationship between revenue decentralisation and 
economic growth. Despite the novelty in investigating this relationship in developing 
countries, the above findings can be challenged by noticeable misspecification errors 
not only to the appropriate measure of FD but also to the main determinants of growth, 
neither complete explanation was given to support the findings. 
 Possible reasons for a negative relationship between FD and economic growth in these 
countries might be related to high deficits, poor quality of governmental decisions, 
higher inequality and corruption (Rodden, 2003). Lack of sufficient capacity of local 
governments compared to the central (Rodden and Rose-Ackerman, 1997) one might 
challenge the FD advantages to boost economic growth.   
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Transition economies 
Characterised by similar problems, the transition economies produce mixed and 
contradictory results. Despite the emergence of FD in transition countries in general 
and ETEs countries in particular, evidence appears sporadic and sensitive to the FD 
measurement. The empirical research at national level appears relatively scarce, while 
the majority of studies are either conducted for China at subnational level or focusing 
on country-specific problems and policy solutions, especially for former Communist 
countries in Europe.  
Meloche et al. (2004) investigate the impact of FD measured by expenditure 
decentralisation and fiscal autonomy (amongst alternative measures of the latter), 
point out the necessity of considering subnational governments’ fiscal autonomy when 
referring to FD effect on economic growth. Their research on 10 selected ETE (from 
1997-2002) concludes that the expenditure decentralisation itself does not seem to be 
related to economic growth, it is the degree of subnational government’s autonomy 
that does affect growth positively. By addressing one the major weakness of measuring 
revenue decentralisation, this study highlighted the importance of considering the real 
fiscal autonomy of subnational governments when measuring decentralisation. Whilst 
this investigation might be criticised for its small size sample (30 observations), 
potential problems of heteroscedasticity and endogeneity which restricts the validity 
of the results provided, it makes an important contribution to the discussion over the 
appropriate measures of FD in transition economies. 
Since neglecting the vertical imbalance is likely to cause a serious omitted variable 
bias, Rodriguez-Pose and Kroijer (2009), in their panel research analysis of 16 Central 
and Eastern European countries over 1990-2004, introduced intergovernmental 
transfers as a share of either subnational expenditure or revenue. The findings, 
somehow in accordance with Meloche et al. (2004), reveal that expenditure 
decentralisation and vertical imbalance retard the economic performance, while the 
degree of local tax-raising powers appears to have a negative impact in short run, but 
a positive economic effect in long run. Using different time lags, the analysis 
highlighted some of the acute problems of FD in ETEs related to lack of local 
accountability, tax-raising capacity and experience in being self-sufficient and 
meeting the local needs. However, it revealed that subnational government with their 
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own revenue source are better able to tailor output to local preferences and eventually 
impacts growth positively in long run. Again, unfortunately, there is still no debate on 
the endogenous nature of this relationship and the appropriateness of using different 
time lags of FD as a dynamic approach, which risk the validity of the results. However, 
the existing studies for ETEs could not be used as a replica or comparison to this 
research given their inappropriate use of FD measures (e.g. subnational governments 
as a share of GDP) and misspecification errors (e.g. Stoilova and Patonov, 2012).  
To date, China is the country where the relationship between FD and economic growth 
in a context of TEs has been most studied, partly because FD has been a central 
component of China’s economic policy at a time when it has experienced remarkable 
economic growth and because its fiscal system is much decentralized despite being a 
communist country. However, there is only one study which focuses at national level. 
Using a VAR model with latent variables, Feltenstein and Iwata (2005) find a positive 
effect of both economic and fiscal decentralisation (revenue, tax decentralisation 
subnational transfers) on economic growth in a time-series analysis between 1975 and 
2005. They argue that the institutional change toward a competitive market through 
decentralisation reform has impacted growth positively in China. 
Overall, these mixed results among transition economies could be attributed partly to 
the large variety of devolved systems of decentralisation (varying degrees of fiscal, 
political and administrative powers) among transition countries and partly to 
specification differences of the studies investigating the FD-growth relationship. To 
investigate this relationship more thoroughly, it might be appropriate to limit the 
investigation into a homogenous set of countries or at least control for cultural, 
historical and institutional differences between countries (Akai and Sakata, 2002; Iimi, 
2005; Enkilopov and Zhuraskaya, 2007; Rodriguez-Pose and Ezcurra, 2010).  
The empirical evidence from transition countries and mostly from mixed samples 
draws attention to the role of institutions and political decentralisation. As local 
governments are closer to citizens, FD empowers individuals and helps to generate 
greater trust, collaboration and networking between citizens and government, which 
in turn can moderate the intensity of the FD effect on growth. In this context, Iimi 
(2005) and Filippeti and Sachi (2013) suggest that the economic effect of 
decentralisation, although does not change radically, is affected by various 
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complementary factors such as institutions. FD may lead to pro-growth effects only 
when intergovernmental relationships are well-established within the institutional 
system. Thus, political decentralisation may play an essential role in shaping policies 
and the provision of public goods and services, which eventually is likely to influence 
the returns of subnational expenditure and revenue efforts (Rodriguez-Pose and 
Ezcurra, 2011, p.620). Complementing this argument, Iimi (2005), and Enkilopov and 
Zhuravskaya (2007) stress the importance of political freedom as a complementary to 
expenditure decentralisation as it reflects the benefits a country can have from the 
Tiebout mechanism. Overall, these arguments might point towards a critical level of 
income or institutions above which a country can utilise the potential gains from 
further decentralisation. 
 
(ii) Theoretical framework followed 
The lack of robust evidence, irrespective of the sample, has been attributed to some 
extent to the lack of a clear theoretical link (Martinez-Vazques and McNab, 2003), 
measurement of FD per se, misspecification errors and trade-off construction, which 
according to Breuss and Eller (2004) reflects the various pros and cons of 
decentralisation. As to the theoretical framework in which empirical investigations at 
national level sustain, the literature can be divided into two groups: (i) the Davoodi 
and Zou approach and (ii) the neoclassical approach. Although the majority of studies 
followed the first approach, the findings of these studies differ widely. Some provide 
evidence supporting the contribution of FD on growth (Xie et al., 1999; Iimi, 2005), 
while others find mixed results (Meloche et al., 2004; Malik et al., 2006; Khattak et 
al., 2010), negative (Zhang and Zou, 1998; 2001; Im and Lee, 2001) or no relationship 
at all (Woller and Philips, 1998; Gemmell et al., 2013; Philip and Isah 2012). Though, 
it should be noted that the majority of the studies that adopt this framework are mainly 
cross-country studies. Similarly, the second group of studies fails to reach a consensus 
on the nature and strength of FD-economic growth relationship. Empirical evidence 
varies from positive (Martinez-Vazquez and McNab, 2003; 2006, Faridi 2011) to 
negative (Bodman et al., 2009b), insignificant (Bodman and Ford, 2006; Thornton, 
2007) and to studies showing a change over time of the FD-growth effect (Thiessen, 
2003; 2005).  
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Mixed results are provided from both groups of studies. For instance, Malik et al. 
(2006) and Faridi (2011) both estimate the FD-growth relationship in Pakistan using 
a time-series analysis. Although they follow different theoretical framework (Faridi, 
2011) follows an exogenous growth model, whereas Malik et al. (2006) follow an 
endogenous growth model) they both suggest a contribution of expenditure 
decentralisation and revenue decentralisation on economic growth. In this regard, the 
theoretical framework followed does not seem to be an important feature when 
reviewing the empirical research.31 Rather, there are other factors that seem to 
influence the results on the effect of FD on economic growth. 
 
(iii) Methodology 
There is considerable heterogeneity in terms of methodological approaches and 
diverse designs for decentralisation among studies that investigate the FD-growth 
relationship. In most of the cases, empirical literature suffers from various 
methodological weakness. First, differences are due to the estimation technique: time-
series analyses tend to provide more positive and significant results than cross-section 
and panel analyses. All the time series analysis investigating the FD-growth 
relationship at national level suggest either a positive effect or FD (independently of 
how FD is measured) or a positive effect for at least one of the measures employed 
(Behnisch et al., 2003; Feltenstein and Iwata, 2005; Malik et al., 2006; Khattak et al., 
2010; Faridi, 2011; Philip and Isah, 2012). Though, it could be argued that since all 
time-series analyses are single-country study, they offer a clearer picture than cross-
country studies which are faced with strong institutional differences and measurement 
problems. As to the other two estimation techniques, the studies estimating a cross-
section or/and panel analysis provide ambiguous results on the effect of FD on 
economic growth. 
Another concern when investigating the FD-growth relationship is the distinction 
between short-run and long-run economic effect of FD. To capture the long-run effect, 
the first group of studies have used the multi-year (triennial or five-year) averages 
                                                          
31 Though, it should be noted that Malik et al. (2011) use an additional measure of FD compared to 
Faridi (2011): the gap between expenditure and revenue decentralisation, 
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(Davoodi and Zou, 1998; Woller and Philips, 1998; Thiessen, 2003; Iimi, 2005; 
Meloche et al., 2004; Thiessen, 2005; Thornton, 2007; Rodriguez-Pose and Ezcurra, 
2010). Alternatively, Gemmell et al. (2013) uses a Pooled Mean Group model (PMG) 
to allow for short-term effect and as well to depict any possible long-term effect, and 
Rodriguez-Pose and Kroijer (2009) use different time lags to grasp the long-term 
effects depending on the type of decentralisation (using different lags of revenue 
decentralisation, expenditure decentralisation and vertical imbalance). However, no 
conclusive results are provided from both types of studies. 
It is now recognized that studies that attempt to infer a causal relationship between FD 
and growth are often fraught with reverse causality, although some of them are 
unambitious in the way they treat causality. Reverse causality occurs because 
efficiency gains from FD appear as economies grow and more decentralisation is 
demanded at relatively higher levels of development (Martinez-Vazquez and McNab, 
2003). To mitigate endogeneity, studies have used either instrumental variable (such 
as political decentralisation, transfers from central government), or lagged value of 
FD. However, there is a considerable lack of debate and estimation methods tackling 
endogeneity (mainly from samples with developing and transition economies), though 
some studies, at least, acknowledge it (Meloche et al., 2004; Martinez-Vazques and 
McNab, 2006; Khattak et al., 2010; Faridi, 2011). Whilst the studies that mention 
endogeneity and try to mitigate it are superior to those that neglect this problem, still, 
no conclusive evidence could be provided (Behnisch et al., 2003, Iimi, 2005, Thiessen, 
2003; 2005, Gemmell et al., 2013, Rodriguez-Pose and Kroijer, 2009). As to the 
estimation technique used to mitigate endogeneity, some use Two or Three Stage Least 
Squares, others use IV, and a few recent studies have used dynamic panel model 
(Filippetti and Sachi, 2013). The last concern is the problem of omitted variables 
which is likely to produce biased estimates. Considering reverse causality in the FD-
growth relationship and the problem of omitted variables (which may simultaneously 
affect FD and growth), estimates of the effect of FD on growth tend to suffer from 
simultaneity bias. 
  
68 
 
2.4.2 Empirical Literature at Subnational Level 
As previously highlighted, the wide range of FD measures used and the lack of 
theoretical framework have contributed to a quite broad and diverse empirical 
literature on the FD-economic growth literature. It is pertinent to note, however, that 
the empirical evidence at subnational level offers more conclusive results than studies 
focusing on national level. A slight preponderance is noted among studies conducted 
at subnational level, by agreeing on the significant, mostly positive, role of FD on 
regional growth. Table 2.2 summarizes the authors, sample under analysis, period of 
investigation, FD measures used, methodology and the findings of main studies 
investigating the effect of FD on economic growth at subnational level. Consequently, 
the empirical literature review is organised similarly as the previous section by (i) the 
development level and FD measurement, (ii) theoretical framework and (iii) 
methodology used. 
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Table 2.2 Summary of the review of main empirical literature on FD-economic growth relationship at subnational level 
Study Sample Period FD measure(s) Method(s) Main Conclusions 
Zhang and Zou 
(1998) 
28 provinces in 
China 
1980-1992 Expenditure 
decentralisation 
(consolidated, extra-
budgetary and spending 
relative to income) 
 
LSDV Decentralisation of expenditure is harmful to provincial 
economic growth. Central and local tax rate has 
negative but non-significant effect on economic growth 
Lin and Liu (2000) 28 provinces of 
China 
1970-1993 Marginal retention rate of 
locally collected budgetary 
revenue and average 
retention rate of locally 
collected budgetary 
revenue 
 
Fixed Effect Model A significant positive relationship between FD and 
economic growth at provincial level.  
Akai and Sakata 
(2002) 
50 USA states 1992-1996 
 
Expenditure 
decentralisation, Revenue 
decentralisation, 
Production 
decentralisation, 
Autonomy 
decentralisation, 
Production-Revenue 
decentralisation 
 
Fixed Effect Model Decentralisation of spending and Production-Revenue 
decentralisation (average of spending and revenues) 
affect growth positively and significantly at 1% level of 
significance. Revenue and Autonomy indicator do not 
significantly affect growth. 
Feld et al. (2004) 26 Swiss Cantons 1980-
1998 
Expenditure 
decentralisation, Tax 
decentralisation, Lump-sum 
grants, Matching grants 
 
OLS and TSLS Decentralisation of spending, revenue and lump-sum grants 
have a non-significant effect on economic growth. 
Contrary, matching grants affect negatively growth. 
Gil-Serrate and 
Lopez-Laborda 
(2006) 
17 Spanish 
Autonomous 
Communities 
1980-
1997 
Full revenue control 
decentralisation, Medium 
revenue control 
decentralisation, low 
revenue control 
decentralisation 
Fixed Effect 
Model 
Only low revenue control decentralisation does 
significantly contribute to regional economic growth.  
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Huang and 
Cheng (2005) 
31 provinces of 
China 
1996-
2004 
Provincial revenue as a share 
of budgetary revenue, 
Provincial revenue as a share 
of extra-budgetary revenue, 
Square term of both 
abovementioned measures 
 
OLS The relationship between FD and economic growth at 
provincial level has a U-shaped trajectory. Initially, FD 
contributes negatively and after reaching the critical point 
then contributes to growth. 
Rodriguez-Pose 
et al. (2007) 
Separate analysis at 
regional level in 
Germany, India, 
Mexico, Spain, and 
the USA 
 
1985-
2002 
Decentralisation of capital 
expenditure, decentralisation 
of current expenditure and 
their respective growth rates 
 
OLS An increase in current expenditures at the expense of capital 
expenditures has impacted regional growth negatively in 
countries where devolution has been driven from above and 
positively where devolution has been driven from below. 
Carrion-i-
Silvestre, Espasa 
and Mora (2008) 
17 Spanish 
Autonomous 
Communities 
1980-
1998 
Expenditure decentralisation OLS The decentralisation of spending has a negative effect on 
overall growth (national level), however a positive effect 
when focusing at subnational level. Evidence of a 
development level threshold. 
 
Feld et al. 
(2009a) 
16 German Lander 1975-
2005 
Expenditure 
decentralisation, Revenue 
decentralisation, Vertical 
and horizontal transfer 
 
Fixed Effect 
Model 
Intergovernmental transfers have no impact on economic 
development. Providing subnational governments with 
more responsibilities would enable them to enter 
competition and affect economic growth. 
Samimi, Haddad 
and Alizadeh 
(2010) 
 
30 provinces of Iran 2001-
2007 
Expenditure decentralisation Fixed Effect 
Model 
A significant positive relationship between FD and 
provincial economic growth exists at provincial level. 
Yushkov (2015) 78 Russian regions 2005-
2012 
Expenditure 
decentralisation, revenue 
decentralisation, 2 vertical 
imbalance measures and the 
municipality autonomy 
indicator 
Fixed Effect 
Model 
Excessive expenditure decentralisation, without 
corresponding revenue decentralisation, is harmful to 
regional growth. Intergovernmental transfers contribute 
positively to growth. 
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(i) Development level of a country and FD measures used 
The studies focusing on the subnational level are single-country studies, different from 
the empirical literature at national level where the majority of studies were cross-
country studies. 
Developed countries 
Regarding the studies conducted for the U.S, empirical evidence suggests either a 
positive relationship between FD and growth (Wallis, 1999; Akai and Sakata, 2002; 
Hammond and Tosun, 2009) or a non-linear relationship (Akai et al., 2007). Wallis 
and Oates (1988) and Wallis (1999), using the expenditure and the revenue shares as 
FD measures, provide the first contributions in the FD-growth relationship by arguing 
that fiscal federalism is crucial in fostering economic growth in the U.S.  Another 
important contribution in this field is the study of Akai and Sakata (2002), which 
heavily criticizes Xie et al.’s (1999) results at national level. Akai and Sakata (2002) 
argue that the multidimensionality and complexity of federalism become difficult to 
be measured and estimated at national level, especially when substantial historical, 
cultural and/or stage of development differences across countries are not taken into 
consideration. To overcome this weakness, the authors disaggregate the U.S. into its 
50 States and consider additional explanatory variables to capture the differences 
between states.32 The results of this investigation revealed the sensitivity of the 
economic effect of FD to the measurement of the latter. Whilst revenue 
decentralisation is conducive to growth, expenditure decentralisation impacts 
negatively on economic growth at state level.  
Akai et al. (2007), on the other hand, argue that such weak (both positive and negative) 
relationship might be attributed to the erroneous linear relationship assumed. By using 
the square term of expenditure decentralisation and revenue decentralisation in a panel 
dataset with 50 U.S. states over 1992-1997, the authors suggest that the existing degree 
of FD is below the optimal level, and further decentralisation is recommended to 
enhance growth.  Despite the novelty in introducing nonlinearity in the FD-economic 
growth relationship, it might be argued that the short time series makes it difficult to 
                                                          
32 Population growth rate, education level and labour quality, liberal vs. conservative tendencies, Gini 
coefficient, quality of regional human capital, trade openness, regional-specific effect, revenue indicator 
decentralisation, production indicator decentralisation, autonomy indicator and production-revenue 
indicator.  
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depict a decent trajectory of the effect of FD on long-run economic growth, necessary 
for a non-linear relationship to be visible. Also, the small sample size, especially when 
forcing it into a cross-section, might risk the validity of the results. An important 
shortcoming in all the above studies is the lack of a clear debate on the appropriateness 
of the FD measures, which addresses the real authority of regions to impose taxes, 
alter tax rates and bases, and the reliance on its own funds. Also, it is pertinent to note 
that these studies lack critical discussion regarding potential sources of endogeneity 
and ways to account for it. 
With regard to other countries, the evidence is also offered from the most fiscally 
decentralized developed countries such as Germany, Switzerland and Canada, and for 
other countries with a medium degree of decentralisation such as Australia and Spain 
(Rodriguez-Pose and Ezcurra, 2011). Evidence is mixed, however still less ambiguous 
than the respective studies at national level. In general, research trying to grasp the 
link between fiscal federalism and economic growth in Germany and Switzerland raise 
attention to the negative effect intergovernmental transfers has on economic 
development. Feld et al. (2004a) claim that apart from the use of conventional 
measures of FD (expenditure and revenue decentralisation), intergovernmental 
transfers should be additionally incorporated in FD measures because the latter can be 
considered as an important instrument of cooperative federalism (cooperation between 
national and subnational governments). In a similar vein, Berthold et al. (2001) and 
Feld et al. (2009a) reveal that grants (mainly matching grants) are harmful to regional 
economic development of Germany and Switzerland. This contradicts the study of 
Behnisch et al. (2003) which suggests a positive effect of FD at national economic 
growth of Germany. However, while this study’s reliance solely on expenditure 
decentralisation may be considered a weakness, its results challenge the FD 
conventional measures used in the literature. Regarding the conventional measures, 
evidence provides ambiguous results. Feld et al. (2009a) fail to find any significance 
of both expenditure and revenue decentralisation on economic performance. The 
authors argue that the theoretical importance of competition for tax bases for beneficial 
effects of FD on economic growth does not hold in case of Germany because this 
country is not characterized by competitive federalism, where tax competition can be 
used by local governments to enhance growth. The latter, as also previously stressed, 
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emphasizes the need to include transfers and grants as a measure of FD where it is a 
feature of cooperative federalism in Germany. 
As for Spanish economy, where the degree of FD is similar to the main federal 
countries and greater than unitary ones, a considerable amount of studies aiming to 
quantify the FD-growth relationship has emerged. The evidence offered by this series 
of studies, to some extent, agree on the contributing role of FD on regional growth, 
despite being subject to the FD measurement. Different from the other countries, 
studies for Spain offer a very wide range of FD measures from expenditure to 
decentralisation to dummy variable if regional government has the responsibility of 
providing education, which challenges the comparison of empirical findings at 
regional level.  
Studies using expenditure decentralisation and dummy variables as a measure of FD33 
provide positive evidence of the impact of FD on regional economic development 
(Solé-Ollé and Esteller-Moré, 2001; Carrion-i-Silvestre et al., 2008), whereas, other 
studies, which use revenue decentralisation as an additional measure of FD, suggest 
an insignificant effect or a negative one (Agundez-Garcia, 2000; Perez and Cantarero, 
2006; Cantarero and Gonzales, 2009). Gil-Serrate and Lopez-Laborda (2006) went 
further by distinguishing between different types of fiscal revenue control which 
Spanish regional governments have (full revenue, medium revenue and low revenue 
control decentralisation) according to the economic classification of public accounts 
and analysing the indirect effects of FD on growth. An FE estimation over the period 
1984-1995 showed that the low revenue decentralisation indicators usually exert a 
weak positive effect on growth, while the full and medium revenue indicators have a 
strong significant effect on growth only indirectly through the private investment 
channel. However, the rationale of these indicators, while neglecting the other 
dimensions of FD (i.e. expenditure, transfers), and the reverse causality of the FD-
economic growth relationship especially when investigating its indirect effect, are 
considered as potential explanations of the insignificant results when investigating the 
direct effect. More explanation regarding the appropriateness of the methodology used 
and control variables are required to validate the empirical findings.  
                                                          
33 Dummy variable if regional government has the responsibility of providing regional roads and 
dummy variable if regional government has the responsibility of providing education. 
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Another study conducted in Spain is the one of Carrion-i-Silvestre et al. (2008), which 
found that FD has a negative effect on economic growth at the aggregated level of 
Spain but a positive economic effect in those regions where FD is high, while stressing 
the Prud’homme argument (recall Section 2.3.1) over the existence of a critical level 
of FD to be conducive to growth. Further, an attempt to verify whether a nonlinear 
relationship holds for the case of Spain, Gil-Serrate and Lopez-Laborda (2006) and 
Cantarero and Gonzales (2009) fail to suggest such relationship between FD and 
regional growth. 
Developing countries 
The evidence from developing economies mostly suggests that FD enhances regional 
economic growth. The recent major contributions are from Indonesia, Iran, Pakistan, 
amongst others South Africa. Unlike the studies in developed countries, studies using 
expenditure and revenue decentralisation as an indicator of FD suggest that spending 
decentralisation contributes to economic growth, whereas revenue decentralisation is 
found to be harmful to regional growth (Ismail and Hamzah, 2004; Shahdani et al., 
2012). Similarly, the studies that use only expenditure decentralisation as a measure 
of FD, although some of them incorporate measures of political decentralisation, argue 
that FD boosts economic growth (Samimi et al., 2010; Pal and Roy, 2010). One of the 
key studies in this field is that of Ismail and Hamzah (2004), which assess the effect 
of the implementation process of FD on the Indonesian regional growth. By using a 
dataset of 26 provinces for the periods of 1992-2002, the estimated model suggests 
that only revenue decentralisation is negatively correlated with economic growth both 
in short term and in the long term. Other evidence on developing countries, 
unfortunately, do not deeply investigate the effect of FD on growth such as 
investigating whether FD through enhanced resource allocation, accountability or/and 
competition affects growth. A common weakness of all the studies from developing 
countries is the little attention paid to the real decision-making power of local 
governments and the intergovernmental transfers from central government, as such, it 
is assumed that the level of share in revenue indicates the level of autonomy in local 
governments, which is likely to distort the estimated effect of FD on growth. 
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Transition economies 
Mostly due to its need to decentralise, empirical research in Russia has emerged lately, 
though still limited at regional level. The findings turn out to be mixed, from positive 
effect of fiscal autonomy (Desai et al., 2005) to negative impact of expenditure 
decentralisation to regional growth (Yushkov, 2015). Contrary to the conventional 
expectations and findings, greater transfers from the federal government are conducive 
to growth, highlighting the advantage of regional government in better allocating the 
funds according to the region’s needs. Another explanation could be related to the 
flypaper effect (also known as money sticks where it hits), which reduces the excessive 
expenditure decentralisation at regional level and funds are spent efficiently.34 
China, on the other hand, remains a country where the FD-growth relationship has 
been widely investigated at subnational level. Studies provide a mixture of FD 
measures, economic growth measures and estimation techniques. Despite this variety, 
empirical findings based on panel data analysis, come up with more significant results 
than findings from national level. These studies suggest that the devolution process 
was conducive to China’s economic growth, where in most cases it has been found to 
make a positive and robust contribution (Qi, 1992; Qian and Weingast, 1997; Ma, 
1997; Lin and Liu, 2000; Jin et al., 2005; Ding, 2007). Studies attribute this 
contribution to several factors. Jin and Zou (2005) attribute the positive effect of 
revenue decentralisation to the increased mobilisation of revenues from local sources, 
which improves the overall fiscal performance and induces economic growth. Further, 
Qi (1992), Qian (1999) and Jin et al. (2005) argue that the fiscal system in China has 
provided adequate incentives for local governments to stimulate local economies, 
while also avoiding revenue predation from the central government and holding to its 
own financial resources for investment that promotes economic growth.   
Lin and Liu (2000), on the other hand, argue that mainly the increased efficiency of 
resource allocation and to a lesser extent the increased capital investment by local 
governments are the two channels of transmission through which FD impacts regional 
growth. Using marginal retention rate as a measure of FD, the study stresses the 
unequivocal contributing role of FD to growth in China over 1970-1993 period, by 
                                                          
34 The flypaper effect refers to the phenomena where local expenditure stimulus is greater from 
intergovernmental transfers than an equivalent increase in income (Lalvani, 2002).  
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comparing the process of devolution to technological changes with a long-lasting 
effect. Apart from FD, the study emphasises also other institutional arrangements (i.e. 
household responsibility system at rural level), which favoured the increased 
efficiency of local governments by allocating a bigger portion of their revenues to 
high-productivity areas. Despite these enthusiastic findings and introduction of a 
measure for local fiscal incentives, the empirical results could be challenged as the 
analysis neglects important dimensions of FD (spending and transfers), neither 
controls for important determinates of growth (e.g. human capital), nor pays attention 
to estimations problems (e.g. endogeneity, cross-sectional dependence between 
regions). 
Alternatively, other studies provide evidence of a negative economic effect of FD 
(Zhang and Zou, 1998; 2001; Young, 2000; 2002). Zhang and Zou (1998) claim that 
central government is in a better position to undertake public investment with nation-
wide externalities in the early stage of economic development, which in the presence 
of aggressive decentralisation may crowd out the public investment. The central 
government, especially in developing and transition economies, are constrained in 
their limited resources for public investment in national priorities (railways, highways, 
telecommunications etc.), expenditure which has a far more significant impact across 
jurisdictions than in each province. Further, this study suggests that the impact of FD 
on economic growth should be measured relative to the stage of a country’s 
development and the existing expenditure and revenue assignments. Further, Young 
(2000) claims that FD stimulated local protectionism in China by also duplicating 
some investment of central government, which in turn impacted growth negatively. In 
the context of China, it seems pertinent to note that the lack of local democratic 
elections and controlled migration across regions, might danger one of the 
fundamentals of decentralisation, the Tiebout mechanism, where people vote by their 
feet. 
Interestingly, there are also other two studies which challenge the conventional 
wisdom over the relationship between FD and economic growth in China. First, the 
findings of Jin and Zou (2005) suggest that the divergence rather than convergence in 
revenue and expenditure of local government contributes to economic growth. 
Namely, FD can contribute to growth if the local government are responsible only for 
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collecting money, whereas central government in spending it. Second, Huang and 
Cheng (2005) suggest that the FD-growth relationship in China is nonlinear 
conjecturing a U-shaped curve, different from the inverse U-shaped suggested at many 
studies at national level. Hence, this study indicates that initially FD effects negatively 
on local economic growth and after the critical value it contributes to higher regional 
growth. 
However, it is important to note that results from China as a transition economy do 
not hold for all the other countries in general and ETEs in particular. At regional level, 
unfortunately, empirical evidence from ETEs is limited only to studies with 
descriptive statistics or with substantial methodological problems. Naumets (2003) 
provides evidence of FD-growth relationship from a panel of 24 Ukrainian regions 
from 1996 to 2000. Despite the short time span and the absence of a fully specified 
model, the study suggests negative, though not robust impact of the share of own 
revenue from consolidated regional revenue on subnational growth. 
 
 (ii) Theoretical framework followed  
Most of the empirical literature on FD and growth at subnational level is not based on 
an explicit theoretical framework. Endogenous and exogenous growth models are 
among the mostly used growth models. However, additionally, Tosun and Yilmaz 
(2008) and Hammond and Tosun (2009) employ a spatial error model for testing the 
FD-growth relationship. Both studies confirm the positive association between the 
number of municipalities (fragmentation) and income growth. Given the innovative 
measures of FD used in these two studies, comparisons with other studies investigating 
the FD-growth relationship are difficult to be made. Regarding studies using 
conventional measures, it becomes difficult to depict any trend whether studies 
following an endogenous growth model find more/less positive effect than those 
employing an exogenous growth model. Instead, the country’s level of income does 
provide some weak evidence that less developed countries (developing and transition) 
offer more positive results than the ones with high-income levels.  
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(iii) Methodology 
In spite of the extensive number of studies having assessed empirically the relationship 
between FD and regional growth, empirical literature seems to have suffered from 
estimation bias due to omission of important determinants of economic growth and all 
dimensions of FD measures used. To the complexity of accurately measuring FD is 
also added the potential prevalence of endogeneity, which often is neglected in the 
empirical research. Studies that have tackled endogeneity at regional level have used 
either the lagged levels of FD (only transfers from central government) (Lin and Liu, 
2000; Feld et al., 2004; Rodriguez-Pose et al., 2009; Yushkov, 2015) or the bargaining 
power through the number of population represented by the vote in legislative 
chambers (Feld et al., 2009a, p.16). In terms of estimation methods, it seems that the 
above studies do not introduce dynamic estimation methods or more contemporary 
ones to estimate the FD-economic growth relationship. The majority of the studies 
employ an OLS or a FE, though the structure of the data might be suitable for other 
estimation techniques and the estimation biasness might still prevail. Partly justified 
by the lack of data at regional level, investigating the FD-economic growth 
relationship at regional level remains a challenge, though studies agree, to a large 
extent, that such relationship is better uncovered at regional level given the origin of 
FD at lower levels of aggregation. 
2.5 Conclusions 
Throughout this chapter, the relationship between FD and economic growth has been 
elaborated in the light of different schools of thought. As being an underdeveloped 
issue in the public finance literature, decentralisation was mainly assessed in the 
context of the mainstream theory. This chapter, however, made the first attempt 
distinguish between the neoclassical and endogenous FD-growth models and shed 
light to the theoretical foundation of the relationship between FD and economic 
growth. These two, often claimed as ad hoc, theoretical framework claim the 
contributing role of FD, mainly measured by expenditure decentralisation, to 
economic growth, while also pointing toward an optimal level of decentralisation. The 
lack of a solid theoretical foundation which could explain the mechanism from which 
FD might contribute to economic growth was blamed as a substantial drawback in this 
literature. By redesigning and adding channels of transmission necessary to 
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understand this relationship, this chapter contributes by distinguishing and 
incorporating them into (i) direct channels of transmission (efficiency criteria, pro-
business environment, and fiscal response) and (ii) indirect channels of transmissions 
(macroeconomic stability, size of government etc.).  
Despite the limited theoretical guidance, an extensive number of studies have assessed 
the FD-economic growth relationship. Unfortunately, the empirical evidence has left 
us without clear assessments regarding the potential effects of FD on economic 
growth, channels of transmission, empirical specification and whether the potential 
effect of FD on growth differ subject to the level of investigation. Overall, this 
comprehensive empirical literature at all levels of investigation (national and 
subnational) has generated mixed and contradictory results regarding the sign and 
magnitude of the FD-growth relationship. However, the level of investigation, whether 
a study is conducted at national or subnational level, shed some light on the ambiguity 
of the empirical results, by agreeing on the insignificance of the FD-economic growth 
relationship at national level and on greater economic effect observed at subnational 
level. Disaggregating this relationship at lower levels of government might better 
uncover the economic effect of FD by exploring the complexity of the latter and 
avoiding the risk of individual subnational unit effects to cancel out with each other 
and result in a (potential) distorted overall economic effect of FD. 
To a large extent, the complexity and multidimensionality of FD are attributed as one 
of the main reasons, which exacerbates the ambiguity of empirical findings. The 
ability to incorporate all dimensions of FD (expenditure, revenue/tax and 
intergovernmental transfers) is relevant in better understanding the economic effect of 
FD, both directly and indirectly, which is often neglected by empirical research. Also, 
different country and sample characteristics evolving differently across time and 
countries are possible explanations for this lack of conclusive empirical results. To 
take a step beyond all the FD-growth relationship research and the ambiguity 
associated with it, a Meta-Regression Analysis focusing on the empirical studies will 
be undertaken in the next chapter. 
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3.1 Introduction 
Despite the limited theoretical guidance, the empirical research on the FD-economic 
growth relationship has widely spurred in the last twenty years, though being unable 
to provide conclusive evidence on the economic effect of FD, neither for the 
magnitude nor the significance of this effect. Some studies provide evidence of a 
positive effect of FD on economic growth (Lin and Liu, 2000; Behnisch et al., 2003), 
while others claim the detrimental (Xie et al., 1999; Rodriguez-Pose and Kroijer, 
2009) or even insignificant (Woller and Philips, 1998; Thornton, 2007) impact. The 
empirical literature review provided in the previous chapter suggested that findings 
from the empirical research are widely heterogeneous, which is mostly attributed to 
the differences in country characteristics, FD measures, time spans and estimation 
methods used. Such heterogeneity and the limited consensus on the economic effect 
of FD are the core factors which have motivated this chapter. 
In order to take a step beyond all these studies and the ambiguity of their results, this 
chapter undertakes a Meta-Regression Analysis (MRA) to synthesise and evaluate the 
consistency of the existing research using statistical methods (Stanley et al., 1989). 
An MRA can shed light on the determinants that drive the (in)significance of the FD-
economic growth relationship, while also identifying the statistical framework that 
characterises a genuine empirical effect. Generally speaking, the aim of MRA is to 
combine comparable estimates, of a specific effect, from different studies and relate 
them to one or more characteristics of the studies. 
The use of MRA in economics is not so common as compared to medicine or 
psychology, where it has a long-standing tradition. However, not very recently, 
Stanley (1989) and Stanley and Doucouliagos (2012) introduced and further 
developed techniques to investigate empirical reviews in economics. Applications can 
already be found in a range of fields, which includes labour economics (Jarell and 
Stanley, 1990; Stanley and Doucouliagos, 2007), international trade (Disdier and 
Head, 2008; Cipollina and Salvatici, 2007; Coric and Pugh, 2008), and development 
economics (Abreu et al., 2005; Doucouliagos and Ulubasoglu, 2008; Efendic et al., 
2011). Evidence of MRA can also be found in the public finance field in general 
(Nijkamp and Poot, 2004, Costa-Font et al., 2011, Ligthart and Martin Suarez, 2011) 
and FD in particular (Feld et al., 2009b; Baskaran et al., 2016; Zhenfa and Wei, 2016).  
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In the context of this chapter, the MRA provides a comprehensive statistical approach 
to estimating the FD-economic growth empirical effects. More specifically, our MRA 
is conducted to determine: 
(i) the causes of the heterogeneity among the FD-economic growth empirical 
studies 
(ii) the presence of publication bias in the FD-economic growth empirical studies,  
(iii) the existence of the genuine effect, after controlling for the sources of the 
heterogeneity and accounting for publication selection bias, in the FD-
economic growth empirical literature. 
Previously, the existing MRAs in the FD-economic growth relationship (Feld et al., 
2009b; Baskaran et al., 2016; Zhenfa and Wei, 2016) investigated only the first issue, 
while ignoring the degree of infection of this literature by the publication bias and the 
presence, if any, of a genuine effect. It is important to note that a comprehensive MRA 
accounts for all the above issues, while paying attention to a rigorous protocol, as 
suggested by Stanley and Doucouliagos (2012). Therefore, our research presents an 
extension of the existing MRA, by providing a comprehensive meta-analysis which 
relies on an unbiased assessment of the FD-economic growth empirical literature. 
The structure of the chapter emerges along the following lines. After the introduction, 
Section 3.2 provides an overview of MRA, which additionally emphasises the 
difference of our approach compared to the existing MRA studies of Feld et al. 
(2009b) and Baskaran et al. (2016). To the best of the author’s knowledge these are 
the only studies conducted on the relationship between FD and economic growth 
(although the latter is only a revised version of the former). In Section 3.3 we proceed 
by discussing the methodology followed in coding the empirical studies and 
constructing the meta-sample. Descriptive statistics are offered to better understand 
the heterogeneity of the sample. Section 3.4 provides a general framework to model 
economic research and tackle different problems such as publication bias, genuine 
empirical effect and heterogeneity between studies. The variables that could 
potentially explain the excess variation in the empirical results and the methods used 
for an MRA are additionally discussed in this section. The fifth section will present 
and discuss the MRA results. Finally, Section 3.6 concludes. 
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3.2 Rationale for an MRA and Search Strategy 
3.2.1 Rationale for an MRA 
The empirical review in Chapter 3 revealed a significant systematic variation in the 
reported estimates of the economic effect of FD, which was linked to differences in 
country development, research design and temporal dynamics. Namely, the model 
specification, type of data, number of observations, and publication status of the 
research were considered as potential factors influencing the effects’ variation. Similar 
conclusions were also reached by existing studies in the field (Thiessen, 2003, 
Martinez-Vazquez and McNab, 2006, Rodriguez et al., 2007, Thornton, 2007, Feld et 
al., 2009b). Drawing on this qualitative literature review, which sometimes may rely 
on subjective judgment, it appears difficult to unequivocally outline the role of FD on 
economic growth. Hence, starting from an agnostic view of what the impact of 
decentralisation could be, this thesis employs an MRA to go beyond such qualitative 
and subjective judgements. 
An MRA provides a comprehensive quantitative review of the estimated results from 
different studies collected, enabling in principle the identification of various sources 
of heterogeneity between empirical studies, and the quantification of the presence of 
a genuine effect and publication bias (Rose and Stanley, 2005). Whilst the first two 
issues were indirectly tackled in the previous MRA literature, publication bias seems 
to be ignored, which is surprising given the severe doubts casted in economics. 
 This problem exists when editors, reviewers and/or researchers are more likely to 
publish research with statistically significant results (Stanley, 2008) that are consistent 
with the theory (Stanley, 2008; Costa-Font et al., 2011). Researchers can be easily 
overwhelmed by publication bias given the abundant available econometric models. 
If the results are insignificant, models are frequently re-specified and re-estimated 
until significant estimates are found. Alternatively, published papers might suffer from 
the biased tendency of journals towards significant results. It may be argued that 
studies selected for publication are likely to have more optimistic (overestimated) 
results than studies producing insignificant or unconventional results, which in turn, 
are less likely to be published. The failure to report non-significant empirical results 
also known as the file-drawer effect (Rosenthal, 1979), since these studies, which 
show no effect, are just filed away. Thus, it is argued that publication bias occurs 
84 
 
whenever the published literature is systematically unrepresentative of the population 
of completed studies (Rothstein et al., 2005, p.1). In order to avoid potential selection 
bias from selecting only published studies, which might amplify the existing 
publication bias, our MRA will include studies both published in (i) peer-review 
journals or/and as a book chapter and (ii) published as working and discussion paper, 
master and PhD thesis.  
Thereafter, all existing studies that empirically investigate a certain relationship (in 
our case the effect of FD on growth) are collected. The variable of interest in a general 
MRA is the measure of the relationship between the focal predictor and the outcome 
of interest in the original studies. The simplest MRA is the one that regresses the 
reported estimates (such as t-value, coefficients or partial correlation) with its standard 
error (Ashenfelter et al., 1999). Then, it is necessary to depict all the characteristics of 
the sample of studies and add them as additional variables/factors that influence the 
conditional expectation of the effect size (Stanley and Doucouliagos, 2012). These 
variables, known as moderator variables, are likely to explain the heterogeneity across 
studies (year of publication, type of publication, type of estimation). All these steps 
(selection of studies and depicting their characteristics) shall be explained more in 
details in the next sections.  
 
3.2.2 Search Strategy and Selection Criteria of the Included Studies 
The Meta-Regression approach is based on the premise that individual studies have 
used either a neoclassical production function, as already mentioned in Section 2.4.1, 
or an informal growth function incorporating decentralisation variables with other 
growth-related variables. A very general form of this function is as follows: 
Yit = f(Xit , FDit )     (3.1) 
 
where Yit is a measure of economic growth for country i at time t, X is a vector of 
control variables (growth rate of population, a measure of the country’s human capital 
stock, the investment ratio, the country’s initial GDP, amongst others, the degree of 
openness) and FD is a measure of fiscal decentralisation.  
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A comprehensive search was carried out to identify all empirical studies reporting 
estimates of the effect of FD on economic growth. The search process included 
Scopus, ScienceDirect, EconBiz database, EconLit database, Google Scholar and 
references of the studies.35 Keywords used in the search were “fiscal decentralisation 
+ economic growth”, “FD + economic performance”, “federalism + economic 
growth”. Whilst only publications written in English were selected, we do not expect 
this to be a source of bias. Stanley and Doucouliagos (2012, p.15) argue that such bias, 
if any, from omitting non-English studies shall not be of particular importance. 
Further, according to them (p.15), the translation of these non-English papers might 
be insufficient and often imprecisely understood.  
The full search identified 117 potential papers. However, not all of them are included 
in our meta-sample. Only papers that conduct an empirical analysis and explicitly 
report the effect size of the economic effect of FD (either the t-statistics or the 
coefficient and the standard errors) are considered as primary studies. In addition to 
the papers that did not report any estimation of the FD-economic growth relationship, 
we excluded all papers which are very different in terms of either the dependent or 
independent variables included in their regressions36. Otherwise, the meta-sample 
would be excessively heterogeneous, which in turn would hamper the ability to draw 
conclusions on the presence of genuine effect or publication bias. Also, from the 
sample, we excluded other three empirical papers of Bodman et al. (2009b), McLure, 
(2006), Asatryan (2011) and Asatryan and Feld (2013) that use Bayesian and Paretian 
approaches, from which it is not possible to identify an effect size of the economic 
effect of FD. Finally, this led us to a sample of 49 empirical papers, as shown in Table 
3.1, which sourced 1001 point estimates.  
 
 
 
                                                          
35 The search was conducted in March 2013 and revised in September 2017, where the meta-sample 
was also updated by 12 new papers (from 37 studies that were found in 2013 to a total of 49 in 2017) 
36 The studies that did not report any t-ratios: Oates 1993, Huther and Shah 1998, Xin-Qiao 2000, 
Wescott and Porter 2002, Breuss and Eller 2004, Vo 2006, Pepinsky and Wihardja 2009, Tabata 2009, 
Feld and Schnellenbach 2010, Qarri and Mishtaku 2010, Esteban-Laleona 2011, Aristovnik 2012. On 
the other hand, Enkilopov and Zhuravskaya 2007, Hallwood and McDonald 2008, Yakita 2011 estimate 
the effect of fiscal decentralization on income inequality, macroeconomic stability, agglomeration, 
migration etc. 
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Table 3.1. List of primary studies used in the MRA database chronologically ordered 
Davoodi and Zou (1998) Huang and Cheng (2005) Bodman et al. (2009a) 
Woller and Philips (1998) Iimi (2005) Cantarero and Gonzales (2009) 
Zhang and Zou (1998) Jin and Zou (2005) Feld et al. (2009) 
Yilmaz (1999) Thiessen (2005) Rodriguez-Pose and Kroijer (2009) 
Lin and Liu (2000) Wilgender (2005) Sagbas et al. (2009) 
Im and Lee (2001) Ismail and Hamzah (2006) Khattak et al. (2010) 
Ebel and Yilmaz (2002) Kim (2006) 
Rodriguez-Pose and Ezcurra 
(2010) 
Akai and Sakata (2002) Malik et al. (2006) Samimi et al. (2010) 
Naumets (2003) 
Martinez-Vazquez and McNab 
(2006) Bodman and Ford (2011) 
Thiessen (2003) Akai et al. (2007) Buser (2011) 
Eller (2004) Ding (2007) Devkota (2011) 
Feld et al. (2004) Khamaladze (2007) Faridi (2011) 
Ismail et al. (2004) Rodriguez-Pose et al. (2007) Philip and Isah (2012) 
Meloche et al. (2004) Thornton (2007) Stoilova and Patonov (2012) 
Desai et al. (2005) Qiao et al. (2008) Gemmell et al. (2013) 
Feltenstein and Iwata (2005) Tosun and Yilmaz (2008)  
Gil-Serrate and Lopez-Lobarda 
(2006) Baskaran and Feld (2009)  
 
 
3.3 The Meta-Regression Methodology 
3.3.1 Effect Size 
Different from other datasets, the meta-sample consists of economic estimates of a 
certain relationship, in our case the economic effect of FD, which are connected to 
different characteristics of the research process (Stanley and Doucouliagos, 2012). In 
order to have estimates, also known as effect sizes, comparable across our meta-
sample, it is necessary to rely on best practices of MRA in economics. Although the 
MRA literature offers a wide variety of measuring the effect sizes, the most commonly 
used are the partial correlation coefficients, t-statistics and elasticities.37 Whilst 
intuitively one might think of the plain coefficient as the effect size (given that the 
economic interpretation relies on the size of such coefficients), this, however, is not 
considered appropriate in an MRA.  
Following Costa-Font et al. (2011), Genc et al. (2011), and Stanley and Doucouliagos 
(2012), the use of regression coefficients as a measure of the effect size jeopardises 
the comparability of estimates across studies, which is particularly aggravated by the 
abundance measure of the variable of interest. With reference to our research, 
                                                          
37 See Stanley and Doucouliagos (2012, p.29) on overview of measures of effect sizes used in 
economics. 
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measuring FD in many ways generates effect sizes that are difficult to compare and, 
foremost, are not dimensionless. Such comparability is also hampered by the 
differences in the scale of measurement of FD. For instance, expenditure 
decentralization might be measured either as a share of local government’s 
expenditure to general government expenditure or as a change in this share. Hence, it 
is necessary to standardise such effect sizes so that they can be compared across 
studies. Stanley and Doucouliagos (2012, p.24) suggest the use of a unitless measure 
of the association between variables: Partial Correlation Coefficient (PCC). The PCC 
is a standardised measure of the degree of association between a dependent and 
independent variable (Greene, 2008) while holding all other variables constant. Such 
measure shows the strength and the direction of an association between the two 
abovementioned variables. PCC produces unitless effect sizes, which in turn allows 
for comparison among each independent study (Efendic et al., 2011; Alptekin and 
Levine, 2012). Although it is not a common practice for the empirical research to 
report PCCs, they can be calculated using the conventionally reported regression 
statistics. The PCC, along with its standard errors (SE) are calculated using the 
following formula: 
PCC = ௧
ඥ(௧మାௗ௙)
       (3.1) 
SE =ට
(ଵି ௉஼஼మ)
ௗ௙
      (3.2) 
where PCC represents the partial correlation coefficient between FD and its effect on 
growth, t denotes the t-value of the regression coefficient (on the independent variable 
FD) df is the regression’s degrees of freedom. Therefore, the t-statistics (if not, we 
have calculated them given the coefficient and the standard error and/or have 
approximated from the reported levels of statistical significance) should be collected 
from each primary study of our meta-sample. Eventually, all the PCCs from the jth 
specification of the ith study are straightforwardly calculated.   
However, due to some mild critics regarding the non-normality distributions of the 
PCC (Stanley and Doucouliagos, 2012, p.25), many MRA studies opt for a different 
measure of the effect size: the t-values. Similar to PCC, the t-statistic is a standardised 
measure of the parameter of interest (Stanley and Jarell, 1989, p.304), though, it has 
been criticised for three main drawbacks. Following Becker and Wu (2007), the use 
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of t-values indicates neither the magnitude of the effect of interest, nor the economic 
significance of the effect of a variable of interest. All it represents is the statistical 
significance for the null hypothesis about the parameter slope. Although, the t-
statistics improves the problem of dimensionless (Feld et al., 2009b; Yeung, 2009 and 
Genc et al., 2011), still, it is difficult to be interpreted, nor it has a predictable statistical 
power (Stanley and Doucouliagos, 2012, p.28). Hence, PCC appears superior to 
regression coefficients, t-values or any other measure of the effect size, while also 
being consistent with the best practices regarding the MRA (i.e. Doucouliagos and 
Laroche, 2003; Efendic et al., 2011; Doucouliagos and Paldam, 2012, Stanley and 
Doucouliagos, 2012).  
Another concern related to the effect size is the overrepresentation of studies that 
report multiple estimates compared to those that report only a few. Such variation in 
the number of estimates from study to study appear to be very common in economics 
in general and in the FD-economic growth literature in particular.38 To address this 
issue, estimates are weighted as to ensure that each study is equally represented in the 
dataset, irrespective of number of estimates supplied, as suggested by the best 
practices in the MRA literature (Stanley and Doucouliagos, 2012; Efendic et al., 
2011). The weights are calculated using the formula: weights=1/(number of reported 
estimates). However, additional need for caution should be taken in our meta-sample 
where variations are observed not only in the number of estimates but also in the 
number of specifications. For instance, the studies of Davoodi and Zou (1998) and 
Buser (2011) both report 30 effect sizes, however they come from a different number 
of specifications, more specifically from 30 and 15 specifications, respectively. It is 
argued that such pronounced heterogeneity between specifications and studies comes 
from the difference in the number of FD measures (e.g. the Davoodi and Zou, 1998 
uses only one measure of FD, Buser, 2011 uses two measures of FD). Hence, it is 
necessary to consider a specific weighting, different from the conventional one, so that 
effect size will be equally represented within specifications of the same study, 
irrespective of the number of FD used. To the best of author’s knowledge this the first 
study that accounts for such weighting in MRA, more specifically for equal 
representation of effect size across specifications (specification weights) and studies 
                                                          
38 This has been amplied when studies started reporting estimates from the robustness check. 
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(study weights)39. For example, in the case of Davoodi and Zou’s (1998) study, which 
reports 30 estimates from specification using only one measure, the study weight will 
be 1/30, whereas the specification weight will be 1 (given that each specification report 
only one estimate). Alternatively, if these 30 estimates come from 15 specifications (2 
measures per specification) as in the case of Buser (2011), then the specification 
weights and the study weights will be different from each other. Namely, the 
specification weights will be 1/2, so as each estimate will be equally represented 
within the same specification. Consequently, the study weights will be calculated as 
the ratio of specification weights divided by the total number of specifications in the 
study, namely 0.5/15. In the end, each estimate from both studies will have a weight 
of 1/30 (or equivalently to 0.5/15), thus assuring that estimates of these two studies 
will be equally represented in the meta-sample.   
 
3.3.2 Bivariate MRA Methodology 
a) Detecting Publication Bias 
The predisposition of researcher and reviewers towards statistically significant results 
and consistent with the conventional view, namely publication bias, appears to be a 
major problem in economics, which can distort any qualitative or quantitative 
literature review (Stanley and Doucouliagos, 2012). However, it is possible to identify 
and correct the contamination of a literature by the presence of the publication 
selection bias. An initial method of detecting this problem is the visual analysis of a 
funnel plot (Stanley and Doucouliagos, 2010) of the inverse of the standard error 
(1/SE) of the point estimates, also referred as the precision, against the non-
standardised estimates (PCC). Whilst the precision, a measure of variability, is placed 
at the vertical axis, it is expected that large sample studies will yield relatively more 
precise estimates, distributed around the true effect, than small sample studies with 
less accurate estimates, asymmetrically dispersed around the true effect. Graphically, 
there will be no presence of publication bias if these estimates will vary randomly and 
symmetrically around the real effect. Contrary, the asymmetric dispersion of estimates 
                                                          
39 As an example, the double weighting procedure calculations for two papers are presented in Appendix 
3.1. 
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around the true effect will signal the presence of publication bias.40 Such graphical 
analysis would resemble, generally, an inverted funnel.41  
 
b) FAT-PET using WLS 
Although the funnel graph is considered a useful instrument in MRA, it still does not 
provide any reliable statistical evidence for detecting publication bias. By using more 
systematic tools in identifying publication bias, Egger et al. (1997) and Stanley and 
Doucouliagos (2012) utilise a linear regression as presented in Equation (3.3). 
 
effecti = 𝛽଴෢ + 𝛽ଵ෢ SEi + 𝜀పෝ      (3.3) 
where effecti denotes the reported coefficient of the effect of FD on growth, derived 
from the sth study, SEi denotes the standard error of the estimates. However, as argued 
before, the effect size should not be measured by the plain coefficients, nor by the 
elasticities or any other measure not used in economics. Rather, recalling Section 
3.3.1, the use of PCC is considered as more appropriate in the context of our 
investigation. Thus, the base regression, although we estimate a modification of it for 
reasons explained below, is:  
PCCi = 𝛽଴෢ + 𝛽ଵ෢ SEi + 𝜀పෝ      (3.4) 
The estimated intercept term (𝛽଴෢) provides an estimate of the real effect, while the 
slope of this equation (𝛽ଵ෢) measures the presence of publication bias and 𝜀௜is the 
estimated error term. In the presence of publication bias, the estimated intercept will 
be statistically significant with a sign signalling the direction of the publication bias. 
While SEi converges to zero, the expected value of the effect size will converge to 𝛽଴෢ 
. Hence, testing for 𝛽ଵ෢= 0 implies a test for the presence of publication bias (Dimos 
                                                          
40 The real effect is also known as the “true” effect or the effect size and is the representative of estimates 
collected in the primary studies. 
41 The literature also suggests the use of other types of funnels such as the scatter plot of the non-
standardised estimates and the sample size. This graphical technique, different from the 
abovementioned, assumes that larger sample studies offer more precise estimates than small sample 
studies. This is because the latter are more likely to re-estimate until they find significant estimates, 
because the large standard errors vary randomly around the real effect. 
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and Pugh, 2016, p.803). Alternatively, testing for 𝛽଴෢=0 constitutes a test for the 
existence of the genuine effect.  
However, a glaring problem with Equation (3.4) is the presence of heteroscedasticity. 
The variation of PCC, consequently 𝜀పෝ , is not constant (Stanley, 2005; 2008). The 
difference in the sample sizes used in primary studies and estimation methods are 
likely to produce heteroscedastic random estimation errors (Stanley and Jarell, 2006). 
To correct for any potential heteroscedasticity, Weighted Least Squares (WLS) is 
usually employed by using the inverse standard errors as weights (Stanley and 
Doucouliagos, 2012; Pugh et al., 2012). Thus, Equation (3.4) is divided by the 
standard error of the partial correlation coefficient (or multiplied by the inverse 
standard errors), as shown below: 
௉஼஼௜
ௌா೔
 = 𝛽ଵ෢ + 𝛽଴෢ 
ଵ
ௌா೔
 + ఌഢෝ
ௌா೔
     (3.5) 
Following the mathematical transformation provided in Pugh (2012), it is important 
to note that the ratio of PCC to SEi yields the same t-statistics as extracted from the 
primary studies.42 Therefore, Equation (3.5) can be written as: 
ti = 𝛽ଵ෢ + 𝛽଴෢ 
ଵ
ௌா೔
 + 𝑣పෝ        (3.6) 
Dividing Equation (3.4) by the standard errors of the PCC reverses the slope and the 
intercept, while parameters 𝛽଴෢ and 𝛽ଵ෢  remain the same. Thus, the former is a measure 
of a genuine effect, whereas the latter provides a measure of the presence of 
publication bias. Finally, following Stanley (2005; 2008), testing whether these two 
coefficients are different from zero becomes a test of the Funnel Asymmetry Test 
(FAT) and the Precision Effect Test (PET). Equation (3.6), namely FAT-PET, is also 
known as the bivariate MRA.  
Before any further explanation of the procedure, it is important to note that the MRA 
literature (Stanley, 2008; Stanley and Doucouliagos, 2011) pays particular focus to 
diagnostics, mostly, related to the functional form. A linear approximation of this 
equation might produce a biased estimate of the real effect, which could be inflated 
when standard errors are very high. Also, additional bias might rise, especially in the 
                                                          
42 See Appendix 3.1.2 for mathematical transformation of Equation (3.3) to (3.4). 
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PET coefficient due to the presence of publication bias. To confirm the consistency of 
the PET estimate, the literature suggests an additional test, such as the Precision Effect 
Estimate Standard Error (PEESE), which will be introduced below.43 
 
c) FAT-PET using FE 
As anticipated in the previous section, all the primary studies in our meta-sample 
report more than one effect size, namely, from 2 in Devkota (2011) to 86 in Rodriguez 
Pose et al. (2007). Whilst we addressed the problem of multiple measures per study 
by using a specific form of weighting across specifications and studies, there might 
still be some unmodelled between-study heterogeneity not considered. Such problem, 
known also as the dependence among the reported estimates, might be considered a 
threat in an MRA, especially when the estimates coming from multiple measures 
within the same study share common effects such as the researcher’ idiosyncratic 
choice of data and methods, quality of the research, amongst others, funding source 
(Stanley and Doucouliagos, 2012, p.68, 113). This multi-estimate research structure 
appears to be common in economics, especially when studies report robustness check 
to prove the validity of their prefered estimated results. A possible solution to this 
problem is to average the within-study estimates. However, this would drastically 
reduce the statistical power and the degrees of freedom (Stanley, 2001), as well the 
information on some study’s characteristics. Hence, following Bateman and Jones 
(2003), and Stanley and Doucouliagos (2012), an unbalanced panel of bivariate MRA 
in Equation (3.6) is used to explicitly account for the within-study heterogeneity by 
including study level effects for the ith estimate in the sth study: 
tis = 𝛽ଵ෢+ 𝛽଴෢
ଵ
ௌா೔ೞ
 +𝜇௦ෞ + 𝑣ప௦ෞ     (3.7) 
where the  𝜇௦ෞ denotes the unobserved study effects (assumed to be either “fixed” or 
“random”) and the 𝑣ప௦ෞ  denotes the error term.44 At this stage, it is important to note 
that the terms fixed and random are not used as in standard panel models, rather in an 
MRA they are simple weighted averages. The fixed-effect estimator assumes that the 
                                                          
43 Since the problem is the potential biased estimate of the real effect, the new equation is run only for 
confirming PET estimate and not publication bias (FAT). 
44 Technically speaking, the former can be replaced by a fixed-effect term, 𝛿D, where D is a 
matrix of study dummy variables. 
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effect sizes, which are drawn from the same population, are identical across studies 
and have a single mean effect (homogeneity assumption). Differences in the estimates 
are only due to sampling variation.  In this case, each reported estimate is weighted by 
the inverse of the square of its standard error (1/𝑆𝐸௜ଶ), which is considered as the 
within-study variance (Stanley and Doucouliagos, 2012 p.46). Contrary, the between-
study variance is zero, given that all studies have identical expected effect size.  
When the homogeneity assumption does not hold, thus estimates are drawn from 
different populations, the fixed-effects weights change into a more complex one by 
accommodating both the within- and between-study variance. The new weights, used 
in a random-effect estimator, are calculated as the sum of the 1/𝑆𝐸௜ଶ and the between 
study variance of 𝑆௦ଶ (sth study). In this case, the differences in the estimated effect 
comes not only from the sampling variation, as in the fixed-effects, but also from 
genuine differences in the underlying effects between studies (Harbord and Higgins, 
2008; Stanley and Doucouliagos, 2012, p.46; Reed et al., 2015).  
A note of caution seems to be in order when including study effects and its correlation 
with the control variables. Whilst the random-effects FAT-PET assumes that study 
effects are uncorrelated with the control variables (in our case the precision term), the 
fixed-effects estimator relaxes this assumption by allowing correlation between these 
variables. However, the random-effects estimator has been increasingly criticised for 
the constant violation of the above assumption, especially in the presence of 
publication bias (as reported in a simulation of Stanley, 2008). If unobservable study 
effects are correlated with the independent variable, the model will suffer from 
additional bias imposed by using a random-effects estimator. With special reference 
to the MRA conducted in economics and business, evidence from simulations and best 
practices in the MRA, it is argued that fixed-effect estimator is considered superior to 
the random-effect estimator (Stanley, 2008; Stanley and Doucouliagos, 2012). 
Simulations of Stanley (2008) and Stanley et al. (2010) show that the latter generally 
reintroduces bias in the model, especially in the presence of publication bias. Although 
the above authors argue that this might be true also for the fixed-effect estimator, they 
assure that such bias is much larger for the random- rather than fixed-effect estimator. 
To the best of author’s knowledge there is no comprehensive research conducted in 
economics, which has used random-effects panel MRA. Thereby, this leads us to use 
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only fixed-effects MRA. Technically speaking, the bivariate WLS panel model is 
estimated by weighting Equation (3.7) by the squared of the inverse standard error of 
each study (1/SE2is) or using the analytical weights in Stata.45  
An additional note of caution seems to be in order regarding the threat of dependency, 
rising from the presence of multiple measures within-study. If not properly accounted, 
the statistical significance of the standard errors and the t-values might be 
miscalculated. Although the efficiency impacted by ignoring the structure of our data 
is not considered severe in the MRA (Stanley and Doucouliagos, 2012, p.71), it still 
needs to be addressed. Following the same authors (p.71), the dependency threat shall 
be addressed by using cluster-robust standard errors (clustering by study), instead of 
conventional standard errors.46 
Also, having studies written by the same author(s) required some attention. Whilst one 
might think of clustering estimates within authors, this seems to be inappropriate given 
that such studies are different from each other regarding the set of countries under 
investigation, time span, amongst others, estimation techniques (Disdier and Head, 
2008; Costa-Font et al., 2011; Ringquist, 2009; 2013). Therefore, we proceed with the 
suggested cluster in the MRA literature: by study. 
Intuitively, estimating the FAT-PET by WLS and FE begs for explanations regarding 
their superiority. Although such answer is addressed, particularly, when accounting 
for excess heterogeneity in the literature, we follow the suggestions of Stanley and 
Doucouliagos (2013) and Dimos and Pugh (2016) by reporting both FAT-PET WLS 
and FAT-PET FE, while the former considered as the baseline model.  
d) Precision Effect Estimate Standard Error 
Whilst usually the PET is amongst the least biased estimator (Stanley and 
Doucouliagos, 2007; Moreno et al., 2009), there are cases when it identifies a false 
genuine effect by over rejecting the null hypothesis. Simulations have shown that 
                                                          
45 Alternatively this can be automatically done in Stata using the command: xi: reg t SE i.studyid 
[aweight=precision_sq] 
46 The two-way clustering, by study and specification, was also used in this research through the 
command cluster2. However, this command does not allow weighting of the estimates by the specific 
weights (or any other weights). Hence, we compared the single clustered Unweighted FAT-PET 
results with the clustered one. Interestingly, the results are almost identical (See Appendix 3.3.4), which 
might be due the fact that most studies report similar number of effects from each model.  
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PEESE yields a better estimate of the genuine effect when there are reasons to believe 
that such effect exists (Stanley and Doucouliagos, 2012, p.66), but which might be 
inflated by PET. Hence, the Precision Effect Estimate Standard Error (PEESE) is used 
as a confirmation for the PET coefficient in the presence of publication bias (Stanley 
and Doucouliagos, 2011). In Section 3.5.1, the estimate of PEESE is reported and then 
is compared to PET, as a confirmation of the consistency of latter.  
The initial equation to start with, and the transformation due to the potential 
heteroscedasticity, are as follows: 
PCCi = 𝜔଴ෞ  + 𝜔ଵෞ(SEi)2+ 𝜀పෝ      (3.8) 
ti = 𝜔ଵෞ  SEij + 𝜔଴ෞ   1/SEij +𝑣పෝ      (3.9) 
For the same reasons explained above in the FAT-PET regarding heteroscedasticity, 
it is argued that this problem might still be present when estimating Equation (3.8). 
Therefore, both sides this Equation are divided by the standard errors of the PCC, 
which derives Equation (3.9), also known as the Heckman MRA (Stanley and 
Doucouliagos, 2012). However, it should be noted that such procedure should be 
undertaken only if (i) there are reasons to believe that the literature has a non-zero 
genuine effect which PET fails to identify, and (ii) in the presence of publication bias 
and no genuine effect from FAT-PET. The interest is on the estimated 𝜔଴, which 
denotes the value of the genuine effect corrected for publication bias. Similar to the 
FAT-PET, the PEESE can be estimated by an WLS or FE, while in both cases using 
the cluster-robust standard errors and the specific weights. 
 
e) Meta Significance Testing 
Economists have taken a very keen interest in going beyond publication bias and 
detecting the genuine effect from different perspective. A pronounced characteristic 
of the genuine effect, although not explicitly claimed before, is the relation of the 
statistical power and the sample size. Namely, the standardised effect, mostly 
measured by the t-value, increases with larger samples or greater precision (Stanley 
and Doucouliagos, 2012, p.76). Initially, Card and Krueger (1995) argued that the 
statistical power increases with the square root of the sample size, a relationship which 
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could be tested using an alternative measure of the sample size, as shown in Equation 
(3.10):  
ln│ti│ = 𝜌଴ෞ+ 𝜌ଵෞlndfi + 𝜀పෝ      (3.10) 
 
Where ln│tij│ and lndfi denotes respectively the natural logarithm of t-value and the 
natural logarithm of the degrees of freedom from the ith study. This test, known as the 
Meta-Significance Test (MST) shows that if there is no real empirical effect, the test 
statistic will be independent of the degrees of freedom47 and the slope coefficient (𝜌ଵෞ) 
will be zero. Otherwise, in the presence of a genuine effect, the above coefficient will 
be statistically different from zero (Stanley, 2008), more precisely, because of the 
‘double natural logarithm’ 𝜌ଵෞ should be close to 0.5 (Stanley, 2005). Although this test 
tackles the problem of genuine effect from different perspective than the FAT-PET or 
PEESE, it has many limitations. First, it is still ambiguous whether the MST “works” 
in the presence of publication bias. Stanley and Doucouliagos (2012) argue that this 
test fails to properly investigate the presence of genuine effect because the relationship 
between the t-values and the degrees of freedom is likely to fade away in the presence 
of publication bias (Stanley and Doucouliagos, 2012). To compound the problem 
further, Stanley and Doucouliagos (2012) and Doucouliagos and Paldam (2012) argue 
that the MST often reveals type I error inflation (Stanley, 2008), namely, finding a 
genuine effect when there is none. The problem comes from the use of the absolute 
value of t-statistics before taking the natural logarithm. Consequently, taking the 
absolute value of t-statistics will cause both positive and negative t-statistics to be 
positive and large. In the presence of unexplained heterogeneity, these t-values are 
more likely to be found in large samples than in small ones; hence, escalating into a 
possible positive 𝜌ଵෞ. The former happens only in the presence of publication bias, 
otherwise MST may straightforwardly reveal the existence of a genuine effect in the 
literature.  
                                                          
47 Initially, Card and Krueger (1995) suggested the regression of the natural logarithm of t-statistics on 
the natural logarithm of the square root of sample size. However, nowadays the latter is substituted with 
the natural logarithm of degrees of freedom since it considers the number of variables into the 
regression, although they both represent statistical power. 
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Given all this limitation, which does not support the superiority of MST towards FAT-
PET and/or PEESE, the presence of publication bias and genuine effect will be tested 
through the conventional test of FAT-PET, and if needed, PEESE.  
f) Investigating Publication Bias across Time 
Whilst the chronological ordering of the meta-data might not necessarily capture any 
particular trend of the evolution of the FD-economic growth literature, more 
systematic tools to investigate potential “economic research cycle” in our field might 
be needed. Goldfarb (1995) argues that economics research has a predictable time 
trend of novelty and fashion. Initially, editors, reviewers and/or researchers are more 
likely to publish statistically significant results and in accordance with theory. After a 
certain time, when studies confirming theory are less interesting, new contradictable 
studies become a fashion, while also impacting the publication bias across time. 
Empirically, this is tested by regressing the effect size on the publication year and its 
squared term. 
tij = 𝜑଴ෞ  + 𝜑ଵෞ timei + 𝜑ଶෞ timei2 +𝜀పෝ     (3.11) 
Where tij denotes the t-value of study i, time and time2 denote the publication year and 
its square term. In this case, one should consider the significance of both 𝜑ଵෞ  and 𝜑ଶෞ  
and report whether there is any (inverse) hump-shaped relationship between the t-
value and publication year. 
 
3.3.3 Multivariate MRA Methodology 
Given the presence of a pronounced heterogeneity between studies, as suggested by 
the empirical literature review in Section 2.4, it is necessary to identify the sources of 
variation in effect sizes and then investigate these across the meta-sample (Efendic et 
al., 2011, Pugh et al., 2012, Antonis et al., 2012). First, two statistical tests are used 
to confirm the presence of heterogeneity in the FD-economic growth literature: the 
Cochran’s Q-test and I2-test (Higgins et al., 2003; Borenstien et al., 2009; Ringquist, 
2013). The Q-test is calculated as the weighted sum of squared differences between 
individual study effects and the pooled effect across studies (Harris et al., 2008), 
though this can be easily detected by the sum of squared errors of the bivariate MRA 
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without constant term.48 Whilst the Q-test statistically confirms the presence of 
heterogeneity (its significance suggests that the sample of studies suffers from definite 
heterogeneity), the I2-test measures the percentage of variation across studies that is 
due to heterogeneity rather than chance (Higgins and Thompson, 2002).49 As such, the 
latter quantifies the excess variation shown in the Q-test, where 0% shows no excess 
heterogeneity and larger values indicate the presence of great variation of estimates in 
the literature.  
By using the sum of squared errors, as suggested above, the Q-test claims the presence 
of excess heterogeneity (p-value = 0.000, while more details are presented in 
Appendix 3.3.3). Also, the I2-test reports a large value of the heterogeneity (I2 = 87%), 
which again confirms the doubts that the FD-economic growth literature contains 
excess heterogeneity. 
Hence, further investigations regarding the sources of this heterogeneity are required, 
otherwise if not counted, the MRA estimates will be biased. To explicitly account for 
this excess variation, the research dimensions, assumed to impact the estimates, are 
included in the regression together with the precision term (Stanley and Doucouliagos, 
2012). Technically speaking, the bivariate MRA is expanded by incorporating a vector 
of independent moderator variables, which are relevant study characteristics, coded as 
dummy variables (Efendic et al., 2011, Pugh et al., 2012, Antonis et al., 2012). The 
best practices in the MRA distinguish between two groups of moderator variables: (i) 
K-moderator variables capturing contextual factors influencing publication bias and 
(ii) Z-moderator variables capturing the excess heterogeneity due to different contexts 
of investigation, research design and methodological issues. This implies that both 
publication bias and genuine effect will allow for greater complexity by 
accommodating factors that influence them. Consequently, the bivariate MRA is 
transformed into a multivariate MRA as follows:  
                                                          
48 The Q-test [Q = ∑wi (yij - θ)2] measures the deviation of observed effect size (y) in a regression j of 
a study i, from an underlying overall effect size (θ), giving a weight (wi) to each study. This test is 
distributed as a chi-squared statistic with number of estimates minus 1 as degrees of freedom.   This 
test has considerable power when the number of studies in the dataset is large (Higgins et al. 2003; 
Stanley and Doucouliagos, 2012, p.45).  
49 I2 = ([Q – df] / Q) × 100% (Higgins et al. 2003). 
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ti = 𝛽ଵ෢ + ∑ 𝛿ఫ෡ 𝐾௝௜  + 𝛽଴෢
ଵ
ௌா೔
 + ∑ 𝛽௞෢
௓ೖ೔
ௌா೔
 +𝑣పෝ     (3.12) 
where 𝐾௝௜ and 𝑍௞௜ are J K-moderator and K Z-moderator variables, and their 
coefficients 𝛿ఫ෡   and 𝛽௞෢, respectively. If the unobserved study effects are taken into 
account, Equation (3.12) can be rewritten as: 
ti = 𝛽ଵ෢ + ∑ 𝛿ఫ෡ 𝐾௝௜௦ + 𝛽଴෢
ଵ
ௌா೔ೞ
 + ∑ 𝛽௞෢
௓ೖ೔ೞ
ௌாೖ೔ೞ
 +𝜇௦ෞ + 𝑣ప௦ෞ    (3.13) 
Equivalently to the bivariate MRA using FE, 𝜇௦ෞ denotes the unobserved study effects, 
which can be replaced by either a fixed- or a random-effects term. By expanding the 
discussion of Section 3.3.2, simulations of Stanley and Doucouliagos (2012; 2013) 
show that neither the FE, nor the RE outperform the WLS in the presence of excess 
heterogeneity. Moreover, in the presence of both excess heterogeneity and publication 
bias, the WLS appears to perform significantly better than the panel MRA. However, 
the authors (ibid, p.8) suggest that the RE seems to perform better than the WLS only 
when there is excess heterogeneity in the literature, but no publication bias. 
Irrespective of the result of the publication bias test, in a comprehensive MRA, it is 
necessary to always assume publication bias because of the low power of this test 
(ibid, p.11). 
 
3.3.4 Moderator Variables used in MRA 
Several moderator variables identified in the primary literature are assumed to explain 
the differences in the reported effect size. These variables, listed and defined in Table 
3.2, are also classified into K- and Z-moderator variables, influencing the publication 
bias and the excess heterogeneity, respectively (see detailed descriptive statistics in 
Appendix 3.2.2). It is worth noting that moderator variables are included in the dataset 
if there is sufficient variation between studies. Although we might think of various 
moderator variables, partly suggested by abundant MRA studies, not all of them might 
be applicable to our context of investigation. The frequency of a specific moderator 
variable across studies is used as the criteria to objectively decide on the inclusion of 
moderator variables in the dataset.50 More specifically, if a particular source of 
                                                          
50 If a specific moderator variable is used (or found in) at least from two papers, we consider the 
inclusion of this moderator variable in our dataset 
100 
 
heterogeneity can be observed in at least two studies, the moderator variable is 
included in the dataset; otherwise, it is not considered as relevant. 
An important contextual variable influencing the publication bias is the direct 
comparison of the effect sizes between studies published as journal articles and those 
published as working paper, PhD or master thesis. More specifically in our dataset, 
peer-reviewed published studies tend to report smaller effect size than the second 
group of studies, with an average t-value of -0.08 and -0.19, respectively (recall Table 
3.2). To control for potential differences in the estimates arising due to the article’s 
publication status, two dummy variables are included: published (1 when a study is 
published in a peer-reviewed journal) and unpublished (0 when a study is published 
as working paper, discussion paper, PhD and Master Thesis). 
Professional association (authors influencing each other’s works) and funding sources 
have been found to be a significant influence regarding publication bias in some MRA 
(see Doucouliagos and Laroche, 2003). We may argue that studies that explicitly 
acknowledge having received a financial support (financial) for their research might 
be more likely to publish significant and larger effect sizes than the ones that do not 
receive funding (nonfinancial). Although there is no evident indication of this 
influence, it is worth investigating through an MRA. 
To gauge the effects of different contexts of investigation related to the stages of 
development, it is necessary to make a distinction between developed, developing, 
transition and mixed countries. The dummy moderator variables transition, 
developing, developed and mixed should indicate whether there is a difference in 
empirical research results from transition versus non-transition countries (developed 
and developing). Although other MRA studies on FD have group transition economies 
with developing ones, this seems to be inappropriate in our research given the 
particular focus of this thesis on this set of countries. Although ideally, we would have 
preferred to carry out an MRA only for transition economies, this was not possible in 
the presence of limited primary studies for transition economies. Therefore, including 
these dummy variables in the model will help to better understand the excess variation 
between different groups of countries. 
An important characteristic of our meta-sample relates to the measurement of the 
dependent variable.  Although the majority of studies used a growth-related variable 
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(recall Table 3.3), it is essential to acknowledge the differences in the estimated results 
of studies that used level-related variables or entirely different measures. Hence, three 
dummy variables, related to the economic performance measure, are coded: growth, 
level and other. However, Efendic et al. (2011) conducted on economic growth argue 
that the output-growth studies and output-level studies should be considered as two 
different subsamples if they share different characteristics regarding publication bias, 
genuine effect and heterogeneity. Hence, in addition to the first approach, including 
output related dummy variables, this research will investigate the differences by 
splitting the dataset into two subsamples: output-growth and output-level studies.  
A general concern is whether the differences in the type of data (cross-sectional data, 
time-series data and longitudinal/panel data) influence the findings. Dummy variables 
for controlling such heterogeneity are included: cross, timeseries and panel. Also, 
potential differences in the estimates that might arise due to different estimation 
techniques are captured by classifying the studies into those that use OLS, fixed-
effects estimation, random-effects estimation, dynamic estimation, instrumental 
variable approach and other techniques different from the abovementioned, ols, 
paneltech, dynamic, iv and othertech, respectively. An additional estimation method 
characteristic is whether a study controls for endogeneity, which is common in IV 
approaches or GMM dynamic models. To explicitly account for excess heterogeneity 
arising from addressing endogeneity in the FD-economic growth relationship, two 
dummy variables (endog and nonendog) are included, due to potential collinearity 
with one of the above estimation method dummies. 
Because of the importance that data availability has on the FD-economic growth 
literature, it is neccessary to distinguish between data sources from which the FD 
measures are obtained/calculated. Whilst the OECD database and other individual 
country statistics databases (othersource) regarding FD data are deemed to provide 
rich information on the FD measures, the IMF (imf) appear limited especially for 
studies aiming to investigate the relationship between the autonomy of local 
government and economic growth (Sacchi and Salotti, 2014). However, the IMF data 
has the broadest coverage regarding countries and time, which is why the majority of 
primary studies has used this data source.  
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One of the most used explanatory variables in an MRA concerns the differences in 
measuring the main variable of interest, FD. Despite the continuous improvement in 
adequately measuring FD through all its dimensions (using multiple measures), a lot 
of studies still rely on a limited number of FD measures. These differences are 
captured by classifying the studies into those that used only expenditure 
decentralization (fdexp), only revenue decentralization or tax decentralization (fdrev), 
both revenue and expenditure dimension of the FD (fdexprev), the three suggested 
measures of FD (expenditure decentralization, revenue/tax decentralization and 
vertical imbalance, which are coded as threefd) and other measures not as 
abovementioned such as indeces or retention rate (otherfd). Indications from the 
empirical literature review reveal that studies might use more than one measure of the 
same category (for instance two measure of expenditure decentralisation). Hence, the 
number of FD, a continuous variable, is included accordingly in the MRA. However, 
any attempt of studies to control for the nonlinearity of the economic effect of FD, by 
using the square term of one of the FD measures, is coded as a different dummy 
variable (nonlinear and linear, when a study accounts for nonlinearity and when a 
study does not account for it, respectively). 
With respect to the main variable of interest, a moderator variable that might exert 
influences on the FD-economic growth relationship is the distinction between 
federalism and decentralisation. The primary studies do provide evidence from both 
constitutions separately and jointly, though the evidence appears mixed and 
inconclusive. Hence, accounting for this difference through three dummy variables 
(federal, unitary, and mixedconst) might help to explain the excess heterogeneity 
which might arise from different governing constitutions.  
The previous chapter revealed significant variations of estimates due to different level 
of investigation (national vs regional). It was argued that studies conducted at regional 
level tend to report higher effect sizes than the ones conducted at more aggregated 
levels. To capture potential differences arising from the level of investigation, studies 
are classified into those that conduct research at the national level (national) and 
regional level (regional). In the same vein, it might be argued that studies conducted 
for a single country tend to report larger estimates than cross-country investigations, 
which are also coded accordingly (single and multi). The rationale is that the economic 
effect of FD is likely to be more visible in a single-country investigation rather than 
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in a multiple-country investigation in which the individual country effect might be 
obscured by countries dominating the dataset. 
Many primary studies stress the importance of distinguishing between short-run and 
long-run economic effect, while arguing that FD might be considered as an 
institutional change in certain contexts of investigation which materialises into growth 
only with considerable lags. In order to investigate whether the FD-economic growth 
relationship is time-varying, studies are classified into those that investigate such 
relationship in long-run and those that investigate it in short-run, through dummy 
variables, longrun and shortrun, respectively. It should be noted, that this variable 
can control for any temporal trend in the effect sizes of FD on economic growth. Size, 
policies and visions of government change from time to time and would be of high 
interest to investigate whether these changes create variation/heterogeneity in the 
studies that estimate such effect. Alternatively, differences in reported results coming 
from a change in “fashion” (preferences of editors and publishers to publish 
fashionable results) can be controlled by publication year (puby).51 Hence, at the crux 
of the debate is whether the differences are due to “fashion” change or different time-
period effects (short-run and long-run). However, it is worth noting that the 
publication might as well be considered as a variable explaining the heterogeneity of 
studies over time, rather than the publication bias due to “fashion” change, which is 
why puby will be considered as K and also as Z in our analysis. 
                                                          
51 For the purpose of distinguishing between the Simple MRA and MRA with moderator variables we 
named this variable differently than time, which is used in Section 3.3.2.  
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Table 3.2 MRA moderator variables 
Characteristics Variable Definition Classification 
Publication 
Characteristics 
 
published Dummy, 1 if the study is published in a journal, 0 otherwise. K 
puby The year a study is published (1=1998, 2=1999 ...) Z and K 
Financial Support financial 
support 
1 if study acknowledges receiving financial support for the research, 0 otherwise. K 
Quality of 
Publication 
quality 1 is published in a high-impact journal, 0 otherwise K 
 
Structure of the 
Data 
 
cross Dummy, 1 if study employs cross-section data, 0 otherwise. Z 
panel* Dummy, 1 if study employs panel data, 0 otherwise. Z 
timeseries Dummy, 1 if study employs time series data, 0 otherwise. Z 
 
Estimation 
Technique 
 
 
 
 
ols Dummy, 1 if study uses OLS, 0 otherwise. Z 
paneltech* Dummy, 1 if study uses either Fixed Effect or Random Effect Estimator, 0 otherwise. Z 
dynamic Dummy, 1 if study uses dynamic modelling (i.e. GMM, using lags), 0 otherwise. Z 
iv Dummy, 1 if study uses IV approach, 0 otherwise. Z 
othertech Dummy, 1 if study uses other techniques than the abovementioned, 0 otherwise. Z 
Endogeneity 
 
endog Dummy, 1 if study treats the endogeneity problem, 0 otherwise. Z 
nonendog* Dummy, 1 if study does not treat the endogeneity problem, 0 otherwise. Z 
Non-linearity nonlinear Dummy, 1 if study investigates the nonlinearity of the FD-economic growth relationship, 0 
otherwise. 
Z 
 
Stages of 
Development 
 
 
developing Dummy, 1 if sample of the primary study is for developing countries, 0 otherwise. Z 
developed* Dummy, 1 if sample of the primary study is for developed country, 0 otherwise. Z 
mixed Dummy, 1 if sample of the primary study is for mixed country, 0 otherwise. Z 
transition Dummy, 1 if sample of the primary study is for transition countries, 0 otherwise Z 
 
Dependent 
Variable 
 
growth* Dummy, 1 if the dependent variable is growth related variable, 0 otherwise Z 
level Dummy, 1 if the dependent variable is a level related variable, 0 otherwise. Z 
othery Dummy, 1 if the dependent variable is neither growth nor level, otherwise 0. Z 
 unitary Dummy, 1 if the study conducts research for unitary government, 0 otherwise. Z 
federal* Dummy, 1 if the study conducts research for federal government, 0 otherwise. Z 
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Government 
constitution 
mixedconst* Dummy, 1 if the study conducts research for both unitary and federal government, 0 
otherwise. 
Z 
Level of 
Investigation 
 
national Dummy, 1 if the study conducts research at national level, 0 otherwise. Z 
regional* Dummy, 1 if the study conducts research at regional level, 0 otherwise. Z 
Number of 
Countries 
 
single Dummy, 1 if the study conducts research only for one country, 0 otherwise. Z 
multi* Dummy, 1 if the study conducts research only for multiple countries, 0 otherwise. Z 
Data Source 
 
 
imf Dummy, 1 if the study uses IMF data, 0 otherwise. Z 
othersource* Dummy, 1 if the study uses OECD or othersources than IMF, 0 otherwise. Z 
 
 
Measure of FD 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
fdexp* Dummy, 1 if the study measures FD with an expenditure decentralization measure(s), 0 
otherwise. 
Z 
fdrev Dummy, 1 if the study measures FD with a revenue decentralization measure(s), 0 
otherwise. 
Z 
fdexprev Dummy, 1 if the study uses both expenditure and revenue decentralization to measure FD, 
0 otherwise. 
Z 
threefd Dummy, 1 if the three conventional FD measures are used as the measure of FD, 0 
otherwise. 
Z 
otherfd Dummy, 1 if the study uses other measures than fdexp, fdrev, fdexprev or threefd, 
otherwise 0. 
Z 
numberfd Number of FD measures used in the regression from which the effect size is obtained Z 
Lags 
 
lags Dummy, 1 if the study uses lags of the FD measures in their regressions, 0 otherwise. Z 
Long-Run longrun Dummy, 1 if the study estimates long-run relationship between FD and growth, 0 
otherwise. 
Z 
shortrun* Dummy, 1 if the study estimates short-run relationship between FD and growth, 0 
otherwise. 
Z 
 * dummy variable considered as the base group 
Note: In the case of federal and mixedconst there are two stars given that we might consider grouping these two dummies together. 
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3.4 Descriptive Statistics 
The oldest study in our database was published in 1998 (the study of Davoodi and 
Zou, 1998), whereas the most recent one was published in 2013 (Gemmell et al., 
2013).52 Appendix 3.2.1 provides more details regarding the number of estimates by 
study. It seems that the boom of the publishing FD-economic growth research was 
during the 2004-2010 period (Figure 3.1a), which also yielded the largest number of 
estimates (Figure 3.1b).  
 
   
(a) Number of studies by year    (b) Number of estimates by year 
Figure 3.1 Number of studies and estimates by year 
 
With regards to estimates obtained from the primary studies, it seems that there is 
also a great degree of heterogeneity, with t-values ranging from -20 to 9.5 (see 
Figure 3.2). Visibly, the histogram casts doubts on some aberrant values of the 
effect size, which are likely to distort the distribution of the estimated effect of our 
variable of interest. Also, confirmed by the letter-value approach53, all 
observations that lie outside the inner fence of -7.14 and +6.97 shall be deemed as 
outliers. By avoiding the effects of all abnormal values, the total number of 
observations reduces from 1001 to 966, reporting a mean of -0.08 and a median of 
-0.06. The maximum value in our dataset is 6.93 and the minimum is -7.04, which 
suggests a high heterogeneity in the reported estimates. 
 
                                                          
52 Although the study of Gemmell et al. (2013) was published in 2013, an early version of the same 
article can be found back in 2001. 
53 The letter-value approach is applied using Stata command “lv” developed by Tukey (1977) and 
Hoaglin (1983). More details are provided in Appendix 3.3.1 
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(a) Including outliers      (b) Excluding outliers 
Figure 3.2 Distribution of t- statistics 
 
To show the heterogeneity in the reported effect size  by study, the t-values, sorted by 
publication year, are plotted in Figure 3.3. Unsurprisingly, this figure suggests a 
considerable variation of the effect of FD on economic growth, while the majority of 
them lie inside the red lines (between the -1.96 and +1.96), indicating the 
insignificance of the FD-economic growth estimates. Also, it must be noted that the 
standard deviation reported for the t-values is quite high (3.08), which leads us to 
question the causes of differences and heterogeneity in the empirical results. The latter, 
as being an important purpose of this chapter are going to be deeply investigated in 
the next sections. 
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Figure 3.3 Box Plot of the t-values reported by study 
Figure 3.3 might also be helpful to visually depict any potential time-series pattern of 
the FD-growth effect. Sorting the studies by the year of publication (from Davoodi 
and Zou, 1998 to Gemmell et al., 2013) gives a mixed picture of the fluctuations over 
time of the t-values. Whilst the initial effect (see year 1998) appears to be negative, 
accompanied by low volatility in the upcoming years, the subsequent literature reports 
relatively larger t-values, as seen by the length of bars. However, it seems difficult to 
depict a particular trend (either positive or negative) of the estimates reported over 
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years. Consequently, more advanced techniques are required to investigate such 
“fashion cycle” of our effect sizes, which will be elaborated in the next sections. 
As mentioned in Section 3.2.2, central to our MRA decisions is accounting for the 
pronounced differences in the FD measures used across studies. Whilst this was 
addressed by introducing weights (see Stanley and Doucouliagos, 2012), it is 
important to devote attention to some descriptive statistics related to this issue. As 
shown in Table 3.3, there is a vast variety of the FD measures used by the primary 
studies, partly due to its changing characteristics over time and partly due to 
specification differences. In general, FD is measured by either expenditure 
decentralisation, revenue/tax decentralisation, different measures of vertical 
imbalance and other measures that combine either local expenditure and local 
revenues into one index or entirely avant-garde measures.54 Surprisingly, such 
heterogeneity is observed not only within studies, but also within specifications of the 
same study. According to our meta-sample, 34% of the estimates are from 
specification that used only expenditure decentralisation as a measure of FD, 21% of 
the estimates come from specifications using only revenue/tax decentralisation 
measure, 15.5% of estimates are supplied by specifications using both expenditure and 
revenue decentralisation, 7.2% of the estimates are from specifications using the three 
conventional measures of FD, while surprisingly 22.3% of the studies used other 
measures of FD than the abovementioned. The latter seems to be a combination of the 
conventional measures with additional ones such as the transfers from other levels of 
government, local government autonomy, the squared term of local 
expenditure/revenue and retention rate.55 We classified the latter as other measures 
because of too many measures of FD that apparently would not help in distinguishing 
the sources of such pronounced heterogeneity between specifications and studies. 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
54 Revenue decentralization is the share of local revenue in percentage of total revenue or GDP. 
Expenditure decentralization is the share of sub-national expenditure in percentage of total expenditure 
or GDP. Vertical imbalance is defined as the ratio of inter-governmental transfers to total tax revenue 
of sub-national governments (De Mello, 2000). 
55 The share of tax revenue generated from a certain territory obtained by the subnational government. 
110 
 
Table 3.3 Descriptive statistics 
Variable Observations Mean Min Max 
Expenditure Decentralization 339 -0.36 -10 8.68 
Revenue Decentralization 212 -0.25 -9.85 9.11 
Expenditure and Revenue Decentralization 156 0.011 -9.6 9.22 
Three Conventional Measures of FD 66 -0.80 -4.42 4.00 
Other Measures of FD 224 0.47 -6.49 6.93 
 
GDP Growth Variable 879 -0.17 -10 9.22 
GDP Level Variable 102 0.30 -6.38 6.93 
Other Measures of economics performance 14 0.06 -5.62 2.92 
 
Developed Countries 678 -0.15 -10 9.22 
Developing Countries 104 0.21 -9.6 8.68 
Transition Economies 193 -0.10 -9.24 9.11 
Mixed Sample 22 -0.88 -2.35 2.79 
 
Published 670 -0.08 -9.6 9.22 
Unpublished 327 -0.19 -10 8.68 
 
Another observable heterogeneity of the estimates across studies could be due to 
differences in measuring the dependent variable: economic performance (see Table 
3.3. Whilst the majority of the studies used variables related to growth (growth of real 
GDP, or difference in natural logarithm of per capita GDP, GDP per employee 
growth), only few of them used independent variables related to the level of output 
(real GDP, GDP per capita, GDP per employee, GNP) or other measurements but level 
or growth variables (i.e. development index, industrial output per region), 88.2%, 
10.3% and 1.5%, respectively.  
Attention is also devoted to differences in the number of estimates supplied by 
different context of investigation. As shown in Table 3.3, the majority of the estimates 
(68%) are supplied by studies conducted in developed countries.56 Next, it seems that 
studies on transition economies also offer a considerable number of estimates (20%) 
when compared to developing (10%) or mixed samples (2%). 
Moreover, differences could be also observed in the studies’ publication status. 670 
point estimates out of 997 are obtained from published studies as journal articles, while 
the rest (327 out of 997) are obtained from PhD, master thesis, discussion and working 
papers. Overall, these brief descriptive statistics (additional descriptive statistics 
provided in Appendix 3.2.2) suggest that empirical research is scattered throughout a 
                                                          
56 The reported numbers in Table 3.3 show the percentage of estimates provided by different type of 
countries. Accordingly, 4.2% of estimates are generated from mixed sample studies; 21.4% from 
transition countries; 23.3% from developing countries and 51.10% from developed countries. 
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diverse research context, while stressing, at the same time, the need to thoroughly take 
into account such differences. 
 
 
3.5 Results 
3.5.1 Results from Bivariate MRA 
 
a) Funnel Plot 
To graphically observe whether publication bias is present in this literature, the scatter 
plot of PCCs and the inverse standard errors are plotted in Figure 3.4a for the full 
sample, and Figure 3.4b and Figure 3.4.c for the two subsamples, the output-growth 
and output level, respectively. It is expected that the least precise estimates, placed at 
the bottom of the funnel plot, will be widely dispersed. Contrary, the most precise 
estimates, placed at the top of the funnel plot, will have a more compact dispersion. 
According to Stanley et al. (2010), these estimates are the least affected by the 
publication bias, which generally denotes 10% of all estimates. Simulations have 
shown that their average provides a statistic beyond publication bias. 
Apparently, the full sample literature provides a rough approximation to the inverted 
funnel shape, in which the estimates are randomly distributed around the “true” effect. 
Whilst the left tail of the funnel appears to be more condensed than the right one, the 
opposite happens when it comes to the number of estimates on the right side of the 
funnel, where the funnel seems to be more dispersed and biased towards the positive 
values. Interestingly, these strange characteristics of the funnel plot seem to suggest 
that studies tend to inflate the positive effect size, while underreporting the negative 
ones. Such mild, if not unobservable, positive preference towards positive effect 
appears in accordance with the theory, which mostly stresses the positive association 
between FD and economic performance.  
 
(a) Full Sample   (b) Output-growth (c) Output-level studies 
Figure 3.4 Funnel Plots 
0
20
40
60
80
in
vS
E
-1 -.5 0 .5 1
pcc
0
20
40
60
80
in
vS
E
-1 -.5 0 .5 1
pcc
0
10
20
30
40
in
vS
E
-.5 0 .5 1
pcc
112 
 
When splitting the full sample into output-growth studies and output-level studies, the 
funnel plots appear more informative. The output-growth studies funnel plot (Figure 
3.4b) seems to be quite identical to the one of full sample, this may be due to the large 
number of estimates provided by this subsample, whereas the output-level studies 
funnel plot (Figure 3.4c) appears to be very scattered and not symmetrical around the 
real effect. Rather, the visual analysis of the funnel plot for the output-level suggests 
a stronger bias towards positive values than in the first subsample, by pointing towards 
a greater publication bias in this literature. 
Averaging the top 10% of estimates, considered as the most precise one, yields an 
average PCC of -0.017 which is smaller than the overall average when all estimates 
are taken into account of -0.0002. Whilst the same results appear in output-growth 
studies (average of top estimates of -0.017, whereas the overall average of -0.005), 
there is no comparison made in output-level studies given that there are no estimates 
from the top 10% of the full sample. Such comparison points towards a positive 
publication bias, which was also visually depicted in the funnel plots. However, any 
graphical examination is subject to subjective interpretation and cannot lead to a 
definite conclusion, especially in the presence of doubt and uncertainty as in Figure 
3.4 and simple comparison as the case of the top 10% estimates. It is thus essential to 
carry out regression analyses and to further investigate this problem through FAT-
PET. 
 
b) FAT-PET 
Although there might not be much difference between the full sample and the output-
growth studies, which was partially suggested by the funnel plot, the risk of comparing 
“apples with oranges” (Glass et al., 1981) might still be present. Such danger targets 
the correct effect size especially in the presence of wide boundaries of research, where 
studies noticeably different from each other. While theoretically there is a clear 
distinction between the effect of FD on economic growth and economic performance 
measured in levels, it might be considered wise to split the dataset into two subsamples 
subject to the measurement of economic performance, thus, combining oranges with 
oranges, and apples with apples. Researchers may warrant such critics by combining 
different effects, with the justification that it is the task of the Multivariate MRA to 
shed light on these differences. Alternatively, this chapter will split the dataset on the 
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most noticeable difference when investigating the economic effect of FD – 
measurement of economic performance- and then compare it with the full sample. 
Hence, Table 3.4 reports the estimated results of the FAT-PET for the full sample, 
output-growth studies and the output-level studies, both using WLS and FE.57 The 
interpretation will start from the full sample, followed by the two subsamples, with 
more emphasis put on the latter. 
The estimated results for the full sample, weighted (by the specific weights and the 
precision term), and clustered-robust, support the evidence of a positive publication 
bias, significant at only 5%. An intercept smaller than 1, as shown in Table 3.4, 
indicates the presence of a “little to modest” publication bias (Doucouliagos and 
Stanley, 2013) However, this is not the case of the output-growth sample in which the 
intercept becomes insignificant both in the WLS and FE (Columns 3 and 4). Contrary, 
in the output-level studies the intercept becomes significant at 5% level of significance 
only when using WLS, suggesting that the estimates of FD on growth are skewed 
towards positive values. The intercept being larger than 1 lend support to a stronger 
bias than it was in the full sample, namely, to “substantial” selectivity among the 
output-level studies. The results seem to be consistent across different estimators (see 
Columns 5 and 6). In addition to the two preferred estimation techniques, the Robust 
Estimator, which is presented in Appendix 3.2.3 for brevity, strongly confirms the 
FAT-PET results. It might be argued that such consistency between the three 
estimators might be due to the rigorous approach taken regarding outliers. 
 
Table 3.4 FAT and PET Baseline Meta-Regression Analysis 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 WLS FE WLS FE WLS FE 
VARIABLES Full 
Sample 
Full 
Sample 
Output-
Growth 
Output-
Growth 
Output-
Level 
Output-
Level 
       
invSE -0.0189 -0.0249* -0.00814 -0.0283* -0.0995** -0.0854*** 
 (0.0130) (0.0136) (0.0104) (0.0131) (0.0370) (0.025) 
Constant 0.565** 0.0468 0.341 0.2035 1.728* 1.619* 
 (0.255) (0.219) (0.246) (0.215) (0.780) (0.537) 
       
Observations 966 966 850 850 104 104 
R-squared 0.008 0.327 0.002 0.280 0.105 0.520 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
                                                          
57 The Stata printouts are presented in Appendix 3.2. 
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Despite the presence of a positive publication bias in the literature, the PET can 
identify the presence of genuine effect beyond such selection bias, as argued before in 
Section 3.3.2. Testing the null hypothesis of β0=0, in our case the coefficient on the 
invSE, serves as a test for the presence of genuine effect. The results (reported in Table 
3.4) suggest that there is weak evidence of genuine effect when the two subsamples 
are combined, though only when using FE. A negative genuine effect is found to 
prevail also in output-growth studies when using FE, and in output-level studies both 
when using WLS and FE. The robustness check by estimating the FAT-PET equation 
by Robust Regression have indicated that both the constant and the invSE are very 
robust, while the magnitude and the significance are not markedly different from our 
preferred results of Table 3.4 (see Appendix 3.4.3 for Stata printouts).  
Interestingly, these results suggest that the genuine effect in the FD-economic 
performance literature appears to be (weakly) negative, though researchers are biased 
towards positive effect sizes. Finding that this literature is infected by publication bias 
should come as no surprise given that the empirical research is mostly driven by the 
Oates Theorem, which predicts devolution to have a positive effect. Despite the 
limited theoretical guidance on the mechanism by which FD affects growth, it seems 
that most of the studies did not question this Theorem, rather endeavoured to prove it.  
As to the output-level literature, where the genuine effect appears to be strong, it seems 
that researchers are reluctant to publish negative results. Whilst the majority and most 
cited papers in the FD-economic performance literature are part of the output-growth 
studies, the minority group of output-level might be easily influenced by them. 
Accordingly, the latter are more prone to underreport the negative effect sizes, which 
in turn explains the presence of a more severe publication bias in the output-level than 
output-growth studies. 
 
c) PEESE 
Despite the confirmation of the graphical diagnostics and the consistency of the results 
across different estimators, Stanley (2008) and Stanley and Doucouliagos (2012) 
argue that the coefficient on the precision might be biased in the presence of 
publication bias and excess heterogeneity. Whilst usually the PET is among the least 
biased estimators (Stanley and Doucouliagos, 2007; Moreno et al., 2009), there are 
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cases when it identifies a false genuine effect by over rejecting the null hypothesis. 
Therefore, as introduced in Section 3.3.2, an improved correction has to be used by 
estimating Equation 3.9, while results are reported in Table 3.5. The estimated 
coefficient on the invSE appears to be insignificant across all samples, suggesting that 
there is no genuine effect in this literature.  
Table 3.5 PEESE Results 
 (1) (2) (3) 
 WLS WLS WLS 
VARIABLES Full Sample Output-Growth Output-Level 
    
sepcc 2.802** 1.966 5.201 
 (1.220) (1.223) (3.152) 
invSE -0.00334 0.000352 -0.0284 
 (0.00960) (0.00918) (0.0395) 
    
Observations 966 850 104 
R-squared 0.023 0.012 0.103 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
 
d) Fashion Cycle  
Table 3.6 report the estimates of Equation 3.8, which investigates whether publication 
bias follows a fashion cycle. The two set of results, with and without outliers, are 
compared with each other, the first three columns and last three columns, respectively. 
The estimated results with outliers, irrespective of the sample used, do not confirm the 
Goldfarb’s concept on the predictable pattern of empirical research. However, when 
outliers are dropped, the two variables (time and time2) becomes statistically 
significant. This suggests that initially, the output-growth studies tend to report 
estimates confirming the theory, but after time elapses, in our case after 8 years of the 
first study in 1998, contradicting the above results becomes a fashion. Reporting 
contradictory results do not appear to be only as a fashion trend in academia, but also 
as a tool which increases the probability of a paper to be published due to the presumed 
“novelty” argument. However, such fashion cycles are not found to be statistically 
significant in output-level studies.  
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Table 3.6 Fashion Cycle Testing 
 (1) (2) (3) 
VARIABLES Full Sample Output-
growth 
Output-level 
    
time 0.0839 0.131* -0.575 
 (0.0731) (0.0753) (0.832) 
time2 -0.00664 -0.0108** 0.0377 
 (0.00426) (0.00446) (0.0373) 
Constant -0.161 -0.226 1.453 
 (0.295) (0.297) (4.493) 
    
Observations 966 850 104 
R-squared 0.004 0.012 0.075 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
 
 
3.5.2 Results from Multivariate MRA 
 
Before interpreting the results from the Multivariate MRA, it is useful to discuss the 
diagnostics of the econometric models. First, based on the results of the correlation 
matrix (see Appendix 3.2.3) it seems that although we collected 40 moderator 
variables, as described in Table 3.3, not all of them can be used in the same model. 
The national/regional and single/multi moderator variables appear to be highly 
correlated with each other (correlation of -0.9306; 0.9306), hence we use only the first 
set of variables given our main concern on the level of investigation as a source of 
heterogeneity. However, the latter will be used as a robustness check to see whether 
results change due to the inclusion of single/multi instead of national/regional and 
moderator variables. 
Whilst the correlation between other moderator variables is not considered 
problematic, inclusion of the study fixed effect appears to create substantial 
multicollinearity problem in the model (VIF up to 1230). Hence, based on the 
suggestion of Stanley and Doucouliagos (2012, p. 91), a general-to-specific approach 
is followed. Namely, a model with all potential explanatory variables is estimated for 
each specification separately and the least significant variables are removed one at a 
time until only statistically significant variables. Concerning the other diagnostics, the 
Ramsey RESET test results suggest that models are mostly well specified, though in 
some specifications this test is not rejected (see Appendix 3.4.2). However, it is 
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important to note that the explanatory power of the multivariate regression rises 
significantly (from 0.2% in the FAT-PET to 64.5% in the Multivariate MRA) when 
the moderator variables are included. Also, the null hypothesis that regressors are 
jointly insignificant is strongly rejected in all the models. 
Table 3.7 presents the results of multivariate MRA for which different estimation 
methods are employed to explain the excess heterogeneity of the economic effect of 
FD reported in the primary studies. Estimations of Equations (3.12) and (3.13) and the 
estimation results from the Robust Regression, used as a robustness check, on full 
sample of the primary studies and the two subsamples (output-growth and output-level 
studies) are reported in Table 3.7: the full sample results in the first three columns 
(Columns 1-3), followed by the output-growth studies (Columns 4-6) and output-level 
studies (Columns 7-9), estimated by WLS, FE and Robust Regression.  
Unlike other regressions, the interpretation of the significant variables appears 
different in an MRA analysis. Positive and significant coefficients suggest that certain 
study characteristics coded as a dummy variable typically increases the effect size 
between FD and growth, while negative and significant coefficients decrease the 
reported effect sizes.  Whilst such analysis is undertaken only for the moderator 
variables, the interpretation of the publication bias and genuine effect is based on 
estimating the average magnitudes of each K-variable weighted by its mean value on 
the intercept term, and Z-variable weighted by its mean value on invSE, respectively 
(Stanley and Doucouliagos, 2012; Dimos and Pugh, 2016). Table 3.8 reports the 
results, while the Stata printouts are presented in Appendix 3.5. 
Explicitly acknowledging any form of financial support by governmental and non-
governmental organisations appears to influence publication bias significantly. Prima 
facie, the negative coefficient on the finsupport across specification and samples 
suggest that studies that have received funding typically have stronger publication 
bias. However, taking a closer look at the studies (i.e. Martinez-Vazquez and McNab, 
2006; Rodriguez-Pose and Ezcurra, 2010), it might be argued that rather than financial 
support, it is the quality of research that might affect publication bias. The authors of 
these papers appear to be amongst the most cited ones in FD-economic growth 
literature, which also signal the popularity and the influence of their research.  
In line with many MRA studies (see Stanley and Doucouliagos, 2012), our results 
118 
 
suggest that the effect size increases with the year of publication of the study in the 
full sample and output-growth studies, while decreases in the output-level sample. 
However, it should be noted that the results do not appear to be consistent in the full 
sample and the output-growth studies, while puby becomes significant only when 
using FE estimation. The positive coefficient in the first two samples, only in the FE, 
might be attributed to the additional unobservable effects related to the improvement 
of data quality and methodology in these primary studies. Alternatively, possible 
changes in the FD level might be a possible reason for the decrease in the effect size 
in the output-level studies, while the majority of these studies focus on developing 
countries. Interesting, if we were to consider the year of publication as a variable 
influencing the publication bias over time (recalling Sections 3.3.2f and 3.5.1d), the 
significance and the sign of all moderator variables would not change. However, 
following the good practices (see Stanley and Doucouliagos, 2012; Dimos and Pugh, 
2016), puby is fixed as Z-moderator variable. Appendix 3.5 provides the estimated 
results (replication of Table 3.7) claiming puby as a K-moderator variable, which 
overall can be considered as an additional robustness check of our preferred results. 
Regarding the span of the data (span), the results suggest no significant variation in 
the estimates. Namely, there is no difference in the effect size between studies that use 
recent and old-time span of data.  
Perhaps, the most striking result is the significant negative coefficient on the national 
variable, suggesting that the difference in the level of investigation (national vs 
regional level) has a great systematic effect on the reported excess heterogeneity, 
though being consistent only for the full sample and output-growth studies (Columns 
1-6). Contrary, this variable had to be dropped in the second subsample due to high 
multicollinearity, as we followed the general-to-specific approach. Apparently, this 
finding appears to confirm our arguments in the previous chapter, where it was argued 
that variations in the economic effect of FD are likely to exist due to the different level 
of investigations. Also, this seems to be consistent with Akai and Sakata (2002) study, 
who argue that the effect of FD on economic growth at national level might be difficult 
to capture because of the complexity and multidimensionality of decentralisation and 
substantial historical and/or cultural differences across countries, and thus yielding a 
smaller effect compared to the one at lower level of aggregation.  
  
119 
 
Table 3.7 Multivariate MRA Results 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
 WLS FE Robust Reg WLS FE Robust Reg WLS FE Robust 
Reg 
VARIABLES Full Sample Full Sample Full Sample Output-
Growth 
Output-
Growth 
Output-
Growth 
Output-
Level 
Output-
Level 
Output-
Level 
          
invSE -0.0328 -0.0961*** 0.160*** -0.00257 -0.0984*** 0.222*** 0.0423 0.150*** 0.301*** 
 (0.0501) (0.0239) (0.0268) (0.0522) (0.0299) (0.0290) (0.0814) (0.0186) (0.0497) 
published 0.727* 1.211*** 1.158*** 0.836** 1.330*** 1.138*** -1.520* -2.783*** -1.073*** 
 (0.372) (0.348) (0.219) (0.400) (0.378) (0.259) (0.781) (0.176) (0.373) 
puby 0.00591 0.0108*** -0.00401 0.00338 0.0110*** -0.0105*** -0.0169* -0.0286*** -
0.0397*** 
 (0.00504) (0.00241) (0.00253) (0.00568) (0.00289) (0.00281) (0.00909) (0.00245) (0.00561) 
finsupport -2.447*** -2.195*** -1.195*** -2.372*** -2.231*** -1.216***    
 (0.603) (0.254) (0.454) (0.668) (0.278) (0.463)    
developing 0.0213* 0.0141 0.0202** 0.0153 0.0145 0.0178*    
 (0.0110) (0.00913) (0.00944) (0.0113) (0.0103) (0.00947)    
national -0.0874** -0.127*** -0.123*** -0.0583 -0.126*** -0.0903***    
 (0.0422) (0.0212) (0.0244) (0.0417) (0.0234) (0.0255)    
imf 0.0678 0.143*** -0.0314 0.0205 0.148*** -0.0852*** 0.201* 0.338*** 0.453*** 
 (0.0449) (0.0203) (0.0265) (0.0467) (0.0251) (0.0289) (0.0915) (0.0207) (0.0331) 
threefd -0.219*** -0.228*** 0.0353 -0.197** -0.236*** 0.101** -0.270*** -0.146*** -0.160** 
 (0.0696) (0.0394) (0.0397) (0.0775) (0.0407) (0.0442) (0.0796) (0.00149) (0.0614) 
level -0.0624** -0.0463*** -0.0412       
 (0.0256) (0.0171) (0.0275)       
othery -0.117*** -0.183*** -0.0989       
 (0.0390) (0.0232) (0.0820)       
cross -0.118  -0.0307 -0.138  -0.0250 -0.855*** -1.048*** -0.913*** 
 (0.0810)  (0.0591) (0.0862)  (0.0642) (0.116) (0.0264) (0.161) 
timeseries 0.232  0.138 -0.0262  -0.0161    
 (0.172)  (0.104) (0.126)  (0.136)    
ols -0.0264  -0.0988*** -0.0306  -0.0921*** 0.702*** 0.816*** 0.847*** 
 (0.0310)  (0.0182) (0.0303)  (0.0184) (0.0713) (0.0270) (0.103) 
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dynamic 0.000616  0.0337 -0.0159  0.0141    
 (0.0685)  (0.0273) (0.0705)  (0.0275)    
iv -0.00128  0.0323 0.0296  0.0755    
 (0.0487)  (0.0437) (0.0463)  (0.0607)    
othertech -0.0293  -0.0342 0.0617  0.104    
 (0.0942)  (0.0903) (0.0424)  (0.103)    
longrun -0.0192  0.00931 -0.0380  -0.00611    
 (0.0348)  (0.0212) (0.0325)  (0.0224)    
mixed 0.0259  0.0148 0.00552  -0.000109    
 (0.0237)  (0.0297) (0.0201)  (0.0301)    
transition 0.0343  -0.0568* 0.0256  -0.103***    
 (0.0511)  (0.0291) (0.0470)  (0.0297)    
endog 0.0173  -0.0819*** 0.0225  -0.0483**    
 (0.0295)  (0.0221) (0.0296)  (0.0226)    
nonlinear 0.0108  0.0951*** 0.000945  0.0833***    
 (0.0326)  (0.0176) (0.0313)  (0.0180)    
unitary -0.0248  -0.0957*** -0.0297  -0.0661**    
 (0.0418)  (0.0248) (0.0415)  (0.0260)    
fdrev -0.0307  -0.00733 -0.0398  -0.00672 0.0642** 0.0534*** 0.0128 
 (0.0238)  (0.0175) (0.0238)  (0.0180) (0.0239) (0.0162) (0.0384) 
fdexprev -0.0364  0.0161 -0.0258  0.0406    
 (0.0419)  (0.0243) (0.0437)  (0.0260)    
otherfd 0.00450  0.0332* 0.0171  0.0472**    
 (0.0365)  (0.0195) (0.0393)  (0.0208)    
span 0.0217  0.00664 0.0183  0.00544    
 (0.0158)  (0.00821) (0.0152)  (0.00826)    
nexplanatory -0.00189**  -0.00248*** -
0.00183** 
0.000296 -0.00248***    
 (0.000898)  (0.000871) (0.000907) (0.000942) (0.000880)    
Constant 0.246 -0.292 -0.766*** 0.192 -0.458 -0.993*** 2.335** 3.163*** 1.541*** 
 (0.429) (0.258) (0.264) (0.432) (0.282) (0.305) (0.777) (0.137) (0.421) 
          
Observations 966 966 1,001 850 850 884 104 104 104 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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It is surprising to find that the moderator variables capturing the context of 
investigation appear weakly significant. The only variable significant at 10% level is 
developing, which appears consistent across the full sample and the output-growth, 
though weakly consistent across estimations. More specifically, studies investigating 
the economic effect of FD, belonging to the abovementioned group of studies, tend to 
report larger effect than studies conducted in developed economies, though this 
finding disappears when the MRA is estimated by a WLS (see Columns 1 and 4). With 
respect to the other categories, it seems that in general there is no significant effect, 
with the only exception on the transition variable in the output-growth subsample 
when using Robust Regression (see Columns 6). However, a note of caution is in order 
when relying only on the results from Robust Regression given its inability to address 
the dependency and the different number of estimates per study. 
In accordance with the expectations, the estimated effect of FD on economic growth 
depends largely on the measurement of FD, a finding which appears strongly 
consistent across specifications, estimations and samples. Compared to studies that 
used only expenditure decentralisation as a measure of FD, the estimated effect of FD 
is found to be, on average, smaller in studies using three measures of FD. There are 
several reasons that might explain this difference in the effect size. First, recalling 
Section 2.4, measuring FD by only one measure is less likely to capture the real level 
of FD taking into account the multidimensionality of this process especially when 
investigating cross-country studies. Consequently, the use of one measure is likely to 
inflate the economic effect of FD and produce biased results when compared to 
measures that capture all the dimensions of FD (expenditure, revenue/tax dimensions 
and vertical imbalance). Second, the use of only one measure of FD is likely to capture 
all the economic effect of FD, contrary, to the use of multiple measures where each 
measure would capture only a part of the total effect of FD on economic growth.  
Compared to studies using panel data, the estimated effect of FD is found to be, on 
average, smaller in studies using cross-section data. Though, this effect seems to be 
greater in the output-level studies compared to the full sample and output-growth 
studies, as suggested by the bigger coefficient of cross-section data (cross) on the three 
last columns. As to the econometric methodology employed, the results appear to 
diverge between the subsample. Whilst none of the estimation techniques is 
considered as a significant variation in the full sample and the output-growth 
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subsample, the opposite might be observed in the second subsample. With fixed and 
random effect estimation as the base category, the output-level studies are more likely 
to report larger estimates when using an OLS estimation technique, a finding which 
appears consistent across different specifications (see Columns 7-9). 
Further, the results partly confirm our hypothesis regarding the variation in the effect 
size due to different sources of data. A larger reported effect is found in the full sample 
and the two subsamples compared to the other dataset than the IMF (OECD and 
individual country’s databases). Such results, which appears consistent also across 
estimation methods, stress the source of FD data as a significant cause of 
heterogeneity. Such findings appear to confirm our previous hypothesis, stated in 
Section 2.4.1, in which the difference in the estimated effect might be attributed not 
only to the methodological issues but also to the databases used. Further from our 
hypothesis, the positive coefficient on imf might be explained by the popularity and 
great coverage in terms of data and time of this database towards OECD and other 
databases, while accompanied by the critics of overestimating some measures of FD 
(revenue decentralisation and vertical imbalance).58 
The endogeneity moderator variable is insignificant across different samples and 
estimators. Although prima facie this would sound as contrary to expectations, in the 
FD-economic growth literature this is somehow expected. Unfortunately, the majority 
of the primary studies do not tackle endogeneity at all, though being aware of it 
(Meloche et al., 2004; Khmaladze, 2007; Khattak et al., 2010; Faridi, 2011). Thus, the 
insufficient variation across the meta-regression sample might be a possible 
explanation of its insignificance. The same argument might perhaps be provided about 
studies controlling for the nonlinearity of the FD-economic growth relationship 
(nonlinear) and those investigating the long-run economic effect of FD (longrun). 
Another conspicuous result is the negative and significant coefficient on the 
measurement of the dependent variable in the full sample. Having growth as the base 
category, the results suggest that studies using either level-related variables or other 
unconventional measures of economic performance tend to report smaller effect. 
Overall, the findings suggest there is considerable dependent variable heterogeneity, 
                                                          
58 A detailed discussion on the advantages and disadvantages of IMF will be provided in the next chapter 
(Section 4.3.1).  
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which demands the full sample to be divided into subsamples, while at the same time 
confirming our approach both in bivariate and multivariate MRA. 
The number of explanatory variables used in the primary study appears to be also a 
significant moderator variable explaining the heterogeneity of the reported effect 
sizes. Namely, the average estimates decrease with the number of explanatory 
variables. The negative coefficient of this variable in the full sample and the output-
growth sample might be a signal of the quality of the research, where the greater the 
number of control variables used the more cautious are the studies regarding the 
omitted variable bias. Although there is ground for debate with the rationale of this 
variable, it might be considered as appropriate to control whether the estimates are 
derived from studies using small or large number of explanatory variables. As to the 
output-level studies, no conclusion can be drawn given the need to drop this variable 
due to high multicollinearity problems. 
 
Table 3.8 Average Publication Bias and Average Genuine Effect 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 WLS FE WLS FE WLS FE 
VARIABLES Full 
Sample 
Full 
Sample 
Output-
Growth 
Output-
Growth 
Output-
Level 
Output-
Level 
       
Average Genuine 
Effect 
-0.048* 
(0.026) 
-0.041* 
(0.018) 
-0.054* 
(0.027) 
-0.032* 
(0.017) 
-0.112** 
(0.037) 
-0.087*** 
(0.016) 
       
Average 
Publication Bias 
0.483 
(0.354) 
0.295 
(0.243) 
0.510 
(0.345) 
0.204 
(0.255) 
1.438** 
(0.446) 
1.521*** 
(0.179) 
       
       
Observations 966 966 850 850 104 104 
R-squared 0.1485 0.2905 0.1410 0.2243 0.4829 0.5564 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
As explained above, to allow judgment concerning the extent of publication bias and 
genuine effect, it is necessary not only to calculate their average coefficient, but also 
to split the dataset so the results from multivariate MRA reported in Table 3.8 would 
be comparable to the bivariate MRA results of Table 3.4. Overall, both results appear 
to be consistent with each other. Namely, once study characteristics are controlled for, 
the negative genuine effect seems to persist in all samples. The presence of a negative 
genuine effect might be explained by the negative estimates reported by studies using 
expenditure decentralisation, which contrary to the theoretical expectations, impacted 
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growth negatively.  
Allowing for greater complexity in the publication bias, through the K-moderator 
variables, the apparent publication bias in the full sample and output-growth studies 
disappears, while dominating in the output-level studies. Apparently, this confirms the 
discussion in Section 3.5.1, where publication bias appeared to be strong mostly in 
studies using level-related dependent variables. Namely, the intuition for a positive 
economic effect of FD among output-level studies appear very strong, partly due to 
theoretical ground and partly due to dominant growth-studies literature, and so 
researchers of output-level studies might think that results showing the opposite are 
difficult to reach publication. Similar to the FAT results, having a constant greater 
than 1 suggests the presence of substantial selectivity in this subsample of the FD-
economic performance literature. 
 
 
3.5.3 Contribution to the existing MRA 
Despite existing MRA on the economic effect of FD of Feld et al. (2009b), Baskaran 
et al. (2016), Zhenfa and Wei (2016), there is still no comprehensive and systematic 
meta-regression study that simultaneously summarizes and quantifies the reported 
economic effect; correct for any potential biases in the literature; test economic 
theories and explain heterogeneity. Before distancing ourselves from the existing 
MRA, it is important to mention that the Feld et al.’s (2009b) paper, despite the critics 
regarding the methodology followed, serves as a pioneering example in the FD-
economic growth MRA, which of course can be further improved regarding the 
methodology and enriched with the latest publication in the field. 
Our MRA applies an approach that identifies the contamination of the literature by the 
publication bias and the presence of a potential genuine effect, by distancing from the 
existing studies, which does not properly control for any of the abovementioned 
problems. In the presence of a very comprehensive guide on MRA by Stanley and 
Doucouliagos (2012), ignoring the existence of a genuine effect or publication bias 
comes as a surprise, especially for the first two studies (Feld et al., 2009b and Baskaran 
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et al., 2016).59 However, it is worth mentioning that the latter study controls indirectly 
for publication bias by splitting the dataset into published and unpublished study. 
Unfortunately, this might be considered as a very illusionary and incomprehensive 
way of identifying the level of contamination in the FD-economic growth literature. 
Contrary, the Zhenfa and Wei’s (2016) study, conducted only for China, attempts to 
go a step beyond the first two studies by investigating publication bias, though no 
inference can be made on how they controlled for this. However, it is still argued that 
this investigation is incomplete given the limited dataset only on China and the denial 
of the investigation of the genuine representative effect in the literature.  
Whilst it is understandable at certain extent that early MRA in economics have 
borrowed methodologies from other disciplines (i.e. medicine), the new MRA should 
follow a more economics oriented meta-analytical approach (Stanley and 
Doucouliagos, 2012, p.132). Accordingly, it becomes imperative to control for the two 
above issues, which might in turn be misleading when deciding on the sources of 
heterogeneity.  
A distinguishing feature of our MRA is the use of PCC to quantify the effect size, 
which is considered superior to the use of plain coefficients or t-statistics (recall 
Section 3.3.1). Again, we would expect that studies conducted recently would be able 
to find an effect size that is unitless and dimensionless, otherwise the comparability of 
estimates across studies would be strongly jeopardized. In the same vein, it is 
surprising that there is no remark on the dependency of the data, for which it is 
necessary to use weights as in Section 3.2.2, and also cluster-robust SEs.  
Another feature of our MRA is the division of studies subject to the dependent 
variable. Apparently, there is a strong division between studies investigating the effect 
                                                          
59 It is important to note that these studies are just updated versions of each other. They appear identical 
in their methodology while differing only from the sample size, changing the order of the authors and 
publication status. Whilst there is no reference regarding the publication status for the former, the latter 
is published as a working paper in the Freiburger Diskussionspapiere zur Ordnungsökonomik). The 
structure and the content of the paper remain the same. It might be easily argued that these two papers 
are almost identical when referring to the literature review section. However, given the different 
ordering of the authors’ name (from Feld et al., 2009b to Baskaran et al., 2016) and the update in the 
number of papers, we will consider them as updated version of each other, more specifically, where the 
second paper might be considered a slightly improved version of the first paper. The authors themselves 
do consider these two papers as identical given that there is no reference of their previous work in their 
recent study of Baskaran et al. (2016).  
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on FD on economic performance measured by output-growth or by output-level. The 
level of heterogeneity appears to be very large, which if not considered would produce 
misleading results especially for the second set of studies. Last, in an MRA which 
primarily focuses on investigating the sources of heterogeneity, such as the one of Feld 
et al. (2009b) and Baskaran et al. (2016) it is imperative to categorise sources into K/Z 
variables, as suggested by Stanley and Doucouliagos (2012).  
 
3.6 Conclusion 
Consistent research efforts have been devoted to the investigation of the economic 
effect of FD, though failing to provide a clear answer on whether higher fiscal 
decentralisation promotes economic performance. Accordingly, through an MRA, this 
chapter aimed to bridge the gaps in the literature by identifying the genuine 
representative effect after controlling for publication bias and uncovering the factors 
that influence the relationship between FD and economic performance in a set of 49 
primary studies, which supplied 1001 point estimates.  
Categorizing studies based on the most prominent difference, the measurement of 
economic performance, our results suggest that output-growth studies appear notably 
different from the output-level studies. The second subsample appears to be 
substantially contaminated by publication bias, while revealing a negative genuine 
effect. With respect to the full sample and the output-growth sample, findings suggest 
similar conclusions, though no strong evidence on the contamination of the literature 
by the selection bias could be found.  
Apart from publication bias and genuine effect, another concern of this chapter, was 
to explore the sources of variation in empirical results. This MRA revealed that the 
excess variation among and within studies could be explained by the following: (i) the 
level of investigation (ii) differences in the measurement of economic growth, (iii) the 
source of the data, (iv) measurement of FD, and (v) other methodological and context 
of investigation issues (developing countries, cross-section data and OLS estimation 
technique). 
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Overall, the conclusions serve as an essential guide for future empirical investigation 
of the relationship between FD and economic growth, especially related to the number 
of FD measures. Since different FD measures impact growth differently, the choice of 
a number of appropriate measure(s) appears to be of great importance. Namely, the 
FD measures usually appear to be chosen arbitrarily to either capture the “true” effect 
of FD on growth, or introduce new measures which could be considered a novelty. 
Hence, agreeing to certain measures of FD, may considerably reduce both 
heterogeneity and publication bias. 
Despite existing MRA in this literature, our analysis appears to be superior and 
contribute to knowledge by (i) using specific weights to account for the data 
dependency and (ii) conducting a rigorous research regarding publication bias, 
genuine effect and uncovering heterogeneity. However, future investigation is 
warranted to investigate the effect of FD on growth preferable in samples of countries 
with similar characteristics such as transition countries. Also, another possibility for 
future research might be to group the variables by country instead of study, which 
allows running a country-specific MRA. Future research may also consider other 
estimation technique such as using a Bayesian model averaging, which might be 
considered as a validation of the WLS and FE. 
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4.1 Introduction 
Despite the abundance of the empirical research on the effect of FD on economic 
growth, there are a limited number of studies focusing on Transition Economies (TEs) 
in general and European Transition Economies (ETEs) in particular. The economic 
impact of FD has been almost ignored which is surprising given the theoretical claim 
and the prevalence of devolution in these countries (Dabla-Norris, 2006). Motivated 
by the scarcity of empirical research in these economies and the heterogeneities in 
both theoretical and empirical literature, which was investigated thoroughly in the 
previous chapter through a MRA analysis, this chapter aims to shed more light on the 
effect of FD on economic growth in TEs. 
The devolution in these countries has often been promoted as a way of enhancing 
democracy, efficiency of government, providing public services more responsive to 
local needs and eventually, promoting economic development. However, the process 
of fiscal devolution has also been associated with many challenges regarding the 
efficiency of the public sector and economic development (Bartlett et al., 2013), as 
already discussed in Chapter 1. The majority of studies in TEs focus only on country 
specific problems and provide policy solutions (recalling Section 2.4.1 and 2.4.2), 
especially for former Communist countries of the Eastern Europe, which, 
unfortunately, cannot be generalised for all TEs. Hence, given this notable lack of 
empirical evidence, this chapter investigates this relationship in the context of TEs, 
more specifically for European and former Soviet Union economies.  
Often FD is considered a normal good, which can be afforded only by developed 
countries. Some authors, such as Bahl and Linn (1992), argue that decentralisation 
benefits (associated with fewer disadvantages) can better be exploited at high levels 
of income. The dataset used in this chapter includes countries with different 
development stages (from laggard reforming economies to advanced reforming 
economies), which calls for additional investigation of the economic effect of FD. 
Therefore, this research aims to contribute to the existing empirical literature on the 
economic effect of FD by considering the stages of economic transition as a 
moderator; whether the FD-economic growth relationship is subject to the 
advancement in economic and institutional reforms. To our knowledge, no study to 
130 
 
date has accounted for the stages of development while investigating the economic 
effect of FD in TEs. 
The chapter is structured as follows.  After the introductory part, Section 4.2 focuses 
on the conventional and unconventional measures of decentralisation such as spending 
decentralisation, revenue decentralisation, tax decentralisation and transfers from 
other levels of government and discusses the rationale to use them in the context of 
TEs. Also, this section discusses the choice of estimation techniques and the data 
employed to test the effect of FD on economic growth. Addressing the drawbacks 
identified in Chapters 2 and 3, we propose a rigorous empirical framework which takes 
into account several problems identified in the literature such as endogeneity, 
collinearity between measures of FD, etc. Section 4.3 presents the estimation results 
by interpreting their statistical and economic significance followed by several 
robustness checks. Particular focus is paid to the stages of transition as a moderator of 
the economic effect of FD. The penultimate section discusses the sensitivity of the 
results by using different explanatory variables, controlling for public sector size and 
investigating the nonlinearity of the FD-economic growth relationship. Finally, 
Section 4.5 concludes the chapter. 
4.2 Data and Specification of the Variables 
4.2.1 Data 
To empirically test whether FD has any impact on economic growth, a panel dataset 
of 21 Transition Economies over the time span 1996 - 2015 is used. Substantially 
determined by the data availability of our main variable(s) of interest, this dataset 
consists of selected transition economies in Europe and the former Soviet Union, 
namely Albania, Armenia, Belarus, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Croatia, Czech 
Republic, Estonia, Georgia, Hungary, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyz Republic, Latvia, 
Lithuania, Moldova, Poland,  Romania, Republic of Serbia, Slovak Republic, Slovenia 
and Ukraine.60 Regarding the time span, we restricted our dataset to the above years 
to avoid possible distortions of the estimated results due to conflicts or war in this 
                                                          
60 According to IMF (2000), transition economies are classified into two main groups: (i) transition 
economies in Europe and former Soviet Union, and (ii) transition economies in Asia. However, given 
that this thesis focuses only on the first set of countries, we will denote TEs as only European and 
former Soviet Union countries. 
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region, while having reasonable number of observations.61 The respective time span 
for each country is shown in Table 4.1. 
Table 4.1. Country and time span in the dataset 
Country 
ID 
Country Time Span 
1 Albania 2002 – 2015 
2 Armenia 2003 – 2015  
3 Belarus 1996 – 2015  
4 Bosnia & Herzegovina 2005 – 2015  
5 Bulgaria 1996 – 2015  
6 Croatia 2001 - 2015 
7 Czech Republic 1996 – 2015 
8 Estonia 1996 – 2015 
9 Georgia 1997 – 2015 
10 Hungary 1996 – 2015 
11 Kazakhstan 1997 – 2015 
12 Kyrgyz Republic 2006 – 2015 
13 Latvia 1996 – 2015 
14 Lithuania 1996 – 2015 
15 Moldova 1996 – 2015 
16 Poland 1996 – 2015 
17 Romania 1996 – 2015 
18 Serbia 2007 – 2015 
19 Slovak Republic 1996 – 2015 
20 Slovenia 1996 – 2015 
21 Ukraine 1999 – 2015 
n=21 and average time span = 17.33 
 
It should be noted that Russia was excluded from our datasets, although the data 
availability and the accuracy of the data did not seem to be a problem. This is because 
Russia stands out as an extreme outlier regarding all indicators of decentralisation, 
large part owing to its federation status and large geographical size, which are likely 
to distort the empirical results of the FD-economic growth relationship.  
To assess the impact of FD on economic growth in TEs, data from the IMF 
Government Finance Statistics, World Bank, and UNESCO are used. The first 
                                                          
61 Most of the wars in this region occurred during the first stage of transition. The wars and civil conflict 
considered in our dataset are the Albanian Civil War in 1997, the Bosnia War 1992-1995, Armenia War 
1988-1994, Croatia 1991-1995 and Moldova War 1992.  
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database, used particularly for our main variable of interest, provides information on 
several indicators of decentralisation, permitting us to build different measures of FD 
(i.e. expenditure decentralisation, revenue/tax decentralisation and vertical 
imbalance), which will be explained in detail in the following section. Whilst for 
developed countries, data can be found in different data sources, which allow assessing 
decentralisation by various FD measures (i.e. OECD Fiscal Decentralisation 
Indicators, IMF Government Finance Statistics, Eurostat, World Bank Fiscal 
Decentralisation Indicators database etc.), the database available for transition 
economies is limited only to the IMF Government Finance Statistics and Eurostat for 
selected countries. The latter, however, suffers from considerable data limitation as it 
provides data only for the EU countries.  
IMF Government Finance Statistics has the broadest coverage for our data, which in 
turn provides a consistent dataset over time and across countries.  Up to now, this 
database represents the state of the art in the public finance data by being the primary 
source for internationally comparable data among TEs at all levels of government 
(subnational and national level). An update of the database with the Government 
Finance Statistics Manual (GFSM2001) enhanced the comparability of fiscal data in 
general and decentralisation in particular (Dziobek et al., 2011). Furthermore, by using 
IMF Government Finance Statistics database, our empirical results are more likely to 
be comparable to other studies using the same database for a similar set of countries 
(i.e. Rodriguez-Pose and Kroijer’s, 2009 study). 
Despite being our preferred source of data, it is worth mentioning some deficiencies 
accompanying the IMF dataset. Ebel and Yilmaz (2002), Stegarescu (2005, p.305), 
and Bodman and Ford (2006, p.16-17) argue that these data do not allow to identify 
the sources of local government revenues (i.e. own taxes vs shared taxes), the 
composition of local government expenditure (i.e. expenditure for education, social 
protection, health, environmental protection etc.) and do not reveal the nature of the 
transfers from other levels of government (conditional vs unconditional transfers, and 
the criteria by which transfers are distributed from national government to subnational 
ones). Concerning the data retrieved for our countries, there seems to be still 
considerable lack of information regarding the type of transfers from central 
government to the local ones and the shared taxes. The GFS database could be utilised 
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better if local revenue would be distinguished between devolved and delegated 
functions such as whether a tax is collected for central government or local 
government is operating as an agent for central government (as an outsourced agent).62 
Further, the inability of the IMF Government Finance Statistics to differentiate 
between types of transfer (conditional versus unconditional transfer) remains an 
unsolved data problem related to public finance in general and FD in particular. 
Addressing these limitations would contribute to the quality and ability of FD 
measures to capture the real degree of decentralisation in many aspects related to 
autonomy, efficiency and fiscal performance of local governments.  
In the absence of such measures, with detailed disaggregated information, studies have 
been limited to the conventional measures of FD (expenditure decentralisation, 
revenue decentralisation or a combination of each with transfers from national 
government) and few additional measures (tax decentralization and two measures of 
fiscal performance) elaborated more in the following section. 
Although IMF data has substantially been improved during the last years, there are 
still some missing observations for selected countries of our main variable of interest. 
The lack of data is more evident for the Balkan and the Southern Caucasus countries. 
Thus, different IMF’s individual country reports and Ministries of Finance data were 
utilized in order to fill the gaps.63  
Another concern in our dataset is the potential inconsistency of the reporting practices 
regarding the FD data over time. A major change took place with the introduction of 
the GFSM2001 reporting system, where the recording system changed from cash basis 
(GFSM1986) to mostly accrual basis64 (Dziobek et al., 2011). Some of the countries 
switched entirely to the new reporting system, whereas others either prepared 
Government Finance Statistics reports on both reporting system (accrual basis and 
cash flow statements), or did not switch at all. Under the new reporting system, the 
                                                          
62 The failure to distinguish between different types of function and taxes, would misestimate (more 
likely overestimate) decentralisation measured with the conventional measures of FD. 
63 Ministry of Finance of Albania and Ministry of Finance of Belarus have been used to fill the gaps in 
the main variable of interest for the two countries: local expenditure and local revenue. Whereas, in the 
case of Moldova in 2001, local expenditure is calculated by summing up all the subcategories of local 
expenditure. 
64 Under accrual basis, transactions are recorded at the time the transaction occurs, independently of the 
cash flow. Whereas, under cash basis transactions are recorded at the time cash flows. 
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categorisation of expenditures changed as well: under the GFSM1986, public sector 
expenditures were classified into 14 categories, whereas under the new system, 
expenditures are classified into ten categories following the Classification of 
Functional of Government (COFOG).65 
Fortunately, the majority of our selected TEs (12 countries out of 17) did not switch 
at all to the new recording system, while the rest either reported in both systems (3 
countries out of 17) or switched to accrual system in the year 2000/2001 (6 countries 
out of 17). By dropping the countries that have switched to the new recording system, 
our observations would significantly decrease and thereby would affect the estimated 
results. Given that there is no technically sophisticated method to convert cash data to 
accrual or vice versa, Seiferling (2013, p.9) suggest to merge the data and additionally 
include a dummy variable in order to control for any possible differences that might 
exist between the two recording systems: in this case accrual data could be seen as a 
proxy for cash data.66  
 
4.2.2 Specification of the variables 
a) The independent variable(s) of interest: Fiscal Decentralisation 
measures 
This section uses the critical literature review and MRA results to accurately model 
the FD-economic growth relationship in the context of TEs. The MRA results 
suggested that the economic effect of FD is subject to different measures of FD, which 
in turn contributes to the heterogeneity of this effect. Namely, if a study employs too 
many measures of FD (additional measures of FD than the conventional ones) or only 
one measure of FD, the effect size is likely to be distorted. 
                                                          
65 COFOG is based on the System of National Accounts in accrual basis. 
66 Gebregziabher and Niño-Zarazúa (2014) suggest merging the two datasets (cash and accrual), but 
instead of including a dummy variable, they impute the cash data using the annual growth rates for the 
accrual data. However, we follow the Seiferling’s (2013) approach as it is more recognizable and 
conventional for GFS data.  It should be noted that it would have been impossible to reconcile the two 
datasets if our focus would have been the composition of local government expenditure or revenues 
(see for more details Arze del Granado et al., 2012 and Seiferling, 2013). If this was the case, the 
comparability of the FD over time would be hampered by inconsistencies between reporting practices 
of individual countries. Given that our focus is not on the COFOG, it seems reasonable to proceed 
forward by finalising our cross-country datasets with data reported in cash or accrual basis. 
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Unfortunately, the MRA did not specify which combination of measures is the most 
appropriate to be used while investigating the economic growth effect of FD. This is 
because it is beyond the scope of an MRA and the selection of decentralisation 
measures depends mostly on the theoretical rationale and data availability. For 
instance, papers that rely on the IMF Government Financial Statistics database are 
more limited in the use of FD measures compared to the ones using OECD database, 
although the latter has a narrower coverage in terms of countries included in the 
database. 
Thus, few considerations need to be taken into account when choosing the FD 
measures for our empirical research. As argued before in Section 2.4, the use of only 
one measure of FD has been criticised for being unable to capture the complex nature 
of decentralisation. The solely use of expenditure decentralisation, will not reflect the 
autonomy of the local government and the vertical structure of the decision-making 
and thereby, FD will be misrepresented (Stegarescu, 2004). Alternatively, focusing on 
both expenditure and revenue side of FD will better reflect the level of FD by 
accounting for the decentralisation of functions at local level and autonomy of local 
governments, as two main pillars of FD (Schneider, 2003, p.36). Despite the 
continuous emphasis on revenue and expenditure aspects of FD, importance should 
also be given to the conceptual problems involved in the measurement of FD through 
these two conventional measures. In most of the cases, they yield insignificant effect 
of decentralisation as it lumps together two opposite effects: (i) revenue 
decentralisation and (ii) grant-financed expenditure decentralisation (Martinez-
Vazques and Timofeev, 2009, p.7; Rooden, 2003).  A note of caution seems to be in 
order when interpreting the economic effect of these two measures given the 
imbalance that might exist between expenditure and revenue decentralisation and their 
different (individual and joint) effects on economic growth. Thereby, a measure of 
intergovernmental transfers (vertical fiscal imbalance), in addition to the orthodox 
measures, might be considered as appropriate given the complexity of vertical 
structure and relationship between the subnational and national government. 
In the context of TEs, the vertical fiscal imbalance, also known as the common pool 
problem (De Mello, 2000), is crucial in assessing FD given the decentralised 
responsibility on one side, and centralised resources on the other side (Rodriguez-Pose 
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and Kroijer, 2009). In the context of our dataset, it is argued that many TEs (Albania, 
Croatia, Estonia, Georgia, Hungary, Lithuania, Poland and Romania) suffer from 
considerable lack of own financial resource, while being dependent on transfers from 
central government. By ignoring such imbalance, the size of decentralisation might be 
misrepresented, which in turn might produce biased results, distort the long-term 
trends (Stegarescu, 2004, p.1) and suggest problematic conclusions. However, the 
decision of the final measures must also depend on the collinearity between different 
FD measures. In some cases, empirical research (Neyapti, 2003) report severe 
multicollinearity between conventional measures. As a conclusion, it is important to 
acknowledge the vertical imbalance of local government, while accounting for 
possible multicollinearity problems between FD measures.  
Whilst decentralization literature (recall Section 1.2) refers to national/total and 
subnational government when measuring FD, the IMF Government Finance Statistics 
database refer to central, state and local government, to represent all levels for both 
federal and unitary governments. Hence, an additional and important need for caution 
has to be taken when extracting information from this database. Henceforward, the 
national level of governance involves the first level of government, central, whereas 
the subnational level of governance comprises state and local government(s). For all 
our countries, except Bosnia and Herzegovina, the subnational level is represented 
only by the local level, given their unitary forms of government in which there is no 
state level.67 
Taking into account the above considerations and following the theoretical and 
empirical literature review, the first FD measure we make use is the expenditure 
decentralisation (fdexp), measured by the subnational government expenditure as a 
share of general government expenditure (see Equation 1). Referring to the 
terminology of IMF Government Financial Statistics, expenditure decentralisation is 
measured as the sum of local and state expenditures minus grants from state to local 
level of government divided by the sum of national, state and local government 
expenditure. Grants from state to local level are deducted from the total amount of 
                                                          
67 See Box 5.1 for detailed description of the levels of government. Different from the other countries, 
Bosnia and Herzegovina is a federal government, for which both state and local level has to be taken 
into account when measuring the expenditure, revenue, tax or grants at subnational level. 
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transfers in order to avoid double counting (i.e. moving from a disaggregated level to 
a more aggregate one.  
 
Expenditure decentralisation = ௌ௨௕௡௔௧௜௢௡௔௟ ௚௢௩௘௥௡௠௘௡௧ ௘௫௣௘௡ௗ௜௧௨௥௘
்௢௧௔௟ ௚௢௩௘௥௡௠௘௡௧ ௘௫௣௘௡ௗ௜௧௨௥௘
   (1) 
 
Next, the IMF Government Finance Statistics database offers the possibility to 
measure the revenue dimension of FD through various measures: revenue 
decentralisation (fdrev), tax decentralisation (fdtax) and tax decentralisation local 
(fdtax_l). The first one, considered as a conventional measure of FD, is measured by 
the subnational government as share of general government revenue, as shown in 
Equation (2). Alternatively, the second measure takes into account only taxes from 
both subnational and national level. Thus, fdtax is measured as the subnational 
government share of tax revenue, shown in Equation (3).  As to the third measure, 
fdtax_l is measured as the subnational government revenue share of tax revenue. 
 
Revenue decentralisation = ௌ௨௕௡௔௧௜௢௡௔௟ ௚௢௩௘௥௡௠௘௡௧ ௥௘௩௘௡௨௘
்௢௧௔௟ ௚௢௩௘௥௡௠௘௡௧ ௥௘௩௘௡௨௘
    (2) 
 
Tax decentralisation = ௌ௨௕௡௔௧௜௢௡௔௟ ௚௢௩௘௥௡௠௘௡௧ ௧௔௫ ௥௘௩௘௡௨௘
்௢௧௔௟ ௚௢௩௘௥௡௠௘௡௧ ௧௔௫ ௥௘௩௘௡௨௘
     (3) 
 
Tax decentralization local = ௌ௨௕௡௔௧௜௢௡௔௟ ௚௢௩௘௥௡௠௘௡௧ ௧௔௫ ௥௘௩௘௡௨௘
ௌ௨௕௡௔௧௜௢௡௔௟ ௚௢௩௘௥௡௠௘௡௧ ௥௘௩௘௡௨௘
                         (4) 
 
It is important to note that the use of all the above measures in the same model is not 
appropriate as multicorrelation might be present, which in turn, might lead to 
imprecise estimates (Wooldridge, 2009, pp.94-95). It is argued that fdtax_l might be 
considered a superior measure relative to the revenue decentralisation or tax 
decentralization. This is because of the inability of the last two measures to properly 
measure the real decentralization level regarding revenues. An increase or decrease in 
one of these measures (fdrev or fdtax) does not necessarily imply an increase or 
decrease in the level of decentralisation. Such change in the above shares might also 
occur from a shrink in general government revenue/tax. Thus, any inferences about 
the degree of decentralisation based on these two measures would mislead the 
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interpretation of the economic effect of FD. Additional drawbacks acknowledged in 
the literature relates to the fact that the revenue decentralisation fails to distinguish 
among different types of revenues: revenues collected through shared taxes, 
piggybacked taxes etc. Accordingly, revenue or tax decentralisation measures tend to 
overestimate the extent of fiscal decentralisation within a given country (Ebel and 
Yilmaz, 2002). In contrast, tax decentralisation measures try to incorporate the tax-
raising power of subnational governments by accounting for the own autonomous 
taxes at the local level (Stegarescu, 2004, p.5). Thereby, it is argued that the autonomy 
of local governments is better measured by fdtax_l, rather than fdrev or fdtax. 
 
Transfer from central government is the most common indicator of subnational 
government dependency to a national one, measured as either as a share of subnational 
revenues (Rodriguez-Pose and Kroijer, 2009) or as a share of subnational expenditure 
(Baskaran, 2010; Eyraud and Lusinyan, 2011). More specifically, the two measures 
(Vertical Imbalance 1 and 2) are explained as follows: 
 
Vertical Imbalance 1 (imbalance1) is measured by the grants/transfers from other 
levels of governments as a percentage of total subnational revenues, as shown in 
Equation (6). Alternatively, the dependency of local government to central 
governments can be measured by the share of grants to subnational expenditure. 
Whilst the former is a mere measure of the dependency of local government to the 
central one, the latter informs us whether grants are used to finance growth enhancing 
expenditures. Since both measures (imbalance1 and imbalance2) take into account 
transfers from central government, there is little to distinguish which measure is 
superior. Therefore, the decision will rely on the correlation matrix given that all these 
measures are likely to be highly correlated with each other and also to be correlated 
with either expenditure decentralisation or revenue decentralisation.68 
 
Vertical Imbalance 1 = ௏௘௥௧௜௖௔௟ ௚௥௔௡௧௦
ௌ௨௕௡௔௧௜௢௡௔௟ ௚௢௩௘௥௡௠௘௡௧ ௥௘௩௘௡௨௘
     (5) 
Vertical Imbalance 2 = ௏௘௥௧௜௖௔௟ ௚௥௔௡௧௦
ௌ௨௕௡௔௧௜௢௡௔௟ ௚௢௩௘௥௡௠௘௡௧ ௘௫௣௘௡ௗ௜௧௨௥௘
    (6) 
                                                          
68 This is because the nominator of revenue decentralisation is the same as the denominator of Vertical 
Imbalance 1 measure. Similarly, the nominator of expenditure decentralisation measure is the same as 
the denominator of the Vertical Imbalance 2.  
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In the attempt to use only one measure of FD, as an aggregate indicator of the fiscal 
performance, the empirical literature (Akai and Sakata, 2002) suggests the use of the 
subnational spending share of either (i) own revenue or (ii) tax revenues, Fiscal 
Performance 1 and Fiscal Performance 2, respectively.69 The rationale for using these 
measures is to indirectly quantify the efficiency of own/tax sources of subnational 
governments by measuring the percentage of expenditures financed with subnational 
governments’ own funds.  Generally speaking, they measure the degree to which local 
fiscal needs are maintained by the local government’s own revenue (Akai and Sakata, 
2002, p.97). 
 
Fiscal Performance 1 = ௌ௨௕௡௔௧௜௢௡௔௟ ௚௢௩௘௥௡௠௘௡௧ ௢௪௡ ௥௘௩௘௡௨௘
ௌ௨௕௡௔௧௜௢௡௔௟ ௚௢௩௘௥௡௠௘௡௧ ௘௫௣௘௡ௗ௜௧௨௥௘
    (7) 
Fiscal Performance 2 = ௌ௨௕௡௔௧௜௢௡௔௟ ௚௢௩௘௥௡௠௘௡௧ ௧௔௫ ௥௘௩௘௡௨௘
ௌ௨௕௡௔௧௜௢௡௔௟ ௚௢௩௘௥௡௠௘௡௧ ௘௫௣௘௡ௗ௜௧௨௥௘
    (8) 
 
Whilst FD measures remain a challenge when investigating the economic effect of 
decentralisation, the non-monotonicity of this relationship seems to be an intriguing 
possibility. Hence, recalling Chapter 2, various studies suggested that the FD-
economic growth relationship is non-monotonic/(inverse) hump-shaped (Thiessen, 
2003; Eller, 204; Thiessen, 2005; Akai et al., 2007), where FD initially affects 
economic growth negatively and after a critical value turns to have a positive effect or 
vice versa. This suggests the existence of an optimal level of FD which maximises 
economic growth Hence, the squared terms of FD measures are considered in the 
model.  
b) The dependent variable: economic growth 
Another concern regarding our model specification is the measurement of the 
dependent variable: economic performance. Based on the comprehensive discussion 
in Section 2.2.2, the theoretical model of Davoodi and Zou (1998) argued over the 
rationale of estimating the impact of FD on output growth rather than output level. 
                                                          
69 See World Bank Fiscal Decentralization Indicator summary, derived by IMF’s Government Finance 
Statistics.  (http://www1.worldbank.org/publicsector/decentralization/fiscalindicators.htm, date of 
access 08/09/2017).  
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75% of the studies in our MRA sample (recall Section 3.3)70 used output growth as a 
dependent variable (growth of real GDP, the difference in logarithm of GDP per 
capita, GDP growth in PPP, GDP growth in PPP constant prices, etc.), while only few 
studies, mainly investigating this effect on a single country, used variables related to 
the level of output (real GDP, GDP per capita, GDP/GNI per employee, GNP).71 In 
addition, the latter group of studies are profoundly criticized for omitted variable bias 
and the lack of theoretical justification of using level of GDP (recall Section 2.4.1). 
Therefore, following best practices in cross-country research at the national level 
(Davoodi and Zou, 1998; Iimi, 2005; Rodriguez-Pose and Kroijer, 2009; Gemmell et 
al., 2013), our investigation uses output growth as a measure of economic 
performance. 
The dependent variable (growth) is measured by taking the first difference of 
purchasing power parity (PPP) adjusted real GDP per capita in logarithmic form.72 By 
using PPP, GDP per capita is converted to international dollars, as a common currency, 
using PPP rates. This adjustment takes into account inflation and possible variation in 
economic growth due to changes in prices across countries under investigation. 
Instead, the use of other adjustments, such as market exchange rate, would only 
convert GDP per capita to a common currency, while there would be no conversion of 
GDP valued at a common price level. In this case, GDP converted to a common 
currency remain valued at national price level, with differences in the level of GDP 
between countries reflecting the differences in volumes of goods and services and the 
differences in price levels. Given this inability of exchange rates to properly reflect 
the differences in prices between countries, especially high- or low-income countries 
(Temple, 1999), the use of PPP to convert GDP per capita into a common currency, 
international dollars, while accounting for price differences between countries (World 
Bank, 2015) is considered superior. In addition, the use of exchange rate has been 
continuously criticised due to the inability to properly estimate the 
                                                          
70 Our sample includes studies that conducted an empirical investigation and have reported at least one 
effect size of the growth effect of FD. 
71 See Faridi (2011), Philip and Isah (2012) and Shahdani et al. (2012). 
72 The 2011 international dollars are used in calculating GDP per capita. 
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irregular/unpredictable movements of capital flows (Filippetti and Peyrache, 2015, 
p.553; World Bank, 2015, p.14).73  
b) Control Variables 
Amongst the commonly used explanatory variables in the growth literature, 
population growth is considered a basic determinant of growth, present in all cross-
country investigations. Despite some contradicting theoretical and empirical evidence, 
it is argued that high rates of population growth decrease economic growth, where 
each worker will have less productive factors to work with (Pritchett, 1996; Barro and 
Sala-i-Martin, 2004; Romer, 2011).74 In our investigation, population growth 
(popgrowth) is measured by the annual growth rate of midyear population in 
percentages.  
Another important variable, as suggested by the theoretical and empirical literature, is 
the rate of accumulation of physical capital accounted through investment to GDP 
ratio. Theoretically, it is argued that high rate of investment leads to high rates of 
economic growth (Solow, 1962, p.86), though its effects might be subject to the extent 
to which technological innovation is embodied in the new capital (Bassanini and 
Scarpetta, 2001). In our empirical research, investment is measured by the gross fixed 
capital formation as a percentage of GDP (gfcf_gdp).  
Theoretical and empirical literature have highlighted the role of human capital as a 
prerequisite for economic growth (Lucas, 1988; Barro, 1991; Barro and Lee, 1993; 
Mankiw et al., 1992). However, difficulties in measuring it properly and lack of 
consistent data across various countries (especially for TEs) has generated mixed 
results. The role of human capital appears to be either overestimated (Pritchett, 2001) 
or underestimated (Kumar, 2006; Sunde and Vischer, 2011). In this regard, different 
proxies for human capital are suggested by the literature such as gross- and net-
enrolment rate in primary, secondary and tertiary education, literacy rate (Le et al., 
2005; Islam, 2009), average years of schooling and level of students’ cognitive skills 
(Hanushek and Woessmann, 2009a; 2009b; 2011; Barro and Lee, 2013).  
                                                          
73 Given that exchange rates mirror the purchasing power of tradable goods, the unpredictable 
movements of capital flows might be difficult to capture. 
74 See Section 3.2.1 for a more detailed explanation on the effect of population growth on a country’s 
growth rate. 
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Whilst gross- and net-enrolment rates in secondary and tertiary education are mostly 
used as proxies for human capital, the appropriateness of these measures is often 
questioned in a cross-country research. Using enrolment rates as proxies for human 
capital has been criticized due to its inability to adequately proxy human capital 
endowment. Enrolment rates measure the current investment in human capital, by 
representing, therefore, a flow of investment in human capital. Further, because 
investment in human capital needs time to be reflected in the human capital stock, 
these measures fail to represent the current human capital of the labour force (Le et 
al., 2005, p.19). Further, it may be argued that the (gross- or net-) enrolment rates fail 
to measure the quality of human capital. High enrolment rates do not necessarily 
indicate high level of human capital quality (the skills obtained in schools), especially 
in TEs where the level of enrolment rates is relatively high (Campos and Kinoshita, 
2002, p.12).  Ideally, human capital would be proxied by the students’ cognitive skills, 
a qualitative measure of human capital. Unfortunately, this is not possible due to 
considerable lack of continuous data for TEs; limited data can be found only in 
Hanushek and Woessmann (2011) and Altinok et al. (2014).  
In an attempt to remedy the majority of the above shortcomings, we opt for the average 
years of schooling. Average years of schooling are measured as the number of years 
of education of population aged 15 and over.  The data, provided by the UNDP 
annually, are calculated using the same methodology of Barro and Lee (2013; 2014), 
but augmented with the UNESCO’s educational attainment figures.75 Thereby, we 
introduce schooling as our main variable of human capital. However, for comparison 
and to address potential measurement error problems, we make use of two alternative 
measures of human capital: gross enrolment rates in secondary education (educ2) and 
tertiary education (educ3).76 
The integration of countries into the world economy is often deemed an important 
determinant of growth. Overall, the literature (Barro and Sala-i-Martin, 1995; 2004; 
Chang et al., 2005) suggest a positive relationship between trade and economic 
                                                          
75 The average years of schooling can also be found in Barro and Lee (2013) dataset, but information is 
incomplete for some countries in terms of time span covered (data are quadrennial) and geographical 
coverage (data are missing for the majority of countries in the Southern Caucasus). 
76 Instead of the two variables, one can use the combined gross enrolment rate of UNDP. However, this 
seems impossible in the case of TEs given the large missing data especially for Southern Caucasus 
countries.  
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growth. It is argued that exposure to international competition and efficent allocation 
of resources through trade openness are the potential mechanisms of trade to economic 
growth (Gries and Redlin, 2012). Alternatively, some authors (Krugman, 1994; and 
Rodriguez and Rodrik, 2001) are sceptic about the positive effect of trade on growth, 
while arguing for the importance of measuring trade consistently. Thus, following the 
best practices in the empirical growth literature, we measure trade by the sum of 
exports and imports of goods and services as a percentage of GDP (trade). 
An important variable included in a growth regression is the country’s initial 
conditions. Unanimously, the literature (Abramovitz, 1986; Baumol, 1986; Dowrick 
and Nguyen, 1989; Verspagen, 1991) claims the importance of initial conditions in 
explaining why some countries are catching-up to a high level of economic growth 
and others are lagging behind (recall Section 2.2.1 for more details). Mankiw et al. 
(1992) claim that economies will grow faster the further they are from the steady-state; 
namely, (relatively) poor economies will grow faster in per capita terms than the 
(relatively) rich ones. To isolate the possible convergence effects between countries 
in our investigation, the initial level of GDP per capita in purchasing power parity at 
constant prices (gdpini) is entered in the model. A negative correlation should exist 
between economic growth rates and initial income if catch-up effect occurs. However, 
the Fixed Effect estimator will wipe out time-invariant variables, as such gdpini. 
Thereby, to accurately measure the existence of a possible convergence process, we 
include an alternative measure to account for the convergence process as suggested by 
Barro and Sala-i-Martin (2004): the lagged level of income measured by the first 
lagged level of GDP per capita in constant prices (laggdp). 
A note of caution is required regarding the variable used to isolate such process. 
Following the best practice in the FD-economic growth literature (Thornton, 2007; 
Rodriguez-Pose and Kroijer, 2009), initial level of income is measured by output in 
levels (i.e. GDP per capita)   Following the suggestions of Rodriguez-Pose and Fratesi 
(2004), the second lag of GDP (lag2gdp), an alternative measure of the initial 
conditions, is additionally included in the dataset. Whilst they argue that the second 
lag of GDP is superior in the presence of potential endogeneity in the regression, the 
empirical evidence does not support this. At this point, we continue with our two 
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preferred variables (gdpini and laggdp), and use the second lag of GDP as a robustness 
check. 
Another concern in this thesis is how to take into account the transition-specifics of 
the countries in our dataset and thereby to move towards an extended version of FD-
growth model adjusted for transition economies. Given that the dataset encompasses 
different countries that experience different transition stages, controlling for the 
institution quality may also be an important explanatory variable in explaining the FD-
growth relationship. Hence, our innovation is to estimate a FD-growth relationship by 
controlling for transition stages. In this regard, we utilise the EBRD transition indices 
to account for the success of the institution building (EBRD, 1994) and transition 
towards OECD standards. The indices assess the progress in transition economies 
through a set of indicators in six areas: large-scale privatisation, small-scale 
privatisation, governance and enterprise restructuring, price liberalisation, trade and 
foreign exchange system and competition policy (EBRD, 2005). Each EBRD index is 
scored from 1.0 (minimum) to 4.3 (maximum). The higher the score, the more 
transition progress a country has made.77 The literature suggests the use of only one 
composite index instead of using all six indicators due to the high correlation of indices 
with each other (Hall and Jones, 1999; Alis, 2003; Eicher and Schreiber, 2010; Efendic 
and Pugh, 2015). Hence, following the approach of Radulescu and Barlow (2002) and 
Eicher and Schreiber (2010), we sum the six indicators into one aggregate index 
(tindex) and then normalize it in a scale from 0 to 100; 0 shows that there was no 
progress of institution quality after the fall of Communism, whereas 100 indicates 
market-based standards typical of advanced industrial economies (EBRD, 2004, 
p.199; Falcetti et al., 2006; Eicher and Schreiber, 2010, p.4).  
An alternative variable suggested by the literature, although rarely used in empirical 
research, (and likely to be highly correlated with tindex or FD measures) is the 
classification of countries based on their decentralisation reform progress. UNDP 
classifies TEs into four categories: (i) active decentralisers, (ii) advanced intermediate 
                                                          
77 Given that the Czech Republic has completed its transition phase in 2008, its test scores are not 
provided by the EBRD. Therefore, we assign the highest score (4.3) to the Czech Republic from 2008 
to 2016.  
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decentralisers, (iii) early intermediate decentralisers, and (iv) non-decentralisers.78 
The control for these various decentralisation reforms might provide useful insight in 
explaining differences in growth effects of FD between economies. However, this 
does not seem appropriate to use in our sample because of the small number of 
observations for each category. An alternative approach is proposed by us, which will 
be explained in detail in Section 4.4, by using the stages of transition as a moderator 
for the FD-economic growth relationship. 
Further, we make use of another variable, which might be considered relevant in our 
context of investigation. TEs that are members of the European Union are likely to 
progress their decentralisation reform faster than non-members, while converging 
towards the OECD decentralisation standards. Countries’ status with respect to the 
process of the EU integration is considered in our model through a dummy variable, 
eu, which takes the value 1 if a country has joined the EU and 0 otherwise. 
Additionally, it might be interesting to investigate whether the economic effect of FD 
varies due to the geographical location. The difference in the advancement of FD 
reforms between countries in Europe and those located in the Southern Caucasus, as 
explained in Section 1.3, might be also reflected in differences in economic effect of 
FD between these two groups of countries. In order to investigate whether location 
influences the economic effect of FD, a dummy variable (europe) is included in the 
dataset, which is also interacted with the main measures of FD. 
Another potential variable, although not of primary concern in the FD empirical 
literature, is public sector size. While the majority of studies have focused mainly on 
the effect of fiscal decentralisation on government size79, only a few studies are 
controlling for the size of the public sector while investigating the economic effect of 
fiscal decentralisation (Sagbas et al., 2004; Rodriguez-Pose and Ezcurra, 2010). A 
note of caution, however, is due when considering the problem of growth 
maximisation explained in Sections 2.2.1 and 2.2.2.  As mentioned in these sections, 
growth-maximizing shares of each level of government (national or subnational) can 
be found by maximising the growth path subject to government level interested in. 
                                                          
78 Dabla-Norris (2006) has a similar categorisation of countries according to their decentralisation 
progress; however, this thesis does not follow her approach because the UNDP’s classification of 
countries is more comprehensive in terms of countries and time span covered. 
79 Brennan and Buchanan (1980) claim that (fiscal) decentralisation is likely to lead to smaller public 
sector size. 
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This explains the inclusion of the share of governments at either the national or 
subnational level, but not both (unless the purpose is to investigate the effect of general 
government activity/size on economic growth). Whilst decentralisation might change 
due to an increase/decrease in subnational shares; the literature ignores the possible 
effect of public sector size fluctuations, which in turn are likely to impact fiscal 
decentralisation. This relates to the measurement of fiscal decentralisation. As 
explained in the above sections, expenditure decentralisation is measured by the share 
of expenditure at subnational expenditure in total expenditures of general government. 
Thereby, this share might vary due to (i) change in the level of expenditure at 
subnational level or (i) change in the level of expenditure of total government. Namely, 
FD can be considered as a corollary of public sector (size), where changes in FD level 
might be caused not by greater devolution transferred from national to subnational 
government, but due to a shrink or enlargement of public sector size in general. Hence, 
the size of public sector (govcons), measured by the share of general government final 
consumption expenditure relative to GDP, will be included in the model to investigate 
whether the economic effect of fiscal decentralisation is subject to the size of public 
sector. Nevertheless, we will use govcons only as a robustness check because we 
employ FD measures that strip off the effect of public sector such as fdtax_l and 
imbalance1 and imbalance2.  
In conclusion, the core independent variables considered in our baseline growth 
regression are the FD measures (subject to the correlation matrix), initial level of GDP, 
population growth, human capital measured by the average years of schooling, 
investment to GDP ratio, trade openness and transition index. Additional measures, as 
mentioned above, are to be used in the growth model as robustness check or to shed 
more light in the FD-economic growth relationship. In what follows, Table 4.2 
summarises the variables used, their definition, expected sign and data source. 
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Table 4.2. Potential variables and data sources  
Variable name Description Expected 
Sign 
Data Source 
fdexp Subnational government share of expenditure (% of total government 
expenditure) 
[percentage of total expenditure accounted for subnational government, 
measured as the sum of local and state total expenditure minus grants from 
state to local, divided by the sum of local, state and national expenditure] 
+/- IMF (GFS) from IMF Data Access to 
Macroeconomic & Financial Data and UK 
Data service, checked with Eurostat and 
individual Ministry of Finances such as 
Ministry of Finance Belarus and Ministry of 
Finance Albania  
fdrev Subnational government share of revenue (% of total government revenue) 
[percentage of total revenues accounted for subnational governments, 
measured as the sum of local and state total revenues minus grants from 
state to local government, divided by the sum of local, state and national 
revenues] 
 
+ IMF (GFS) from IMF Data Access to 
Macroeconomic & Financial Data and UK 
Data service, checked with Eurostat and 
individual Ministry of Finances such as 
Ministry of Finance Belarus and Ministry 
of Finance Albania 
fdtax Subnational government share of tax revenues (% of total general 
government tax revenues) 
[percentage of tax revenues collected by subnational government, 
measured as the sum of local and state tax revenues, divided by the sum 
of local, state and national tax revenues] 
 
+ IMF (GFS) from IMF Data Access to 
Macroeconomic & Financial Data and UK 
Data service, checked with Eurostat and 
individual Ministry of Finances such as 
Ministry of Finance Belarus and Ministry 
of Finance Albania 
fdtax_l Subnational government share of tax revenues (% of total subnational 
revenues) 
[local and state government tax revenue divided by the sum of local and 
state government revenue] 
 
 
+ IMF (GFS) from IMF Data Access to 
Macroeconomic & Financial Data and UK 
Data service, checked with Eurostat and 
individual Ministry of Finances such as 
Ministry of Finance Belarus and Ministry 
of Finance Albania 
fiscalperform1 Subnational government share of own revenue (% of total subnational 
expenditure) 
[local and state government own revenue (tax revenue and other revenues) 
divided by the sum of local and state government expenditure] 
+ IMF (GFS) from IMF Data Access to 
Macroeconomic & Financial Data and UK 
Data service, checked with Eurostat and 
individual Ministry of Finances such as 
Ministry of Finance Belarus and Ministry 
of Finance Albania 
fiscalperform2 Subnational government share of tax revenue (% of total subnational 
government expenditure) 
+ IMF (GFS) from IMF Data Access to 
Macroeconomic & Financial Data and UK 
Data service, checked with Eurostat and 
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[the sum of local and state tax revenues divided by the sum of local and 
state subnational government expenditure] 
 
individual Ministry of Finances such as 
Ministry of Finance Belarus and Ministry 
of Finance Albania 
imbalance1 Intergovernmental transfer share (% of subnational government revenue) 
[intergovernmental transfers received by central government minus grants 
from state divided by the sum of local and state revenues] 
 
- IMF (GFS) from IMF Data Access to 
Macroeconomic & Financial Data and UK 
Data service, checked with Eurostat and 
individual Ministry of Finances such as 
Ministry of Finance Belarus and Ministry 
of Finance Albania 
imbalance2 
 
Intergovernmental transfer share (% of subnational government 
expenditure) 
[intergovernmental transfers received by central government minus grants 
from state divided by the sum of local and state expenditure] 
 
- IMF (GFS) from IMF Data Access to 
Macroeconomic & Financial Data and UK 
Data service, checked with Eurostat and 
individual Ministry of Finances such as 
Ministry of Finance Belarus and Ministry 
of Finance Albania 
growth Log first-difference of GDP per capita based on purchasing power parity 
(PPP). PPP GDP is gross domestic product converted to international 
dollars using purchasing power parity rates. Data are in constant 2011 
international dollars. 
 
 WB 
gdpini Initial level of GDP per capita PPP in 2011 international $ in logarithmic 
form 
 
- WB (double checked with IMF Access to 
Macroeconomic & Financial Data, and 
Eurostat) 
laggdp First lag of GDP per capita based on purchasing power parity (PPP). PPP 
GDP is gross domestic product converted to international dollars using 
purchasing power parity rates. Data are in constant 2011 international 
dollars. 
- WB (double checked with IMF Access to 
Macroeconomic & Financial Data, and 
Eurostat) 
lag2gdp Second lag of GDP per capita based on purchasing power parity (PPP). 
PPP GDP is gross domestic product converted to international dollars 
using purchasing power parity rates. Data are in constant 2011 
international dollars. 
- WB (double checked with IMF Access to 
Macroeconomic & Financial Data, and 
Eurostat) 
popgrowth Population growth (annual %) measured as the exponential rate of growth 
of midyear population from year t-1 to t. 
 
- WB 
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gfcf_gdp Gross fixed capital formation measured as a share of Gross Domestic 
Product 
 
+ WB (double checked with IMF Access to 
Macroeconomic & Financial Data, and 
Eurostat) 
educ2 Secondary Education, total enrolment in secondary education as a 
percentage of the total population of the five-year age group following 
from primary school leaving. 
 
+ WB 
educ3 Tertiary Education, total enrolment in tertiary education as a percentage 
of the total population of the five-year age group following from 
secondary school leaving. 
 
+ WB 
schooling Average years of schooling the population aged 15 and over 
 
+ Barro and Lee’s dataset, UNESCO and 
UNDP 
dschooling The difference in the average years of schooling the population aged 15 
and over 
 
+ Barro and Lee’s dataset, UNESCO and 
UNDP 
trade The sum of exports and imports of goods and services measured as a share 
of Gross Domestic Product 
 
+ WB  
eu Dummy variable: 1 if a country is a member, 0 otherwise 
 
+ European Union 
europe Dummy variable: 1 if a country is located in Europe and 0 otherwise.  
 
+/- IMF 
govcons Government size measured by the share of general government final 
consumption expenditure relative to GDP, expressed in percentage. 
 
- IMF (Government Finance Statistics) 
through IMF Access to Macroeconomic & 
Financial Data 
rsdummy Dummy variable: 0 if the country reports on a cash basis and 1 if country 
switched to an accrual basis. 
 
 IMF 
year1-20 Time dummies, in the case of unbalanced dataset year1 = year 1990, year2 
= year 1996,…, year20 = year 2015 
 
  
 
150 
 
4.3 Methodology 
4.3.1 Model Specification 
 
To empirically test whether FD has any impact on economic growth, this chapter, as 
already introduced in Section 4.2.1, employs panel data for selected TEs.80 The use of 
panel data derives from the need to explicitly take into account the heterogeneity of 
countries and uncovering potential dynamic relationships (Hsiao, 2006; Greene, 2011, 
p.343), which otherwise would produce serious bias into the estimates (Frees, 2004). 
An important advantage of panel data over cross-section or time series data is the 
mitigation of omitted variable bias (lurking variables), which is likely to be a serious 
problem when estimating a growth model (Frees, 2004, p.7). Panel data models are 
often recommended in establishing the causality between variables better than cross-
section or time series analysis, due to the larger number of observations and weaker 
collinearity between variables that result in more efficient estimates; other things 
being equal, as the number of observations increases standard errors become smaller 
(Baltagi, 1995; Hsiao, 2006). 
Whilst the literature offers various types of panel data models, how best to choose 
between different estimators depends on the nature of our dataset (wide dataset vs long 
dataset) and the diagnostic testing. The starting point when modelling panel data is 
whether to employ a Fixed Effect (FE) or a Random Effect (RE) estimator. The former 
makes use of only the within-country variation, whereas the latter utilises both the 
within- and between variation (Hsiao, 2006, p.11). In the context of our dataset where 
FD does not vary much within the same country (recall Chapter 1) and where some of 
the variables are likely to be either time-invariant (e.g. initial level of GDP, 
geographical location) or slowly-moving (e.g. population growth), the RE estimators 
seem to be more appropriate. The initial model to start with is as follows: 
)(10 itiitiitit uXFDgrowth     (4.1) 
where, β0 is the overall intercept, FDit is a vector of FD measures and Xit is the vector 
of control variables (determinants of economic growth), (ui + εit) is a composite error 
                                                          
80 More details regarding the countries and time span will be provided in the next section. 
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of an unobserved effect ui (time-constant factor also known as country heterogeneity) 
and the idiosyncratic error εit (time-varying error).81 By using an RE model, we assume 
that all the countries included in the model are drawn from a larger dataset and have a 
common mean value for the overall intercept equal to β0. Potential differences that 
might exist between countries’ individual intercept and the common mean are 
reflected in the error term ui (Gujarati, 2004, p.647). 
Although RE estimators seems more appropriate than FE estimators for the reasons 
explained above, a crucial assumption over the correlation between the error terms and 
the independent variables might question the plausibility of the former. The estimates 
will be biased if the individual error term and independent variables are correlated, 
which in turn prioritizes the FE estimator (Gujarati, 2004, p.650). Since the key criteria 
in choosing between an RE and FE approach is whether the assumption of the 
conditional independence between the intercept and independent variables holds, a 
Hausman test must be performed to check its validity (Gujarati, 2004, p.651 and 
Greene, 2012, p.421).82 The FE model considered is as below:  
ititiitiit XFDgrowth   10    (4.2) 
Contrary to Equation (1), where countries have a common mean value, the FE model 
allows the intercept to vary across countries ( i0 ). Now, each intercept is considered 
as unknown parameter to be estimated (Greene, 2008), while the slopes of the 
coefficients remain the same (Gujarati, 2004). The utilization of only within variation 
by the FE model, makes it preferable to the other estimates as it mitigates the bias of 
unobserved country specific, which are time constant. Such unobserved effect will be 
swept away by the first-difference approach in FE model. This seems to be important 
in the context of growth regressions, where some variables are considered as time 
invariant, amongst others, the initial conditions (Bond et al., 2001).  
It is important to note that the above equations are estimated by using a different 
combination of FD measures. Although the preferred measures will be substantially 
determined by the data availability and the correlation matrix, there are few 
suggestions from the critical literature review and MRA to be considered. Whilst the 
                                                          
81 More detailed review will be provided in the next section regarding the specification of FD measures 
and control variables used. 
82 This assumption is also known as the random effects assumption. 
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shortcomings of using solely one FD measure are eminent in the lierature (Scheneider, 
2003, p.42), the use of many FD measures pose also some crucial challenges. Potential 
multicollinearity might exist between FD measures of the same category (i.e. revenue  
and tax decentralisation) or even between different categories (i.e. revenue 
decentralisation with vertical imbalance, expenditure decentralization with revenue 
decentralization). Following the best practices in the literature and the MRA 
conclusions, it is argued that our model should have either two or three measures of 
decentralisation, subject to the correlation matrix, encompassing the expenditure 
decentralization, the revenue aspect of decentralisation, and the imbalance between 
expenditures and revenue of local government. However, the final measures chosen 
for the model are to be specified in Section 4.3 and decided after the collinearity check 
in Section 4.4. Thus, two sets of equations (4.3 and 4.4) are considered as baseline 
specifications. 
)(exp 210 itiitiititit uXfdrevfdgrowth     (4.3) 
)(exp 3210 itiitiititit uXimbalancefdrevfdgrowth   (4.4) 
The first specification uses two measures of FD, which encompasses both the 
expenditure and revenue dimension of FD, whereas the second specification includes 
vertical imbalance as an additional aspect of decentralization. Both specifications will 
be estimated using both RE and FE estimators, however for simplicity, the following 
equations assume the use of RE estimators.  
 
4.3.2 Potential identification problems and empirical 
approach 
Before proceeding with the diagnostics and results, it is important to acknowledge 
some potential identification problems that are likely to occur. The estimation of 
Equations 4.3 and 4.4 pose some crucial challenges regarding the empirical 
methodology. First, it is likely that endogeneity might arise from the inclusion of FD 
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as an explanatory variable in a growth model.83 There is a theoretical possibility that 
some control variables, in addition to some FD measures, exhibit reverse causation. 
As argued intensely in Sections 2.2 and 2.3, reverse causality occurs because 
efficiency gains from FD appears as economies grow, and more FD is demanded at 
relatively higher levels of development. Literature review suggests that taxes collected 
locally and transfers from central government are likely to be endogenous. More 
specifically, the more developed localities are likely to collect more local taxes than 
less developed subnational governments/units due to the higher tax base (Cantarero 
and Gonzalez, 2009), whereas less developed subnational governments/units are likely 
to receive more funds than the more developed ones (Martinez-Vazquez and McNab, 
2003). Ignoring such endogenous correlation would produce biased estimates and 
cause wrong inference about the economic effect of FD.  
Preferably, this problem (also given the potential dynamics in the residuals) would be 
addressed by employing a difference/system-GMM by using lagged values and/or 
difference of lagged values of the endogenous variables as instruments (Bundell and 
Bond, 1998; and Roodman, 2006). Unfortunately, this method cannot be employed in 
the case of our dataset as it requires large N and small T (Roodman, 2006). Otherwise, 
the estimates will be biased.  
Alternatively, in an attempt to mitigate endogeneity, the literature often recommends 
the inclusion of lags of the presumed endogenous variables (Baltagi, 1995). However, 
this seems to be economically irrational in a cross-country growth regression 
estimated by FE. Having the lagged GDP (to control for the convergence effect) as an 
explanatory variable jeopardizes the inclusion of lagged values of other control 
variables. The existence of all these lagged values on the same side of the growth 
regression will create a growth model within a growth model, which would escalate 
into a severe conceptual problem. For instance, including the first lag of investment in 
our growth model, would by definition be conceptually wrong as this lagged variable 
will be correlated with the lagged GDP, which is an independent variable, and both of 
them will be considered as control variables for growth. In addition, Bellemare et al., 
(2015) claim that this procedure often creates bias in the absence of identification 
                                                          
83 Endogeneity refers to the bias caused by omitted variables, simultaneity, or measurement errors 
(Wooldridge, 2002). Technically speaking, endogeneity arises when the error term is correlated with 
one/some of the explanatory variable(s), which in turn leads to biased estimates. 
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strategies over the appropriate number of lags on presumed endogenous variables. At 
this point, we opt for a two-stage instrumental variable (IV) estimator to address the 
endogeneity of some regressors claimed (theoretically) as endogenous, which will be 
explained in detail in the next section. 
The second concern in an empirical investigation, which has recently received 
increased attention, is the problem of cross-sectional dependency. Cross-sectional 
dependency denotes the correlation of idiosyncratic errors across panels, which may 
arise due to the presence of common shocks (omitted unobserved components), spatial 
correlation and/or economic distance (Sarafidis et al., 2009, p.2). Whilst early 
application of panel data models assumed that disturbances in panel data are cross-
sectionally independent (Pesaran, 2004; Sarafidis et al., 2009), there are potential 
reasons to believe that this assumption might not hold. Particular to our research, the 
potential reasons are as discussed below. 
First, changes in the level of FD (expenditure or revenue decentralisation) are likely 
to occur simultaneously in TEs, or at least display similar trends among countries in 
Europe and those in the Caucasus and Central Asia. One can observe that even within 
the same group, there is still some similarities of the FD trend observed among some 
countries that share similar characteristics.  For instance, the Czech Republic, Hungary 
and Poland, all part of the EU, have been following more advanced reforms regarding 
(fiscal) decentralisation (whether by coincidence or designed) compared to the Balkan 
countries (Davey and Peteri, 2008; Rodriguez-Pose and Kroijer, 2009). Next, FD 
measures might vary not only due to the change in the local expenditure/revenue, but 
also due to contracting or expansion fiscal policies of central governments (i.e. 
economic crisis, austerity etc.), which might impact FD simultaneously across all 
countries.84 Further, the geographical vicinity of these countries might be considered 
as a potential factor for the presence of cross-country correlation.  
Ignoring these potential causes, if cross-sectional dependence is present, will lead to 
biased estimators and invalidate the conventional t-test and F-test due to incorrect 
standard errors (De Hoyos and Sarafidis, 2006; Hoechle, 2007).  Also, Lee (2002) 
claims that, in certain cases, such dependency might lead to inconsistent estimators. 
                                                          
84 Recalling Section 4.3, an increase/decrease in the national government expenditure due to 
financial/fiscal crisis or fiscal policies will decrease/increase the fdexp. 
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This seems to be an important potential identification problem in the FD-growth 
research, where to the best of our knowledge, the existing FD-economic growth 
empirical studies ignored the dependency of errors between countries.85 In this regard, 
this thesis will test whether cross-sectional dependence is present in our dataset of TEs 
and potential estimators (Driscoll-Kraay SEs) to account for this problem. 
In case of the presence of cross-sectional dependence, it is necessary to rely on 
standard errors which are robust to cross-sectional dependence. The econometrics 
literature (Cameron et al., 2011 and Thompson, 2011) suggests double-clustering86 or 
multi-way clustering of SEs to account for correlated residuals across time (common 
shocks) and space (cross-sectional correlation). This estimator relies on the one-way 
cluster-robust variance estimator of Arellano (1989) and extends it to two or more 
non-nested dimensions (i.e.  two- or multi-clustering). However, a concern which 
arises with this procedure is the large number of clusters needed to avoid additional 
bias in the SEs. Whilst the literature (Cameron et al., 2011, p.8) offers two small-
sample adjustments (options in Stata: cgmreg and small), there is no evidence that SEs 
will not be biased in the case of our dataset, where the number of clusters is relatively 
small (21 countries and 17 years).87 As such in an attempt to mitigate the dependence 
across time and space, the two-way clustering SEs might additionally bias the result 
due to the small number of clusters.  
In an attempt to adress the drawback of a small number of clusters in the data, Driscoll 
and Kraay (1998) propose a superior estimator by transforming the nonparametric 
time series covariance matrix estimator contemporaneously robust to both temporal 
and spatial dependence.88 Their Monte-Carlo simulations show that the performance 
of the Driscoll-Kraay SEs are similar to Newey-West, but the former is superior given 
that it takes into account the spatial dependence and relies on large-T asymptotic. Thus, 
considering the drawbacks of the two-way clustering of SEs and the Newey-West SEs, 
                                                          
85 Unless studies employ spatial model(s). 
86 Double clustering is calculated by summing up the time- and group-clustering, and subtracting the 
White estimator to avoid double counting (Thompson, 2011, p.1).   
87 Pfaff (2013) argues that bias can be found even on datasets with 100 clusters, whereas Gonzales 
(2014) argues that bias is severe in a state-year context. 
88 Another available estimator which controls for cross-sectional dependence is the Panel Corrected 
Standard Errors (PCSE). This estimator uses either OLS or Prais-Winsten parameter estimates and 
usually it relies on large-scale panel regressions, which is not the case of our dataset. Additionally, this 
estimator is robust to cross sectional correlation, first-order autocorrelation and heteroscedasticity.   
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the models in this chapter are estimated using the Driscoll-Kraay SEs, using the 
adjustment offered by Hoechle (2007) for unbalanced panel data. 
Another concern in our empirical approach is the presence of variables with very little- 
or constant-longitudinal variance, which will be “wiped out” in FE estimation. The 
estimation of these variables is likely to be unreliable and “produce wrong inferences 
in the same way a biased estimator could” (Plümper and Troeger, 2007, p.125). 
Accordingly, a Fixed Effect Vector Decomposition (FEVD) approach of Plümper and 
Troeger (2007) is proposed to overcome the loss of information and efficiency that 
occurs when using a FE approach in estimating time-invariant or rarely-changing 
variables. As shown in Plümper and Troeger (2007), the FEVD utilises a three-stage 
procedure for the estimation of such variables in panel data with unit effects. First, a 
standard FE model is estimated with variables that have high longitudinal variance, 
while time-invariant and slowly moving variables are excluded. In stage two, the unit 
effects, obtained from the regression of the previous stage, are regressed on slowly-
moving variables and time-constant variables. The unit effects are decomposed into 
two parts: the explained component by the slowly-moving and time-constant variables 
and the unexplained component. In stage three, the full model, including time variant, 
time-constant and slowly-changing variables, and the unexplained component of stage 
two instead of the unit effects, is estimated by pooled OLS.89 
Despite the increasing popularity that has gained among economists, this estimator has 
been criticised for its ostensive efficiency, which according to Greene (2011), are 
illusory. More specifically, he (p.135) elaborates on this as follows: 
The FEVD simply reproduces (identically) the linear FE (dummy variable) 
estimator then substitutes an inappropriate covariance matrix for the correct 
one…. The efficiency gains are illusory. The claim that the estimator provides 
an estimator for the coefficients on time-invariant variables in an FE model is 
also incorrect.  
It is argued that this procedure manipulates the dataset since there are no instrumental 
variables introduced, neither through Hausman and Taylor’s (1981) approach nor 
through other procedures which take into account the endogeneity of the (time-
                                                          
89 This is implemented in Stata using the ado files provided by the authors. More details on this 
three-stage procedure is provided in Appendix 4.3. 
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invariant) variables.90 Similarly, Breusch et al. (2011, p.133), based on a Monte Carlo 
evidence, demonstrate that the FEVD coefficients after the three stages are the same 
as in a standard FE. Further, the authors claim that these estimators would be 
inefficient in the presence of endogeneity, especially if time-invariant and/or slowly 
moving variables are known as endogenous. On the other hand, Plümper and Troeger 
(2011) claim that these critics are either incomplete or wrong as this procedure 
produces efficient estimators and has both asymptotic and finite sample reasonable 
properties. 
 
4.3.3 Diagnostic testing 
The first standard diagnostic is about the assumption of a normally distributed error 
term (Wooldridge, 2002). The graphical diagnostic (Appendix 4.2.4) suggests 
violation of this assumption. In order to address this problem, the literature suggests 
either use of a logarithmic transformation of the dependent variable or/and detection 
of outliers (Wooldridge, 2002). Unfortunately, the former seems to be not possible in 
this thesis, where the dependent variable is measured in growth rates. By using a 
logarithmic transformation, we risk the validity of the economic interpretation of our 
results. Also, our research appears to challenge the use of logarithmic transformation 
given the existence of negative and zero values. Instead, checking for outliers seems 
to better address the non-normality. 
In order to avoid the effects of abnormal values in the estimation results, graphical 
diagnostics and more advanced techniques are used. The box plot and the letter-value 
displays approaches suggest presence of some aberrant values of growth. Whilst the 
former is based on visual detection of outliers, the letter-value displays approach is 
based on a more systematic observation of outliers. This approach displays a collection 
                                                          
90 Hausman and Taylor (1981) suggest a new approach to estimate the time-invariant variables, which 
is superior to the conventional FE model only if some of the explanatory variables are not correlated 
with the unobserved group effects. Namely, if the variables are known to be exogenous, Hausman-
Taylor approach seems to be more appropriate than the other estimators. However, identifying the 
exogeneity/endogeneity of all the variables in the model (time-varying and time-invariant variables) 
seems very difficult (Breusch et al., 2011 and Wooldrige 2002). Based on Monte Carlo evidence, 
Plümper and Troeger (2007) argue about the superiority of FEVD in estimating efficiently the time-
invariant and slowly moving variables compared to the Hausman-Taylor procedure, the RE model and 
pooled OLS. 
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of observations drawn from the sample in the tails rather than the middle of the 
distribution in an attempt to identify observations that are outside some predetermined 
cut-off called fences (Hoaglin, 1893; Emerson and Stoto, 1983; StataCorp, 2013). 
Based on the visual diagnostic through box plot and especially on the latter value 
approach, Models 5.3 and 5.4 are estimated within the recommended fences for the 
growth rate of -12.55 and 21.20 (see Appendix 4.2.3).91 As to the independent 
variables, the observations seem to be within the suggested inner and outer border, 
with no serious threat to our analysis (see Appendix 4.2.4). We rely on the Tukey 
Ladder of Power test (Tukey, 1977) to decide on the appropriate transformation of 
independent variables once the normality assumption is rejected. 
As second check, the collinearity diagnostics show relatively low correlation between 
the control variables and FD measures, but as expected, there is high correlation 
between the main variables of interest with each other (see Appendix 4.1). Following 
the correlation matrix and based on the review provided in Section 4.3.2, there are 
several decisions to be taken regarding the FD measures. The first one is the inclusion 
of a measure that captures the expenditure dimension of FD. Given that fdexp is the 
only available measure capturing this dimension, it seems reasonable to consider it as 
the first selected FD measure. Next, given the appropriateness of tax rather than 
revenue decentralization, and the high correlation of the later with fdexp (0.94), we 
include fdtax_l to measure the revenue dimension of FD.92 Next, a decision regarding 
the third dimension of FD (vertical imbalance) has to be taken. Whilst the two vertical 
imbalance measures do not seem to be highly correlated with the first selected measure 
(fdexp), contrary they appear to be highly correlated with fdtax_l. The correlation 
between fdtax_l with imbalance1 and imbalance2 is -0.88 and -0.76, respectively. 
Hence, it is argued that the second measure of vertical imbalance is superior to the 
first one. As to the fiscal performance measures, the correlation between 
(fiscalperform1 or fiscalperform2) and other FD measures appear to be severely high 
(above 0.80), which questions their appropriateness. Also, in case one of the above 
measures would be used in a growth regression, that would be as a single measure 
                                                          
91 Denoting the interquartile range as the IQR, defined as the spread of the fourths, the inner fence is 
defined as (3/2)IQR, whereas the outer fence as 3IQR above and below the F-summaries (StataCorp 
2013, p.3). 
92 The correlation between fdtax_l and fdexp is 0.1166 (see Appendix 4.1 for more Stata printouts).    
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(due to the high correlation with other FD measures), powerless to capture all the 
dimensions of FD. Hence, we rule out the two fiscal performance measures.  
Summing up, the final FD measures are fdexp to measure the expenditure dimension 
of FD, fdtax_l to measure the revenue dimension (chosen between fdrev, fdtax and 
fdtax_l) imbalance2 to measure the dependency of local governments to central one 
(chosen between imbalance1 and imbalance2). Thus, Model 5.4 becomes our 
preferred specification. However, given the presence of mild multicollinearity 
between imbalance2 and the other selected FD measures, it will be interesting to 
contrast the results of this model with the one including only fdexp and fdtax_l 
(Equation 4.3). Turning back to the collinearity between all independent variables, the 
mean VIF seem to be very low (1.85 when using Equation 4.3 and 2.05 when using 
Equation 4.4), suggesting that the inclusion of our control variables do not cause a 
problem of multicollinearity.93  
In terms of standard diagnostics test, a RESET, as suggested by Wooldridge (2009, 
p.306), is performed. Accordingly, we do not reject the null hypothesis of a correctly 
specified form in Equation (the p-value on the chi2 test is 0.903).94 However, the 
question is not only which FD measures to use, but also whether to include a squared 
term of FD to account for its nonlinear effect. Although mostly ignored, few studies 
(Thiessen, 2003; Asatryan and Feld, 2013) argue that the relationship between FD and 
economic growth might exhibit an inverse U-shape. This points towards an optimal 
size of FD, above which the effect of FD on growth becomes negative. Estimation 
outputs provided in Appendix 4.4.1 suggest the existence of a linear relationship, 
rather than an inverse U-shape and an optimal size. Same results seem to be suggested 
even when having only two measures of FD (where Equation 4.3 is augmented with 
the squared terms of fdexp and fdtax_l).  
 The modified Wald’s test (Baum, 2006) and the Wooldridge test for panel data 
(Drukker, 2003) are performed to test the presence of group-wise heterogeneity and 
autocorrelation, respectively. As expected in a cross-country regression, the above 
tests suggest that the model suffers from group-wise heteroskedasticity and 
autocorrelation (see Appendix 4.2.6 and 4.2.7 for Stata printouts). Next, a unit root 
                                                          
93 Mode details are provided in the Appendix 4.2.2. 
94 Similarly, we fail to reject the null hypothesis when this test is performed on Equation 4.3. 
160 
 
test is conducted to decide whether there is need to test for a cointegration relationship. 
The Maddala and Wu’s (1999) Phillips-Perron type test is performed on all variables, 
while using the demean option to mitigate the effect of cross-sectional dependence 
(Phillips and Perron, 1998; Levin et al., 2002; StataCorp, 2013).95 This test is a Fisher-
type test, where p-values from individual tests are combined together to obtain the 
overall test statistics on whether panels have unit roots. Based on the p-values from 
individual tests and the overall Fisher-type unit root test (see Appendix 4.2.5), it is 
suggested to not proceed further with conducting a cointegration relationship test. 
Another important test performed is the Pesaran test of cross-sectional dependence 
(Pesaran, 2004). The null hypothesis that the cross-section units are independent is 
strongly rejected with a p-value of 0.002.96 If this dependence is coming from the 
exposure of countries to common/homogenous shocks, eventually the inclusion of 
time dummies would remove it completely (Sarafidis et al., 2009; Gaibulloev et al., 
2014). Consequently, Equations 4.3 and 4.4 are augmented and re-estimated with time 
dummies. In this case, it is wise to test again for the presence of cross-sectional 
dependence, however this time originating from non-homogenous effect, which does 
not show pattern of common components (i.e. economic distance) and spatial 
dependence (Sarafidis et al., 2009, p.150). Again, the test indicates the existence of 
cross-sectional dependence, which was not able to be absorbed by time-dummies (p-
value after including time dummies of 0.003).97 Therefore, it is necessary to rely on 
standard errors which are simultaneously robust to autocorrelation, heteroscedasticity 
and cross-sectional dependence by using the Driscoll-Kraay SEs and the adjustment 
offered by Hoechle (2007) for unbalanced panel data (recall Section 4.3.2). 
To test whether a FE- or a RE-estimator with Driscoll-Kraay SEs will be used, a 
Hausman test is performed. Unfortunately, this test becomes invalid and does not have 
any statistical inference once the panels are correlated (Hoechle, 2007, p.25). 
However, a modified Hausman test proposed by Wooldridge (2002, p.288) is used as 
an alternative to the standard Hausman test. This test, robust to general forms of spatial 
and temporal dependence, suggests that the null hypothesis can be soundly rejected 
                                                          
95 The demean option is suggested by Levin et al. (2002) to mitigate the impact of cross-sectional 
dependence in pane data. Technically speaking, this option requests the xtunitroot to first subtract the 
cross-sectional averages from the series (StataCorp, 2013). 
96 More details provided in Appendix 4.2.9. 
97 See Appendix 4.2.9 for more details. 
161 
 
with a p-value of 0.000 (see Appendix 4.2.9 for Stata printouts).98 Thereby, it appears 
that FE estimation is preferred relative to the RE-estimators, which appear to be 
inconsistent. Additionally, based on the F-test, it is argued that the OLS estimation 
relative to the FE is likely to produce inconsistent estimates. Hence, we conclude that 
the FE using Driscoll-Kraay SEs is the most appropriate estimator as it is 
simultaneously robust to cross-sectional correlation, autocorrelation and 
heteroscedasticity.99 
Regarding our next identification problem, the presence of time-invariant or slowly 
changing variables requires the use of FEVD. However, the discussion in the previous 
section on the appropriateness of FEVD gives us sufficient reasons to not rely solely 
on this estimator but also to report other estimators (i.e. FE with Driscoll-Kraay SEs). 
However, to ensure the inference of the economic estimates it is important to 
investigate whether the FEVD is well specified. Following the suggestion of Plümper 
and Troeger (2007), the coefficient of the unobserved unit effects hi should be equal 
to 1.0 for the estimates to be valid. In all the estimation, this coefficient (see Appendix 
4.3) equals 1. At this point, it is necessary to identify the slowly moving variables. If 
the between-to-within SEs ratio of a variable is above 2.8, then this variable is 
considered with very little longitudinal variance (Plümper and Troeger, 2007, p.20; 
Greene, 2012, p.9). Nevertheless, they claim that this threshold relies heavily on not 
only the between-to-within variation but also on the correlation between the unit 
effects and the slowly moving variables. In the context of our dataset, one variable 
appears to be slowly-moving (tindex) and two as time-invariant (lngdpini and 
europe), while the calculations for all the variables are presented in Table 4.3. 
Additionally, fdexp (with a ratio of 2.40), which despite being lower than 2.8 stands 
out from the rest of the other ratios. Given that the decision to treat a variable does not 
rely only on the above ratio, but also on other economic consideration, it is worth 
treating fdexp as slowly-moving variable and observe whether this influences the 
estimation.100  
                                                          
98 This is performed in Stata through performing a Hausman test using the option sigmamore (see 
Hoechle 2007, p.24 for further details). 
99 The Stata command xtscc compute standard errors robust to temporal and spatial dependence for 
linear panel models. 
100 Taking a look at the descriptive statistics and the trend of expenditure decentralisation over time and 
across countries, one can easily distinguish that this variable does not have a high within variation, 
which is likely to be imprecisely (less efficient and less reliable) estimated with conventional FE model. 
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Table 4.3 Identifying the time-invariant and the slowly moving variables 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
*Variables used for the robustness check 
 
Turning back to the diagnostics of the FEVD model, it seems that Equations 4.3 and 
4.4 display satisfactory diagnosis statistics (the value of hi = 1.0, see Appendices 4.3.1 
and 4.3.2 for Stata printouts). As to one of the main variables of interest, fdexp, it 
seems that treating this variable as slowly-moving does not change either the sign or 
the significance. Therefore, specification of the following estimations will be based 
on the between-to-within SEs ratio and thus, fdexp will not be considerd as a slowly-
moving variable. 
However, the above estimation procedures do not eliminate the biases stemming from 
the potentially endogenous variable(s), where, as argued before, there are sufficent 
reasons to believe that not only FD (recall section 4.2.3), but also other variables, such 
as investment and trade openness, might be endogenous. Based on the discussion of 
Section 4.3.2, the use of two-stage instrumental variable (IV) estimator to address the 
endogeneity of some regressors appeared superior to other estimators. Four variables 
are considered as endogenous in our model: fdtax_l, imbalance2, gfcf_gdp and trade.  
Variable 
 
Between SEs 
 
Within SEs Between/Within ratio 
fdexp 9.15 3.81 2.40 
fdrev* 9.74 4.08 2.38 
fdtax 11.21 6.31 1.77 
fdtax_l 16.70 12.49 1.33 
imbalance1* 17.67 12.73 1.38 
imbalance2 17.29 16.80 1.03 
fiscalperform1* 22.36 12.88 1.74 
fiscalperform2* 20.19 12.86 1.57 
Popgrowth 0.53 0.45 1.18 
educ2* 6.22 5.91 1.05 
educ3* 11.07 12.75 0.86 
schooling 0.80 0.64 1.25 
dschooling 0.05 0.44 0.11 
gfcf_gdp 3.63 4.22 0.87 
trade 25.23 17.12 1.47 
tindex 14.02 4.92 2.85 
laggdp 6777.67 3547.25 1.91 
lag2gdp* 6722.24 3446.85 1.95 
lngdpini 0.624 0 Time-Invariant 
Govcons* 3.13 2.09 1.49 
europe* 0.48 0 Time-Invariant 
eu* 0.28 0.37 0.76 
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Given the difficulty of finding external instruments for our claimed endogenous 
variables, we use the lagged values of these variables as instruments (lag structure 
from 1 to 4, with more details provided in Appendices 4.3.1 and 4.3.2). 
Attention has been paid to the underidentification test, weak identification test, Sargan 
test (also known as the overidentifying restrictions test) and endogeneity test. The 
underidentification test is essentially a test of whether the excluded instruments are 
correlated with the endogenous regressors; a test of whether instruments are relevant. 
In the reported regressions in Appendices 4.3.1-4.3.4, the rejection of null hypothesis 
indicates that the instruments are relevant (p-values range from 0.000 to 0.0757). 
However, when the dataset is split into two subsets (refer to Appendix 4.3.4), the null 
hypothesis could not be rejected (p-value of 0.884), a failure that might be attributed 
to the drastic reduction of the number of observations.101 Similar results are obtained 
when performing the weak identification test, a test of whether the instruments are 
weak (more details reported in Appendices 4.3.1-4.3.4). Next, testing whether the 
instruments are valid (not correlated with the error term), the Sargan test supports the 
validity of each model specification, where we fail to reject the null hypothesis (p-
values from 0.3 to 0.8).102 Last, the endogeneity test confirms that the variables 
considered as endogenous (fdtax_l, imbalance2, gfcf_gdp and trade) are indeed 
endogenous. The null hypothesis is rejected in all specifications with a p-value of 
0.000.  
In what follows, we shall use three estimation methods to estimate Equations 4.3 and 
4.4: (i) the FE with Driscoll-Kraay SEs, (ii) FEVD, and (iii) IV approach. 
4.4 Results 
4.4.1 The Baseline Model 
Because FD appears to be a multidimensional process among TEs, this section reports 
two sets of results using a combination of two and three measures of FD, respectively 
fdexp and fdtax_l, and fdexp, fdtax_l and imbalance2. Although it was argued before 
that the preferred specification is the latter, it is interesting to investigate changes in 
the economic effect when adding vertical imbalance to the model. Additionally, given 
                                                          
101 Number of observations dropped from 328 to 89. 
102 More detailed reported in Appendices 4.3.1-4.3.4. 
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that there is (to some extent) ground of multicollinearity between imbalance2 and 
other FD measures, we report and contrast the results from the two specifications, 
though ultimately the one with three measures of FD are interpreted.  The results from 
(i) FE with Driscoll-Kraay SEs, (ii) FEVD and (iii) IV approach are reported in Table 
4.4. The first three columns present the results when employing two measures of FD 
estimated by FE with Driscoll-Kraay SEs (Column 1), FEVD (Column 2) and IV 
approach (Column 3), whereas the next three columns report results using three FD 
measures with corresponding estimation methods. 
As explained in the previous section, none of the proposed estimation approaches (FE 
with Driscoll-Kraay SEs, IV estimator and FEVD) can simultaneously address the 
problems that this dataset faces: cross-sectional dependence, endogeneity, and time-
invariant and slowly-moving variables. Contrary, each estimation approach can 
address only one of the above problems, which leaves us with no preferred estimator. 
We will start by interpreting the results from the first estimator, followed by any 
changes in the coefficient and size obtained by the IV approach. 
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Table 4.4 Estimated results of Equations 4.3 and 4.4 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 Equation 4.3 Equation 4.4 
VARIABLES FE with 
D-K SEs 
FEVD IV FE with D-K SEs FEVD IV 
       
fdexp 0.063* 0.024 0.025 0.066* 0.021 0.088 
 (0.035) (0.037) (0.049) (0.035) (0.037) (0.075) 
fdtax_l -0.018* -0.007 -0.037 -0.004 0.007 0.206 
 (0.009) (0.018) (0.032) (0.028) (0.049) (0.156) 
imbalance2    0.013 0.014 0.199 
    (0.024) (0.039) (0.125) 
popgrowth -0.348 -0.859* -0.802 -0.379 -0.893* 0.105 
 (0.352) (0.517) (0.524) (0.357) (0.529) (0.662) 
gfcf_gdp 0.209*** 0.204*** 0.031 0.209*** 0.205*** 0.115 
 (0.031) (0.054) (0.076) (0.031) (0.053) (0.109) 
dschooling 1.024*** 1.420*** 1.402 1.021*** 1.415*** 2.609* 
 (0.351) (0.472) (1.073) (0.348) (0.469) (1.402) 
trade 0.049*** 0.039* 0.044** 0.049*** 0.041** 0.081*** 
 (0.013) (0.021) (0.021) (0.012) (0.021) (0.028) 
tindex -0.041 -0.027 0.076 -0.033 -0.024 0.129 
 (0.053) (0.032) (0.086) (0.051) (0.032) (0.119) 
laggdp -
0.0006*** 
 -
0.0004*** 
-0.0006***  -
0.0005*** 
 (0.0002)  (0.0001) (0.0002)  (0.0002) 
lngdpini  -1.393**   -1.236  
  (0.659)   (0.874)  
constant 5.304 7.500  3.321 4.569  
 (5.759) (6.170)  (6.717) (11.46)  
       
No. of 
observations 
328 328 247 328 328 250 
R-squared  0.673 0.623  0.674 0.610 
Number of 
groups/country 
21 21 21 21 21 21 
eta/standard 
deviation 
 1/(0)   1/(0)  
Under 
identification test 
(p-value) 
  0.000   0.0014 
Weak 
identification test 
(value) 
  21.565   2.486 
Sargan test (p-
value) 
  0.811   0.6047 
Endogeneity test   0.001   0.0048 
Instrumented 
variables 
  fdtax_l, gfcf_gdp, trade fdtax_l, imbalance2, 
gfcf_gdp, trade 
  Note: time dummies not included in the table 
      Standard errors in parentheses 
      *** p<0.01, ** p <0.05 and * p <0.1 
 
 
Regarding the main variables of interest, the results, in terms of sign and size, are 
overall consistent across different specifications, though the significance vanishes 
when shifting from one estimator to the other. Obtained results from the FEVD and 
IV approach seem to be more consistent than those from FE with Driscoll-Kraay SEs. 
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Surprisingly, inclusion of imbalance2 wipes out the negative coefficient of fdtax_l 
(see Columns 1 and 4), while there is no change in the fdexp coefficient and sign. 
Obtained results from the first estimator indicate a positive impact of expenditure 
decentralisation on economic growth, although weakly significant at 10%. Irrespective 
of the number of FD measures used (Equation 4.3 or Equation 4.4), the results seem 
to support the hypothesis that the more spending carried at local level, the higher the 
national economic growth, with local governments being sufficiently able to 
determine the “productive” expenditure that enhances growth. Nonetheless, the 
coefficient of fdexp is relatively small, such that a 10 percentage points increase in 
expenditure decentralisation will have a small effect on economic growth by 
approximately 0.6 percentage points, ceteris paribus.  However, the statistical 
significance vanishes when opting for an IV approach, though the sign and the size of 
the coefficient remain the same. A note of caution seems to be in order when using the 
IV approach in small datasets. The number of observations reduces drastically, which 
in turn weakens its performance. As to the weak statistical significance of fdexp, this 
might be attributed to the existence of high level of transfer dependency in these 
countries, which is likely to impact the use of expenditure assignments conditional to 
the transfer received. As such, it may hinder the full effect of local spending.  
Our results contradict the findings of Rodriguez-Pose and Kroijer’s (2009) research in 
which it was suggested that spending decentralisation deteriorates growth. A possible 
rationale for such differences, in addition to the larger dataset in our research at longer 
time span and different estimation techniques, might be attributed to the distinct 
decentralisation phase experienced by the local government. The above study is 
conducted in a different time span (1990-2004), which captures the initial and 
relatively moderate phase of expenditure decentralisation. Such period is characterized 
by high fluctuations in expenditure decentralisation, which were claimed as outliers in 
our research (data before 1996). While we focus on a more recent time span and ignore 
potential distortion due to conflicts and war, the economic effect of FD is likely to 
change over time. Over the years, local governments tend to be more accountable and 
experienced in financing productive spending that are likely to boost economic 
growth. Also, the EU membership aspiration has contributed to many European 
countries in further advancing the local reform, while being more accountable and 
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efficient (Davey and Peteri, 2008).103 Given the positive coefficient of fdexp, although 
sensitive to different estimators, it might be argued that local governments are entering 
a more mature phase of decentralisation compared to the two last decades.  
Contrary to the expectations, tax decentralisation does not have any impact on 
economic growth. The only exception is when FD is proxied by two measures, and FE 
estimator with Driscoll-Kraay SEs is used. However, when this variable is treated as 
endogenous (either when using two or three measures), the positive effect ceases to 
exist. Possible reason for this result might be attributed to the low degree of local tax-
raising powers which might dampen the direct effect of FD on growth. Whilst some 
of the countries have relied on shared taxes (part of income collected by the central 
government), the contribution of own revenues to the local budget remains modest, 
emphasising the lack of financial capacity. Also, the majority of countries are more 
expenditure than revenue decentralized, while still struggling with finding a balance 
between financial resources delegated from the national government or locally raised 
funds through tax revenues or fees. Despite the theoretical expectations that fdtax_l is 
positively correlated with economic growth, our context of investigation seems to 
challenge these expectations. Some subnational government units among TEs, 
especially in South East Europe, are faced with various challenges related to the 
financial and technical capacity (Bartlett et al., 2013). Generally speaking, local 
governments in TEs have limited power to determine the tax base and tax rate. 
However, few exceptions are observed within Southern Caucasus countries and new 
EU member states, which have been keen to decentralise rapidly. Thus, it may be 
argued that the effect of these countries has offset one of less developed countries that 
face the above challenges.  
Another significant concern in this chapter was the inclusion of all dimensions of FD 
in the growth model, amongst them imbalance2104, which measures the extent to 
which subnational government’s expenditure is financed by transfers from central 
government. This variable appears insignificant across all estimators. It seems that the 
                                                          
103 11 European TEs have joined the EU (Bulgaria in 2007, Croatia in 2013, the Czech Republic in 
2004, Estonia in 2004, Hungary in 2004, Latvia in 2004, Lithuania in 2004, Poland in 2004, Romania 
in 2007, Slovakia in 2004 and Slovenia in 2004). 
104 See Appendix 4.1 on the decision, based on a correlation matrix, on the appropriate vertical 
imbalance measure. The decision was made between three measures of vertical imbalance (imbalance1, 
imbalance2 and imbalance3). 
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inclusion of vertical imbalance did not provide much insight regarding the imbalance-
economic growth relationship. Potential reasons why such effect does not become 
visible might relate to the heterogeneity of TEs regarding the dependency on central 
governments. The overall result might be offset by the heterogeneities among three 
different groups of countries: those that have high vertical imbalance (i.e. Albania, 
Lithuania, Romania), the group that rely mostly on their own revenue (i.e. the Czech 
Republic, Bosnia & Herzegovina, Moldova), and the third group characterized by a 
more balanced relationship between transfers and own revenue (i.e. Hungary, 
Romania).105 
However, the sign reported does not indicate our theoretical expectations. In general, 
the literature leans towards a negative impact of transfers to growth. Subnational 
governments might be less incentivised to responsibly distribute the local revenues 
(Rodden et al., 2003), as they know that they will be financed by intergovernmental 
transfers, even if local taxes are not efficiently collected. Moreover, subnational 
governments, relying on intergovernmental transfers to heavily finance their spending 
are likely to be more incentivised to overfish (Fiva, 2006), which in turn, lead to a 
higher competition for these grants rather than for tax base or tax rate. Consequently, 
this deterioration of the fiscal discipline, stemming from imbalanced decentralisation, 
may negatively affect the economic performance. However, contradicting views argue 
that such competition increases the local government efficiency to spend the funds in 
enhancing economic growth functions. Though, such distinction (between competitive 
vs non-competitive or conditional vs unconditional) is not possible with our data. 
As to the control variables included in the growth model, gross fixed capital formation 
measured as a percentage of GDP (gfcf_gdp) is found to have a positive and significant 
effect on national economic growth, though becoming insignificant when opting for 
the IV approach. Accordingly, a 1 percentage point increase in investment, on average, 
is associated with an increase of annual economic growth by 0.21 percentage points, 
ceteris paribus. Despite the differences among transition economies, their average 
performance suggests that investment has played a significant role in the national 
economic growth. Even when employing FEVD procedure, which is criticized for 
inflated standard errors, gfcf_gdp appears to be positive and highly significant (1% 
                                                          
105 The mean value of the imbalance2 of the first group of countries is 70.75, whereas of the second 
group is 54.50 and of the third group is 40.15.  
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level of significance). This result seems to be in line not only with the theoretical 
expectations but also with the other empirical research on economic growth for TEs 
(see Mileva, 2008) Despite the different utilization rate of capital flow in these 
countries, the rate of investment has been quite high with desirable pace (Sohinger, 
2004), which seems to have played a significant role in helping them prosper and have 
higher rates of economic growth. However, when investment is treated as endogenous, 
the positive effect vanishes, though the sign of the coefficient does not change. 
Different from other control variables, investments seem to be highly sensitive to 
endogeneity. The decrease in the number of observations when using IV and the 
possible omitted dynamics might influence its statistical significance. 
As expected, education is positively and significantly (from 1 to 10% level of 
significance) associated with the growth rate, across all specifications and estimation 
techniques. Accordingly, an increase of one year in the change in average years of 
schooling boosts the economic performance by 1.1 to 2.6 percentage points, all other 
factors being constant.106  
The significant and positive coefficient of the trade variable across all the 
specifications and estimators suggests that the more outward-oriented the economies 
are, the higher the growth rate will be. Namely, an increase in trade shares (trade) by 
1 percentage point, ceteris paribus will increase the average growth rate by 0.04 to 
0.08 percentage points annually. Interestingly, the obtained coefficient and 
significance do not seem to be hampered by the endogeneity nature of trade when 
using the IV approach (see Columns 3 and 6).  
Among other factors, population growth appears to be statistically insignificant, 
except when using FEVD. Such effect might be due to the use of different specification 
when using FEVD (gdpini is used instead of laggdp). (recall Table 4.2). In general, 
the obtained results do not confirm the Solow’s (1956) argument on population 
growth.107  
                                                          
106 Also, it has to be noted that when we change the education measure to the average years of schooling 
instead of its first difference, coefficient becomes negative, although not robust (see Appendix 4.4). 
Insignificant effect of education is reported across all specifications and estimators (see Appendix 4.4) 
when using enrolment rates in secondary and tertiary education. 
107 According to the neoclassical growth model, Solow (1956) argues that population growth reduces 
economic growth due to capital dilution. 
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In conformity with the expectation from the neoclassical growth theory, the coefficient 
of laggdp is negative and significant, suggesting the presence of conditional 
convergence, where lower-income countries tend to grow faster than higher-income 
countries. Different from the other estimators, FEVD allows the estimation of the 
time-invariant variable, which permits us to substitute laggdp with lngdpini (Initial 
level of GDP per capita PPP in 2011 international $ in logarithmic form). Following 
the suggestions of Rodriguez-Pose and Fratesi (2004), the second lag of GDP was used 
as an alternative measure of catch-up effect to avoid potential endogeneity in the 
regression. However, the second lag did not seem to change our results; both the 
coefficients and the sign remain the same as our preferred specification with one lag 
of GDP. Overall, the obtained results suggest a consistent catch-up effect between 
TEs, though it may be argued that the transition path to the long-run growth might not 
be the same for all TEs. Given the heterogeneity of these economies, the catch-up 
effect might be slow for some countries which fail to pass the poverty trap (as such 
having low levels of income) in comparison to others that grow faster. However, it 
seems that the transition stage might be largely influenced by economic fundamentals 
(education, investment etc.).108  
 
4.4.2 The moderating role of stages of transition and 
geography 
In the jargon of public sector economics,  FD is considered a luxury good (also known 
as a superior good) which can be afforded only when income increases. Bahl and Linn 
(1992) and Martinez-Vazquez and McNab (2003), amongst other authors, argue that 
high-income countries can better utilize the decentralisation benefits (associated with 
fewer disadvantages). As income increases, FD becomes desirable and countries 
become able to use its benefits. Contrary, low-income countries are faced with many 
challenges and burdens, while benefits come relatively slowly. Yilmaz and Meloche 
(1999) complement this view by arguing that in the presence of a positive correlation 
between FD and economic growth, decentralisation either can be considered a superior 
good or otherwise help the economic development.  
                                                          
108 See Dufrénot et al. (2009) for a detailed review related to the catch-up effect. 
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However, a note of caution is required regarding the definition of the luxury good in 
the context of FD. From a microeconomic perspective, a luxury good is a good for 
which demand increases more proportionally than an increase in income, when income 
rises. However, there is no discussion in the literature about the superiority nature of 
FD and whether FD as a “good” involves a more than proportionate increase compared 
to the increase of FD by assessing the income elasticity of FD. Instead, the dominant 
definition in the theoretical literature of FD, the presence of a positive correlation 
between FD and economic growth, is that of a normal rather than luxury good. 
Therefore, in the context of this thesis, we will pay attention to these two terms (luxury 
and normal) by not using them interchangeably with each other. 
Using a dataset that includes countries with substantial differences regarding transition 
stages, geographical location, culture or institutions, it is likely that the genuine effect 
of FD on economic performance is hidden, or at least undershot. While we account 
for the economic and institutional reforms through tindex, it seems that this is not fully 
accounting for stages of transition. It does indeed consider the direct effect of tindex 
on economic growth, but it does not account for any differences of the economic effect 
of FD due to different stages of transition. Some countries have developed very fast 
in contrast to some others that have been stagnating for years. It is likely that the 
economic effect of FD follows a similar trend, which might be invisible when not 
differentiating between stages of transition. This might be a possible explanation for 
the weakly significant, up to insignificant, effect of fdexp in  the previous set of results 
(recall Table 4.4). In order to shed more light on this relationship, this thesis 
contributes to the existing literature by investigating the economic effect of FD across 
different stages of transition and geographical location of countries. These two 
differences seem to be the most visible in our dataset. To the best of our knowledge, 
up to date, this is the first study that accounts for stages of transition while 
investigating the economic effect of FD. The use of marginal effects appears to be a 
novelty not only in a transition context, but also in all other contexts. Only two studies 
(Martinez-Vazques and McNab, 2003; Iimi, 2005) have distinguished between 
developed and developing countries, however no distinction has been made regarding 
the development stage within the same group of countries.  
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a) Is FD a normal good? 
To answer this question, it is necessary to differentiate countries by their transition 
stages. Ideally, we would replicate the results of Table 4.4 by using an interaction term 
between each of FD measures and tindex. Unfortunately, none of our preferred 
estimators allows the use of interactions. Therefore, we shift to conventional FE with 
cluster-robust SEs and use interaction terms. Whilst we are aware of potential 
problems arising from this estimator, such as cross-sectional dependency and 
endogeneity, we validate the results by using two approaches.  
The first approach  uses our preferred estimators across two subsamples, which are 
split based on the average value of the tindex in our sample (subsample 1 with tindex 
greater than 74 and subsample 2 with tindex lower than or equal to 74).109 It should 
be noted that countries do not necessarily fall under one subsample. Instead, they fall 
on both. Countries that have advanced fast in terms of economic and institutional 
reforms, thus having more observations for which tindex is greater than the average, 
dominate the first group. In contrast, the second subsample includes fewer 
observations from developed countries (mainly observations from the early stage of 
transition) and more from laggard economies.110  
The second approach consists of augmenting Equation 4.5 by three variables that are 
generated by multiplying each of the FD measures with tindex, namely, 
interaction_exp, interaction_tax and interaction_imb. Being unable to include 
interaction terms properly in the regression, as it was possible in the FE with cluster-
robust SEs, we calculate the marginal effects by hand, while assuming different stages 
of transition. However, we can only observe the variation of the FD measures 
coefficents due to stages of transition, but no inference can be made regarding the SEs 
and thus, the statistical significance. Therefore, the results from the FE cluster-robust 
SEs seem to be superior to the two approaches used for validation.  
                                                          
109 The average is similar to the median value (75.70). 
110 The first subsample includes countries such as Albania, Armenia, Belarus, Bosnia & Herzegovina, 
Bulgaria, Croatia, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Georgia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Romania, 
Slovakia and Slovenia, whereas the second subsample includes Albania, Armenia, Belarus, Bosnia & 
Herzegovina, Belarus, Georgia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyz Republic, Latvia, Lithuania, Moldova, Romina, 
Serbia, Slovenia and Ukraine. Kazakhstan, Kyrgyz Republic, Moldova, Serbia and Ukraine have only 
one observation in the first subsample. 
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Overall, in investigating the moderating role of transition on economic growth three 
sets of results are to be presented: (i) results from FE with cluster-robust SEs (ii) results 
from FE with Driscoll-Kraay SEs and IV approach across two subsamples (split by 
the average value of tindex) and (iii) results from FE with Driscoll-Kraay SEs and IV 
approach of our preferred specifications (Equation 4.5) augmented with interaction 
terms of tindex and FD measures. For brevity, the results reported in Table 4.5 are 
only for the preferred specification with three FD measures. Results from FE with 
robust-cluster SEs are presented in Column 1; results from the first approach are 
presented in Columns 2- 5, respectively using the FE with Driscoll-Kraay SEs 
(Columns 2 and 3) and the IV approach (Columns 4 and 5). Whereas, results for the 
second approach are presented separately in Table 4.6, which also are compared with 
the results from FE with cluster-robust SEs. The first set of results is also displayed in 
Figure 4.1. More specifically, the results for all the FD measures are shown in Figure 
4.1 A, whereas those for each measure is shown in Figures 4.1 B, C and, respectively 
for fdexp, fdtax_l and imbalance2. In order to avoid repetition, our primary focus will 
be only on the FD measures rather than on the control variables, which seem to meet 
all the theoretical expectations and are in line with the results reported in Table 4.4. 
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Table 4.5 Results using different subsamples based on transition index score and European union membership 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
 3 measures t>=74 t<74 t>=74 t<74 Europe=1 Europe=0 Europe=1 Europe=0 
VARIABLES (FE) (FE with 
D-K SEs) 
(FE with D-
K SEs) 
(IV) (IV) (FE with D-
K SEs) 
(FE with 
D-K SEs) 
(IV) (IV) 
fdexp -0.221** 0.125* 0.0260 0.165 -0.0436 0.137** -0.00659 0.148 -0.089 
 (0.102) (0.067) (0.056) (0.114) (0.113) (0.052) (0.078) (0.103) (0.322) 
tindex*fdexp 0.004***         
 (0.001)         
tindex 0.136 0.081 -0.224*** 0.108 -0.673 0.033 -0.097 0.141 -0.469 
 (0.179) (0.089) (0.045) (0.106) (0.520) (0.083) (0.155) (0.091) (1.305) 
fdtax_l 0.250 -0.0016 -0.011 0.150 -0.263 0.015 -0.016 0.216 -1.033 
 (0.148) (0.039) (0.058) (0.098) (0.228) (0.033) (0.062) (0.189) (1.595) 
tindex*fdtax_l -0.003         
 (0.002)         
imbalance2 0.251 -0.0039 0.009 0.166* -0.241 0.023 0.003 0.204 -0.619 
 (0.150) (0.031) (0.051) (0.084) (0.190) (0.023) (0.043) (0.167) (1.022) 
tindex*imbalance2 -0.003         
 (0.002)         
laggdp -0.001*** -0.001* -0.001** -0.0004* -0.0005 -0.0006** -0.0005* -0.0005*** -0.0008 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.0002) (0.0003) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0001) (0.00101) 
popgrowth -0.149 -0.918*** -0.554 -1.254* 0.051 -0.790* -0.377 -0.982 4.542 
 (0.549) (0.310) (0.575) (0.746) (1.806) (0.400) (0.905) (0.661) (9.772) 
dschooling 1.086** 0.514 0.548 0.620 -1.419 0.033 1.551* 0.768 -4.223 
 (0.390) (0.378) (0.553) (1.533) (3.060) (0.384) (0.834) (1.340) (7.910) 
gfcf_gdp 0.201** 0.264*** 0.172** 0.053 0.039 0.239*** 0.162** 0.315 0.521 
 (0.074) (0.072) (0.067) (0.128) (0.210) (0.029) (0.075) (0.217) (0.937) 
trade 0.065*** 0.069*** 0.005 0.087 -0.0069 0.069*** 0.004 0.102*** -0.022 
 (0.021) (0.017) (0.025) (0.055) (0.091) (0.021) (0.030) (0.033) (0.177) 
constant -8.898 -9.476** 19.71***   -4.907 11.03   
 (15.95) (4.212) (6.807)   (8.133) (10.43)   
No of observations 333 200 128 179 96 227 101 187 86 
R-squared 0.676   0.575 0.580   0.660 -1.431 
Number of 
id_country/groups 
21 14 15 14 11 14 7 14 7 
Under identification 
test (p-value) 
   0.0025 0.0274   0.0757 0.884 
Weak identification 
test 
   2.153 1.232   1.074 0.074 
Sargan statistics (p-
value) 
   0.8082 0.4552   0.3763 0.4550 
Endogeneity test of    0.000 0.0418   0.0003 0.0220 
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the regressors 
Instrumented 
variables 
   gfcf_gdp, 
trade, 
fdtax_l, 
imabalnce2 
gfcf_gdp, 
trade, 
fdtax_l, 
imabalnce2 
  gfcf_gdp, 
trade, 
fdtax_l, 
imabalnce2 
gfcf_gdp, 
trade, 
fdtax_l, 
imabalnce2 
           Note: time dummies not included in the table. 
      Standard errors in parentheses 
      *** p<0.01, ** p <0.05 and * p <0.1 
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   A     B 
 
   C     D 
 
Note: The average marginal effect of transition stages and all FD measures is displayed in Figure A, 
of fdexp in Figure B, of fdtax_l in Figure C and imbalance2 in Figure D), with 90 CIs. 
 
Figure 4.1 Average marginal effects  of FD moderated by transition stages  
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Table 4.6 Average marginal effects of transition stages and FD measures from the 
second approach compared with the FE cluster robust SEs 
 FE with Driscoll-Kraay SEs 
calculated coefficents 
FE cluster robust SEs 
reported coefficient and SEs from Stata 
Stages of Transition (1) 
fdexp 
(2) 
fdtax_l 
(3) 
imbalance2 
(4) 
fdexp 
(5) 
fdtax_l 
(6) 
imbalance2 
tindex = 10 
-0.11 0.18 0.18 
-0.17*  
(0.09) 
0.21*  
(0.12) 
0.21*  
(0.12) 
tindex = 20 
-0.08 0.15 0.16 
-0.12  
(0.08) 
0.17*  
(0.10) 
0.18*  
(0.10) 
tindex = 30 
-0.04 0.12 0.13 
-0.07  
(0.07) 
0.14*  
(0.08) 
0.15*  
(0.08) 
tindex = 40 
-0.01 0.09 0.11 
-0.02  
(0.06) 
0.10  
(0.06) 
0.12*  
(0.06) 
tindex = 50 
0.02 0.06 0.08 
0.02  
(0.06) 
0.07  
(0.04) 
0.08*  
(0.05) 
tindex = 60 
0.06 0.03 0.05 
0.06  
(0.04) 
0.03  
(0.30) 
0.05*  
(0.03) 
tindex = 70 
0.10 0.00 0.03 
0.11*  
(0.04) 
0.01  
(0.02) 
0.02  
(0.01) 
tindex = 80 
0.13 -0.03 0.00 
0.16*  
(0.04) 
-0.03  
(0.03) 
-0.01  
(0.03) 
tindex = 90 
0.17 -0.06 -0.02 
0.21*  
(0.05) 
-0.06  
(0.04) 
-0.04  
(0.03) 
tindex = 100 
0.21 -0.09 -0.05 
0.25  
(0.05) 
-0.10  
(0.06) -0.07 (0.05) 
     Note: See Calculations of the Stata printouts and the average marginal effects calculated by hand   
     in Appendix 4.3.3 C. 
     Standard errors in parentheses 
     *** p<0.01, ** p <0.05 and * p <0.1 
Empirical findings strongly support the moderating role of stages of transition in the 
economic effect of fdexp, with the interaction variable being highly significant at 1% 
level of significance. This significant effect is also confirmed by the results from the 
first subsample (see Column 2 and Figure 4.1 B), though only when using FE with 
Driscoll-Kraay SEs. Given that the latter estimator was used only as a validation to 
the FE with cluster robust SEs and results from it are less informative (as do not 
distinguish between different transition stages), we will interpret only the first set of 
results.  
Interestingly, the results suggest that at the very early stages of transition (tindex lower 
than 20) the effect of expenditure decentralisation on growth is negative. Misuse of 
funds, lack of clarity of spending assignments, unaccountable and incompetent local 
governments are potential reasons for this early effect. As a country progresses (tindex 
increases up to its average) the adverse effect becomes fragile and ceases to exist. 
However, at more advanced stages of transition, spending decentralisation culminates 
in a positive and significant effect on economic growth. As a country advances its 
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economic and institutional reforms, the positive effect reinforces and becomes larger 
(from 0.11 to 0.25).111 When comparing coefficents with the ones from the second 
approach of using interactions (see Column 1 and 4 of Table 4.6), it seems that they 
are almost identical. The sign changes from negative to positive exactly when tindex 
is equal to 50. And the effect becomes positive (see Figure 4.1 B) after tindex becomes 
larger than 70. Overall, the findings suggest the presence of a critical level of 
development after which the economic effect of fdexp becomes positive.  This 
suggests that only advanced economies can benefit from the advantages of FD. 
Contrary, its benefit comes slowly to less developed economies, accompanied by high 
costs in further spending decentralisation. A similar view was argued theoretically by 
Bahl (2007; 2013), who claims that the lack of institutional capacity and economic 
reforms deteriorate the ability of less developed countries to consider FD as an elixir 
to development.  
Contrary, the interaction variable between tax decentralisation and economic growth 
appears insignificant. A closer look at the marginal effects (see Figure 4.1 C) informs 
us about a changing effect of fdtax_l across different stages of transition, though being 
mostly insignificant. Tax decentralisation is conducive to growth only in the early 
stages of transition. Eventually, as a country moves to more advanced stages of 
transition, the effect disappears; the sign changes from positive to negative, with 
borderline significance. Namely, this effect changes from positive at lower values of 
transition index to negative at higher levels of transition index.. The weak positive 
effect of higher tax decentralisation confirms the need for a closer match between 
spending and own revenue in these countries. Advances in economic and institutional 
reforms increase the tax raising capacity of local government, which appears 
ephemeral if not associated with higher local taxing power. Unfortunately, this is far 
from reality for many countries, which either do not have the tax raising capacity at 
all or rely on limited taxes, which usually have a small tax rate and/or base.112 
Surprisngly, there are also few countries (Albania, Bulgaria, Kosova etc.) that do not 
yet fully utilise shared taxes, especially of important taxes such as Personal Income 
                                                          
111 See Table 4.6 and Appendix 4.3.3 for Stata printouts. 
112 Examples of this type of taxes are property tax, city planning tax, landholding tax, hotel tax and 
fees applied at local level.  
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Tax or Business Tax. In this case, intergovernmental transfers seem to be a safer option 
in financing local spending.  
As to the vertical imbalance, the findings seem to complement the above scenario. In 
early stages of transition, countries tend to expenditure rather than revenue 
decentralise. The need to cope with the functions relies, as a safer option, on 
intergovernmental transfers. Whilst the initial effect of imbalance2 is positive and 
statistically significant (see Figure 4.1 D and Table 4.6), at more advanced stages, this 
variable changes its sign (from positive to negative values close to zero), with 
borderline signficance. Again, the coefficents seem to be validated by the first 
approach (see Column 3). The need to rely on its own fund rather than 
intergovernmental transfers becomes urgent only at higher stages of development.  
b) Is FD a good “made in Europe”? 
Another intriguing question in the context of our investigation is whether the economic 
effect is subject to the geographical location of TEs. Thereby, emphasis will also be 
given to whether the economic growth effect of FD is substantially different between 
ETEs and Southern Caucasus TEs. The findings reported in Column 6 (using FE with 
Driscoll-Kraay SEs) suggest that the positive effect of FD on economic growth is 
evidenced only among European countries. However, this effect becomes extinct 
when using the IV approach. Another method to validate this result was using the 
interaction between dummy variables and FD measures. Accordingly, the findings 
suggest that location does not determine the economic effect of FD (See Appendix 
4.3.4). 
 
4.4.3 Robustness Check 
a) Controlling for public sector size 
As anticipated in Section 4.3.2, the public sector size is used as a moderator of the 
relationship between FD and economic growth. The economics of decentralization 
argues, although rarely, that the economic effect of FD might be influenced by the size 
of public sector measured by the general government consumption as a percentage of 
GDP. The estimated results presented in Table 4.7, both using two and three measures 
of FD, suggest that the economic effect of FD, irrespective of the measure used, is not 
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subject to the size of public sector. govcons appears insignificant across all 
specifications and estimation methods, which surprisingly does not influence the 
significance  and the sign of the FD measures (see Appendix 4.4). 
 
Table 4.7 Controlling for public sector size 
VARIABLES FE with 
D-K 
SEs 
FEVD IV FE with D-K SEs FEVD IV 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
VARIABLES growth growth growth growth growth growth 
       
fdexp 0.0678 0.0222 0.0213 0.0609* 0.0197 0.117* 
 (0.0393) (0.0381) (0.0527) (0.0320) (0.0382) (0.0660) 
fdtax_l -0.0214* -0.00619 -0.0476 -0.00200 0.00627 0.214 
 (0.0103) (0.0199) (0.0335) (0.0281) (0.0528) (0.132) 
imbalance2    0.0210 0.0122 0.224** 
    (0.0216) (0.0435) (0.110) 
Govcons -0.146 0.0701 -0.309 -0.104 0.0638 -0.261 
 (0.0987) (0.110) (0.187) (0.0760) (0.115) (0.200) 
Observations 328 328 247 328 328 267 
R-squared  0.674 0.554  0.675 0.472 
Number of 
groups 
21 21 21 21 21 21 
 
a) Using Worldwide Governance Indicator as a proxy for institutions 
Another robustness check consists of different proxies for institutions. The Worldwide 
Governance Indicators (WGI) of World Bank provide different indices related to voice 
and accountability of governance, political stability and absence of violence, 
government effectiveness, regulatory quality, the rule of law and control of corruption. 
In the context of this thesis, we consider the penultimate index, which we name wdi, 
as the more appropriate and close to the transition index. The use of the rank of wdi as 
a control variable for institution quality does not perform better; nor is statistically 
significant across all specification and estimation methods (see Appendix 4.4). 
However, with respect to our main variables of interest, the results of Table 4.7 appear 
similar regarding the coefficient, sign and significance level with the one presented in 
Table 4.5, confirming once again the robustness of the preferred estimated results. 
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4.5 Conclusions  
Motivated by the scarcity of empirical research in general and transition economies in 
particular, this chapter explored the effect of FD on economic growth across a sample 
of 21 TEs during the period 1996-2015. Attention was given to the stages and 
transition and geographical location as moderators of the economic effect of FD. To 
the best of our knowledge, no empirical analysis has been undertaken to this date on 
such large dataset of TEs, encompassing both the ETEs and the Southern Caucuses 
TEs, and most importantly answering the question whether FD is a normal good, 
through the moderating role of stages of transition. The appropriate choice of FD 
measures and important identification problems such as endogeneity and cross-
sectional dependence, appear as crucial while investigating the economic effect in 
TEs, which suggests that previous empirical studies have produced biased results in 
the presence of these problems.  
The results of the baseline regression analysis suggest that FD, measured by 
expenditure decentralization, has a positive effect on national economic growth, 
though these results seem to vanish when FD is treated as endogenous. No supportive 
evidence, on the other hand, was found for the contribution of tax decentralization and 
vertical imbalance on national economic growth. A potential reason for such 
insignificant effect, except expenditure decentralization in some specification, might 
be attributed to the inability to account for countries’ heterogeneity regarding the 
development stage.  
In order to shed more light on the economic effect of FD, this chapter differentiated 
countries by their transition stages. Our findings suggest that FD, measured by 
expenditure decentralization, has a negative effect at a country’s initial stage of 
transition, while its growth inducing benefits becomes visible at moderate stages when 
countries advance in their economic and institutional reforms. As to the other variables 
of interest, tax decentralization appears as conducive to growth only at early stages of 
transition, while highlighting the need of local governments to finance expenditure by 
their own funds and not transfers from central government, which is also confirmed 
when FD is measured by vertical imbalance. Overall, the results from this original 
investigation confirm the theoretical claim, empirically ignored up to now, that FD is 
a normal good. Namely, FD measured by expenditure decentralisation can be afforded 
182 
 
and exploited only by countries at advanced stages of transition. In contrast, countries 
at early stage of transition appear to experience either a deteriorating or insignificant 
economic effect of FD, with FD benefits coming very slowly. The moderating effects 
of the economic and institutional reform points towards a critical mass of income 
(transition stage), above which FD becomes desirable and countries utilize its 
advantages. In terms of policy implications, although elaborated in detail in Section 
6.4, these findings highlight the need to address policy recommendations regarding 
the three dimensions of FD (expenditure, tax or vertical imbalance) differently subject 
to the country stage of transition. To further utilise growth inducing benefits of FD, 
countries at advanced stages of transition need to focus on increasing the efficiency of 
their local expenditure and increasing the local autonomy, while countries at 
intermediate or early stages of transition need to face some fundamental problems of 
local government, from clarifying the roles and functions of subnational governments 
to utilise local and central taxation (through their own taxes and shared taxes). With 
respect to the geographical location, the findings do not suggest any moderating effect 
of location (Europe vs Southern Caucasus) on the FD-economic growth relationship 
irrespective of FD measure.  Also, the results do not lend support for an optimal size 
of FD or moderating effect of public sector size.  
These findings stress the importance of studying the economic effect of FD on a more 
homogenous dataset and most importantly analysing this issue more systematically at 
a lower level of investigation. Given the high cross-country variation, it may be argued 
that the country’s effect of FD on growth might cancel out the overall effect, which 
makes it difficult for FD, especially measured by tax decentralization and vertical 
imbalance, to be noticed.  This brings out the necessity to analyse the issue more 
systematically at the subnational level. Hence, the following chapter will focus on the 
investigation of the impact of FD on economic growth from a regional perspective and 
will use a more homogenous dataset than the one in this chapter.  
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5.1. Introduction 
The empirical investigation of Chapter 4 did not provide conclusive evidence in 
support of the hypothesis that high level of FD positively impacts economic growth in 
TEs, a result which is consistent with the lack of a genuine effect suggested by the 
meta-regression analysis presented in Chapter 3. As argued previously in Chapter 4, 
the use of aggregate FD measures and conducting research for heterogeneous datasets 
at aggregate (national) level are one potential explanation for the lack of the empirical 
evidence on the economic effect of FD.  Therefore, this chapter uses a more 
homogeneous dataset and conducts empirical analysis on a more disaggregated level 
than national one. By doing so, this thesis seeks to fill the gap in the literature by 
providing empirical evidence on the economic effect of FD from a regional 
perspective in ETEs. Accordingly, it focuses on 64 sub-national regions of five 
selected countries: Albania, the Czech Republic, Hungary, Estonia and Poland. The 
selection is based on the availability of data at regional level. Furthermore, we seek to 
fill the gap in the literature by delving into new issues that hitherto has not received 
attention. Namely, this chapter aims to investigate the FD-economic growth 
relationship subject to country size and identify potential reasons why the effect size 
varies between small and large size countries. Following a similar methodology as in 
the previous chapter, an economic growth model will be used to estimate the 
relationship between FD and economic performance at the regional level using both 
static and dynamic panel models. Attention will be paid to the regional characteristics 
within a country and national characteristics across the selected countries. 
The remainder of the chapter is organised as follows. Based on the theoretical and 
empirical considerations provided in Chapters 2 and 4, Section 5.2 will briefly review 
and discuss the similarities and differences between the FD-economic growth 
relationship at national and subnational level. Moreover, this section will discuss the 
characteristics of the dataset and the variables to be used in the empirical model. 
Section 5.3 will discuss the empirical assessment strategy, whereas Section 5.4 will 
carry out the diagnostics and robustness check. The main findings of the empirical 
investigation are discussed in Section 5.5 and 5.6. Section 5.7 will summarise the main 
findings of this chapter. 
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5.2. Model Specification, Variable Description and Data 
5.2.1. Model Specification 
The disaggregation level 
The previous chapter, despite the variety of the estimation techniques and FD 
measures used, provided limited support for the hypothesis that higher share of FD 
positively affects economic growth. A statistical significant effect was found only 
when FD was measured through expenditure decentralisation, whereas higher tax 
autonomy of subnational governments and transfers from national to subnational 
governments were found to have a statistically insignificant effect on economic 
growth. As argued in Chapters 2 and 4, these results could be attributed to the inability 
to properly measure the complexity of  the FD process through conventional measures. 
Further, differences across countries, such as economic, cultural etc., might highlight 
this inability especially when investigating the economic effect of FD at national level, 
which according to Akai and Sakata (2002) is due to the multidimensional nature of 
decentralisation.  
 As already argued in Chapter 4, investigating the FD-economic growth relationship 
at a national level and pooling all the countries into one dataset might have limited the 
ability to deeply and systematically investigate this effect, which is likely to have been 
cancelled out by the individual countries’ economic effect of FD. Moreover, the 
insights provided about the aggregate economic effects of FD are difficult to be 
attributed to a specific country or group of regions, especially when it comes to TEs, 
which have experienced different paces of decentralization process during the last two 
decades and most likely with different impacts on individual country’s economic 
growth. As such, to estimate its economic effect, it is necessary to analyse this issue 
more systematically for individual countries. Nevertheless, this approach does not 
fully guarantee that the effect of FD on economic growth for a specific country is 
deeply analysed. National level- rather than subnational level- economic effects of FD 
and the use of aggregate measures might mask the (potential) effects that FD has at a 
more disaggregated level. Focusing on individual countries, but not peering into more 
disaggregated levels than the national one might hide the possible variation of the 
economic effect of FD across different subnational units (i.e. regions) within a country. 
In the context of this thesis, variation of FD (decentralization of expenditure, revenue 
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and transfers) are visible not only across countries but also across subnational units 
within a country113; some subnational units (i.e. regions where capital city is located) 
are more decentralized, in terms of expenditure and/or revenues than some others. This 
variation might induce a non-symmetric relationship between FD and economic 
growth across units, which in turn might cancel out the overall/aggregate economic 
effect of FD (especially when substantial differences across subnational units exist) or 
reinforce (when no substantial differences across subnational units exist) when 
shifting the investigation to an aggregate level. Therefore, it seems sensible to also 
focus on disaggregated levels of governance within a country to thoroughly investigate 
the FD-economic growth relationship.  
An ideal approach would be to focus on individual country(ies) and disaggregate the 
data at the lowest level of devolution that is observed within a country. However, given 
that the regional data for any TE114 starts at earliest in year 2000 (for some countries 
it starts even later, in 2005), it is difficult to produce sensible results with a severely 
number of observations.115 Therefore, the unavailability of a longer period drives us 
to select multiple countries (from the sample of the previous chapter) for which data 
are available at the subnational level. The selected countries (further details will be 
provided in the following section) are Albania, the Czech Republic, Hungary, Estonia 
and Poland.   
The countries under investigation are former socialist countries which have embarked 
on the process of transformation to a market economy since 1990, with four of them 
having almost completed the process and joined the European Union and the fifth 
(Albania) in the early stages of preparing for accession. Although there are still 
differences between the five selected counties, their recent common history of nearly 
fifty years of planned economy and twenty-five years of similar transition policies, 
means that they constitute a more homogenous group than those studied in Chapter 4. 
Disaggregation of data at subnational level can be in accordance with either the 
administrative organisation/decentralisation of a country’s territory or Eurostat 
                                                          
113 FD measures (expenditure decentralization, revenue decentralization and transfers from national to 
subnational governments) for regions where capital city is located outperforms other regions. 
114 Data can be found only for the abovementioned ETEs, whereas for the other TEs, part of the 
Caucasus and Central Asia, data are not available. 
115 For instance, the time span for the Czech Republic is 2006-2013. 
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classification of regions (NUTS2, NUTS3 or lower territorial organisations).116 Either 
way, the data availability for the dependent and control variables allows us to descend 
to the NUTS3 classification. Hence, we might either investigate at the lowest level at 
which the data are available in accordance with Eurostat classification (either NUTS3 
or NUTS2 level) or use a mixture of regions at NUTS2 and NUTS3 level depending 
on the administrative level of decentralisation (i.e. county, municipality etc.). 
Disaggregating data up to the same NUTS level does not produce much relevant 
insight into the FD-economic growth relationship at the subnational level. This is 
because in the case of our sample some small countries such as Estonia constitute a 
single statistical region according to NUTS2 classification, which is the same as at 
country level. On the other hand, large countries such as Poland are divided into 
greater territorial units than small countries at the same statistical classification. This 
is because the NUTS classification is based on the population of each region and size 
of the country. Namely, if we choose to disaggregate data at the NUTS2 level, the 
database could be biased since some countries (i.e. Estonia) would still be at national 
level whereas others would be highly disaggregated due to the large geographical size. 
Likewise, if we choose to disaggregate data at a lower level, NUTS3 level, the dataset 
would still be very diverse and biased towards large size countries such as Poland, 
which would dominate the whole dataset (Poland consists of 64 regions out of 127 
regions of all countries at a NUTS3 level in our dataset).  
As such, countries either at NUTS2 or NUTS3 will be diversely fragmentized, where 
small local governments, mainly of small countries, are required to provide a broad 
range of local public services (Rodriguez-Pose and Kroijer, 2009) and vice versa, the 
large size local governments (because of the large surface) are required to provide 
small range of local services. We argue that what matters in the context of 
decentralisation (of any form, administrative, fiscal etc.) is whether, at a certain level 
of disaggregation/fragmentation, regions are granted a certain degree of autonomy and 
can manage their subnational expenditure irrespective of their size and populations. 
In light of this heterogeneity of countries in our dataset with respect to their sizes 
(small and large size countries), and given the relevance of this thesis, we prioritise 
the first approach where countries are divided based on the administrative-territorial 
                                                          
116 NUTS stands as an abbreviation in French of the Nomenclature of Territorial Units for Statistics. 
NUTS are a geographical division of EU territory into regions for statistical proposes. 
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fragmentation and regions are granted a certain degree of autonomy. While we prefer 
to conduct analysis at the lowest level at which local governments have autonomy 
(based on the administrative decentralisation), the data availability limits to choose the 
county as our geographical unit of analysis. By mixing NUTS levels in accordance to 
the county level of each country, our estimated results are likely to be more 
informative than in the second approach in which the results are likely to be biased 
towards large countries with a large number of regions. Accordingly, the estimated 
results are likely to be more comparable across countries. Given that counties fall 
under different NUTS classification (some are part of NUTS2 and other of NUTS3), 
throughout this chapter, we will refer to them as regions. 
The choice of the administrative level in this research is in line with other studies that 
focus on the subnational level (Lin and Liu, 2000; Akai and Sakata, 2002; Cantarero 
and Gonzales, 2009). These studies (recall Table 2.2 for a detailed summary of the 
review of the main empirical studies at subnational level) have used the first 
subnational administrative level as their level of disaggregation. This level 
corresponds largely to county or a level analogue to county.117 This is partly justified 
due to data limitation and partly because this is the first level at which subnational 
governments have a certain degree of autonomy/power to set tax rates and bases. 
Nevertheless, it is important to note that the use of the first subnational administrative 
level at which local governments have some power (of any type) does not imply that 
the level of decentralisation of lower administrative levels is ignored. More 
specifically, we measure FD at regional level by disaggregating all dimensions of FD 
up to the first subnational administrative level, in other words, aggregating all 
dimensions of FD (expenditure, revenue and grants) from subnational units level up 
to the first administrative level that is the county level. 
 
 
 
                                                          
117 Either way, subnational governments enjoy a certain degree of decision-making power regarding 
taxes and/or expenditures at the level of disaggregation chosen for the empirical research. The majority 
of this research has focused on federal countries such as Switzerland, Australia, the United States etc., 
whereas others have focused on Italy, Spain, Germany and China. 
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Model Specification  
The basic analytical framework used to investigate the FD-economic growth 
relationship is an endogenous growth model, same as in Chapter 4, which predicts that 
for a given government size, FD affects economic growth. This framework consists of 
regressing economic growth on a list of country characteristics including measures of 
FD and a set of control variables.  
The empirical literature review provided in Chapter 2 concluded that there are no 
major differences in terms of theoretical approach followed, FD measures used and 
estimation techniques between studies focusing on national level and those at 
subnational level. Nevertheless, the latter group of studies have been more helpful in 
shedding light on the ‘black box’ of the economic effect of FD. Accordingly, it was 
argued that the effect of FD on economic growth (irrespective of the FD measure used) 
is more observable at subnational level. While in most of the cases this effect is 
positive and linear, few studies do report a nonlinear (mostly inverse U-shaped) 
relationship. This relationship has been mainly investigated in individual countries 
with large geographical area and/or population (i.e. Russia, Germany, Spain, etc.) or 
for countries with heterogeneous characteristics in their populations (i.e. Russia) 
(Behnisch et al., 2003; Desai et al., 2003; Feld et al., 2004; Solé-Ollé and Esteller-
Moré, 2005; Enkilopov and Zhuravskaya, 2007).Whilst there is considerable empirical 
research on the effect of FD on economic growth that focuses on subnational level for 
developed and developing countries, there are only a limited number of empirical 
investigations focusing on TEs in general and ETEs in particular.  
Given that our focus of investigation is on ETEs, it is important to rely on Chapter 4 
(by taking into account transition specifics of the countries in our dataset) and move 
towards an extended version of FD-growth relationship adjusted for transition 
economies and regional level. Accordingly, the specification adopted in this chapter 
is similar to that introduced in Chapter 2 and developed in Chapter 4, except that the 
dependent variable and some of the independent variables are now measured at a 
higher level of disaggregation: at the regional level.118 The model used is as follows: 
                                                          
118 We denote regional level as the county level. 
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itjtiitiitit ZXFDgrowth   10      (5.1) 
Where, i denotes the region, j denotes the country, t denotes time, growth is the 
dependent variable, β0 is the overall intercept, FDit is a vector of fiscal decentralization 
measures and Xit is a vector of control variables at regional level (determinants of 
economic growth), Zjt is a vector of control variables at national level and εit is the 
idiosyncratic error (time-varying error). In the context of growth models, the overall 
intercept reflects the productivity changes that are similar across all countries (Bond 
et al., 2001, p.15). In addition to the time-varying error, Equation (5.1) can be 
augmented with a time-constant factor, also known as the regional heterogeneity, to 
better reflect the differences in the initial level of efficiency between cross-sectional 
units (Bond et al., 2001), in our case the differences between regions. The augmented 
equation is as follows: 
)(10 iitjtiitiitit uZXFDgrowth      (5.2) 
 
5.2.2 Specification of Variables 
Dependent variable 
In line with the theoretical literature review and most empirical studies reviewed in 
Chapters 2 and 4, economic performance is measured by taking the first difference of 
the real GDP per capita for each region in 2001 constant prices in logarithmic form. 
Regional GDP per capita which is provided by Eurostat Regional Statistics119, is the 
level of income divided by the regional population. In order to take into account the 
possible variation of economic growth due to changes in prices, we used regional GDP 
per capita in constant prices. This variable was easily accessible at the regional level 
for Hungary and Poland, but not for Albania, the Czech Republic and Estonia. For the 
latter group of countries, we extracted the nominal regional GDP per capita120 instead 
                                                          
119 Whilst Eurostat represents our prime source of the data (Regional Statistic, Url: 
http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/web/regions/data/database), data at regional level can also be found at 
OECD, which does provide regional statistics, but it is very limited in terms country coverage 
(especially for our sample under investigation); data can hardly be found for all TEs. 
120 For Albania and the Czech Republic data are converted in million Euros using the respective Central 
Banks’ annual exchange rate. 
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and then converted it into real terms using the country’s GDP deflator.121 Whilst 
disaggregated data could be easily retrieved from the Eurostat for the Czech Republic, 
Hungary and Poland, the Eurostat Regional Statistics does not provide information for 
Albania and Estonia at NUTS3 level. Hence, individual country’s statistical offices 
(Institute of Statistics of Albania and Statistic Estonia) were used to draw data for the 
dependent variable. Before using other sources of information than Eurostat, 
importance is paid to the concepts and definitions used for regional statistics, which 
must be identical to the one used by the statistical offices of each country. 
 
Fiscal Decentralization variables 
As already anticipated in the previous chapters, FD involves three main dimensions: 
the expenditure side (the extent to which local governments choose the level of public 
services and determine the allocation of their expenditure within their 
jurisdictions/regions), the revenue side (the extent to which local governments raise 
their own revenue within their jurisdictions/regions and determine their level of tax 
base and/or tax rate) and the intergovernmental transfers (the extent to which local 
governments receive grants from national government). Different variations of these 
dimensions are the measures introduced in the previous chapter, which cannot be used 
in this chapter because of the difference in the context of investigation. Since this 
chapter investigates the FD-economic growth relationship at a subnational level, we 
make use of only three measures of FD that can be measured at this level (out of five 
introduced in the previous chapter): expenditure decentralisation/coverage, tax 
decentralisation and vertical imbalance.122  
Individual country’s statistical office (for the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary and 
Poland) and Ministry of Finance (for Albania)123 are used to construct the three 
abovementioned measures of FD. Expenditure decentralisation/coverage (fdexp) is 
measured by the percentage share of own tax revenues collected locally/regionally in 
                                                          
121 Due to lack of data at regional level, we used country’s national GDP deflator instead of regional 
GDP deflator. 
122 The two measures ruled out in this chapter are two alternative measures of vertical imbalance (recall 
Chapter 5, p.11), which by construction are to be correlated with the one used here and most 
importantly, in the context of this chapter, are similar to expenditure decentralization and tax 
decentralization measured at subnational level. 
123 Contact person: Fran Brahimi (Fran.Brahimi@financa.gov.al), Department of Budget, Albanian 
Ministry of Finance. 
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subnational government expenditure. Further elaborating, fdexp is considered as a 
measure of the degree of expenditure discretion of subnational governments and local 
government capacity (Bird and Rodriguez, 1999; Uchimura and Suzuki, 2009) to 
finance its own expenditure. The subsequent measure is tax decentralisation (fdtax), 
which is measured by the percentage share of subnational government own tax 
revenues of each region in the regional subnational governments’ revenue. It has been 
previously argued (recall Section 4.2.2 and Stegarescu, 2004 for a detailed review), 
that fdtax is a better measure of the revenue dimension of decentralisation in 
comparison to other conventional revenue measures because it takes into account the 
tax-raising power and autonomy of subnational governments in comparison to their 
total revenue.124 Regarding the third dimension of fiscal decentralisation, vertical 
imbalance (fdgrant) measures the share of grants (transfers) from national to 
subnational governments in percentage of subnational governments’ expenditure. The 
mismatch between expenditure responsibilities and revenue resources at lower levels 
of governance is financed by the transfers from national governments. Thus, fdgrant 
aims at measuring the extent to which subnational governments rely on the amount of 
grants received from the national government (Jin and Zou, 2002; Rodden, 2006), 
given that these funds are used to finance the local expenditure. Often, this measure is 
considered as important for the fiscal health of local governments regarding the 
efficiency and equity of the provision of local goods and services (World Bank, 2001).  
Control variables  
There are two groups of control variables used in our growth model: (i) control 
variables at regional level and (ii) control variables at national level. We introduced 
the second set of independent control variables in a regional growth regression for two 
main reasons. First, the data availability hampers us to use some variables (which will 
be elaborated below) at a regional level. Although at first sight this might be 
considered as a limitation in terms of our research, using such variables at national 
level instead of subnational level can account for country specific characteristics. 
Given that our dataset comprises five countries with different socio-economic 
                                                          
124 The subnational government revenue consists of own sources, transfers from central government 
and shared taxes. 
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development, it seems reasonable to control for such country specific factors in 
addition to regional characteristics. 
An important variable used in the growth model is population growth (popgrowth), 
which is measured as the annual growth rate of population size on January 1st of the 
given year and the corresponding level of the previous year.125 Eurostat Regional 
Statistics provide population data at the beginning of the year from which we extracted 
data for the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland, whereas data for Albania and 
Estonia were provided by their respective country’s statistical offices.126 
Following the discussion of Section 4.2.2, ideally, human capital would be measured 
using stock measures such as the percentage of working age who have completed 
secondary or/and tertiary education. Unfortunately, these data can be found and/or 
calculated only for the Polish regions, whereas for the other countries, data are not 
available at disaggregated levels. Considering this limitation, we make use of the flow 
measures of human capital such as enrollments in secondary and tertiary education. 
While for the countries disaggregated at NUTS2 level data can be found at the Eurostat 
Regional Statistics database, for countries disaggregated at NUTS3 level data have to 
be calculated using information from their statistical offices. Nevertheless, high 
importance has been given to the data collection and calculation of the two following 
measures of education in order to be consistent with the Eurostat Regional Statistics 
methodology and avoid potential discrepancies between the reporting practices of 
individual countries. The first measure of education, the secondary enrolment rate 
(educ2), is measured by the total number of students in upper secondary and post-
secondary, non-tertiary education in each region expressed as a percentage of the total 
regional population in the age group of 15-25. The subsequent variable proxying 
human capital, the tertiary enrolment rate (educ3) is measured by the total number of 
students in tertiary education in each region expressed as a percentage of the total 
regional population in the age group of 20-24. Nevertheless, a note of caution seems 
to be in order when measuring educ3. Whilst the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland 
do report the number of students enrolled in tertiary education (which can then be 
                                                          
125 This variable is measured slightly different compared to the one used in the previous chapter. In the 
last empirical chapter, population growth was measured using the midyear rather than the beginning 
year population size. 
126 Albanian Institute of Statistics and Statistics of Estonia. 
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easily divided by the population aged 20-24), Albania and Estonia do not. Given this 
substantial lack of data, the regional reports were used for both countries in order to 
retrieve data regarding the number of students enrolled in each regional university. 
However, as expected, universities are not spread equally across the country. Whilst 
some regions have more than one university, others have none. Hence, one might be 
misled into thinking that the latter implies that there are no educated students from 
those regions. Students of these regions (where no university is located) might be 
educated in the neighbour regions or most likely in a region where the capital city is 
located. Accordingly, this lack of data constrains us to use an alternative measure of 
educ3 for these two countries: the tertiary enrolment rate at the national level 
(educ3_n), which provides a better approximation of human capital than the data 
extracted from the regional database or reports from the abovementioned countries.  
Another important variable considered in the growth model is the gross fixed capital 
formation. Despite its importance not only for economic growth studies but also for 
other areas, serious data limitation exists at the regional level for some countries. This 
is because of the lack of data at a lower level than NUTS2 and the data limitation for 
countries that are not part of the EU. These problems are relatively challenging for 
countries such as Albania and Estonia, for which gross fixed capital formation is not 
available at all at any regional classification level. In the case of Estonia, data can be 
disaggregated at NUTS2 level, but that would be the same as national level because 
this country constitutes a single statistical region according to NUTS2 classification. 
As to Albania, gross fixed capital formation is available in neither NUTS2 nor NUT3 
level. Given that this variable is a key determinant of economic growth and the 
national data of gross fixed capital formation cannot be allocated to regions, the 
empirical research concerned with the FD-economic growth relationship at 
subnational level suggests the use of a weighting factor to disaggregate this variable 
from national to regional level. Lin and Liu (2002) and Gil-Serrata and Lopez-Laborda 
(2006) used regional population and/or number of firms as weights for investments. 
In the context of transition economies, the number of regional population might be 
less accurate than the number of firms due to high internal migration within these 
countries, especially in Albania. Therefore, we use the number of firms in each region 
as a weighting factor to disaggregate gross fixed capital formation for Albania and 
Estonia. Whilst data are easily accessible for Hungary and Poland in the Eurostat 
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database, data for the Czech Republic had to be extracted from the Czech Statistical 
Office. Accordingly, the gross fixed capital formation is now disaggregated at the 
regional level for the all the five countries in the dataset.  
The empirical literature (Basannini and Scarpeta, 2001) on economic growth suggest 
the use of either the gross fixed capital formation as a percentage of GDP (gfcf_gdp) 
or the logarithm of gross fixed capital formation (lngfcf_gdp). The former is 
considered as more appropriate when the investigation is conducted in multiple 
countries because it takes into account the size of the economy (GDP). This variable 
is further transformed into logarithmic form given its skewed distribution and 
suggestions by the ladder command in Stata (see Appendix 5.3.1). 
Among the variables strongly suggested by the economic theory and included in 
empirical research (Mankiw et al., 1992; Verspagen, 1991; Barro and Sala-i-Martin, 
2004) are the initial conditions. In order to capture the different inherited initial 
conditions across regions, the initial level of GDP per capita in logarithmic form 
(reallngdpini) is included in the model. As already explained in Section 4.3.2, a 
negative correlation between this variable and the growth rate of GDP per capita 
should exist if catch-up effect occurs. In the context of this chapter, this effect states 
that poor regions will grow faster the further they are from their steady-state compared 
to richer regions (Mankiw et al., 1992). Nevertheless, due to different estimation 
techniques used in this chapter, there is a risk that this variable, being time-invariant, 
might drop out. Hence, in some of the specifications used in this chapter, we use the 
first lag of GDP per capita (lag1realgdp) instead of reallngdpini to control for the 
convergence effect (following the same arguments provided in Chapter 4, which were 
based on Barro and Sala-i-Martin (2004)). Namely, the choice of the estimation 
technique employed in this chapter depends on which of these variables are used to 
control for the initial conditions. 
Expenditure decentralisation and tax decentralisation measures are systematically 
higher in capital city regions than others across all countries under investigation. As 
to the other measure of FD, vertical imbalance, the region where the capital city is 
located stands beyond the averages of all other regions. Therefore, it seems sensible 
to control for any differences in the economic effect of FD between capital and non-
capital regions. A dummy variable (capital) and an interaction term of this variable 
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with expenditure decentralization (expcapital), tax decentralization (taxcapital) and 
transfers from local government (grantcapital) are additionally included in the dataset 
in order to investigate whether the FD-economic growth relationship is different for 
capital-regions. 
Whilst size of the country has been largely recognized as one of the main determinants 
of FD (Panizza, 1999), the theoretical and empirical literature investigating the 
economic effect of FD has never detangled this relationship through this determinant. 
The rationale is that large countries are predisposed to have a higher level of FD and 
vice versa and thus, its economic impact might be better manifested than in a small 
size country. Hence, it might be likely that the size of the country can determine or/and 
alter the economic effect of FD. Accordingly, this chapter aims to fill the gap in the 
literature by investigating differing economic effects of FD given different country 
sizes. In a dataset with a mixed sample of countries, this might be explained by 
dividing countries according to their geographical size: small and large. To distinguish 
between these two groups, we can either include a dummy variable for country size or 
split the dataset into two subsamples. In the former approach, a dummy variable size, 
is included in the model, which takes the value of 1 if a country is large (the Czech 
Republic, Hungary and Poland) and 0 otherwise (Albania and Estonia). While creating 
this dummy variable, surface area (measured in square kilometres) and population of 
countries were used to determine the size of a country.127  In order to somehow identify 
the threshold at which size influences the FD-economic growth relationship, we 
question our pre-set threshold. Hence, the Czech Republic, which is ranked third out 
of the five given countries (being in between small and large size countries in the 
context of our dataset), is considered a small country in an alternative variable size1, 
which takes the value 1 if a country is large (Hungary and Poland) and 0 otherwise 
(Albania, the Czech Republic and Estonia). Alternative to the above measures, the 
surface area of a country (surf) is included into the model in order to determine more 
precisely the square kilometres (if any threshold) at which the FD-economic growth 
relationship becomes visible. 
                                                          
127 If the surface of a country is over 50000 (sq. km), a country is considered (relatively) large, otherwise 
a country is considered (relatively) small. In case of population size, we used the threshold of 5 million 
inhabitants. In both cases, Albania and Estonia were considered as small size countries, whereas the 
Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland were considered large size countries. 
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Countries with large geographical area are likely to be more decentralised than 
countries with small geographical area. Thus, large countries may better exploit local 
public provisions at regional level due to economies of scale (Arzaghi and Henderson, 
2005) and be more efficient in expenditure assignments and revenue collection given 
that central government is less likely to serve distant regions due to high transportation 
costs, poor information and attention to other (key) regions. Further, the economic 
effect of FD might vary not only due to country’s size but also to the way FD is defined 
(expenditure decentralization, tax decentralization or vertical imbalance). A recent 
approach would be to interact size (size1 or surf) with all the FD measures and 
calculate the marginal effects to properly identify the statistical significance and 
economic rationale (StataCorp, 2013).  
Considering the possibility of a curvilinear relationship (either positively accelerated 
or negatively accelerated) between FD and economic growth, three additional 
variables are created by using the quadratic term of expenditure decentralization, tax 
decentralization and vertical imbalance, respectively fdexp2 fdtax2 and fdgrant2. 
Whilst the main research regarding a nonlinear relationship has been conducted mostly 
at national level (Eller, 2004; Thiessen, 2005), attention should be given also to the 
local level, whether this relationship takes the inverted U-shaped curve.128 
In line with the theoretical and empirical evidence on the main determinants of 
economic growth, integration of countries into the world economy is often considered 
an important determinant. However, it is impossible to disaggregate data at a regional 
level for any country. This limits us to use the sum of exports and imports as a share 
of GDP at national level (trade).129 Despite the inability to disaggregate this variable 
at a lower level, having trade at national level helps to capture the differences between 
countries, which up to now were not considered in our analysis and regional growth 
literature. 
                                                          
128 The inverted U-shaped curve is also known as the BARS curve, referring to Barro, Armey, Rahn 
and Fox, and Scully (Di Liddo et al., 2015). 
129 The most common measure used in the growth regressions (especially in the analysis of the 
relationship between trade and economic growth) is the sum of exports and imports (both goods and 
services) as a share of GDP, which is the preferred measure for our analysis as well. Additionally, we 
used exports as a share of the sum of exports and imports as an alternative measure for openness. In 
line with the majority of the empirical studies on trade-economic growth effect, we report the results 
using the first measure of trade. 
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Also, featured among the potential explanatory variables in the FD-growth regression 
is a dummy variable eu, which takes the value of one when countries are members of 
the European Union, zero otherwise. By including this variable, we aim to control for 
possible political integration effect on economic growth rates in the selected ETEs. In 
order to investigate potential variations of the FD-economic growth effect due to the 
membership in the European Union, we can either split the dataset into subset subject 
to the country’s membership status or include in the model interactions of eu with the 
FD measures (expeu, taxeu and granteu). 
Another concern in the previous chapter (Chapter 4) was how to better take into 
account the transition specifics of the countries in our dataset. This was made possible 
through a transition index. Nonetheless, in the context of this chapter, inclusion of a 
transition index in the analysis seems to be less of a concern for two main reasons. 
First, the dataset of Chapter 4 comprises almost all TEs in which there was a need to 
differentiate between stages of transition, whereas in the case of this chapter the 
dataset is more homogenous comprising a small number of ETEs. Further and most 
importantly, institutions and/or political differences between countries are likely to be 
more visible at national rather than at subnational level. In the context of this chapter, 
where the focus of investigation is at the subnational level, there seems to be less need 
to control for such differences between regions. A similar argument was also given by 
Hammond and Tosun (2009) in a subnational investigation of the effect of FD on 
economic growth in the USA. 
In order to account for homogenous shocks affecting fiscal decentralization (due to 
the financial crisis, austerity etc.) in our sample and simultaneously for potential cross-
sectional dependence, a full set of time dummies is included, with the first year 
omitted as the reference category. Table 5.1 presents the list of variables together with 
their description, expected effects on economic performance and the data source. 
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Table 5.1 Variables, expected sign and data sources  
Variable 
Name 
Description Expecte
d Sign 
Data Source 
fdexp 
 
Subnational government share of own tax 
revenues (% of subnational government 
expenditure) 
[percentage of own tax revenues collected by 
subnational government, measured as the 
sum of local and state tax revenues, divided 
by the sum of local and state expenditure] 
 
+ Individual country’s 
statistical office and 
IMF 
fdtax 
 
Subnational government share of own tax 
revenues (% of subnational government 
revenue) 
[percentage of tax revenues collected by 
subnational government, measured as the 
sum of local and state tax revenues, divided 
by the sum of local and state revenue] 
 
+ Individual country’s 
statistical office and 
IMF 
fdgrant 
 
A measure of vertical imbalance, measured as 
a share of grants (transfers) to subnational 
government expenditure 
[grants (transfers) received from other levels 
of government received by local and state 
governments minus grants from state to local 
level, divided by total subnational 
expenditure] 
 
- Individual country’s 
statistical office and 
IMF 
fdexp2† The square term of ownlexp 
ownlexp^2 
- Individual country’s 
statistical office and 
IMF 
fdtax2† The square term of ownlrev 
ownlrev^2 
- Individual country’s 
statistical office and 
IMF 
fdgrant2† The square term of grantlexp 
grantlexp^2 
- Individual country’s 
statistical office and 
IMF 
growth First-difference of natural logarithm of GDP 
per capita in Euro constant prices for each 
region.  
 Eurostat, Institute of 
Statistics of Albania 
and Statistics office 
of Estonia 
gdpcapita Natural logarithm of GDP per capita in in 
Euro constant prices for each region. 
 Eurostat, Institute of 
Statistics of Albania 
and Statistics office 
of Estonia 
reallngdpini Initial level of the natural logarithm of GDP 
per capita in Euro constant prices for each 
region. 
 
- Eurostat, Institute of 
Statistics of Albania 
and Statistics office 
of Estonia 
lag1realgdp GDP per capita in Euro constant prices for 
each region, first lag. 
 
- Eurostat, Institute of 
Statistics of Albania 
and Statistics office 
of Estonia 
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popgrowth Population growth (annual %) measured by 
the annual growth rate of population. 
 
- Eurostat and 
Individual country’s 
statistical office 
lngfcf_gdp Natural logarithm of the regional gross fixed 
capital formation in Euro as a share of 
regional GDP. 
[the number of firms in each region is used as 
weights in the case where gross fixed capital 
formation is not disaggregated at a regional 
level] 
 
+ Eurostat and 
Individual country’s 
statistical office 
educ2 Pupils and Students in upper secondary and 
post-secondary non-tertiary education 
(ISCED 3-4) - as % of the population aged 
15-24 years at regional level. 
 
+ Eurostat and 
Individual country’s 
statistical office 
educ3 Students in tertiary education (ISCED 5-6) - 
as % of the population aged 20-24 years at 
regional level. 
 
+ Eurostat and 
Individual country’s 
statistical office 
trade Trade as a share of GDP. 
[the sum of exports and imports at national 
level divided by the value of GDP at national 
level] 
 
 WB 
eu† Dummy variable: 1 if a country is a member, 
0 otherwise. 
 
+ European Union 
size Dummy variable: 1 if a country is a large 
country (the Czech Republic, Hungary and 
Poland), 0 otherwise (Albania and Estonia). 
[Surface area (sq. km) of countries and 
population were used to determine the size of 
a country] 
 
+ WB and Eurostat 
size1† Dummy variable: 1 if a country is a large 
country (Hungary and Poland), 0 otherwise 
(Albania, the Czech Republic and Estonia). 
+ WB and Eurostat 
surf† Surface is measured in square kilometers 
which takes the value of 28,748 for Albania; 
78,866 for the Czech Republic; 45,339 for 
Estonia; 93,030 for Hungary and 312,679 for 
Poland. 
+  
capital† Dummy variable: 1 if the capital city is 
located in that region, 0 otherwise. 
+  
govcons† General government final consumption 
expenditure as a % of GDP (includes all 
government current expenditure for 
purchases of goods and services, 
compensation of employees, national defense 
and security expenses etc.  
+/- WB 
year1-13 Time dummies, in the case of the unbalanced 
dataset year1 = year 2000, year2 = year 
2001,…, year13 = year 2013 
  
† Not in the baseline specification 
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5.2.3 Data 
Our main dataset includes 64 regions listed in Table 5.2. Data availability limits our 
sample to unbalanced panels. For the majority of regions/countries data starts in 2001 
and ends in 2014, while data series of Albania and Hungary end in 2013 (see Table 
5.2 for more details). 
Table 5.2 Countries, their respective regions/counties included in the dataset and time 
span 
Country Count
ry ID 
NUT
S 
level 
Number 
of 
Regions 
Regions (counties) Time 
Span 
Albania 1 3 12 Dibër, Berat, Durrës, Elbasan, Fier, 
Gjirokastër, Korçë, Lezhë, Kukës, 
Shkodër, Tirana and Vlorë. 
2002- 2013 
The Czech 
Republic 
2 3 14 HlavníměstoPraha, Středočeskýkraj, 
Jihočeskýkraj, Plzeňskýkraj, 
Karlovarskýkraj, Ústeckýkraj, 
Libereckýkraj, Královéhradeckýkraj, 
Pardubickýkraj, Vysočina, 
Jihomoravskýkraj, Olomouckýkraj, 
Zlínskýkraj, Moravskoslezskýkraj. 
2005-2014 
Hungary 3 2 7 Közép-Magyarország, Közép-
Dunántúl, Nyugat-Dunántúl, Dél-
Dunántúl, Észak-Magyarország, 
Észak-Alföld, Dél-Alföld. 
2001-2013 
Estonia 4 3 15 Põhja-Eesti, Lääne-Eesti, Kesk-
Eesti, Kirde-Eesti, Lõuna-Eesti. 
2003-2014 
Poland 5 2 16 Łódzkie, Mazowieckie, Małopolskie, 
Śląskie, Lubelskie, Podkarpackie, 
Świętokrzyskie, Podlaskie, 
Wielkopolskie, 
Zachodniopomorskie, Lubuskie, 
Dolnośląskie, Opolskie, Kujawsko-
pomorskie, Warmińsko-mazurskie, 
Pomorskie. 
2001-2014 
Source: Eurostat (2006) 
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Before turning to the empirical analysis, a short preview of the FD measures and 
control variables is provided in Table 5.3. In general, there is considerable variation 
in most of the variables. Also, detailed summary statistics (see Appendix 5.2.2) show 
that there is substantial heterogeneity in sample size across different regions and 
countries. There is substantial variation in FD and some of the main control variables, 
except those that are considered time-invariant.   
 
Table 5.3 Descriptive statistics (mean, standard deviation, minimum and maximum 
value)  
    Variable Observations Mean Standard 
Deviations 
Min Max 
growth 766 5.95 8.64 -39.10 29.80 
lag1realgdp 766 6730.93 4060.26 679.36 29976.58 
reallngdpini 766 4886.57 3505.01 687.82 24029.87 
fdexp 720 39.60 18.53 4.92 90.41 
fdgrant 720 36.20 19.21 3.97 95.07 
fdtax 720 39.08 18.58 4.922 87.73 
popgrowth 766 -0.51 2.38 -26.84 15.42 
lngfcf_gdp 750 3.30 0.37 0.93 4.32 
educ2 713 63.07 25.81 28.8 162.07 
educ3_n 713 54.58 25.62 4.90 222.70 
trade 766 111.58 34.53 58.08 170.42 
size 766 0.39 0.48 0 1 
capital 766 0.07 .27 0 1 
eu 766 0.70 0.45 0 1 
 
Note: Detailed summary statistics about these variables are provided in Appendix 5.2.2. 
A closer look at the descriptive statistics provided above indicates that some 
independent variables (including some of the FD measures) do not have high within-
group variation. Following Plümper and Troeger (2007, p.19-20), all control variables, 
having a between-to-within SE ratio above 2.8, are considered as either slowly moving 
variables or time-invariant (see Table 5.4). This ratio is above 2.8 for tertiary education 
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enrolment rate, gross fixed capital formation, and the first lag of GDP. Conversely, 
reallngdpini, which has a zero within SEs, is considered a time-invariant variable. 
  
Table 5.4. Identifying the time-invariant and the slowly moving variables 
 
†Not included in the baseline specification 
 
5.3 Empirical Strategy 
In evaluating the relationship between FD and economic growth through an 
unbalanced dataset with 64 regions, we restrict our estimation to panel data techniques. 
This chapter will follow the same empirical strategy as the previous chapter (recall 
Section 4.3) given that both chapters use panel data. However, a detailed discussion 
regarding new potential estimation techniques that can best fit the nature of the new 
dataset used in this chapter will be additionally introduced here. 
The starting point when modelling panel data is whether to employ a Fixed Effects 
(FE) or a Random Effects (RE) estimator. How to best choose between FE and RE 
depends on the judgment over the appropriateness of each model, as well as on the 
Hausman test result on the random effects assumption (Gujarati, 2004, p.651; Greene, 
2012, p.421). As argued in the previous chapter, RE seems to be more appropriate than 
Variable Between  
SE 
Within  
SE 
Between/Within ratio 
 
fdexp 17.06 9.42 1.81 
fdtax 16.93 9.68 1.74 
fdgrant 17.81 7.06 2.50 
popgrowth 0.96 2.17 0.44 
educ2 23.61 9.30 2.55 
educ3_n 25.50 8.77 2.91 
lngfcf_gdp 10.17 5.24 2.00 
lag1realgdp 4489.05 1364.05 3.29 
reallngdpini 0.73 0 Time-Invariant 
trade 31.42 13.71 2.29 
size 0.48 0 Time-Invariant 
expsize† 25.74 8.42 3.05 
taxsize† 25.68 8.41 3.05 
grantsize† 16.23 5.61 2.89 
eu† 3.45 0.85 1.20 
capital† 0.27 0 Time-Invariant 
govcons† 3.46 0.88 3.93 
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FE in the context of our dataset where some of the variables are slowly-moving or 
time-invariant variables.  
Several identification problems such as multicollinearity, heterogeneity, spatial 
dependence, the presence of variables with very little or no longitudinal variance, and 
endogeneity, which are reviewed in Chapter 4, are likely to occur also when testing 
the FD-economic growth relationship from a regional perspective.  
It is important to note that there is no superlative method which can, simultaneously, 
tackle all the anticipated identification problems. In Chapter 4, the FD-economic 
growth relationship was estimated using FE with Driscoll-Kraay SEs, FEVD, and IV 
approaches, which will be also employed in this chapter given the same structure of 
the data and potentially similar identification problems.  Whilst these methods are 
thoroughly analysed in the previous chapter, the focus here  will be on the 
appropriateness of these methods in the context of regional dataset and on additional 
estimation technique(s), if any, that can better approach the identification problems 
based on the new structure of the dataset. The use of FE with Driscoll-Kraay SEs was 
justified by the presence of cross-sectional correlation, autocorrelation, and 
heteroscedasticity (Hoechle, 2007), which all are very likely to occur also at a regional 
level. On the other hand, FEVD was proposed to overcome the loss in efficiency that 
occurs when using fixed effect models while estimating time-invariant and slowly-
changing variables (Plümper and Troeger, 2007); variables that are also present in the 
regional dataset. Nevertheless, both methods fail to explicitly take into account the 
endogeneity problem. Neglecting such problems might jeopardise the above 
techniques itself and thus, their estimated results. Breusch et al. (2011) argue that the 
FEVD estimator becomes inconsistent when the time-invariant and slowly-changing 
variables are endogenous. Therefore, as in Chapter 4, IV approach is  selected as a 
preferred estimation method in order to overcome any potential problem of 
endogeneity occurring.  
However, given the new structure of the dataset in this chapter, there is a need to recall 
any additional estimation technique suitable for the sample under investigation. The 
disaggregation of the data at regional level increased significantly the number of cross-
sectional units from 5 (if the investigation would be conducted at the national level) 
to 64. This increase in the cross-section (N) dimension points to the GMM estimators. 
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Following Roodman’s (2006, p.35) suggestion on the appropriate number of cross-
section and time series, we meet the requirements of N larger than 20 and time series 
larger than 3.  Despite the suitable nature/structure of the dataset in this chapter, it is 
necessary to assess (i) the rationale for a dynamic model and (ii) the merits of the 
(System) GMM in better taking into account the anticipated identification problems. 
In the context of the FD-economic growth relationship, irrespective of the 
specification used130, it is important to acknowledge the policy inertia of FD and the 
dynamic aspect of the relationship (if any) with economic growth. It seems that not 
only FD but also other independent variables used in the model are likely to manifest 
their effect on economic growth with time lags.  It is often argued in the economic 
growth literature (Hoenack, 1993; Baldaci et al., 2004; Delgado et al., 2012) that an 
increase in the current level of human capital (educ2 and educ3) and investment 
(lngfcf_gdp) do not necessarily affect the current level of economic growth; contrary, 
it may take some time for the effect to be perceptible to economic growth.131 Similarly, 
FD is likely to manifest itself gradually in increased economic growth rates given its 
slow change over time (Sow and Razafimahefa, 2015). Eventually, any fixed effect 
estimation method employed on this data might hide any potential long run variation 
and thus, ignore its dynamic nature. One would argue in favour of using lagged 
explanatory variables (employing FE with Driscoll-Kraay SEs, FEVD and IV) to 
account for dynamics of these variables, which would, at the same time, address the 
endogeneity problem. Regrettably, this seems to be inappropriate in our case for two 
reasons: 
First, existence of a lagged GDP per capita as an independent variable does seem to 
jeopardise the use of any other lagged explanatory variable. Otherwise, a lagged GDP 
per capita and lagged explanatory variables on the same side of the regression would 
create a growth model within a growth model, generating a conceptual problem in 
terms of a growth model estimation. Second, the sole use of lagged values to tackle 
endogeneity does seem to be hazardous in terms of statistical inference. Bellemare et 
al. (2015) argue that this strategy often produces bias in the absence of identification 
strategies for the number of lags on endogenous variables.  
                                                          
130 Economic performance might be measured either in growth rates or in levels. 
131 See Middendorf (2005) for a detailed discussion on the lagged effect of education on economic 
growth and Barro et al. (2004) on the lagged effect of investment on economic growth. 
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While the first problem seems to be avoided when employing FEVD, in which the 
lagged GDP per capita is substituted with the initial level of GDP, the problem of 
endogeneity and policy inertia persists. Regarding the main variable of interest, as 
previously argued in Chapters 2 and 4, it seems that the FD-economic growth 
relationship might suffer from reverse causality. Despite the small number of 
empirical studies claiming this, it is argued that efficiency gains from FD emerge as 
the economic development of country increases, and thus more decentralisation is 
required. Although this thesis uses economic growth and not GDP per capita as its 
dependent variable, endogeneity still might prevail. 
As Bodman and Ford (2006, p.41) argue, the FD-growth literature needs to explicitly 
take into account the endogeneity of the regressors, amongst which the endogenous 
nature of all variables of FD needs to be thoroughly discussed. A significant body of 
empirical literature suggests that the level of income is a determinant of FD (Panniza, 
1999). Development stimulates demand for variety and quality in the range of public 
services being provided while increasing the revenue raising capacity of governments, 
making decentralisation affordable and needed. If FD has a high-income elasticity, 
then higher income per capita may allow the constitution of a new level of 
decentralisation. If FD affects economic growth, then the new level of decentralisation 
will, in turn, have an impact on the level of income. This suggests a potential 
bidirectional relationship between FD and economic growth. However, it is argued 
that when FD is measured by grants from central government, there can be a reverse 
causality between this variable and economic growth as poorer regions are more prone 
to receive larger amount of grants (Feld et al., 2004) in order for them to catch up with 
other regions.  
Whilst endogeneity may be tackled through an IV approach in a static model, it does 
give rise to biased and inconsistent estimates in the presence of time-invariant and 
slowly-moving variables, and cross-sectional dependence. Independent variables with 
little within variation have little explanatory power and thus produce imprecise 
estimations with large SEs (Plümper and Troeger, 2007; Breusch et al., 2011). 
Accordingly, FEVD is used to properly estimate coefficients for such variables. 
Nevertheless, it is important to recall the debate in the literature about the 
appropriateness of this method (Breusch et al., 2011; Greene, 2011) and whether 
indeed FEVD is a solution to time-invariant and slowly moving variables in FE 
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models. Despite the critics, FEVD seems to be very popular in the empirical research 
regarding the estimates of little within variation variables, but among the existing 
empirical research on the FD-economic growth relationship.  
The last concern in the empirical strategy is the persistence of the data series. As 
suggested in the economic growth literature, growth regressions are usually examples 
of time series with a persistent dependent variable, where past observations might 
influence the current value of a variable of interest. Whilst GDP per capita is expected 
to be persistent (Bond et al., 2001, p.3), economic growth might not necessarily be. 
However, a note of caution seems to be in order when referring to the economic growth 
in the context of this thesis. Economic growth is measured as the difference in 
logarithm of GDP per capita, which per se is persistent. Accordingly, the potential for 
accounting for the likely persistence of the dependent variable, or variables generated 
by the difference of a persistent time series, lead us to consider additional estimation 
technique and control for any possible dynamics.  
In an attempt to address the majority of all the abovementioned problems 
simultaneously (except cross-sectional dependence), a System GMM estimator seems 
to be in place. In addition to the System GMM, the literature on the GMM estimator 
also acknowledges the first-differenced GMM estimator as a possible estimation 
technique when employing a dynamic panel model. This method first-differences the 
data in order to remove the fixed effects (Roodman, 2009a, p.3). Despite the influential 
work of Caselli, Esquivel and Lefort (1996) on estimating empirical growth models 
with first-differenced GMM estimator, this has to be ruled out because of the concern 
of the finite sample bias occurring due to the weak instruments, a problem which 
seems to be worsen particularly in (i) small sample, (ii) presence of persistent 
explanatory variables (Blundell and Bond, 1998; Bond et al., 2001) and (iii) cross-
country growth regressions (Bond et al., 2001; Dornetshumer, 2007). Contrary, the 
proposed System GMM is known to be superior compared to first-differenced GMM 
in terms of precision and reduced finite sample bias. This is mainly attributed to the 
ability of the System GMM to use more instruments not only from the model in first-
differences but also from the model in levels. The two equations (in differences and 
levels) are simultaneously estimated and instrumented for the lagged dependent 
variables and all other independent variables. This appears to be a crucial advantage 
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of the System GMM, particularly for the time-invariant variables, which would have 
been wiped out if one would have used the first-differenced GMM (Roodman, 2009b).  
In order to increase the moment conditions, an alternative approach suggested in the 
growth literature by Bond et al. (2001) is to use external instruments such as lags of 
school enrollment as instruments. However, this variable is already included in our 
model and thus, used as instruments. Regarding other external instruments that can be 
used, it seems that they are difficult to be found/constructed at regional level for the 
countries under analysis. 
Next, System GMM appears to perform better than first-differenced GMM in the case 
of unbalanced panels. Roodman (2009a) suggests that the former maximises the 
sample size, whereas the latter magnifies the gaps in the data. Another advantage of 
the System GMM compared to the other abovementioned estimation techniques (FE 
with Driscoll-Kraay SEs, FEVD and IV) is that this method does not rely on strict 
assumption regarding the normality of error terms (Verbeek, 2004, p.152) and 
accommodates very easily the interactions between variables (through the marginal 
effects option in Stata). Also, System GMM allows for heteroscedasticity and serial 
correlation of unknown form (Roodman, 2009a, p.99).  
Despite the superiority of the System GMM, a critical shortcoming of this method, 
which needs to be pointed out, is the problem of instrument proliferation. Roodman 
(2009b, p.8) argue that particularly in small-sample size, the number of instruments 
can rapidly grow large relative to the number of observations, which in turn overfit 
the endogenous variables and provide imprecise estimates of the weighting matrix of 
the moments. While there is no precise guidance on the preferred number of 
instruments, except that the number of instruments should not exceed the number of 
cross-sectional units, we follow the advice of Roodman (2009b, p.17) for “using only 
certain lags instead of available lags for instruments… and combine instruments 
through addition into smaller sets”. Finally, the application into Stata offers the 
possibility to use the two-step System GMM with the Windemeijer correction in case 
of heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation problem through the xtabond2 syntax and 
collapse option to avoid instrument proliferation (Windemeijer, 2005; Roodman, 
2009b). 
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In terms of model specification, this thesis relies on the best practices regarding growth 
regressions employing a System GMM, amongst which the reputable guidance 
provided by Bond et al. (2001). Generally, the literature on economic growth using 
dynamic panel procedure (Bond et al., 2001; Forbes, 2001; Carkovic and Levine, 
2002) estimates a model with averaged year periods (either five- or three-year 
averaged data) in order to remove business cycle fluctuations. A typical cross-country 
growth model regresses economic growth on the lagged level of GDP (on each starting 
period of averaged data) denoted by reallngdpini, main variable of interest FD and 
other control variables denoted by X and Z as shown in Equation 5.3. 
)(ln 10 iitjtiitiitit uZXFDgdpinirealgrowth      (5.3)  
Nevertheless, different from standard cross-country growth regressions, our study is 
using annual data. Any attempt to opt for three-year or five-year averaged data would 
drastically reduce the number of observations, which in turn would undermine the 
reliability of the estimated results. Given that our investigation is conducted at the 
regional level, the business cycle fluctuation might be less visible relative to the 
national level. Therefore, in line with similar cross-country growth regressions using 
annual data (Di Liddo et al., 2015), the growth equation to be estimated by a System 
GMM is amended to:   
)(ln 110 iitjtiitiititit uZXFDgdpinireagrowthgrowth     (5.4) 
Compared to Equation (5.2), the equation above is augmented with a lagged dependent 
variable and the first lag of per capita GDP (lag1realgdp) in Equation 5.1 is substituted 
by the initial level of GDP (reallngdpini) in Equation 5.4 in order to control for 
convergence between regions. Before presenting the results, it is important to clarify 
the rationale of this equation in the context of GMM estimation of empirical growth 
models. Given that the initial level of GDP is measured at the starting year of the data, 
this variable measures permanent or final convergence of a region. Namely, it 
measures the convergence occurring from the first year until the last year in the dataset. 
Whereas, the lagged growth measures the intermediate or recent convergence from 
year-to-year (between two consecutive periods). With reference to Equation 6.4, this 
variable controls also for the cumulative growth (known as cumulative causation), a 
concept introduced by Myrdal (1957). Although underreported in the economic 
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growth empirical research, this theory as stated by Monastiristis (2011, p.10) argues 
that “cumulative causation is about a positive relationship between past and current 
rates of growth, irrespective of initial incomes…because initial incomes capture only 
the initial advantage in regional conditions and characteristics”. In other words, the 
lagged growth controls for potential cumulative mechanism occurring at regional 
level, where relatively rich regions grow faster than relatively poor regions. 
Two more advantages of the dynamic analysis compared with the static analysis are 
that it allows discriminating between short- and long-run effects of the independent 
variables, in this case of FD, on economic growth, and uses weights to better take into 
account any possible discrepancies in terms of good representation of each country in 
the dataset. Because the lagged growth is included as a regressor in Equation 5.4, the 
coefficients from any of the estimators represent the short-run impact of the 
determinants of regional economic growth. The rationale behind the estimation of 
long-run coefficients is the assumption that the historical effect of the determinants of 
growth is captured by the lagged growth. Therefore, there is need to differentiate 
between the short- and long-run effects of FD on economic growth. The System GMM 
allows also the estimation of long-run effects through the formula presented in 
Equation (5.5) below.132 As to the second issue, the rationale for using weights in our 
regressions, a detailed discussion will be provided in the following sections.  
Coefficient of the regressor/(1- coefficient of the lagged dependent variable)      (5.5) 
 
5.4. Diagnostics and Robustness Check 
5.4.1 Diagnostics and Robustness Check for the Static Model 
Before proceeding with the estimation of the model introduced above, it is necessary 
to perform various diagnostics checks. First, a unit root test is performed in order to 
determine whether a cointegration relationship exists between variables. However, in 
the context of this chapter, this test has low power given the short time series of our 
data. This is also confirmed by the Fisher test of Maddala and Wu (1999), which 
suggests that the variables in our model do not contain a unit root. Therefore, a 
                                                          
132 The nlcom command in Stata is used to calculate the long-run effects.  
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cointegration relationship between variables, which requires that the variables show 
co-movement over time, is ruled out (Stata printouts of the tests performed for unit 
root for each of the independent variables are presented in Appendix 5.3.2). 
Another concern in this chapter is the degree of correlation between FD measures. A 
note of caution seems to be in order when using the FD measures altogether because 
of potential correlation between them. The theoretical and empirical literature review 
(recall Chapter 2) suggested that the use of only one measure of FD is unable to capture 
the complexity of FD, instead it is necessary to take into account all three dimensions 
of decentralization: expenditure, tax (or revenue) and grants from central government. 
Whilst this suggestion was followed in Chapter 4, this chapter uses only combinations 
of two FD measures due to multicollinearity problems. In the context of this chapter, 
the criticisms of using less than three measures seem to be less of a concern for several 
reasons. First, in Chapter 4, it was relatively difficult to measure FD due to the 
complexity and multidimensionality of decentralisation in a heterogeneous set of 
countries such as TEs. Contrary to this, the current chapter uses a more homogeneous 
dataset, ETEs, which share common characteristics of FD during the transition, which 
in turn makes it easier to define FD and measure its nature. Additionally, the degree 
of decentralisation is likely to be distorted at higher aggregate levels of investigation 
given that it lumps together many dimensions of FD occurring at different aggregation 
levels (i.e. counties, cities, etc.). Contrary to this, the current chapter, which focuses 
at regional level, adapts the conventional measures of FD (as used in the previous 
chapter) to a regional context without taking into account the central government share 
(as this is the same across regions of the same country).133 Despite the great variation 
of FD at regional level, the unconventional FD measures require some caution. By 
definition, (some) of the FD measure employed in the current chapter (recall Table 
5.2) are constructed in such way that either a nominator for one measure is the 
denominator for another measure, or two measures have the same nominator. For 
instance, both expenditure decentralization and tax decentralization measures have the 
same nominator: own tax revenue of subnational government. Hence, the use of all 
                                                          
133 Nevertheless, the public sector size is taken into consideration later on in this chapter through the 
government consumption variable. 
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three measures in the same model would, by definition, create problems of 
multicollinearity.   
In order to assess the presence of multicollinearity between all variables we 
additionally rely on the correlation matrix and VIF (see Appendix 5.1.1 and 5.1.2). 
Following the rule of thumb of VIF being less than 10 and correlation between two 
variables being less than 0.70, our results show no serious problem of 
multicollinearity, except the correlation between the FD measures, which is higher 
compared to the other variables and above the suggested VIF of 10 (VIF of 39.58 for 
fdtax and 36.73 for fdexp). As abovementioned, the high correlation between the three 
FD measures suggest a (relatively) severe problem in the model if all these measures 
are used together. However, it seems that the correlation between fdexp and fdgrant, 
and fdtax and fdgrant are not problematic, respectively 0.03 and -0.02. Therefore, in 
estimating the FD-economic growth relationship at subnational level, the equation 
(5.2) is estimated by using a combination of fdgrant with either fdexp or fdtax. 
In addition to the VIF, we make use of the pairwise correlation test, which examines 
multicollinearity for each cross-sectional unit (regions in the context of this chapter). 
Overall, this test suggests similar multicollinearity as VIF and the correlation matrix.  
Consequently, Equation (6.1) was initially estimated using the FE- and RE- estimators 
repeated for each of the FD measure combinations. Graphical diagnostics and a 
normality test (skewness and kurtosis) on the error terms suggest a non-normality 
problem (see Appendix 5.3.4). However, based on the discussion in Section 4.3.1, we 
address non-normality by checking for outliers and estimating the model within the 
suggested border rather than using a logarithmic transformation. In addition, 
Wooldridge test for autocorrelation in panel data and modified Wald’s test (Baum, 
2006, p. 222) suggest that the model suffers from group-wise heteroskedasticity and 
autocorrelation (see Appendix 5.3.5 and 5.3.6 for Stata printouts). Consequently, we 
follow the letter-value approach, which displays a collection of observations of the 
dependent variable focusing on the tails rather than the middle of distributions 
(Hoaglin, 1893 and Emerson and Stoto, 1983). In the context of this chapter, an 
observation of the dependent variable is considered as an outlier if it stands beyond 
the suggested inner fences of -29.94 and 43.19. Thus, the model is estimated within 
these borders. 
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Another important diagnostic test is the presence of cross-sectional dependence. The 
assumption that the units in a panel are cross-sectionally independent seems to be a 
strong and restrictive assumption when referring to FD. Indeed, violating this 
assumption would lead to large bias and inefficiency (De Hoyos and Sarafidis, 2006, 
p. 483), which in turn, will produce dramatic effects on the estimated impacts of FD 
on economic growth. Similarly to national level, cross-sectional dependence is (more) 
likely to occur also at a lower level of governance, at subnational level. Regions, 
especially within the same country, may share common (socio-economic) 
characteristics and be exposed to homogenous shocks or trends (i.e. austerity). In order 
to test for the presence of cross-sectional dependence, the Frees’s (1995) and Pesaran’s 
(2004) tests for cross-sectional dependence are performed. Both tests strongly reject 
the null hypothesis of no cross-sectional dependence in the panel (see Appendix 5.3.7 
for Stata printouts). At this stage, we follow the suggestions of Sarafidis et al. (2009), 
elaborated in Section 5.3.2, to include year dummies134 in the model in order to “catch” 
common shocks affecting FD in our sample.  
Subsequently, the abovementioned tests are re-performed to check whether year 
dummies could absorb the common shocks. These tests again indicate existence of 
cross-sectional dependence. However, the null hypothesis is weakly rejected at 5 
percent level of significance (p-value of 0.021), which suggests that our model exhibits 
a cross-sectional dependence of errors across countries which arises by the non-
homogenous shocks such as economic distance and/or spatial dependence. When data 
contain cross-sectional dependence, conventional FE- and/or RE-estimators are 
inefficient, and the standard errors are biased (De Hoyos and Sarafidis, 2006). 
Given the existence of cross-sectional correlation between regions, heteroscedasticity 
and autocorrelation, it is reasonable to rely on standard errors which are robust to all 
these problems simultaneously. In order to address these issues simultaneously, 
Hoechle (2007) suggests the use of the Driscoll and Kraay’s (1998) and/or Two-Way 
cluster-robust estimator, which renders errors robust to the temporal and spatial 
dependence of any kind.  However, following the justification provided in Chapter 4, 
the former is more appropriate than the latter given the inability of the Two-Way 
cluster-robust estimator to properly mitigate cross-sectional dependence on small 
                                                          
134 The first year is omitted as the reference category. 
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samples of less than 100 cross units/clusters (Baum et al., 2011). Accordingly, 
equation (5.1) is estimated using FE- and RE-estimators with Driscoll-Kraay’s SEs. 
The modified Hausman test, which is robust to temporal and spatial dependence, 
suggests that RE-estimators are not the preferred estimators (the null hypothesis is 
rejected at 5 percent level of significance as shown in Appendix 5.4.2). Whilst OLS 
would produce inconsistent estimators, it is argued that FE using Driscoll-Kraay 
estimator is more appropriate than OLS and RE-estimators.135 
Another diagnostic check, relevant in the presence of FE-estimators (of any kind), is 
how to best address the loss in efficiency from time-invariant and the slowly moving 
variables. As introduced in the previous chapter, FE models are inconvenient in an 
empirical analysis as it “wipe out” the effect of variables with no longitudinal variance 
and it is inefficient in estimating the effect of slowly-moving variables (Plümper and 
Troeger, 2007). To overcome this loss, Plümper and Troeger (2007; 2011) propose the 
use of FEVD (recall Section 4.4). Given the above discussions, there is little to 
distinguish which model specification is preferable in terms of diagnostics and 
rationale in the context of FD-economic growth relationship, both FE estimator using 
Driscoll-Kraay SEs and FEVD approach will be reported, compared and interpreted 
in the next section.  
Next, a Panel Data Regression Specification Error Test (RESET) is performed in order 
to test whether the functional form imposed on the FD-economic growth relationship 
is supported by Equation (5.2). Whilst RESET can easily be performed in cross-
sectional and time-series analysis, various limitations exist when it is performed on 
panel data regression model. An adjusted RESET for panel model (Ramsey test, 
DeBenedictis-Giles Specification Reset test and White Functional Form test) can be 
performed only on conventional panel data models and few on contemporary panel 
models (Shehata and Mickaiel, 2015). This thesis, as argued previously, uses either a 
FE/RE estimator with Driscoll-Kraay’s SEs or FEVD approach. Unfortunately, these 
estimation techniques are not supported by the RESET test for panel data. One 
                                                          
135 In addition, we have considered other estimations such as Generalized Least Squares (GLS) and 
Panel-Corrected Standard Error estimator (PCSE). However, the former cannot be used in our dataset 
given that GLS (with an option of panels correlated) can be performed only under balanced dataset (see 
Appendix 5.4.6). As to the PCSE, the results seem to be similar to the FE using D-K SE. Though, the 
results (see Appendix 5.4.6) are presented only as a robustness check given the inability of the PCSE 
estimator to account for autocorrelation (StataCorp, 2013).  
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possibility would be to perform this test for conventional panel models and FE using 
Panel Corrected SEs which corrects only for heteroscedasticity and cross-sectional 
correlation (Driscoll-Kraay SEs are, in addition, robust to any form of serial 
correlation).  
However, a note of caution seems to be in order when interpreting the Ramsey and 
DeBenedictis Giles tests, and the White Functional Form test because they are not 
performed on the preferred model, but on alternative ones. One possibility, which 
seems to be safer compared to the above ones, would be to perform the RESET Test 
manually based on the strategy provided by Wooldridge (2009, p.306).136 
Accordingly, this test suggests (the p-value for the 𝑦ොଶ  and 𝑦ොଷ is respectively 0.537 
and 0.516) no severe problem of misspecification in terms of functional form (see 
Appendix 5.3.8 for this test conducted when using pooled OLS, FEVD, System GMM, 
etc.) and thus, we may proceed with the selected variables as described in the previous 
sections. 
Finally, the IV-GMM estimations of the FE and first-differenced panel data models 
are employed.137 In terms of diagnostics, attention has been paid to the 
underidentification test, weak identification test, endogeneity test and the test of 
overidentifying restrictions, also known as Sargan test, using the same empirical 
strategy regarding the IV estimation as in Section 4.3.3.  The underidentification test 
indicates that the instruments are all relevant; the null hypothesis was rejected with a 
p-value of 0.000. Next, the rejection of the null hypothesis for the weak identification 
test confirms that the instruments are not weak. The overidentifying restrictions could 
not be rejected (with a p-value of 0.3502), and the endogeneity test suggests the 
presence of endogeneity in some variables such as educ2, educ3_n, fdgrant (p-values 
of 0.000).138 
 
   
                                                          
136 The squared and cubes fitted values of the initial estimation are to be included as explanatory 
variables. 
137 The command in Stata is xtivreg2 introduced by Schaffer (2015). 
138 See Appendix 5.4.4 for more details on the underidentification test, weak identification test, Sargan 
test and endogeneity test. 
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5.4.2. Diagnostics and Robustness Check for the Dynamic Model 
 The choice regarding the preferred dynamic model specification is based on several 
tests such as the first-order serial correlation (m1 test), the second-order correlation 
(m2 test), the Sargan test, Hansen test, the difference-in-Hansen test of exogeneity of 
instruments (also known as C-test), and comparison of the coefficient of the lagged 
dependent variable from those obtained by OLS and Fixed Effects.  
As to the first two tests, the GMM estimator requires the rejection of the m1 null, but 
not of the m2 null (See Stata printouts in Appendix 5.5). The corresponding p-values 
suggest that there is sufficient evidence to reject the former, but not the latter. Second, 
similar as in the IV approach, the System GMM tests for the validity of instruments 
through Sargan test (not robust to heteroscedasticity, but not weakened by many 
instruments) and Hansen test (robust to heteroscedasticity, but weakened by many 
instruments). In both cases, the tests of overidentifying restrictions’ p-values range 
between 0.3 and 0.7, which are within the boundaries suggested by Roodman (2008; 
2009a; 2009b). Consequently, the validity of instruments cannot be rejected.  
Another important test, although usually under-reported in the empirical literature, is 
the difference in Hansen test, which tests the exogeneity of the instruments used in the 
regression. In all the instrument subsets (GMM-instrument for the levels, the lagged 
dependent variable and other variables claimed as endogenous), the corresponding p-
values suggest that there is no sufficient evidence to reject the null hypothesis of the 
validity/exogeneity of instruments. The p-value for the second subset is also used to 
test for the presence of cross-sectional dependence. Likewise static panel models, the 
presence of year dummies seems to significantly absorb cross-sectional dependence 
yielded by homogenous shocks (p-value of 0.596).   
Finally, the coefficients of the lagged dependent variable obtained by OLS, System 
GMM and FE are compared between each other. According to Bond et al. (2001), the 
coefficient of the lagged growth should lie below the estimator obtained by OLS and 
above the corresponding FE estimator Table 5.5 shows that the coefficient of the 
lagged growth for the baseline model using fdtax and fdgrant lies near (slightly above) 
the coefficient estimated by FE and below the coefficient estimated by OLS (see 
Appendix 5.3.9 for Stata printouts). Similarly, this is also proved for the model when 
FD is measured by fdexp and fdgrant. 
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Table 5.5 Comparison of the coefficient of the lagged dependent variable of the 
baseline model when FD is measured with fdtax and fdgrant 
 FE System GMM OLS 
Coefficient of the lagged growth 
(Baseline Model using fdexp and 
fdgrant) 
-0.14 -0.02 -0.07 
Coefficient of the lagged growth 
(Baseline Model using fdtax and 
fdgrant) 
-0.145 -0.141 -0.07 
 
The last issue to be raised in terms of diagnostics is the use of weights. One might 
argue that even though we combined NUTS2 and NUTS3 in order to avoid 
overrepresentation of large size countries in comparison to the small size countries, 
there might still be a need to use, or at least double check for “good representation” of 
each country’s regions. System GMM, different from the abovementioned techniques, 
accommodates weights. Accordingly, the data are weighted using the number of 
regions in each country. Nevertheless, the estimated results from System GMM 
estimator with and without weights are very similar, while being almost unchanged in 
some specifications (see Appendix 5.5.9). Therefore, we report the unweighted 
estimation results and consider the weighted one as a robustness check. 
Also, another concern in our estimations (both in the static and dynamic approach) is 
whether a particular country drives the results. For example, there might be reasons to 
believe that Poland (being the largest size country in our sample) might drive the 
overall results. Hence, we repeated the estimations by excluding one country at a time 
and re-running the regressions with the remaining sample of countries. In all cases, 
expenditure decentralisation was still significant, whereas no pattern could be 
observed for the other FD measures.  
5.5. Estimated Results - Static Approach 
As anticipated previously in the empirical methodology section, three main sets of 
estimates are to be presented in this section: estimates using (i) FE with Driscoll-Kraay 
SEs (ii) FEVD, and (iii) IV.  The results are reported in Table 5.6, in which the 
estimated results from the first empirical approach are reported in Column (1) and (2), 
whereas those from FEVD in Column (3) and (4), and from IV in Column (5) and (6). 
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The odd columns (1, 3 and 5) report the results when FD is measured through fdexp 
and fdgrant, whereas the even ones (2, 4 and 6) report the results when fdtax and 
fdgrant are used. 
Table 5.6 Estimated Results using FE with Driscoll-Kraay SEs, FEVD and IV of the FD-
economic growth relationship (dependent variable: Growth) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
VARIABLES FE with D-
K 
FE with D-
K 
FEVD FEVD IV IV 
       
fdexp 0.208**  0.159***  0.0521  
 (0.0922)  (0.0316)  (0.0545)  
fdgrant -0.0881 -0.0649 -
0.157*** 
-
0.159*** 
-0.809*** -0.704** 
 (0.117) (0.113) (0.0524) (0.0493) (0.263) (0.340) 
fdtax  0.268**  0.171***  0.915*** 
  (0.106)  (0.0323)  (0.239) 
popgrowth -0.237* -0.280** -0.263** -
0.291*** 
-0.285** -0.560*** 
 (0.127) (0.118) (0.107) (0.106) (0.129) (0.153) 
educ2 0.138* 0.158** 0.112** 0.119** 0.137** 0.479*** 
 (0.0699) (0.0676) (0.0517) (0.0489) (0.0619) (0.105) 
educ3_n -0.177** -0.122 0.00946 0.0120 -0.133 0.0835 
 (0.0779) (0.0730) (0.0255) (0.0239) (0.0905) (0.0970) 
lag1realgdp -
0.00292*** 
-
0.00323*** 
  -
0.00336*** 
-
0.00580*** 
 (0.000650) (0.000664)   (0.000532) (0.000919) 
gfcf_gdp -0.665 -1.894 -0.968 -1.772 -5.008 -7.803 
 (3.089) (2.747) (2.102) (2.153) (4.605) (5.296) 
trade -0.121 -0.122 -0.0581 -0.0559 -0.138 0.0478 
 (0.131) (0.129) (0.0412) (0.0407) (0.129) (0.101) 
reallngdpini   -3.177* -3.647**   
   (1.694) (1.637)   
eta   1.000 1.000   
   (0) (0)   
constant 34.13 33.06 39.57*** 45.45***   
 (23.34) (22.96) (13.46) (13.38)   
       
Observations 669 669 661 661 541 542 
R-squared   0.518 0.520 0.367 0.108 
Number of 
groups 
64 64   64 64 
Under 
identification test 
(p-value) 
    0.000 0.000 
Weak 
identification test 
(F-stastics) 
    7.807 3.612 
Sargan statistics 
(p-value) 
    0.3502 0.6450 
Endogeneity test 
of the regressors 
    0.000 0.000 
Instrumented 
variables 
    Lngfcf_gdp, 
trade, 
educ2_n, 
educ3_n, 
fdgrant 
Lngfcf_gdp, 
trade, 
educ2_n, 
educ3_n, 
fdgrant, fdtax 
Note: year dummies included 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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As the main aim of this thesis is to identify the impact of FD on economic growth, we 
begin first by interpreting the coefficient of this variable followed by the interpretation 
of the other independent variables. The results of FE using Driscoll-Kraay SEs,-  and 
FEVD- estimator appears to support the hypothesis that the FD-economic growth 
relationship is subject to the measurements of FD and some extent to the estimation 
strategy. When FD is proxied by tax decentralisation, FD exerts a positive and 
significant effect on economic growth irrespective of the methodology used. In 
contrast, the statistical significance of the expenditure decentralisation (fdexp) and 
vertical imbalance (fdgrant) is subject to the estimation method used.  
Starting with the first estimation method, FE using Driscoll-Kraay SEs, we note that 
the results reported in Column (1) and (3) suggest a positive and significant effect (at 
5 percent level of significance) of fdexp on the regional economic growth. As 
theoretically expected, a 1 percentage point increase in the share of fdexp is, on 
average, associated with 0.21 percentage points increase in the regional economic 
growth, all else being equal. This FD measure is the share of own revenue in 
percentage of subnational government’s expenditure, which assesses the degree of 
reliance of local expenditure on its own revenue, thus taking into account both the 
expenditure and tax dimension. The higher this share, the greater the capacity of a 
local government to rely on its own expenditure. This in turn, as suggested by the 
results (when estimated by FE using Driscoll-Kraay SEs and FEVD), has a positive 
effect on the region’s economic growth. A possible rationale is that local government 
units that are characterised by high shares of fdexp are better able to finance their own 
expenditure through their own funding. By doing so, these units are also likely to 
match better (in terms of quantity and quality) the provision of local services to the 
citizens’ preferences. Contrary, local government units that cannot rely on their own 
taxes, but for instance on transfers from central government (or borrowing) are 
conditioned to use these funds on specific local services, which are homogenous across 
all regions (as determined by the central government) of the country and not tailored 
to the preferences of their specific region. However, this measure is unable to identify 
the efficiency of specific local government expenditures, namely, whether local 
government expenditures are spent on growth-enhancing functions. Next, it is 
important to note, that both the statistical and economic significance of fdexp do 
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depend on the estimation approach. This variable is no longer significant when an 
estimation method is an IV approach.  
Whilst FE with Driscoll-Kraay SEs is employed, vertical imbalance does not seem to 
lend support to the hypothesis that higher level of dependency of local governments 
to central government is growth depressing. The coefficient of this variable is found 
to be statistically insignificant. A possible reason for the lack of significant results 
might be the inability to distinguish between types of grants (conditional and 
unconditional grants) and the little longitudinal variance of this variable (Recall Table 
5.4). With respect to the former, grants to subnational governments are argued to have 
two opposing effects, which is difficult to tackle through conventional measures. First, 
grants may provide adverse incentives to poorer regions to compete with other regions, 
not efficiently allocate these funds and rely on funds from central government. Second, 
grants might boost competition between regions and make them more competitive to 
existing and potential investors (Feld et al., 2004). However, in the context of ETEs, 
the former effect might be argued to dominate the latter due to potential overspending 
tendency of subnational government than what is socially optimal given the 
disposition of central government to finance local governments.  
As to the second reason, the little longitudinal variance, it seems that when FEVD is 
employed, fdgrant becomes significant suggesting an adverse effect on economic 
growth. A 1 percent increase in the share of grants received by central government 
over the region’s local expenditure is, on average, associated with 0.15 percentage 
points decrease in the regional economic growth, all else being equal. A similar 
coefficient is obtained also when fdgrant is used together with fdtax instead of fdexp, 
and when its endogeneity is taken into consideration (Columns 5 and 6). 
On the other hand, tax decentralization is found to have a statistical significant effect 
across all specifications and combinations of FD variables from 5 to 1 percent level of 
significance (Columns 2, 4 and 6). Namely, a 1 percent increase in the share of fdtax, 
all else being equal, appears to enhance economic growth in the selected ETEs’ 
regions by approximately 0.27 percentage points in the case of FE with Driscoll-Kraay 
SEs up to 0.9 percentage points when IV approach is employed. As argued in Chapter 
2, tax decentralization rather than revenue decentralization is a better measure of the 
autonomy of local governments as it takes into account the tax-raising power (but not 
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the decision-making over tax rates and base) and the autonomy from central 
government. As argued by Stegarescu (2005) and Boetti et al. (2010), the provision of 
goods and services using own financial resources makes subnational governments 
more autonomous and efficient. 
Overall, the conclusions regarding the main variable of interest are consistent with 
recent papers on the relationship between FD-regional economic growth conducted in 
Columbia, Italy, Spain, Russia, etc.139 As to the control variables, the panel data 
results, both using FE with Driscoll-Kraay SEs and FEVD, also seem to confirm the 
established finding in the growth literature over the main determinants of economic 
growth.  
The significance and size of population growth are statistically significant across all 
estimation methods and combinations of the FD measures. Although population 
growth is generally considered as a slowly moving variable, it is not considered as 
such in the current chapter (recall Table 5.4 on the between/within SEs ratio of 
population growth).140 This is because, in a regional context, there is much more 
variation between and within regions (amongst others due to internal migration) than 
in between and within countries at aggregated levels. In line with the theoretical 
expectations (the Malthusian analysis) and the vast majority of empirical studies, an 
increase by 1 percentage point the rate of population growth, will result in an adverse 
effect on the regional economic growth by 0.23 percentage points.141 In general, both 
the coefficient and the level of significance are consistent across different estimation 
approaches used (see from Columns 2 to 6). 
With respect to the control variables, the economic effect of human capital appears to 
be subject to the human capital measure adopted (educ2 and educ3). When human 
capital is measured by the enrolment in secondary education, the result suggests that 
an increase in human capital would boost regional economic growth possibly due to 
increase in labour productivity. This result, being consistent across all specifications 
and in line with both theoretical expectations and empirical evidence, suggests that a 
rise in the secondary school enrolment by 1 percentage point will increase, ceteris 
                                                          
139 Desai et al. (2003); Gil-Serrate and Lopez-Laborda (2006); Lozano and Julio (2015); Bartolini et 
al. (2016). 
140 In the previous chapter, population growth was considered a slowly moving variable. 
141 See Headey and Hodge (2009) for a more detailed overview on the effect of population growth on 
economic growth. 
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paribus, GDP growth from 13 to 47 percent depending on the specification used.142 
Contrary to the a priori expectations, educ3 is found to have either an insignificant or 
a negative effect on regional economic growth. The latter is found only when a 
combination of fdexp and fdgrant is used and the method of estimation is FE with 
Driscoll-Kraay SEs. In all the other specifications (Column 2 to 6), this variable is 
insignificant irrespective of the FD measures used.  Accordingly, 1 percentage point 
increase in tertiary school enrolment rate, all else being equal, is associated with a 
decrease in the regional economic growth by 0.17 percentage points. However, this 
negative coefficient does not contradict the entire empirical evidence. The empirical 
literature on the relationship between human capital and economic growth argue that 
the negative sign might be attributed to the difficulty in properly measuring human 
capital due to quantitative nature of these measures. According to Le et al. (2005), 
(gross- and net-) secondary and/or tertiary school enrollments, although being among 
the most used proxies for human capital, measure neither the human capital 
endowments nor the quality.143 Despite the arguments in favour of these contradictory 
results, what seems interesting is the fact that high enrolment rates, especially for 
tertiary education, tend to be found in capital cities and large/richer regions. Hence, in 
the context of our research, an increase in high enrollment rates does not necessarily 
mean that more educated students will contribute to the corresponding region’s 
economic growth, but it might be that the effect is concentrated only to the region they 
study (usually capital city because of high numbers of schools and universities). This, 
in turn, might under- or over- estimate the overall impact of educ3 on regional 
economic growth. Another potential reason, which can explain to some extent the 
counterintuitive effect of enrolment in tertiary education on economic growth, is the 
static perspective in this model. Having a contemporaneous value of educ3 neglects 
the potential lagged effect of this variable. As argued in the previous section, the effect 
of education on growth is likely to occur at later periods, at a relatively slow pace.  
Another important control variable included in Equation (5.2) is the initial condition 
of a region, which is proxied by the lag of regional GDP per capita (lag1realgdp) or 
the initial level of GDP (reallngdpini) depending on the estimation method employed. 
The estimated results presented in Table 5.6 suggest the existence of catch-up effect 
                                                          
142 See Hanushek and Woessmann (2011) for more details. 
143 Secondary and/or tertiary enrolments rate are considered as flow measures of investment in human 
capital. 
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of (relatively) poor regions to (relatively) rich regions. Irrespective of the FD measure 
and estimation method used, the lag1realgdp/reallngdpini is always significant across 
estimations at 1 percent level of significance and they have the expected sign. 
Another key determinant of regional economic growth is the rate of investment, 
proxied by the rate of gross fixed capital formation. Investment is found to have an 
insignificant effect across all specifications and combination of FD measures. This 
might be attributed to the measurement error of this variable and the inability to take 
into account any lagged effect of investment on growth. Recalling section 5.3, the use 
of lagged investment (first lag and/or second lag) together with the lagged GDP per 
capita, used to isolate the convergence effect, would produce a misspecification error. 
Therefore, our results suggest that the current value of investment does not affect the 
current value of regional growth from a static perspective.  
The variable trade representing a country’s measure of openness to international 
markets appears to be insignificant across all estimations. Attention has to be devoted 
to this variable given that it is measured at the national level due to the lack of data. 
Regions as spatial units differ economically and is likely that trade would have a 
different effect on each region’s economic growth. However, the results from the static 
model suggest that such effect is not visible. Indeed, a more thorough investigation is 
required at subnational level in order to properly analyse the trade-economic growth 
relationship at regional level and shifting to a dynamic perspective by investigating 
the lagged effect of trade on economic growth. 
Another concern in the above estimations, especially in the one reported in Table 5.6, 
is the inability to properly distinguish the individual country’s economic effect of FD 
at regional level. Namely, pooling all the regions of all countries into one dataset might 
hinder the individual country’s effect. However, as argued in Section 5.2, the 
unavailability of the longer time period, and thus a number of observations, drives us 
to select multiple countries. The small number of observations (in particular for the 
Czech Republic and Hungary) makes it difficult to produce sensible results from 
individual country regressions. Appendix 5.4.5A provides the estimated results for 
individual countries. Nonetheless, it is difficult to rely on these results for which the 
number of observations is small and there is not much additional information provided 
by this approach of splitting countries into small sub-datasets. 
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Therefore, as argued before in this chapter, the relationship between FD and regional 
economic growth might be mediated by country size. Namely, regions of large size 
countries are likely to better exploit the economies of scale of FD relative to the 
regions of small countries. In this context, our understanding of the economic effect 
of FD can be improved by considering country size as a potential factor that influences 
the FD-growth relationship. In order to test the hypothesis that the regional economic 
effect of FD is sensitive to the country’s size, we augment the baseline model (5.5) 
with size dummies and their respective interactions with FD measures. Following 
Section 5.2.2, countries and their respective regions are divided according to the 
country’s surface area and population; thus, by considering the country size not only 
as a geographical dimension but also that encompasses other dimensions such as 
population. In addition to these two criteria, we divided countries according to their 
economic development stage based on their OECD membership. The Czech Republic, 
Hungary and Poland comprise the first group (also are part of the large size country 
group), whereas Estonia and Albania are part of the second group of countries that are 
either (very) recently part of OECD countries, or not a member at all (part of the small 
size country group).  
In order to avoid repetition and in the interest of brevity, the interpretation of the 
estimated results from these two approaches will focus only on the main variable of 
interest, FD. The first approach is to split the dataset subject to size and compare the 
results between the first and second group of countries. Given that the results are a 
replication of the one presented in Table 5.6, the methods employed here shall be the 
same: FE with Driscoll-Kraay SEs, FEVD and IV. The results reported in Table 5.7 
are found to differ substantially between small size and large size country group not 
only in terms of FD measures but also regarding control variables. Interestingly, the 
economic effect of FD is statistically significant only in the large size country sample, 
suggesting that an increase by 1 percentage points in the fdexp, all else being equal, 
would increase regional economic growth 0.08 to 0.1 percentage points, depending on 
the specification used. However, this effect seems to disappear in the case of IV 
approach. The effect of FD is found to be statistically insignificant among small size 
countries. These results suggest that large size countries can better exploit the benefits 
of FD than small size countries, by better translating these benefits in growth 
maximising. In contrast, Albania and Estonia, being small size countries, are found to 
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be unable to affect regional economic growth by decentralisation expenditure. Similar 
results are reported when FD is measured by tax autonomy and vertical imbalance 
(Stata printouts reported in Appendix 5.4.5B). 
Recalling Section 5.3, the second approach to test for the differences in the FD 
economic impact due to country’s size is by making use of a dummy variable (size) 
and its interaction with all the measures of FD. Thus, Equation (5.2) is augmented 
simultaneously with two additional variables: size and its interactions either with 
expenditure decentralisation, tax decentralisation or vertical imbalance. However, it 
should be noted that these techniques do not allow the inclusion of the interaction term 
through the marginal effect approach, while some of them do not allow the inclusion 
of size as a time-invariant dummy variable. The FE with Driscoll-Kraay SES and 
FEVD, being fixed effect estimators, will drop out size as a dummy variable. 
Therefore, the results using FE with Driscoll-Kraay SEs and FEVD do not contain the 
size variable, but only the interactions with the FD measures. The estimated results 
are reported in Table 5.8 (more details in Appendix 5.4.5C).  
With regard to the main variable of interest, FD is found to vary across estimations 
and combination of FD measures. As to the first measure, fdexp is found to be either 
insignificant or negative and significant when the model is estimated with FE with 
Driscoll-Kraay SEs and FEVD, contrary to the approach where the dataset is divided 
into two sub-datasets.  As to the second measure, the increase in local governments’ 
fiscal autonomy, as expected, is suggested to contribute positively to regional 
economic growth, however, the size of the country does not alter such relationship. 
The interaction of size with fdtax is found insignificant across all estimations. Higher 
transfers from central government to finance the local governments’ expenditure is 
indicated to have a negative effect (at 10 level of significance) only when IV approach 
is employed. Interestingly, the interaction term of this variable with size is found to be 
insignificant in this specification, but significant in other specification where fdgrant 
itself is not significant (see Column 2). The results suggest somehow that economic 
effect of vertical imbalance is caught either by this variable itself or by its interaction 
with size, but not by both. 
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Table 5.7 Estimation results using FE with Driscoll-Kraay SEs, FEVD and IV from large and small size country group by splitting the dataset 
Method FE with Driscoll-Kraay SEs FEVD IV 
FD measures used fdexp + 
fdgrant 
fdtax + 
fdgrant 
fdexp + 
fdgrant 
fdtax + 
fdgrant 
fdexp + 
fdgrant 
fdtax + 
fdgrant 
fdexp + 
fdgrant 
fdtax + 
fdgrant 
fdexp + 
fdgrant 
fdtax + 
fdgrant 
fdexp + 
fdgrant 
fdtax + 
fdgrant 
Sample Large Small Large Small Large Small Large Small Large Small Large Small 
Variables             
fdexp 0.08** 0.23   0.14*** -0.01   0.02 1.491   
 (0.03) (0.19)   (0.05) (0.17)   (0.05) (1.71)   
fdtax   0.13** 0.078   0.19*** -0.08   0.244 -1.33 
   (0.05) (0.17)   (0.05) (0.22)   (0.407) (1.71) 
fdgrant -0.25* 0.05 -0.21 -0.08 -0.34*** 0.03 -0.29*** -0.03 -1.15*** 1.60 -1.070* -1.245 
Observations 359 310 359 310 353 308 353 308 285 256 286 256 
R-squared     0.827 0.50 0.83 0.50 0.79 0.38 0.77 0.35 
Number of 
groups/regions 
37 27 37 27 37 27 37 27 37 27 37 27 
Standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
Table 5.8 Estimation results from large and small size country group using size dummy variable and interactions with FD measures 
Method FE with Driscoll-Kraay SEs FEVD IV 
    
FD measures used fdexp + fdgrant fdtax + fdgrant fdexp + fdgrant fdtax + fdgrant fdexp + fdgrant fdtax + fdgrant 
Variables       
fdexp 0.298  0.305*  -1.634***  
 (0.264)  (0.177)  (0.300)  
fdtax  0.401**  0.146  1.181* 
  (0.135)  (0.108)  (0.681) 
fdgrant 0.0784 0.116 -0.0231 -0.0895 -1.808*** -0.640 
 (0.199) (0.0911) (0.172) (0.0945) (0.313) (0.724) 
size 0 0 16.42 4.316   
 (0) (0) (15.29) (8.907)   
expsize -0.0985  -0.153  1.903***  
 (0.209)  (0.179)  (0.322)  
grantsize -0.249 -0.273** -0.136 -0.148  0.458 
 (0.172) (0.115) (0.176) (0.104)  (0.729) 
taxsize  -0.154  0.0313  -0.902 
  (0.118)  (0.105)  (0.644) 
Observations 669 669 661 661 541 541 
R-squared   0.519 0.561 0.216 0.265 
Number of groups/regions 64 64 64 64 64 64 
Note: Standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Control variables included in the estimations, but not reported in the table 
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5.6. Estimation Results - Dynamic Approach 
Table 5.9 presents the results of the growth equation in a dynamic setting (Equation 
5.4). The analysis of baseline results (Columns 1 and 2) is followed by the 
investigation of country size as a determinant of the FD-growth relationship (Columns 
3 and 4), next by claiming some of our main variables of interest as endogenous 
(Columns 5 and 6) and their interaction with country size (Columns 7 and 8). In order 
to avoid repetition, this section will focus only on the difference of the System GMM 
results compared to those from the static panel model. 
However, a note of caution is required before jumping to the differences between the 
two approaches. Different from the static panel model, the dynamic model includes 
the lagged dependent variable, which captures the entire history of the right-hand side 
variables and their influence on the current level of the growth rate (Greene, 2008, 
p.469). According to our results presented in Table 5.9, lagged growth appears to be 
insignificant across specifications, which shows no persistence of the growth rate over 
the periods. Namely, the insignificance of lagged growth implies that the regional 
growth rate in the current year is not related to the regional growth rate in the previous 
year. 
Whilst the presence of a significant lagged dependent variable is important in a 
dynamic model, it should be noted that in this empirical investigation it is not the 
persistence of the regional growth rate per se that is of interest. However, such 
dynamics should be modelled and interpreted. Although the “history” is not 
significantly reflected in the lagged growth rate, it is important to mention that its 
coefficient lie between 0 and 1, and also in the credible range of LSDV and OLS 
estimates (see Table 5.9). 
As to our greatest concern, the relationship between FD and economic growth, the 
estimated results from a System GMM provide a similar, but more informative picture 
than the results from a static panel. The results from baseline specification (Columns 
1 and 2) indicate that FD, when measured by fdexp and fdtax, has a positive impact 
on regional economic growth. Contrary, fdgrant does not have any significant effect 
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on the regional economic growth either in the first specification (Column 1) or in the 
second (Column 2). 
 
Table 5.9 Estimated results from dynamic panel system GMM estimations of the FD-
economic growth relationship at regional level (dependent variable: Growth) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Variables fdexp + 
fdgrant 
fdtax + 
fdgrant 
fdexp + 
fdgrant 
fdtax + 
fdgrant 
fdexp + 
fdgrant 
fdtax + 
fdgrant 
fdexp + 
fdgrant 
fdtax + 
fdgrant 
     
growtht-1 -0.0215 -0.142 0.0374 0.382 0.103 -0.303 0.293 0.405 
 (0.258) (0.260) (0.172) (0.553) (0.319) (0.197) (0.472) (0.532) 
fdexp 0.129***    0.0295    
 (0.0412)    (0.0492)    
fdgrant 0.0390 0.0206       
 (0.0367) (0.0414)       
fdtax  0.186***       
  (0.0462)       
reallngdpini -
14.24*** 
-
15.73*** 
-12.18** -
18.56*** 
-5.694** -13.04*** -3.838 4.568 
 (2.348) (2.480) (4.890) (5.041) (2.255) (3.642) (3.860) (9.092) 
popgrowth 0.0323 -0.0116 0.0852 0.255 0.0459 -0.0940 0.115 0.0665 
 (0.146) (0.177) (0.123) (0.286) (0.176) (0.177) (0.220) (0.309) 
educ2† -
0.242*** 
-
0.227*** 
-0.175 -0.176 -0.0965* -0.0232 -0.0897* -0.200** 
 (0.0555) (0.0585) (0.105) (0.125) (0.0560) (0.0579) (0.0495) (0.0832) 
educ3† 0.153*** 0.150*** 0.136*** 0.171*** 0.0492* 0.0898** 0.0205 -0.0164 
 (0.0318) (0.0301) (0.0445) (0.0439) (0.0281) (0.0386) (0.0322) (0.0446) 
lngfcf_gdp 9.449** 8.158** 12.17* 10.59 9.902* -3.997 2.582 14.25** 
 (4.547) (3.800) (6.777) (6.524) (5.367) (6.279) (4.776) (5.936) 
1size   37.88 23.11    3.138 
   (55.46) (50.81)    (74.42) 
0b.size#c.fdgrant   0.452 0.267     
   (0.592) (0.502)     
1.size#c.fdgrant   -0.115 -0.152     
   (0.233) (0.207)     
0b.size#c.fdexp   0.402    -0.0631  
   (0.582)    (0.163)  
1size#c.fdexp   0.170*    0.147**  
   (0.0954)    (0.0722)  
trade† 0.128*** 0.128*** 0.120** 0.177*** 0.0244 0.109 0.0273 -0.0456 
 (0.0378) (0.0392) (0.0510) (0.0579) (0.0315) (0.0652) (0.0469) (0.0532) 
0b.size#c.fdtax    0.244     
    (0.554)     
1.size#c.fdtax    0.309***     
    (0.109)     
fdgrant†     -0.0167 -0.123***   
     (0.0419) (0.0409)   
fdtax†      0.189***   
      (0.0518)   
size       -4.241  
       (12.59)  
0b.size#c.fdgrant†       0.00633 0.147 
       (0.0965) (0.754) 
1.size#c.fdgrant†       -
0.287*** 
-0.171* 
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       (0.101) (0.1000) 
0b.size#c.fdtax†        -0.0560 
        (0.814) 
1.size1#c.fdtax†        -0.0820 
        (0.204) 
Constant 89.55*** 106.4*** 27.60 87.17 25.52 124.2*** 40.27 -62.74 
 (20.37) (21.64) (88.83) (70.34) (23.79) (38.62) (30.11) (145.2) 
Model 
Diagnostics 
        
         
Observations 667 667 667 667 652 666 652 666 
Number of 
regions 
64 64 64 64 64 64 64 64 
         
AR(1) p-value 0.009 0.025 0.003 0.067 0.024 0.044 0.058 0.0409 
AR(2) p-value 0.346 0.604 0.130 0.195 0.232 0.574 0.237 0.209 
Sargan test p-
value 
0.689 0.337 0.259 0.710 0.685 0.685 0.254 0.493 
Hansen test p-
value 
0.596 0.372 0.359 0.725 0.452 0.585 0.410 0.312 
†Different lags of the variables are used 
Note: year dummies included 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
Looking more in detail at the first measure of decentralisation, fdexp is found to have 
a positive and statistically significant effect on economic growth. An increase by 1 
percentage point in the share of expenditure covered by own local government 
expenditure increases regional economic growth by 0.12 percentage points, ceteris 
paribus. Similar findings were also reported in the previous estimations (recall Table 
5.6). With respect to fdtax, ceteris paribus, the results suggest that on average a 1 
percentage point increase in this share increases regional economic growth by 0.18 
percentage points. In terms of economic rationale, the contribution to economic 
growth for both fdexp and fdtax seems sensible given the high variation of regional 
economic growth (minimum -30% (excluding outliers) and maximum 29.8%). Last, 
as previously reported, the effect of fdgrant appears to be insignificant. 
In order to shed more light on the FD-economic growth relationship, our focus of 
investigation shifts to the interaction between country size and our main variable of 
interest. Different from the static panel, the two-step System GMM does allow the use 
of interactions and time-invariant variables such as size.  The results from Equation 
(5.2) augmented with size, seems to stress the importance of an in-depth investigation 
of any measure of FD given the variation it had due to size. Otherwise, one would risk 
to over generalise the conclusion and not expose the factors that are likely to drive the 
FD-economic growth relationship. In order to avoid this risk of overshooting when 
230 
 
concluding about the economic relevance of the FD measures, our focus shifts to 
Columns (3) and (4), which are replication of the two baseline models (Columns 1 and 
2) with size interacted with FD measures. Graphically, the average marginal effect size 
of size and FD measures are presented in Figure 5.1. 
  
Figure 5.1 Average Marginal Effects of size and FDexp and FDgrant (on the left), and 
FDtax and FDgrant (on the right), with 90 CIs. 
 
Whilst the country size per se has no significant effect on regional growth, an 
interaction with FD measures sheds light on their economic effect at regional level. 
The results from Column 3 suggest that expenditure decentralization exhibits a 
positive and significant effect at the10 percent conventional level only for large 
countries. Accordingly, a 1 percentage point increase in fdexp increases regional 
economic growth rate in the large country group by 0.17 percentage points, ceteris 
paribus. In contrast, there is no effect of expenditure decentralization on the regional 
growth for small countries.144 As such, it is argued that the expenditure 
decentralization-economic growth relationship at the regional level is subject to the 
country size. Such conclusions are consistent across specifications (See Column 7). 
Thus, if a country is large enough in terms of surface area and population size, then 
expenditure decentralization can exploit its benefit better and affect economic growth.  
                                                          
144 A possible reason for the insignificant effect of the expenditure decentralisation on regional growth 
in small size countries might be the large standard errors or small variation in this sample, which in turn 
lead to unprecise estimation of the coefficients. Referring to the descriptive statistics (see Appendix 
5.2), the sample size of small size country (Albania and Estonia) is relatively smaller compared to the 
one of large size countries (the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland), 324 and 455 observations, 
respectively. 
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Similar results are also reported for tax decentralization (Column 4), where the effect 
of large countries out weighted the effect of small countries. A 1 percentage point 
increase in the local government share of own tax revenues as a percentage of total 
local revenue increases regional economic growth by 0.3 percentage points, all else 
being equal. However, this effect seems to disappear when this variable is claimed as 
endogenous. Looking more in detail and across other variables of FD, the results 
suggest that now the positive effect of fdtax in large countries is shifted to fdgrant, 
which was insignificant before (Column 3). Only after grant decentralization are 
treated as endogenous, its effect becomes significant (p-value changes from 0.46 to 
0.09)145  Columns 7 and 8 and graphically presented in Figure 5.2). As a priori 
expected, the higher the dependence of local government on central government funds, 
the lower the regional economic growth, which seem to be in line with the majority of 
empirical research (Berthold et al., 2004; Feld et al., 2004; Feld et al., 2009a). Thus, 
a 1 percent increase in the vertical imbalance of local governments decreases regional 
growth by 0.28 percentage points (if fdgrant combined with fdexp) and 0.17 
percentage points (if fdgrant combined with fdtax), ceteris paribus.  
 
 
 
 
Figure 5.2 Average Marginal Effects of size and fdexp and fdgrant (on the left), and 
fdtax and fdgrant (on the right), when claiming fdtax and fdgrant as endogenous, with 
90 CIs. 
 
                                                          
145 See Columns 7 and 8 and Figure 5.2 for graphical presentation. 
-.4
-.2
0
.2
Ef
fe
ct
s 
on
 F
itt
ed
 V
al
ue
s
0 1
size1
fdgrant fdexp
Average Marginal Effects with 90% CIs
-2
-1
0
1
2
Ef
fe
ct
s 
on
 F
itt
ed
 V
al
ue
s
0 1
size1
fdgrant fdtax
Average Marginal Effects with 90% CIs
232 
 
Such an effect is also found by a similar study by Cevik (2017), although the focus of 
investigation is different from ours. Cevik argues that size matters when referring to 
vertical fiscal imbalances of Moldova. In terms of the degrees of novelty, our study is 
focusing on a completely different area, countries, level of investigation and has a 
different definition of size. The above study defines size as the subnational 
government’s population, whereas our study uses the country geographical and 
demographical size, as well as OECD and EU membership to categorise countries. 
Although the lagged depepdent variable is not significant, as already discussed earlier, 
there is strong evidence (at 1 percent level of significance) of a permanent or final 
catch-up process that took place from the first to the last year of investigation, while 
being consistent across all specifications (from column 1 to 8).146 The inability to find 
an intermediate convergence seems reasonable and expected when dealing with annual 
data. Contrary, if we would have five-year averaged data, the catch-up process would 
likely to be more visible relative to our case. As to the initial GDP, the results appear 
to be consistent across all specifications (static and dynamic) and estimation methods. 
The negative correlation between the initial level of GDP and the subsequent regional 
growth rates is also supported by a recent study of IMF (2016) on regional economic 
growth in CESEE. Despite the slow pace of convergence in the recent year, regions of 
CESEE show evidence of a significant convergence process during their transition 
phase. 
With regard to the other control variables used in the model, it seems that the results 
have the expected sign and are consistent with the majority of empirical growth 
literature. Though, our results appear to be slightly different (for some variables only) 
when compared to those of the static analysis. Accordingly, the regional population 
growth does not provide any longer evidence of its negative effect on the regional 
economic growth.  
Investment, measured by the share of gross fixed capital formation as a percentage of 
the regional GDP, is found to have a positive and significant effect on economic 
growth. Apparently, the coefficient of this variable in the static model did hide 
important information in the static analysis, which could not be revealed if the lagged 
effect of investment was not taken into consideration and this relationship shifted to a 
                                                          
146 Stata printouts are provided in Appendix 5.5 (from 5.5.1 to 5.5.8). 
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dynamic approach. The system GMM estimated result suggests that a 1 percentage 
point increase in the share of investment to GDP, leads to a 9.4 percentage points 
increase in the regional economic growth, all else being equal. In the context of the 
regional economic growth, it is important to note that this coefficient is economically 
meaningful and not that large as it gives the first impression. The regional economic 
growth rates are higher and more fluctuating compared to the rates at the aggregate 
level (the average economic growth of our sample is approximately 6%, while the 
maximum growth rate is 29%). This result seems to be consistent also in the second 
baseline specification where the second combination of FD measures is used (fdtax 
and fdgrant), and somewhat in the other estimations when FD measures are claimed 
as endogenous or interacted with country size. Though, in some specification 
(Columns 4, 6 and 7) investment loses its statistical significance (See Appendices 
5.5.4, 5.5.6 and 5.5.7).  
Interestingly, human capital variables, namely educ2 and educ3, swapped their signs 
compared to the static model. As argued before in Section 5.3, it is important in the 
case of human capital to consider its lagged effect, since this variable (irrespective of 
the way measured educ2 or educ3) takes time to manifest its effect on growth. In 
addition to the lagged effect, the System GMM did take into account also the possible 
endogenous relationship between human capital and economic growth.147 The first 
measure of human capital, namely educ2, exhibits a negative effect on economic 
growth across all estimations, though the level of significance changes drastically 
across specifications (p-value from 0.690 to 0.000).  Referring to the first specification 
(see Column 1), a 1 percentage point increase in the enrolment rate in secondary 
education, decreases the regional growth rate by 0.24 percentage points, all else being 
equal. Nevertheless, the results seem to be more in line with the theoretical and 
empirical research when human capital is proxied by the enrolment rate in tertiary 
education. In the two baseline specifications, educ3 is highly significant at 1 percent 
level of significance and has the expected positive sign. Accordingly, a 1 percentage 
point increase in the enrolment rate at tertiary education increases regional growth by 
0.15 percentage points, ceteris paribus. 
                                                          
147 In all the specification, educ2 and educ3 are considered as endogenous.  
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A different picture emerges in the case of trade, which from being insignificant before 
in the static model becomes now highly significant and in line with the majority of 
empirical research. The results suggest that country’s trade openness contributes to the 
regional economic growth, where 1 percentage point increase in this variable increases 
regional growth by 0.12 percentage points, all else being equal. Consequently, the 
higher a country is opened to international markets, the greater are the benefits for 
individual regions. 
5.7 Sensitivity of the results 
Although the nonlinearity of the FD-economic growth relationship is not a vital point 
in the empirical research (recall Chapter 2), we hypothesise an (inverted) U-shaped 
relationship in order to control for possible variations over time of the economic effect 
of FD. Such hypothesis can point to the optimal size of decentralization, namely, to 
the level of FD that maximises growth. Although largely ignored, this is thought to be 
a common practice among research conducted at national level, because it answers the 
question of whether a country should decentralise more or less in order to benefit from 
FD. To do so, one should take into account the size of the central government in the 
analysis, contrary to this chapter, which has adapted the FD measures at a regional 
context. Nevertheless, we assume such counteracting economic effect of FD also in 
research conducted at regional level in order to shed more light on the relationship 
between FD and economic growth. 
Equations 5.2 and 5.4 are both augmented with a quadratic term of each measure of 
FD (used combinations similar to the linear specifications). Estimated results are 
reported in Table 5.10 and Table 5.11, respectively for static and dynamic panel 
models. In the interest of brevity, we focus only on the main variable of interest, FD 
measures. The positive sign of fdexp and the negative sign of its quadratic term suggest 
that the increase of this measure can be beneficial for the regional economic growth 
until FD reaches the critical value that ranges from 55.7% to 65.3%. Any increase of 
the fdexp beyond this point would harm regional economic growth. The optimal size 
of FD from the regional perspective seems to be confirmed only for fdexp, whereas 
fdtax and fdgrant mostly seem to suggest a linear effect on regional economic growth. 
Similar results are also found in the System GMM (see Table 5.11), except when FD 
is claimed as endogenous. Different from the other measures, the sign of the fdgrant 
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and its quadratic terms suggest a U-shaped relationship between FDgrant and regional 
growth, where the minimum of FD is reached at 41% (see Appendix 5.6.1 for Stata 
printouts). Nevertheless, as pointed out previously, pooling different countries of 
different sizes in one dataset, might expose us to the risk of overshooting the economic 
effect of FD. Given that in terms of policy implications this is not of special relevance 
(recalling the debate in the first paragraph), we will leave this for future research and 
not include an interaction term between FD measures, size and squared term of FD. 
 
Table 5.10 Optimal Size of FD (static panel models) 
Method Combination of FD 
measures 
Measure of FD Optimal size 
FE with Driscoll Kraay 
SEs 
fdexp and fdgrant fdexp 65.3% 
fdgrant Insignificant 
fdtax and fdgrant fdtax 71% 
fdgrant Insignificant 
 
FEVD 
 
 
fdexp and fdgrant fdexp 60.7% 
fdgrant Insignificant 
fdtax and fdgrant fdtax 61.7% 
fdgrant Insignificant 
IV 
 
 
fdexp and fdgrant fdexp 55.7% 
fdgrant Insignificant 
fdtax and fdgrant fdtax Insignificant 
fdgrant Insignificant 
 
 
Table 5.11 Optimal Size of FD (dynamic panel models) 
Method Combination of FD 
measures 
Measure of FD Optimal size 
Baseline Specification fdexp and fdgrant fdexp 63.6% 
fdgrant Insignificant 
fdtax and fdgrant fdtax 63.4% 
fdgrant Insignificant 
 
Claiming FD Measures 
as Endogenous 
 
 
fdexp and fdgrant fdexp 68% 
fdgrant Insignificant 
fdtax and fdgrant fdtax Insignificant 
fdgrant 41% 
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Another issue raised in Chapters 2 and 4 was whether the size of a government, 
measured by the government final consumption (recall Table 5.1 for the precise 
definition of this variable), should be taken into consideration when investigating the 
economic effect of FD.  We argued before in this thesis that there is no underlying 
theoretical justification of including government size due to likelihood of double 
counting the local government expenditures once in the FD measures and then in the 
government consumption. Nevertheless, the estimated results reported in Appendix 
5.6.2 suggest that the size of a general government, almost across all estimation 
methods and specifications, is insignificant.  
With respect to the regions where the capital city is located, FD does not seem to have 
a different (larger/smaller) effect relative to the other regions. Contrary to our 
expectations, although capital regions are more decentralized, there is not enough 
evidence that such higher decentralization would be conducive to regional economic 
growth (see Appendix 5.6.3 for Stata printouts). Though, it should be noted that the 
estimation results are only from the static models. 
In general, the country’s membership in the European Union appears insignificant 
when using interaction terms of EU with FD measures (expeu, taxeu and granteu). 
However, this seems to be contradicted by the second approach when dataset is split 
into two sub-datasets subject to their EU membership status: (i) the Czech Republic, 
Hungary, Estonia and Poland, which are all part of the EU, and (ii) Albania, which is 
not yet a member of EU (see Appendix 5.6.4 for more details). A possible rationale 
for this contradiction might be because when splitting the dataset, instead of 
interaction terms, the significance of FD measures does not necessarily state that the 
EU membership has contributed to its economic effect, but it is likely that we are 
capturing factors other than the EU membership.  
 
Table 5.12 Long-run coefficients of the economic effect of FD 
Combinations of 
FD measures 
fdexp and fdgrant fdtax and fdgrant 
FD measure fdexp fdgrant fdtax fdgrant 
Coefficient 
(Standard Error) 
0.032 
(0.054) 
(-0.018) 
(0.044) 
(0.14)*** 
(0.04) 
(-0.09)** 
(0.03) 
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Finally, the long run coefficients of the effect of FD on economic growth are presented 
in Table 5.12. We would expect the economic effect of FD to be stronger in the long-
run relative to the short-run. A possible rationale behind this is with time, local 
governance can better benefit, amongst others, from economies of scale and 
experience (and other channels of transmission elaborated in Chapter 2) and be more 
efficient in offering local public goods and services, which eventually would be 
conducive to higher regional economic growth.  
However, the estimated coefficients are found to differ between the baseline 
specification and the second specification where FD is claimed as endogenous. Given 
that the second specification might be considered as more appropriate in the presence 
of endogeneity, we will prioritise this type of coefficients, while the former being 
reported in Appendix 5.6.5. The results, reported in Table 5.12, suggest there is no 
long-run economic effect of fdexp, whereas there is a significant effect on regional 
economic growth of fdtax and fdgrant. Regarding the sign and magnitude of the 
coefficient for these two variables, they are as expected: positive for fdtax and 
negative for fdgrant, while having weaker effect than in the short-run effect. 
5.8 Conclusions 
In the previous chapter, it was argued that conducting research on a heterogenous 
dataset at a higher level of aggregation (i.e. national level) and the use of heterogenous 
datasets with countries at different stages of development is considered a weakness 
when investigating the economic effect of FD in a cross-country context. Therefore, 
this chapter seeks to fill the gap in the literature by studying the economic effect of 
FD from a regional perspective in selected ETEs. Despite the abundance of the 
empirical research on the effect of fiscal decentralization on economic growth, there 
are only a limited number of empirical investigations focusing on European Transition 
Economies (ETEs) in general and at regional level in these countries in particular. To 
the best of our knowledge and up to date this is the first study investigating this 
relationship at regional level (defined as the first level of administrative 
decentralisation within each county).  
Using an endogenous growth model, the panel data analysis over the 2000-2014 period 
suggests that the relationship between FD and regional economic growth depends 
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largely on the measurement of FD and size of the country. With regard to the former, 
the results appear to be consistent across all specifications and estimations, suggesting 
that the relationship between FD and regional growth is subject to the FD measures 
used. When FD is proxied by either fdexp or fdtax, the economic effect of FD appears 
to be positive and significant. Contrary, fdgrant either has an insignificant effect or it 
is detrimental for growth when claiming it as an endogenous variable.  
As to the size of the country, our results are more emphasized when employing a 
dynamic model (System GMM). The effect of FD on economic growth is statistically 
significant and positive in larger countries (the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland) 
and insignificant in smaller countries (Albania and Estonia), which suggest that the 
size of the country matters in explaining the FD-economic growth relationship. Large 
size countries are able to decentralize economic decision making (especially over tax 
and spending) to lower levels of administration better and make the process more 
effective – thus the better economic results. Smaller countries cannot decentralise very 
much because of the limited scope for decentralization (indeed, in EU regional 
decentralization classification terminology -NUTS2 level- the smaller countries 
constitute only one region). Larger countries are likely to be able to exploit the benefits 
of FD better if the diverse preferences across distant regions of large countries 
(especially of hinterland regions with ethnic backgrounds) are matched to local public 
services and there is greater local accountability and competition among subnational 
governments. Consequently, the regions can better assess the amount and type of 
public goods offered to diverse regions and thus, benefit from FD. 
Additional extensions to the core investigation, which included investigating for an 
optimal size of FD, controlling for the size of the general government, EU membership 
status, did not appear to alter significantly the results from the baseline specification 
and the one when FD is claimed as endogenous, neither in the static, nor in the dynamic 
approach. Contrary, the long-run effect of FD on economic growth was found to vary 
subject to the specification used.  
In summary, this chapter pointed out the importance of considering homogenous 
dataset in the analysis when investigating the economic effect of FD and particularly 
investigating this relationship more systematically at lower levels of aggregation. In 
the context of future research, our analyses could be extended to larger dataset of 
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ETEs, which would shed more light on the other determinates impacting the FD-
economic growth relationship. The inclusion of political decentralization in addition 
to FD might reveal another dimension of decentralization worth investigating. 
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6.1 Introduction 
The aim of this thesis was to examine the effect of Fiscal Decentralisation (FD) on 
economic growth in TEs, with special reference to European TEs (ETEs). While these 
countries have been progressing in their transition from the centrally planned system 
to decentralised market economies, the process of political, administrative and 
economic decentralisation and its implications have varied from country to country 
(Bird et al., 1995). An important aspect, critical to the transition process, is the 
decentralisation of government itself, which has not received much attention (mostly 
from the empirical perspective) in TEs in general and in ETEs in particular. The 
renewed focus on decentralisation in these countries has been mainly driven by either 
(i) the failure of the centrally planned system accompanied by the expectation that 
devolution will deliver efficiency gains and promote economic development, or (ii) 
the need to adapt to new international and political conditions in the post-socialist 
period (Rodriguez-Pose and Kroijer, 2009, p.7). Whilst facing many challenges in 
successfully implementing (fiscal) decentralisation reforms (Prud’homme, 1995), the 
nature of transition raises particular issues in terms of FD and its implications for 
economic development for TEs.  
Once the rationale for investigating the relationship between FD and economic 
performance is elaborated, this research embarked on a critical review of the 
theoretical and empirical studies on the relationship between FD and economic 
growth. Having found no solid economic arguments to explain the mechanism by 
which FD contributes to growth, this research expanded the existing knowledge of 
transmission by elaborating in more detail the existing channels and introducing new 
channels. The literature appears to be unable to provide conclusive empirical evidence 
concerning the impact of FD on growth, on either the magnitude or the sign of this 
relationship, though some weak evidence of a positive economic relationship had been 
found only when the relationship was investigated at subnational levels. Despite the 
abundant empirical research, it was surprising to find that studies focusing on TEs are 
rather scarce.  
Motivated by the ambiguity of the empirical literature and their scarcity in TEs, several 
research questions were posed for this thesis. The first two research questions, 
elaborated in Chapter 3, concerned whether the heterogeneity among the FD-
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economic growth empirical studies can be identified by the characteristics of the 
previous empirical studies and whether a publication bias as well as an authentic 
effect can be identified. Next, the analysis moved to the empirical investigation of the 
economic impact of FD in TEs as a cross-country investigation. Based on a critical 
review of alternative measures of FD, the next research questions, discussed in 
Chapter 4 were whether FD has any impact on economic growth in TEs and whether 
FD is considered a normal good and/or “made in Europe”. This analysis highlighted 
the need to investigate the FD-economic growth relationship in more details at lower 
levels of aggregation and for a more homogeneous set of countries. Using a panel data 
of ETEs at regional level, the next set of research questions, elaborated in Chapter 5, 
concerned whether the economic effect of FD becomes more visible at lower levels of 
aggregation and whether country size has any effect on the FD-economic growth 
relationship.  
Overall, the aim of this concluding chapter is to synthesise the key findings of this 
research and highlight its contribution to knowledge and public policy. The rest of this 
chapter is organised as follows. Section 6.2 lists and presents the main empirical 
findings by explicitly answering the abovementioned research questions. Section 6.3 
appraises the contribution to knowledge, both with regard to the findings on the 
economic effect of FD in TEs and the more general methodological findings of interest 
related to the FD-economic growth relationship. Section 6.4 provides policy 
recommendations on the basis of the empirical findings. Section 6.5 points out the 
limitations of this research and, finally, Section 6.6 discusses the venues for debate 
and further research on FD-economic growth relationship.  
 
6.2 Main findings 
The aim of this thesis was to explore the concept of FD and its impact on economic 
growth in TEs. More specifically, the objectives related to the critically review the 
theoretical and empirical literature and fill the gaps in knowledge; to provide evidence 
on publication bias as well as genuine effect of FD on economic growth; to investigate 
this relationship in a transition context from both national and subnational (regional) 
level. 
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6.2.1 Theoretical and empirical evidence and the gaps in knowledge 
The review of literature on the relationship between FD and economic growth showed 
that whilst this relationship has been extensively investigated from an empirical 
perspective, the theoretical literature remains limited. Hitherto, there is no clear and 
unique theoretical framework that justifies the inclusion of FD in a growth model. The 
existing (endogenous and neoclassical) FD-growth models lack explanation and 
comprehensible economic arguments on the mechanism and transmission channels of 
FD to economic growth.  
The exploration of channels of transmission have generally been neglected in the last 
decades, while being limited only to traditional channels (consumer heterogeneity and 
producer channels of transmission), which appear to be indefinite and unclear about 
uncovering the mechanism by which FD contributes to growth. The failure to 
recognise the multidimensional nature and complexity of FD is considered as the main 
cause of the vague underlying relationship between FD and economic growth. To 
address this knowledge gap, this thesis has reformulated the existing channels of 
transmission and introduced new ones to better disentangle the economic effect of FD 
on economic growth from different perspectives. By departing from the traditional 
approach of considering subnational governments as a provider of local public goods 
to a facilitator of the economic agents’ activities, two direct channels of transmission, 
the pro-business agenda channel and the fiscal response channel, as well as two 
indirect channels, government size and corruption channels are introduced to the 
literature. The pro-business agenda channel relies on the ability of local governments 
to create a friendly business environment by altering spending and local taxation, 
which stimulate the existing entrepreneurial activity and attract new business. Whilst 
the above channel targets only businesses, the fiscal response targets both business 
and consumers through altering tax policy (changes in tax rate and tax base) and local 
expenditure and taxes (productive vs unproductive). On the other hand, the 
hypothesised economic effect of increased FD can be explained indirectly through the 
effect of FD on macroeconomic stability, corruption and the size of government, 
which in turn affect economic growth.  
Despite the lack of a universal theoretical framework, an extensive number of studies 
have assessed the FD-economic growth relationship empirically. However, the 
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empirical evidence remains inconclusive. The diverse and contradictory findings in 
some cases regarding the sign and magnitude of the economic effect of FD raised the 
debate on the appropriateness of FD measures for best depicting the relationship 
between FD and economic growth. The lack of robust evidence has been attributed to 
the inconsistent measurement of FD and to some extent to the lack of theoretical 
framework, misspecification errors and the methodology used. However, it is pertinent 
to note that categorising the economic effect of FD subject to the level of investigation 
(national vs subnational level) has shed some light on the ambiguity of the empirical 
effects. A slight majority of studies at subnational level are similar in terms of the 
significance of factors, suggesting that the economic effect of FD (irrespective of the 
measurement) is more visible at lower levels of investigation than at national level.  
6.2.2 Publication bias or genuine effect? 
Having found no or little consensus on the economic effect of FD, after a review of 
the empirical research, the first empirical chapter in this research was conducted to 
objectively summarise and estimate the consistency of the FD-economic growth 
empirical results?. The meta regression analysis of the empirical studies in Chapter 3 
revealed a wide range of estimates scattered throughout a multidimensional landscape 
of research, differing widely in terms of FD measurement, country characteristics (i.e. 
stages of development), methodology employed, time span and data sources. To the 
heterogeneity of estimated results is also added the complexity and 
multidimensionality of FD, which makes deriving precise inferences on the economic 
effect of FD difficult. To take a step beyond the literature review’s qualitative 
judgments, the MRA was employed to synthesise, integrate and evaluate the results of 
previous empirical literature. More precisely, in the context of this thesis, the MRA 
was used to: (i) determine the presence of a publication bias and quantify it, (ii) 
determine the existence of a genuine economic effect of FD and quantify it, and (iii) 
uncover the potential factors that influence the FD-economic growth relationship, 
using a set of 49 primary studies with 1001 point estimates.   
The graphical examination of the presence of publication bias, through funnel plots, 
revealed the mild contamination of the FD-economic growth literature by positive 
publication bias, where studies tend to inflate the positive effects while underreporting 
the negative ones. Moving to more objective tools to test publication bias, the bivariate 
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MRA, using WLS and FE, confirms the results of the funnel plot, and suggest the 
presence of a positive “little to modest” publication bias in the full sample of primary 
studies. The bivariate MRA also tested the existence of an authentic effect of FD on 
economic growth beyond publication bias. The findings suggest the presence of a 
weak negative genuine effect, which might be attributed to a large number of studies 
using expenditure decentralisation as the only measure of FD. On the other hand, the 
contamination of this literature by a positive publication bias should not come as a 
surprise especially when the real economic effect of FD appears to be negative, 
contrary to the theoretical underpinnings of the presumed positive effect of FD.    
To avoid comparing different studies with each other, our next MRA categorises 
studies by the measurement of economic performance (output-level and output-
growth) as the most prominent difference across the primary studies.  The results 
suggest that these two groups of studies are notably different from each other. A 
negative genuine effect appears to persist in all subsamples irrespective of the 
measurement of economic performance. Stronger contamination up to “substantial 
bias” is found in output-level studies, whereas no strong evidence of publication bias 
is found in output-growth studies.  The presence of a positive publication bias, 
significant only in output-level studies, reconfirms the above discussion on the 
predisposition of this subsample to report positive results due to the positive 
theoretical prediction of devolution on growth and influence of the output-growth 
studies, both in numbers and visibility as most-cited papers, in the FD-economic 
growth literature. 
 In addition to the publication bias and genuine effect, the multivariate MRA accounts 
for any source of excess variation in the primary studies.  In this regard, the multiple 
MRA findings revealed four main sources of the excess heterogeneity between and 
within empirical literature: (i) the level of investigation, (ii) differences in measuring 
economic performance, (iii) differences in measuring FD and (iv) methodological and 
context of investigation. The level of investigation appears as one of the most striking 
results of our MRA, suggesting that the difference in the level of investigation 
(whether a study is conducted at national or subnational/regional level) is a great 
source of heterogeneity. The effect size of studies conducted at national level appears 
to be smaller than the ones conducted at regional level. Again, as anticipated, the 
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heterogeneity between studies measuring economic performance in growth rates and 
levels is substantial, begging for distinct examination of the two samples. The 
estimated effect of FD on economic growth depends mainly on the measurement of 
FD, also blamed throughout Chapter 2 as a great source of heterogeneity. The effect 
size in the selected empirical literature is found to be significantly lower in studies 
using cross-section data, but larger in studies conducted in developing countries and 
in those using large number of control variables, while no significant variation is found 
within studies testing for nonlinearity, endogeneity, long-run relationship and other 
differences in estimation techniques.  
Our MRA results, superior to the existing ones, have implications for research 
practice. The conclusions of the multivariate MRA warrant a more in-depth analysis 
of how FD affects economic growth and whether this relationship is subject to the FD 
measures used. Agreeing on the appropriate measures of FD, by including all its 
dimensions, and including the necessary control variables is crucial in empirical 
research to identify the economic effect of FD. 
 
6.2.3 Does FD affect economic growth in TEs? 
Based on the discussion of Chapters 2 and 3 and motivated by the scarcity of empirical 
research in TEs despite the prevalence of decentralisation in these countries, Chapter 
4 examined the effect of FD on economic growth in a macro level investigation using 
panel data for 21 countries during the period 1996-2015. Addressing the identified 
shortcomings of the empirical studies, the growth model based on Davoodi and Zou’s 
approach, adapted to the transition context, was used to estimate the economic effect 
of FD. Because FD appeared as a multidimensional process especially in TEs which 
encompassed the expenditure, revenue/tax and intergovernmental transfers 
dimensions, our model used a combination of three measures of FD, namely, 
expenditure decentralisation, tax decentralisation and vertical imbalance. However, 
due to the presence of collinearity between the last measure and expenditure 
decentralisation, results using the first two measures of decentralisation were 
contrasted with the first set of results.  
Overall, the empirical findings suggested a weak positive effect of FD, measured by 
expenditure decentralisation, on economic growth. The results from FE estimations 
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with Driscoll-Kraay SEs revealed the positive effect of higher subnational expenditure 
as a share of general government expenditure on economic growth in TEs, irrespective 
of the number of other FD measures employed. Accounting for potential endogeneity 
of tax decentralisation and vertical imbalance, the findings suggested that the 
inclusion of the above measures impacts neither the significance nor the magnitude of 
the effect of expenditure decentralisation on economic growth. The weak significance 
of this effect might be attributed to a few possible reasons. First, existence of high 
level of transfer dependency in the majority of TEs, likely to impact the expenditure 
assignments conditional to the transfers received, might hinder the full effect of local 
spending on economic performance. The insignificance of tax decentralisation, on the 
other hand, does not come as a surprise. The low degree of local tax-raising power and 
the dependence mostly on shared taxes emphasise the lack of local financial capacity, 
both regarding tax base and rate, and the inability of the latter to impact economic 
growth. Although the Southern Caucasus countries seem to be more advanced in terms 
of their revenue/tax decentralisation reform than the European countries, the 
dominance of the latter group might hide or offset the potential effect from the former 
group of countries. The inclusion of vertical imbalance to measure the local 
governments’ dependency to the central one highlights, once again, the heterogeneity 
of TEs regarding this issue: from countries that are highly dependent on 
intergovernmental transfers to countries that rely mostly on their own revenues. 
Lastly, the complexity and multidimensionality of FD, despite using appropriate 
measures, might be still present when the focus of investigation is at national level, 
rather than at lower levels of aggregation where this process originates.  
Using a dataset of countries with substantial differences in FD, stages of transition, 
geographical location, institutions and socio-cultural characteristics, confronted us 
with the risk of undershooting the genuine economic effect of FD. In spite of including 
transition index to account for potential differences in economic and institutional 
reforms in different countries, it seems that the heterogeneity of transition stages (from 
laggard to advanced reformers) is not entirely captured. Indeed, this index considers 
the potential direct effect of transition on economic growth, but it does bypass any 
differences of the economic effect of FD due to different development stages. To 
provide further insight into the relationship between FD and economic growth, the 
stages of transition and geographical location (as the most visible differences among 
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TEs) will be considered as moderating factors on the economic effect of FD, also 
formulated as the next research question. 
 
6.2.4 Is FD a “normal” good or “made in Europe” good? 
In the jargon of public economics, FD is often considered as a luxury good, the demand 
for which grows with the increase of per capita income (Tanzi, 2000). It is argued that 
the decentralisation benefits can better be exploited at high levels of income, different 
from low-income countries which, instead of benefits, witness many challenges and 
burdens from decentralisation. Whilst from a theoretical perspective this is a well-
known concept, empirical research has ignored this characteristic of FD. However, the 
above definition, from a microeconomic perspective, represents a normal rather than 
a luxury good. Therefore, given this vague distinction between the luxury and normal 
good in the literature, this thesis tested whether FD is a normal good. 
Using an interaction term of stages of transition and FD, our empirical findings reveal 
the strong moderating role of stages of transition on the economic effect of expenditure 
decentralisation and the weak role in tax decentralisation and vertical imbalance.  
Namely, at very early stages of transition, the effect of FD on economic growth is 
negative, mainly attributed to misuse of local funds, unaccountable and incompetent 
local governments, lack of clarity of spending assignments and the potential 
homogeneity of preferences at lower levels of government that does exploit the 
benefits of FD. As economic and institutional reforms progress up to an average stage, 
the economic effect of FD dissolves into a zero effect. However, at further stages of 
transition, eventually, the economic effect reappears with a strong positive impact. 
Overall, these findings highlight the existence of a critical level of development, 
proxied in our case by the transition index, after which FD becomes desirable and 
growth benefits from higher expenditure devolution. 
With respect to the other variables of interest, FD measured by tax decentralisation, 
although being mostly insignificant, stresses the different economic effect of FD over 
various stages of development. Whilst at early stages of transition, tax decentralisation 
is conducive to growth, at more advanced stages, its economic effect becomes non-
existent. The weak positive effect of tax decentralisation further reinforces the 
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importance of a closer match between own revenue and spending at local level. 
Otherwise, the positive effect, irrespective of advances in economic and institutional 
reform, are likely to be ephemeral, with intergovernmental transfers being a safer 
option in financing local spending. This is also confirmed by the marginal effects 
obtained from the interaction of transition index and vertical imbalance, which are  
mostly insignificant except at lower levels of development. The need to rely on 
transfers rather than own funds becomes urgent only at lower stages of development, 
whereas at higher stages of transition transfers appear to be substituted easily and 
safely by own funds of local governments.   
Another intriguing research question in the context of TEs, which has also gone 
untested, is whether the economic effect of FD is subject to the geographical location. 
When differentiating between European and non-European economies (Southern 
Caucasus TEs), the interaction term of a geographic location dummy variable and each 
FD measure (as well as the coefficient of the FD after splitting the dataset) appears 
insignificant, revealing no variation of the economic effect of FD subject to location. 
Investigating for any potential effect of public sector size, measured by government 
consumption as a share of GDP, this study finds that public sector size does not impact 
economic growth and its inclusion in the model impacts neither the significance nor 
the sign of FD measures. Also, the nonlinearity of FD does not seem to hold in our 
sample, suggesting a linear direct relationship between FD and economic growth, 
rather than the existence of an optimal size. 
 
6.2.5 Does the economic effect of FD become (more) visible at lower 
levels of aggregation? 
The weak evidence on the economic effect of FD, which could be disentangled only 
when using interaction terms, might be attributed to the complexity of measuring FD 
through conventional measures and conducting research for heterogenous datasets at 
national (aggregate) level. Investigating the FD-economic growth relationship at 
national level and pooling all the counties into one dataset might have limited the 
ability to deeply investigate the economic effect of FD, and is likely to have cancelled 
out individual countries’ economic effect. With the purpose of modelling and testing 
the economic effect of FD more systematically at lower levels of aggregation and 
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filling the gap in the literature at regional level, Chapter 5 analyses 64 regions in five 
European countries (Albania, the Czech Republic, Hungary, Estonia and Poland) for 
the period 2001-2014. 
Disaggregating data according to the country’s administrative organisation (at the first 
level of administrative decentralisation within each country), an endogenous growth 
model, same as in Chapter 4, is used to estimate the economic effect of FD at regional 
level, both from static and dynamic perspective. The FD measures are adapted to this 
new level of investigation, to better account for the country and regional characteristics 
of expenditure decentralisation (subnational own tax revenues as a percentage of 
subnational government expenditure), tax decentralisation (subnational own tax 
revenues as a share of subnational government revenue) and vertical imbalance 
(intergovernmental transfers as a share of subnational government expenditure). 
Overall, the findings from both static and dynamic estimation reveal a positive and 
significant effect for FD, proxied by expenditure decentralisation and tax 
decentralisation, on regional economic growth. Alternatively, vertical imbalance has 
either no effect or it is detrimental to growth when it is claimed as endogenous.  
As to the first measure of FD, which assesses the degree of reliance of local 
expenditure on its own revenue, while taking into account both the expenditure and 
tax dimension, the highly significant results suggest that the increased capacity of a 
local government to rely on its own expenditure will exert a positive effect on the 
region’s economic growth. Local governments with high shares of expenditure 
decentralisation are better able to finance their own expenditure through own funding, 
which gives them the freedom to determine the quantity and quality of local services 
that best suit citizens’ preferences. Alternatively, relying on intergovernmental 
transfers (or borrowing) to finance local spending are conditioned to use these funds 
on specific local services, determined by the central government, and not (necessarily) 
tailored to the local preferences of a specific region. Whilst this variable does not 
directly measure the local government efficiency, it provides insights into the direct 
link between increased fiscal performance and increased regional growth. As to tax 
decentralisation, a superior measure of the local tax-raising power and the autonomy 
from central government, the findings suggest that the provision of goods and services 
using own financial resources makes subnational governments more autonomous and 
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efficient. However, the insignificance of intergovernmental transfers at regional level 
might be attributed to the inability to distinguish between types of grants (conditional 
and unconditional grants) and the little longitudinal variance of this variable.  
The regional approach allowed us to delve deeper into the FD-economic growth 
relationship and highlighted the importance of FD in the regional growth. Only 
disaggregating at lower levels of aggregation, the economic effect of FD became 
(more) visible. However, having a dataset with countries of different stages of 
development and country size, which demands different processes of decentralisation, 
emphasises the need to separate countries based on the above characteristics. To shed 
more light on the above relationship, countries and their respective regions are divided 
according to the country’s size (measured by their surface areas and population), a 
separation which coincides with the division according to the development stages 
based on the country’s OECD membership status. Accordingly, our understanding of 
the economic effect of FD can be improved by considering country size as a potential 
factor that mediates the FD-growth relationship, elaborated as the next research 
question. 
 
6.2.6 Does country size matter? 
Whilst the country size per se has no significant effect on regional growth, its 
interaction (large vs small size countries) with the FD measures seems to shed light 
on their economic effect at regional level. The empirical findings revealed that one of 
the most crucial determinant of FD, country size, moderates its economic effect. More 
precisely, the results suggest that large size countries can better exploit the benefit of 
FD (measured by expenditure decentralisation and tax decentralisation) and boost 
economic growth in comparison to small size countries. Contrary, FD in small 
countries does not seem to be conducive to regional economic growth. 
Intergovernmental transfers, on the other hand, appear to have an adverse effect on 
regional growth of large countries.  
It is argued that large size countries, being better at exploiting the benefits of FD than 
small size countries, can translate these benefits to growth-maximising functions and 
local fiscal policies (local taxes) which support the regional growth. Intuitively, the 
economic results are expected to be more visible in countries where preferences are 
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more heterogeneous and countries are larger. Conversely, in small size countries, 
which in our case happened to be two countries with relatively medium level of FD in 
comparison to the ETEs, FD does not seem to have any impact on regional growth.  
6.3 Contribution to knowledge 
This thesis has made several contributions to the existing theoretical and empirical 
literature on the relationship between FD and economic growth.  
First, this thesis established new channels of transmission. The main criticism of the 
theoretical and empirical literature on this relationship is the lack of a universal 
theoretical framework. Many questions were raised about whether the well-known 
theoretical claim that FD contributes to economic growth through enhanced matching 
of public policies to local needs is sufficient to explain the economic effect of FD. The 
failure to recognise the multidimensionality and complexity of FD is blamed 
throughout this thesis as the primary source of vague arguments provided in the 
literature on the mechanism by which FD contributes to growth. Whilst the existing 
transmission channels are not highly explored and generally-accepted in the literature, 
new cogent channels (both direct and indirect) followed by a novel classification, have 
been introduced in this thesis to disentagle better the mechanism through which FD 
impacts economic performance. More specifically, this thesis departs from the 
conventional approach of considering subnational government as a provider of 
efficient local goods and services to a more innovative approach where the subnational 
government is considered as a facilitator of all economic agents. Introducing the pro-
business agenda and fiscal response as direct channels and size of government and 
corruption as indirect channels are contributions to the existing theoretical foundation 
linking FD and economic growth.  
These insights further amplify the problem of measuring FD, which raises the need to 
consider all dimensions of FD (expenditure, revenue/tax and intergovernmental 
transfers) in an empirical approach and policy perspective. Ignoring one of these 
aspects is argued to be inappropriate as it truncates the understanding of the economic 
effect of FD. It was argued that this arbitrary selection of FD measures has given rise 
to mixed and contradictory empirical results regarding the sign and magnitude of the 
economic effect of FD. However, reviewing the empirical literature subject to the level 
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of investigation (national vs subnational), different from the other literature reviews 
in the field, has shed some light on the ambiguity of empirical findings, otherwise 
impossible to be observed.  
The second contribution is related to the synthesis of results from the previous 
empirical research. Left with no or very little clear answers regarding the magnitude 
and the sign of the relationship between FD and economic growth, this thesis takes a 
step beyond by synthesising and assessing the consistency of the empirical research 
through an MRA. Despite existing meta-regression studies on the effect of FD on 
economic growth (Feld et al., 2009b; Baskaran et al., 2016; Zhenfa and Wei, 2006), 
this thesis provides a comprehensive and systematic analysis, with several 
contributions not only to the existing MRA but also to the FD-economic growth 
literature. By rigorously following the MRA procedure suggested by Stanley and 
Doucouliagos (2012), our research simultaneously quantifies the reported effect size; 
correct for any potential publication bias and explain the sources of heterogeneity in 
the FD-economic growth literature. Whilst the other studies of MRA in the field ignore 
the first two issues, our research considers them as an integral part of an MRA. More 
precisely, by synthesising 49 studies, which supplied 1001 point estimates, and 
categorising studies subject to the measurement of economic performance (growth and 
level), our MRA identified the presence of publication bias in the FD-economic 
growth literature as a threat (positive selectivity) to the validity of the effect size. 
Whilst the output-level studies, having a negative genuine effect, appeared 
substantially contaminated by publication bias, the output-growth studies and the full 
sample of studies show no strong evidence of a genuine effect. Another contribution 
of this research is related to the identification of excess variation among and within 
previous empirical research. Accordingly, it was found that the economic effect of FD 
is likely to be linked to (i) differences in the level of investigation (national vs 
subnational level), (ii) differences in measuring economic performance (growth vs 
level) (iii) measurement of FD, (iv) source of the data (IMF vs other data) and (v) 
country and methodological characteristics.  
An important contribution to knowledge, related to MRA, regards the use of a unique 
weighting of the data. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first MRA not only in 
the FD-economic growth literature but also in other disciplines that use a specific 
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weight to address the problem of dependency of the effect sizes within and between 
studies. Namely, the problem of overrepresentation of studies with multiple FD 
measures is addressed by using an innovative weighting that simultaneously accounts 
for equal representation of effect sizes across specifications and studies, which we 
named specific weighting. In addition, the use of PCC, as a superior measure of the 
effect size, and the adaption of a wide range of estimation techniques precisely for 
MRA in economics (not like the other studies which adapted estimation techniques 
from medicine or other disciplines) represent a distinguished feature of our MRA. 
The third main contribution to knowledge is the investigation of the economic effect 
of FD in the transition context by being, to the best of our knowledge, the first study 
that comprehensively explores the relationship between FD and economic growth in 
almost all TEs. Based on an endogenous growth model adapted for TEs, our research 
makes use of various FD measures, which shed light on the complexity and 
multidimensionality of the decentralisation process in the above countries. However, 
the choice of appropriate measures of FD, based on theoretical and empirical 
considerations and the inclusion of transition-specific control variables were 
considered crucial in this research programme. A distinguishing feature of our 
research is the importance given to the identification problem, such as endogeneity 
and cross-sectional dependence, which were neglected in previous cross-country 
empirical investigations and most likely led to biased estimates. 
Given the variation in countries’ development stages (from advanced to laggard 
transition countries) and geographical locations (Europe vs Southern Caucasus), the 
incorporation of these two as moderators of the economic effect of FD appears not 
only a contribution to disentagle the relationship between FD and economic growth, 
but also as an important contribution to the empirical literature by being the first study 
to investigate whether FD is a normal good. Whilst the theoretical literature alludes to 
the variation of the economic effect of FD based on country’s development, the 
empirical literature has, to the best of our knowledge, ignored this. By using 
interactions of stages of transition and FD measures, our findings suggest that FD 
becomes affordable and better exploited only by countries at later stages of transition, 
contrary to countries at early stages of transition which experience either insignificant 
or detrimental effect of FD on economic growth. Overall, these findings confirm the 
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theoretical claim that FD is a normal good, while the benefits of FD becomes more 
visible the more a country advances its economic and institutional reform. It seems 
that this insight critiques the relevance of conventional theory of decentralisation with 
regard to transition economies, emphasising the development stage as an important 
factor for a country to benefit from FD. 
By accounting for other differences between TEs, this research contributed to 
knowledge by investigating whether the geographical location (ETEs vs Southern 
Caucasus TEs) has a moderating role on the economic effect of FD. Again, by using 
interaction terms, it was found that the economic effect of FD is not subject to the 
location of TEs. 
The fourth contribution of this thesis relates the the empirical investigation of the FD-
economic growth relatioship at regional level. Whilst conducting research at national 
level and for heterogeneous set of countries, such as TEs, was considered challenging 
to disentangle the relationship between FD and economic growth, our empirical 
investigation in Chapter 6 focussed on lower levels of aggregation 
(subnational/regional level). In the previous chapters, (Chapters 3, 4 and 5) it had been 
argued that investigating the effect of FD on economic growth at national level might 
be a possible explanation of the lack of conclusive empirical evidence. More 
specifically, investigating this relationship at national level and pooling all the 
countries into one dataset, might have limited the ability to systematically investigate 
the impact of FD on economic growth, which is likely to have been cancelled out by 
the individual countries’ economic effect of FD.  with abundant empirical literature at 
national level, the question of disaggregation is rarely addressed. Aiming to fill the 
gap in the empirical literature, we delved into new issues that hitherto have received 
attention in neither the theoretical nor the empirical research. Undertaking research at 
regional level for multiple ETEs constitutes an important contribution to knowledge 
of this thesis by representing a pioneering work on regional growth in transition 
economies.  
Studying this relationship from regional perspective, defined as the first level of 
administrative decentralisation within each county, it was found that the economic 
effect of FD is more visible at higher levels of disaggregation, while also being subject 
to the measurement of FD. Our findings suggest that both expenditure and tax 
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decentralisation are conducive to growth, contrary to transfers from central 
government which are detrimental to regional growth.  
Embarking on a different panel model estimation (static and dynamic) of the 
relationship between FD and economic growth, our research revealed that one of the 
main determinants of FD, country size moderates the economic effect of FD. Namely, 
the findings suggest that FD, measured by expenditure decentralisation and tax 
decentralisation, is conducive to regional growth in large size countries, whereas in 
small size countries this effect vanishes. Intergovernmental transfers, on the other 
hand, appear to be detrimental to economic growth in large countries. Furthermore, 
accounting for the country size as a determinant of FD, while investigating the 
economic effect of FD, represents a core contribution of this thesis and a novelty not 
only in the context of TEs but also for cross-country/region investigations on the 
economic effect of FD. 
As far as the application of methods is concerned, the research both at national and 
regional level carries out an extensive empirical investigation by interweaving static 
and dynamic estimation methods such as FE with Driscoll-Kraay SEs, FEVD, IV 
approach and System GMM. The use of these estimation techniques, superior to 
estimation techniques used in the previous empirical research, helped to ensure that 
the results were consistent and free of identification problems. In this regard, this is 
the first study that explicitly addresses the problem of cross-sectional dependency 
(both at country and regional level), slowly moving variables and endogeneity of all 
measures of FD. Unfortunately, in abundant empirical literature, it is surprising to find 
that the above problems remain unsolved. Finally, the provision of robustness checks 
ensured the reliability of our findings, which in turn can better assist policy making 
and guide future empirical research in the FD-growth relationship. 
Last, an additional contribution to knowledge might be considered to be the discussion 
of the appropriateness of FD measures both at national level (reported in Chapter 5) 
and regional level (reported in Chapter 6). The investigation of multidimensional and 
complex process such as FD requires incorporation of all possible aspects 
(expenditure, tax and intergovernmental transfers, while the conventional measure of 
revenue decentralisation has to be substituted with a measure of tax autonomy). In this 
regard, the economic effect of FD should never be raised as a polar question. Instead, 
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many questions with potentially different answers are in place depending on the 
measurement of FD. Also, to better understand the effects of this process on 
countries’/regions’ economic performance, this research has carefully explored the 
nonlinearity of the FD-economic growth relationship, while also accounting for the 
potential endogeneity of this relationship. 
However, as elaborated in Chapters 3 and 4, the nonlinearity might also be subject to 
the number of measures used and time span under investigation. As to the former, this 
research argued that when FD is measured by multiple measures, it becomes difficult 
to conclude on the nonlinearity of the relationship between FD and economic growth 
when multiple nonlinear relationships might simultaneously exist between each 
individual measure FD and economic growth.  Also, investigating this relationship on 
a limited time span, such that of TEs, might limit the ability to observe the prevalence 
of a nonlinear relationship, different from other countries over a relatively long time. 
 
6.4 Policy implications 
Despite different pace of devolution from national to subnational governments among 
TEs, having decentralisation of any form on their agenda has always been tempting 
for ETEs and to a lesser extent for Southern Caucasus TEs. Whilst the basic problem 
of legacies from the former socialist regimes seems to have been overcome, the 
process of FD still poses many old and new challenges to these countries. Given the 
increased importance of FD during the last years and the ongoing process of transition 
and accession to the EU, the empirical evidence obtained in this research programme 
can improve the understanding of FD as a tool for development, and consequently help 
policy making in these countries. Whilst the progress in the FD process varies 
extensively across countries, our policy recommendations will be relatively wide, 
from strengthening democracy to increasing revenue autonomy. In this regard, 
countries are grouped into three categories, as classified in Chapter 1, so that the policy 
recommendations could be better addressed to the specific group of countries, namely 
(i) the advanced decentralisers, (ii) the intermediate decentralisers, and (iii) the laggard 
decentralisers. As this coincides with the advancement in economic and institutional 
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reforms measured by the transition index, it further improves the targeting of policy 
recommendations to each group of countries.  
Starting from the macro evidence at national level reported in Chapter 5, the findings 
imply that the effect of FD on economic growth across the transition stages (advanced, 
medium and earlier stage of transition) are different.  Such differences in the economic 
effect of FD also represents different paths across TEs regarding their FD reform and 
challenges.  Our policy recommendations will target the three dimensions of FD: 
expenditure, revenue and intergovernmental transfers.  
With regard to the expenditure decentralisation, the positive effect of FD among 
advanced decentralisers embodies successful decentralisation process of spending 
occurring in these countries. These countries have been keen to decentralise and 
harmonise their reform to the EU standards, by increasingly promoting the role of 
subnational governments in the provision of goods and services. Having established a 
sound system of expenditure decentralisation, the advanced decentralisers seem to 
have overcome the lack of clarity, stability and accountability regarding the main 
functions devolved to subnational level. However, the need to improve the efficiency 
of their spending in growth-enhancing expenditure should always be considered as 
challenging. As argued in Chapter 3, FD, by altering the composition of public 
investments towards more productive spending at local level, can boost the local 
economic development. Analysing the efficiency (based on over/under provision) of 
local goods and services increases the existing conducive effect of expenditure 
decentralisation on economic growth. Contrary, the negative or an insignificant effect 
among countries at early and medium stages of transition has come as no surprise. 
These countries, part of the second and third group of decentralisers, lack clear 
assignment of responsibilities, under provision of adequate basic public goods and 
services for citizens, accompanied by the lack of transparency and accountability 
(Dabla-Norris, 2006). Despite the improvement among the intermediate group of 
countries, especially the new EU member countries (Rodriguez-Pose and Kroijer, 
2009), policy interventions might involve the strengthening of accountability and 
capacity building of subnational governments at all levels (regional, municipal and 
village). As suggested by Wetzel and Dunn (2001), strengthening accountability 
among TEs is vital since it contributes directly to the efficiency of local public goods 
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provision. Holding elections at all levels of governance, increasing citizens’ 
participation and strengthening democracy might be considered as potential tools to 
utilise the advantages of FD. Further, focusing on community needs by providing 
required services (Wetzel and Dunn, 2001) constitutes an important aspect to be 
improved in the above groups regarding the expenditure assignments. However, two 
issues require caution when referring to the functions of local governments. First, the 
assignment of responsibility to local government does not necessarily match with the 
corresponding funds, either from own sources or intergovernmental transfers. In this 
regard, policymakers should engage not only in determining the functions of local 
government but also in analysing the composition of local spending; whether the 
majority of spending goes to investment or administrative expenses (social sector 
employees’ wages). The latter problem appears to be prevalent in some countries of 
the second and third group of decentralisers, where according to NALAS (2017), local 
governments in Bulgaria, Moldova and Romania pay the full costs of pre-university 
education and health sector. This evidence urges caution on the intergovernmental 
fiscal relations between national and subnational governments. 
Second, despite the persistent progress on the expenditure side, the economic effect of 
FD in all TEs might be compromised by the economies of scale, which is directly 
linked to the excessive territorial fragmentation of the country (Dabla-Norris, 2006). 
Policy interventions might be required to lower the cost of the provision of goods and 
services, especially in small municipalities, by considering the territorial organisation 
of the country (the Czech Republic, Slovakia and already considered in Albania), 
or/and by incentivising the cooperation between local government units or even the 
creation of micro-regions (Vigvari, 2010; Barati-Stec, 2012). In addition to the above 
purpose, cooperation between local governments might tackle problems of human 
capital shortages and weak tax bases, especially among small units (NALAS, 2017). 
With respect to the second measure of FD, tax decentralisation, the empirical findings 
are in accordance with the evidence of the limited revenue autonomy in almost all 
transition countries. Irrespective of the progress regarding revenue decentralisation, 
all three groups of decentralisers appear to have low power to levy taxes or user fees 
by experiencing high dependency to central government funds. Whilst some 
improvements were noticed among the advanced reformers, the challenge of 
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developing adequate revenue systems remains prevalent in all TEs. Also, based on the 
findings of Chapter 5, where countries are unable to utilise tax decentralisation as a 
development tool at all stages of transition, our results have policy implications for 
governments to expand the variety of taxes and fees utilised at local level. Local 
governments in developing and transition economies usually utilise property taxes, 
business taxes, personal income taxes, excises and general sales taxes (Bird, 1999). 
Whilst some of the countries of Eastern Europe (i.e. Poland and Hungary) have 
managed to receive a share of personal income tax and business tax as part of their 
own revenue, other countries of South Eastern Europe and Southern Caucasus are far 
away from considering such taxes part of their own sources. This becomes of special 
importance in the intermediate and laggard decentralisers where the devolution of 
responsibility for goods and service provision is conducted without the corresponding 
revenue side. Instead, the persisting weak local capacity in raising its own revenue 
should focus on decreasing the dependency to intergovernmental transfers. Substantial 
efforts, not necessarily permanent, are needed to enhance their revenue capacities, 
while at the same time improving the problem of tax collection and administration. 
Part of the answer is to enforce the existing local taxes such as property taxation, as 
already argued by NALAS (2017), while also ensuring the well-functioning of real 
estate market. On the other hand, introducing surcharges (piggybacking), such as fixed 
shares of personal income tax, social insurance taxes or business taxes, becomes vital 
to the exploitation of the benefits of FD by spending the money at the same jurisdiction 
they are collected. Attention, also, should be paid to the political will both at local and 
central level to enforce the local government administrative and financial capacity. 
Hence, given the uneasy relationship between the two or even three tiers of 
governments at local, regional and central level (Dallago, 2013), further 
decentralisation reforms should not only focus on augmenting revenue autonomy 
within a well-defined structure, but also accompany this process by training and 
monitoring, which would build the capacity of local governments (Ainsoo et al., 2000; 
Wetzel and Dunn, 2001). 
Third, the intergovernmental transfers, as an inevitable aspect of FD, also require 
special focus. Not accompanying expenditure decentralisation by revenue 
decentralisation has led local governments in TEs to high dependency on central 
governments or other institutions (i.e. EU funds). Despite the improvement in 
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clarifying the transfer system in almost all TEs, there is still need to address issues 
regarding the formula-based process, transparency and monitoring of the grants and 
whether the latter have the desired impact. In line with the argument of Wetzel and 
Dunn (2001), the transfer process has been unstable and transparent in many cases, 
though the advanced reformers make an exception regarding the well-defined and 
transparent fiscal relations between the two tiers of government. In terms of policy 
recommendations, first, it is necessary that the top-down policies coordinate with the 
local level’s needs. Second, the transfer schemes should be transparent both for the 
horizontal and vertical grants. However, a potential problem in these countries is the 
lack of incentives, partly generated by the transfers, which may force local 
governments to demand additional grants (Dethier, 2000) and consequently increase 
the national deficit. In the same vein, local borrowing should be regulated and in 
addition, monitored in order not to create excessive and uncontrolled debt.  
6.5 Limitations  
Despite several important contributions to the existing theoretical and empirical 
literature, this thesis faced various limitations that need to be acknowledged and 
discussed. The first limitation has resulted from the lack of data, both at national and 
regional level, which had implications for the empirical analysis in Chapters 5 and 6. 
With regard to the empirical investigation at national level, the first concern was 
related to the IMF database, as already elaborated in Section 5.3.1. Whilst this is the 
only available source for FD measures in TEs, it is rather limited regarding 
disaggregated information concerning the type of transfers (conditional vs 
unconditional) and revenue (shared taxes vs other taxes). Disaggregated information 
would significantly contribute to the use of FD measures which would capture the real 
degree of autonomy of local governments. The lack of such information did not allow 
to control for any potential differences in the economic effect of transfers and taxes 
based on their different types.  
Also, the lack of data appeared as a major challenge in Chapter 6. Although 
information was gathered by individual country statistical offices and Ministries of 
Finance, the scarcity of the data forced us to select countries for which data were 
available at regional level. Further, in the absence of crucial data regarding some 
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determinants of regional growth at regional level for Albania and Estonia, we had to 
make few assumptions. More precisely, we measured gross enrolment rates at regional 
level based on the definition of the Eurostat (given the substantial lack of stock or 
qualitative measures of education) and disaggregated gross fixed capital formation by 
using the number of firms at each region as a weighting factor. The inability to 
disaggregate some variables (i.e. trade openness) also limits the findings of this 
research. Indeed, having data at regional level for all ETEs would further contribute 
to knowledge, while findings could be easily comparable between national and 
regional level for the same set of countries, namely results of Chapter 5 with Chapter 
6. 
Also, in the absence of information regarding the main variables of interest, FD 
measures had to be adapted to regional level to accurately measure the expenditure 
decentralisation, tax autonomy and intergovernmental relations between central and 
local governments. Similar to the first limitation, enrichment of FD data by the type 
of transfers and taxes would have given more insights into the FD-economic growth 
relationship and consequently provided better policy recommendations. 
Last, as already argued in previous sections, FD has a complex and multidimensional 
nature and so is the FD-economic growth relationship, therefore different channels of 
transmission have been proposed in the literature to disentangle this relationship from 
a theoretical perspective. Whilst the focus of this thesis is the investigation of direct 
economic effect of FD, exploring the indirect effects of FD both on regional and 
national economic growth and other dimensions of decentralisation (i.e. political 
decentralisation, territorial fragmentation) from the empirical perspective might have 
provided further insights into better detangling this relationship. 
6.6 Directions for future research 
Although this research has tackled some specific research question related to the 
economic effect of FD, it also raised many potential questions for future research. 
Several avenues for research, listed below, are suggested in this section that would 
further enrich the theoretical and empirical literature on FD-economic growth 
relationship. 
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First, the multidimensional nature of FD and the vague theoretical ground between FD 
and economic growth call for future research to move toward a more comprehensive 
theoretical framework. A possible extension might be the incorporation of the other 
two dimensions of decentralisation, the political and administrative decentralisation, 
and the investigation of the indirect effect of FD more in details. In this context, it 
might be interesting to observe the economic effect of FD from the political 
perspective (local political cycles, left-wing vs right-wing parties) and fragmentation 
of countries (number of regions, municipalities etc.), while also disaggregating this 
relationship at lower levels of aggregation. 
Second, building upon the empirical findings of the MRA, future research may use 
additional estimation techniques to explore from a different perspective the 
heterogeneity in the literature, while also serving as a validation to the existing 
findings. In this regard, a Bayesian approach could be employed as an estimation 
technique which considers all possible model uncertainty and base inference on a 
weighted average of all subset of explanatory variables in an MRA (Feldkircher and 
Zeugner, 2009). Also, a potential extension of our MRA might be to group variables 
in panel by country instead of study, which would allow running a country-specific 
MRA instead of the conventional study-specific MRA. Alternatively, conducting an 
MRA only to transition economies, while the empirical research enriches, might 
provide more insights regarding the heterogeneity of the economic effect of FD. 
Third, potentially the most interesting finding of this research, finding that FD is a 
normal good in TEs, could be further extended and investigated in other contexts of 
investigation such as developed and developing countries. Also, a similar approach 
could be used to test the same hypothesis at regional level, though in a limited and 
homogenous set of countries, by using the recently published dataset on the Quality 
of Data published by the Quality of Data Institute. 
Another interesting research question, not directly related to the focus of this thesis is 
the investigation of the potential effect that FD might have on inequality. 
Decentralization of expenditure and revenues give rise to a variety of subnational 
government responses to individuals within the same country, which generates an 
uneven distribution of public services, regardless of their preferences. The local 
delivery of basic social and/or economic services is directly linked to the redistribution 
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of income across individuals and regions within a country, and thus influences income 
inequality. Prud’homme (1995) suggests that FD, all else equal, is likely to lead to 
greater concentration of resources in certain geographic areas. Whereas, greater 
central provision of public services, harmonisation or a redistributive grant system are 
likely to lead to an equal distribution of resources across regions/jurisdictions. Whilst 
this and the majority of empirical research has focused on economic growth, shifting 
to the consequences of FD on the equity side both from aggregate level and household 
level using spatial econometrics, might be worth investigating in future.  
Another possible extension of this research could be the investigation of the efficiency 
of local public services. Based on the Oates theorem regarding the preference 
matching and (consumer and producer) efficiency, this research could be extended by 
investigating the efficiency of public services delivery (i.e. education, health) instead 
of policy outcome such as economic growth. Focusing on TEs and using both 
parametric and nonparametric frontier techniques, the efficiency of public services and 
the potential effect of FD on the efficiency represent a highly recommended research. 
Similarly, the impact of FD on the composition of public expenditure or the 
determinants of FD in the context of TEs might also be a possible extension of our 
research.  
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Appendix 3.1 Additional Information regarding Weights and Mathematical Transformation 
Appendix 3.1.1 Examples of Specific Weights 
 
id id study id specification Name of Study No study No specification specification weights study weights 
1 1 1  (1998) Davoodi and Zou 30 1 1 0.03333333 
2 1 2  (1998) Davoodi and Zou 30 2 1 0.03333333 
3 1 3  (1998) Davoodi and Zou 30 3 1 0.03333333 
4 1 4  (1998) Davoodi and Zou 30 4 1 0.03333333 
5 1 5  (1998) Davoodi and Zou 30 5 1 0.03333333 
6 1 6  (1998) Davoodi and Zou 30 6 1 0.03333333 
7 1 7  (1998) Davoodi and Zou 30 7 1 0.03333333 
8 1 8  (1998) Davoodi and Zou 30 8 1 0.03333333 
9 1 9  (1998) Davoodi and Zou 30 9 1 0.03333333 
10 1 10  (1998) Davoodi and Zou 30 10 1 0.03333333 
11 1 11  (1998) Davoodi and Zou 30 11 1 0.03333333 
12 1 12  (1998) Davoodi and Zou 30 12 1 0.03333333 
13 1 13  (1998) Davoodi and Zou 30 13 1 0.03333333 
14 1 14  (1998) Davoodi and Zou 30 14 1 0.03333333 
15 1 15  (1998) Davoodi and Zou 30 15 1 0.03333333 
16 1 16  (1998) Davoodi and Zou 30 16 1 0.03333333 
17 1 17  (1998) Davoodi and Zou 30 17 1 0.03333333 
18 1 18  (1998) Davoodi and Zou 30 18 1 0.03333333 
19 1 19  (1998) Davoodi and Zou 30 19 1 0.03333333 
20 1 20  (1998) Davoodi and Zou 30 20 1 0.03333333 
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21 1 21  (1998) Davoodi and Zou 30 21 1 0.03333333 
22 1 22  (1998) Davoodi and Zou 30 22 1 0.03333333 
23 1 23  (1998) Davoodi and Zou 30 23 1 0.03333333 
24 1 24  (1998) Davoodi and Zou 30 24 1 0.03333333 
25 1 25  (1998) Davoodi and Zou 30 25 1 0.03333333 
26 1 26  (1998) Davoodi and Zou 30 26 1 0.03333333 
27 1 27  (1998) Davoodi and Zou 30 27 1 0.03333333 
28 1 28  (1998) Davoodi and Zou 30 28 1 0.03333333 
29 1 29  (1998) Davoodi and Zou 30 29 1 0.03333333 
30 1 30  (1998) Davoodi and Zou 30 30 1 0.03333333 
…         
…         
…         
866 44 555  (2011) Buser 30 1 0.5 0.03333333 
867 44 555  (2011) Buser 30 1 0.5 0.03333333 
868 44 556  (2011) Buser 30 2 0.5 0.03333333 
869 44 556  (2011) Buser 30 2 0.5 0.03333333 
870 44 557  (2011) Buser 30 3 0.5 0.03333333 
871 44 557  (2011) Buser 30 3 0.5 0.03333333 
872 44 558  (2011) Buser 30 4 0.5 0.03333333 
873 44 558  (2011) Buser 30 4 0.5 0.03333333 
874 44 559  (2011) Buser 30 5 0.5 0.03333333 
875 44 559  (2011) Buser 30 5 0.5 0.03333333 
876 44 560  (2011) Buser 30 6 0.5 0.03333333 
877 44 560  (2011) Buser 30 6 0.5 0.03333333 
878 44 561  (2011) Buser 30 7 0.5 0.03333333 
879 44 561  (2011) Buser 30 7 0.5 0.03333333 
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880 44 562  (2011) Buser 30 8 0.5 0.03333333 
881 44 562  (2011) Buser 30 8 0.5 0.03333333 
882 44 563  (2011) Buser 30 9 0.5 0.03333333 
883 44 563  (2011) Buser 30 9 0.5 0.03333333 
884 44 564  (2011) Buser 30 10 0.5 0.03333333 
885 44 564  (2011) Buser 30 10 0.5 0.03333333 
886 44 565  (2011) Buser 30 11 0.5 0.03333333 
887 44 565  (2011) Buser 30 11 0.5 0.03333333 
888 44 566  (2011) Buser 30 12 0.5 0.03333333 
889 44 566  (2011) Buser 30 12 0.5 0.03333333 
890 44 567  (2011) Buser 30 13 0.5 0.03333333 
891 44 567  (2011) Buser 30 13 0.5 0.03333333 
892 44 568  (2011) Buser 30 14 0.5 0.03333333 
893 44 568  (2011) Buser 30 14 0.5 0.03333333 
894 44 569  (2011) Buser 30 15 0.5 0.03333333 
895 44 569  (2011) Buser 30 15 0.5 0.03333333 
…         
…         
…         
950 49 606 (2013) Gemmell et al. 49 1 0.5 0.029412 
951 49 606 (2013) Gemmell et al. 49 1 0.5 0.029412 
952 49 607 (2013) Gemmell et al. 49 2 0.5 0.029412 
953 49 607 (2013) Gemmell et al. 49 2 0.5 0.029412 
954 49 608 (2013) Gemmell et al. 49 3 0.333333 0.019608 
955 49 608 (2013) Gemmell et al. 49 3 0.333333 0.019608 
956 49 608 (2013) Gemmell et al. 49 3 0.333333 0.019608 
957 49 609 (2013) Gemmell et al. 49 4 0.5 0.029412 
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958 49 609 (2013) Gemmell et al. 49 4 0.5 0.029412 
959 49 610 (2013) Gemmell et al. 49 5 0.333333 0.019608 
960 49 610 (2013) Gemmell et al. 49 5 0.333333 0.019608 
961 49 610 (2013) Gemmell et al. 49 5 0.333333 0.019608 
962 49 611 (2013) Gemmell et al. 49 6 0.333333 0.019608 
963 49 611 (2013) Gemmell et al. 49 6 0.333333 0.019608 
964 49 611 (2013) Gemmell et al. 49 6 0.333333 0.019608 
965 49 612 (2013) Gemmell et al. 49 7 0.333333 0.019608 
966 49 612 (2013) Gemmell et al. 49 7 0.333333 0.019608 
967 49 612 (2013) Gemmell et al. 49 7 0.333333 0.019608 
968 49 613 (2013) Gemmell et al. 49 8 0.25 0.014706 
969 49 613 (2013) Gemmell et al. 49 8 0.25 0.014706 
970 49 613 (2013) Gemmell et al. 49 8 0.25 0.014706 
971 49 613 (2013) Gemmell et al. 49 8 0.25 0.014706 
972 49 614 (2013) Gemmell et al. 49 9 0.25 0.014706 
973 49 614 (2013) Gemmell et al. 49 9 0.25 0.014706 
974 49 614 (2013) Gemmell et al. 49 9 0.25 0.014706 
975 49 614 (2013) Gemmell et al. 49 9 0.25 0.014706 
976 49 615 (2013) Gemmell et al. 49 10 0.333333 0.019608 
977 49 615 (2013) Gemmell et al. 49 10 0.333333 0.019608 
978 49 615 (2013) Gemmell et al. 49 10 0.333333 0.019608 
979 49 616 (2013) Gemmell et al. 49 11 0.333333 0.019608 
980 49 616 (2013) Gemmell et al. 49 11 0.333333 0.019608 
981 49 616 (2013) Gemmell et al. 49 11 0.333333 0.019608 
982 49 617 (2013) Gemmell et al. 49 12 0.25 0.014706 
983 49 617 (2013) Gemmell et al. 49 12 0.25 0.014706 
984 49 617 (2013) Gemmell et al. 49 12 0.25 0.014706 
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985 49 617 (2013) Gemmell et al. 49 12 0.25 0.014706 
986 49 618 (2013) Gemmell et al. 49 13 0.25 0.014706 
987 49 618 (2013) Gemmell et al. 49 13 0.25 0.014706 
988 49 618 (2013) Gemmell et al. 49 13 0.25 0.014706 
989 49 618 (2013) Gemmell et al. 49 13 0.25 0.014706 
990 49 619 (2013) Gemmell et al. 49 14 0.333333 0.019608 
991 49 619 (2013) Gemmell et al. 49 14 0.333333 0.019608 
992 49 619 (2013) Gemmell et al. 49 14 0.333333 0.019608 
993 49 620 (2013) Gemmell et al. 49 15 0.333333 0.019608 
994 49 620 (2013) Gemmell et al. 49 15 0.333333 0.019608 
995 49 620 (2013) Gemmell et al. 49 15 0.333333 0.019608 
996 49 621 (2013) Gemmell et al. 49 16 0.333333 0.019608 
997 49 621 (2013) Gemmell et al. 49 16 0.333333 0.019608 
998 49 621 (2013) Gemmell et al. 49 16 0.333333 0.019608 
999 49 622 (2013) Gemmell et al. 49 17 0.333333 0.019608 
1000 49 622 (2013) Gemmell et al. 49 17 0.333333 0.019608 
1001 49 622 (2013) Gemmell et al. 49 17 0.333333 0.019608 
 
Appendix 3.1.2 Mathematical transformation  
 
The t-statistic of the estimated regression coefficient is the same as the t-statistic of the corresponding partial correlation coefficient (tPCC) as shown 
below: 
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Appendix 3.2 Descriptive Statistics 
Appendix 3.2.1 Number of Estimates by Study 
 
. tab namestudy 
 
                           namestudy |      Freq.     Percent        Cum. 
-------------------------------------+----------------------------------- 
              (1998) Davoodi and Zou |         30        3.00        3.00 
           (1998) Woller and Philips |         12        1.20        4.20 
                (1998) Zhang and Zou |         50        5.00        9.19 
                      (1999) Yilmaz  |          3        0.30        9.49 
              (2000) Ebel and Yilmaz |          3        0.30        9.79 
                  (2000) Lin and Liu |         12        1.20       10.99 
                   (2001) Im and Lee |         12        1.20       12.19 
              (2002) Akai and Sakata |         20        2.00       14.19 
                      (2003) Naumets |          6        0.60       14.79 
                     (2003) Thiessen |         37        3.70       18.48 
                        (2004) Eller |         39        3.90       22.38 
                  (2004) Feld et al. |          8        0.80       23.18 
                (2004) Ismail et al. |          3        0.30       23.48 
               (2004) Meloche et al. |          8        0.80       24.28 
                 (2005) Desai et al. |         12        1.20       25.47 
         (2005) Feltensten and Iwata |         14        1.40       26.87 
(2005) Gil-Serrate and Lopez-Lobarda |          3        0.30       27.17 
               (2005) Huan and Cheng |          4        0.40       27.57 
                         (2005) Iimi |          2        0.20       27.77 
                  (2005) Jin and Zou |         25        2.50       30.27 
                     (2005) Thiessen |          5        0.50       30.77 
                    (2005) Wilgender |         30        3.00       33.77 
             (2006) Ismal and Hamzah |         20        2.00       35.76 
                          (2006) Kim |          6        0.60       36.36 
                 (2006) Malik et al. |          4        0.40       36.76 
   (2006) Martinez-Vazquez and McNab |         12        1.20       37.96 
                  (2007) Akai et al. |         32        3.20       41.16 
                         (2007) Ding |          8        0.80       41.96 
                   (2007) Khamaladze |          3        0.30       42.26 
        (2007) Rodrigues-Pose et al. |         86        8.59       50.85 
                     (2007) Thornton |          5        0.50       51.35 
                  (2008) Qiao et al. |          8        0.80       52.15 
             (2008) Tosun and Yilmaz |          8        0.80       52.95 
            (2009) Baskaran and Feld |         48        4.80       57.74 
                (2009) Bodman et al. |         26        2.60       60.34 
     (2009) Cantanerero and Gonzales |         16        1.60       61.94 
                  (2009) Feld et al. |         68        6.79       68.73 
  (2009) Rodriguez-Pose and Kroijer  |         27        2.70       71.43 
                (2009) Sagbas et al. |         18        1.80       73.23 
        (2010) Rehman Khatak, et al. |          4        0.40       73.63 
   (2010) Rodriguez-Pose and Ezcurra |         90        8.99       82.62 
                (2010) Samimi et al. |         12        1.20       83.82 
              (2011) Bodman and Ford |         26        2.60       86.41 
                        (2011) Buser |         30        3.00       89.41 
                      (2011) Devkota |          2        0.20       89.61 
                       (2011) Faridi |          4        0.40       90.01 
              (2012) Philip and Isah |         12        1.20       91.21 
         (2012) Stoilova and Patonov |         36        3.60       94.81 
               (2013) Gemmell et al. |         52        5.19      100.00 
-------------------------------------+----------------------------------- 
                               Total |      1,001      100.00 
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Appendix 3.2.2 Correlation Matrix 
a) No categorization into K/Z moderator variables 
 
. corr published finsupport puby timeseries cross panel ols paneltech dynamic iv othertech longrun mixed developed develo 
> ping transition unitary mixed_const national regional imf othersources single multi fdexp fdrev fdexprev threefd otherf 
> d numberfd growth level othery published nexplanatory midpoint span control samplesize 
(obs=988) 
 
             | publis~d finsup~t     puby timese~s    cross    panel      ols panelt~h  dynamic       iv othert~h 
-------------+--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
   published |   1.0000 
  finsupport |   0.2403   1.0000 
        puby |  -0.0209   0.2239   1.0000 
  timeseries |   0.0257  -0.0808   0.0481   1.0000 
       cross |   0.1672  -0.0958   0.0385  -0.0672   1.0000 
       panel |  -0.1250   0.1327  -0.0551  -0.6090  -0.7224   1.0000 
         ols |  -0.2334  -0.1964  -0.0060  -0.0964   0.4344  -0.2899   1.0000 
   paneltech |   0.1331   0.3332   0.0173  -0.2425  -0.2876   0.3922  -0.5896   1.0000 
     dynamic |   0.2468  -0.1182  -0.0850  -0.0830  -0.0984   0.1363  -0.2018  -0.3549   1.0000 
          iv |  -0.1977  -0.0951   0.0621  -0.0667  -0.0792   0.1096  -0.1623  -0.2855  -0.0977   1.0000 
   othertech |   0.0228  -0.0800   0.0043   0.9296  -0.0666  -0.5628  -0.1365  -0.2400  -0.0821  -0.0661   1.0000 
     longrun |   0.2972   0.4169   0.2574  -0.1412   0.1183   0.0127  -0.0884   0.1384   0.1302  -0.1891  -0.1395 
       mixed |   0.0632   0.0390  -0.2260  -0.0359  -0.0426   0.0590   0.0867  -0.0576  -0.0526  -0.0159   0.0566 
   developed |  -0.0163   0.1774   0.3387  -0.0758   0.1950  -0.0785  -0.0246   0.0147  -0.1076   0.1853  -0.0699 
  developing |  -0.0578  -0.0730  -0.0945   0.2843  -0.0969  -0.1187   0.0448  -0.0128  -0.1195  -0.0962   0.2293 
  transition |   0.0404  -0.1672  -0.2422  -0.1173  -0.1392   0.1625  -0.0379   0.0140   0.2390  -0.1381  -0.1161 
     unitary |  -0.0286  -0.2001  -0.1931  -0.1404   0.0279   0.0465  -0.0000   0.0471   0.1666  -0.1654  -0.1287 
 mixed_const |   0.3441   0.4228   0.0654  -0.1911   0.1063   0.0569  -0.0628   0.2612  -0.0394  -0.2170  -0.1891 
    national |   0.2579   0.3232   0.2272   0.0649   0.0289  -0.0497  -0.0469   0.1511  -0.0267  -0.2865   0.0974 
    regional |  -0.2785  -0.3141  -0.2151  -0.1844  -0.0209   0.1225   0.0634  -0.1225   0.0367   0.2950  -0.2182 
         imf |  -0.0206  -0.1044  -0.2110  -0.1378  -0.0475   0.1369   0.1225   0.1529  -0.2018  -0.1533  -0.1051 
othersources |   0.0206   0.1044   0.2110   0.1378   0.0475  -0.1369  -0.1225  -0.1529   0.2018   0.1533   0.1051 
      single |  -0.2719  -0.3469  -0.2011   0.2328  -0.0489  -0.1316   0.0058  -0.2232   0.0020   0.2664   0.2033 
       multi |   0.2719   0.3469   0.2011  -0.2328   0.0489   0.1316  -0.0058   0.2232  -0.0020  -0.2664  -0.2033 
       fdexp |  -0.0563   0.3663  -0.1002  -0.0765  -0.0971   0.1302   0.2334   0.0189  -0.1614  -0.1771  -0.0453 
       fdrev |   0.1469  -0.0513   0.0552  -0.0337   0.1789  -0.1226  -0.0443   0.1800  -0.1468  -0.1151  -0.0317 
    fdexprev |  -0.0170  -0.1469   0.3103   0.1433  -0.0905  -0.0190   0.0246  -0.1745   0.2689  -0.1214   0.1217 
     threefd |  -0.0891  -0.0900   0.1173  -0.0632  -0.0750   0.1038  -0.1536   0.0646  -0.0925   0.3026  -0.0625 
     otherfd |  -0.0129  -0.1832  -0.2815   0.0326   0.0604  -0.0745  -0.1506  -0.0849   0.1469   0.2398   0.0137 
    numberfd |   0.0136  -0.1513  -0.2572  -0.0645  -0.1558   0.1677   0.0027  -0.3411   0.5862   0.0254  -0.0717 
      growth |   0.0217   0.1238  -0.1954  -0.2760   0.0549   0.1355   0.1531   0.1073   0.1271  -0.4300  -0.2238 
       level |  -0.0508  -0.1164   0.2159   0.2989  -0.0717  -0.1382  -0.1529  -0.0590  -0.1195   0.3099   0.2441 
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      othery |   0.0486  -0.0407  -0.0401  -0.0285   0.0316  -0.0036  -0.0299  -0.1221  -0.0418   0.3617  -0.0283 
   published |   1.0000   0.2403  -0.0209   0.0257   0.1672  -0.1250  -0.2334   0.1331   0.2468  -0.1977   0.0228 
nexplanatory |   0.1874   0.0694  -0.0842  -0.0020  -0.0581   0.0435  -0.2186   0.1712   0.0545  -0.0269  -0.0117 
    midpoint |  -0.1514   0.2426   0.4169  -0.2595  -0.0101   0.1616   0.1304   0.0848  -0.1092   0.0045  -0.2823 
        span |  -0.3205   0.1979   0.6018   0.0129  -0.2801   0.1952  -0.0135   0.0501  -0.1247   0.0720  -0.0185 
     control |   0.3060   0.1809  -0.1464   0.0752   0.0914  -0.1332  -0.2640   0.1570   0.0260   0.0493   0.0445 
  samplesize |   0.0086   0.3434   0.1406  -0.2352  -0.2790   0.3564  -0.0817   0.2493   0.0401  -0.1913  -0.2057 
 
             |  longrun    mixed develo~d develo~g transi~n  unitary mixed_~t national regional      imf others~s 
-------------+--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
     longrun |   1.0000 
       mixed |   0.0462   1.0000 
   developed |   0.3724  -0.2185   1.0000 
  developing |  -0.1602  -0.0518  -0.4967   1.0000 
  transition |  -0.3324  -0.0744  -0.7135  -0.1690   1.0000 
     unitary |  -0.3979  -0.0733  -0.6959   0.0389   0.8179   1.0000 
 mixed_const |   0.6528   0.1459   0.3280  -0.0793  -0.3797  -0.4733   1.0000 
    national |   0.5377   0.1437   0.0661  -0.0299  -0.1083  -0.2579   0.7644   1.0000 
    regional |  -0.5195  -0.1397  -0.0858   0.0397   0.1225   0.2752  -0.7429  -0.9719   1.0000 
         imf |   0.1079   0.2607  -0.1844   0.0220   0.1034  -0.0000   0.4058   0.5514  -0.5360   1.0000 
othersources |  -0.1079  -0.2607   0.1844  -0.0220  -0.1034   0.0000  -0.4058  -0.5514   0.5360  -1.0000   1.0000 
      single |  -0.5762  -0.1543  -0.1080   0.1441   0.0733   0.2159  -0.8205  -0.9316   0.9054  -0.5919   0.5919 
       multi |   0.5762   0.1543   0.1080  -0.1441  -0.0733  -0.2159   0.8205   0.9316  -0.9054   0.5919  -0.5919 
       fdexp |   0.1271   0.1808   0.0676   0.1080  -0.2306  -0.2195   0.1487   0.0142   0.0063   0.0020  -0.0020 
       fdrev |   0.0568  -0.0437   0.1306  -0.0137  -0.1272  -0.0864   0.1496   0.0848  -0.0704  -0.0960   0.0960 
    fdexprev |   0.0432  -0.0653  -0.1344   0.0143   0.1717   0.1696  -0.0916   0.1068  -0.1726   0.0694  -0.0694 
     threefd |  -0.1790  -0.0400  -0.1049  -0.0910   0.2091   0.1514  -0.2129  -0.0579   0.0655   0.1006  -0.1006 
     otherfd |  -0.1292  -0.0815  -0.0259  -0.0669   0.1126   0.0965  -0.1059  -0.1547   0.1704  -0.0278   0.0278 
    numberfd |  -0.2070  -0.1127  -0.1928  -0.1025   0.3486   0.2240  -0.2743  -0.2953   0.2881  -0.1509   0.1509 
      growth |   0.0290   0.0550  -0.0837  -0.1310   0.1797   0.1720   0.0994   0.0555  -0.0660  -0.0064   0.0064 
       level |  -0.0037  -0.0518   0.0605   0.1510  -0.1690  -0.1722  -0.0590  -0.0035   0.0132   0.0448  -0.0448 
      othery |  -0.0809  -0.0181   0.0828  -0.0411  -0.0591  -0.0316  -0.0962  -0.1259   0.1295  -0.0694   0.0694 
   published |   0.2972   0.0632  -0.0163  -0.0578   0.0404  -0.0286   0.3441   0.2579  -0.2785  -0.0206   0.0206 
nexplanatory |  -0.0578  -0.0527  -0.1377   0.1458   0.0691   0.2219  -0.1594  -0.2468   0.2272  -0.1991   0.1991 
    midpoint |  -0.1967  -0.1790  -0.2024   0.0162   0.2927   0.3976  -0.3146  -0.1366   0.2132  -0.2146   0.2146 
        span |   0.1147  -0.1135   0.1552   0.0672  -0.1928  -0.1509  -0.0960   0.0421  -0.0076  -0.1943   0.1943 
     control |   0.0433  -0.0661  -0.0044  -0.0756   0.0883   0.1083  -0.0397  -0.1537   0.1297  -0.2735   0.2735 
  samplesize |   0.0191   0.0567   0.1107   0.0108  -0.1600  -0.1247   0.1943   0.0776  -0.0497  -0.1004   0.1004 
 
             |   single    multi    fdexp    fdrev fdexprev  threefd  otherfd numberfd   growth    level   othery 
-------------+--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
      single |   1.0000 
       multi |  -1.0000   1.0000 
       fdexp |  -0.0224   0.0224   1.0000 
       fdrev |  -0.0812   0.0812  -0.3693   1.0000 
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    fdexprev |  -0.1151   0.1151  -0.3115  -0.2222   1.0000 
     threefd |   0.0390  -0.0390  -0.1909  -0.1362  -0.1149   1.0000 
     otherfd |   0.1793  -0.1793  -0.3885  -0.2771  -0.2338  -0.1433   1.0000 
    numberfd |   0.2598  -0.2598  -0.0950  -0.2809   0.0829   0.1644   0.2113   1.0000 
      growth |  -0.1680   0.1680   0.1497   0.0556   0.0717  -0.1061  -0.2243   0.0276   1.0000 
       level |   0.1243  -0.1243  -0.1285  -0.0380  -0.0400   0.1218   0.1462  -0.0392  -0.9199   1.0000 
      othery |   0.1172  -0.1172  -0.0863  -0.0615  -0.0519  -0.0318   0.2221   0.0231  -0.3287  -0.0411   1.0000 
   published |  -0.2719   0.2719  -0.0563   0.1469  -0.0170  -0.0891  -0.0129   0.0136   0.0217  -0.0508   0.0486 
nexplanatory |   0.2258  -0.2258  -0.1327  -0.0762   0.1109   0.1105   0.0617   0.2025   0.1330  -0.1296  -0.0343 
    midpoint |   0.0967  -0.0967   0.0897  -0.0465   0.0615   0.0886  -0.1650   0.0114   0.0306  -0.0861   0.1207 
        span |  -0.0085   0.0085   0.1527  -0.0295   0.0226   0.1685  -0.2662  -0.0876  -0.1080   0.1613  -0.1457 
     control |   0.1564  -0.1564  -0.1706   0.0128  -0.0926   0.2258   0.1259   0.1275   0.1228  -0.1358  -0.0021 
  samplesize |  -0.1476   0.1476   0.3354  -0.0685  -0.0447  -0.1152  -0.2041  -0.0542   0.2974  -0.2597  -0.1184 
 
             | publis~d nexpla~y midpoint     span  control sampl~ze 
-------------+------------------------------------------------------ 
   published |   1.0000 
nexplanatory |   0.1874   1.0000 
    midpoint |  -0.1514   0.1104   1.0000 
        span |  -0.3205  -0.0030   0.4207   1.0000 
     control |   0.3060   0.5723  -0.0423  -0.1070   1.0000 
  samplesize |   0.0086  -0.0409   0.1037   0.1695  -0.0657   1.0000 
 
 
 
b) Categorization into K/Z moderator variables 
 
. corr published finsupport puby_se timeseries_se cross_se panel_se ols_se paneltech_se dynamic_se iv_se othertech_se lon 
> grun_se mixed_se developed_se developing_se transition_se unitary_se mixedconst_se national_se regional_se imf_se other 
> sources_se single_se multi_se fdexp_se fdrev_se fdexprev_se threefd_se otherfd_se numberfd_se growth_se level_se othery 
> _se nexplanatory_se midpoint_se span_se samplesize_se 
(obs=1000) 
 
             | publis~d finsup~t  puby_se timese~e cross_se panel_se   ols_se panelt~e dynami~e    iv_se othert~e 
-------------+--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
   published |   1.0000 
  finsupport |   0.2365   1.0000 
     puby_se |  -0.3572   0.0049   1.0000 
timeseries~e |   0.0060  -0.0770  -0.1508   1.0000 
    cross_se |   0.1377  -0.0888  -0.1610  -0.0602   1.0000 
    panel_se |  -0.3991  -0.0493   0.9390  -0.2166  -0.2500   1.0000 
      ols_se |  -0.4428  -0.1288   0.8617  -0.0782  -0.0176   0.8807   1.0000 
paneltech_se |   0.0743   0.2693  -0.0850  -0.1978  -0.2283   0.0199  -0.3309   1.0000 
  dynamic_se |   0.2260  -0.1085   0.1218  -0.0736  -0.0849   0.0354  -0.1231  -0.2789   1.0000 
305 
 
       iv_se |  -0.1013  -0.0838  -0.0867  -0.0568  -0.0655  -0.0673  -0.0950  -0.2153  -0.0801   1.0000 
othertech_se |   0.0123  -0.0717  -0.1506   0.7528  -0.0561  -0.1767  -0.0813  -0.1842  -0.0685  -0.0529   1.0000 
  longrun_se |   0.2579   0.4388   0.0819  -0.1247  -0.0837  -0.0579  -0.1985   0.0235   0.5212  -0.1426  -0.1164 
    mixed_se |  -0.0118   0.0425  -0.0377  -0.0274  -0.0317   0.0684  -0.0272   0.2089  -0.0387  -0.0253   0.1136 
developed_se |  -0.3110   0.0038   0.8343  -0.1222  -0.0948   0.8150   0.7467  -0.0523   0.0456  -0.0102  -0.1157 
developing~e |  -0.2065  -0.0575   0.2790   0.0016  -0.0611   0.3180   0.3300  -0.0290  -0.0747  -0.0577  -0.0179 
transition~e |   0.0831  -0.1551  -0.1787  -0.1051  -0.1213  -0.0922  -0.1088   0.0467   0.0737  -0.1144  -0.0979 
  unitary_se |  -0.0562  -0.1726  -0.1022  -0.1170   0.0062  -0.0386  -0.1315   0.2724   0.0098  -0.1273  -0.0767 
mixedconst~e |   0.1976   0.3539   0.0484  -0.1521  -0.1162   0.0380  -0.2068   0.4164   0.2499  -0.1638  -0.1416 
 national_se |   0.1658   0.3026   0.0338  -0.0991  -0.1585  -0.0129  -0.2377   0.3473   0.2964  -0.2040  -0.0424 
 regional_se |  -0.4340  -0.1864   0.8265  -0.1172  -0.0848   0.8889   0.9058  -0.1593  -0.1055   0.0163  -0.1176 
      imf_se |  -0.1302  -0.0698  -0.1530  -0.1136  -0.0930  -0.0161  -0.1302   0.3749  -0.1602  -0.1214  -0.0378 
otherso~s_se |  -0.3301  -0.0365   0.9273  -0.1096  -0.1271   0.9225   0.8826  -0.1468   0.0769  -0.0318  -0.1134 
   single_se |  -0.4370  -0.1916   0.8223  -0.0653  -0.0885   0.8817   0.9059  -0.1711  -0.1101   0.0133  -0.0718 
    multi_se |   0.1715   0.3064   0.0474  -0.1824  -0.1515   0.0066  -0.2275   0.3615   0.2999  -0.1968  -0.1166 
    fdexp_se |  -0.3944   0.0442   0.8419  -0.0978  -0.1036   0.9004   0.9159  -0.1165  -0.1311  -0.1051  -0.0689 
    fdrev_se |   0.1327  -0.0228  -0.0008  -0.0729   0.0022  -0.0316  -0.1143   0.2519  -0.0547  -0.0472  -0.0691 
 fdexprev_se |   0.0311  -0.1308   0.1345  -0.0008  -0.0858  -0.0054  -0.0949  -0.1475   0.5739  -0.0964  -0.0171 
  threefd_se |  -0.0228  -0.0857  -0.0749  -0.0581  -0.0670  -0.0905  -0.0971   0.0327  -0.0819   0.1184  -0.0541 
  otherfd_se |  -0.0285  -0.1492  -0.1432  -0.0449  -0.0477  -0.0299  -0.1572   0.2076   0.0359   0.2022  -0.0584 
 numberfd_se |  -0.3593  -0.1248   0.8758  -0.1202  -0.1465   0.9215   0.9242  -0.2545   0.1055  -0.0817  -0.1115 
   growth_se |  -0.3884  -0.0429   0.9225  -0.1713  -0.1613   0.9716   0.8945  -0.0107   0.0412  -0.1850  -0.1363 
    level_se |  -0.0457  -0.0943  -0.0410   0.0802  -0.0499  -0.0566  -0.1020   0.0206  -0.0901   0.4477   0.0253 
   othery_se |   0.0449  -0.0401  -0.0667  -0.0272   0.0760  -0.0647  -0.0368  -0.1031  -0.0383   0.2744  -0.0253 
nexplanato~e |  -0.1582  -0.0344   0.6350  -0.1512  -0.1811   0.6768   0.5722   0.1198  -0.0314  -0.0759  -0.1372 
 midpoint_se |  -0.4073  -0.0655   0.9459  -0.1621  -0.1727   0.9925   0.9063  -0.0168   0.0216  -0.0807  -0.1375 
     span_se |  -0.1307   0.1949   0.3396  -0.1064  -0.0280   0.3200   0.3148   0.0892  -0.1596  -0.0952  -0.0994 
samplesize~e |  -0.3498   0.0128   0.9338  -0.1571  -0.1813   0.9714   0.8469   0.0677   0.0324  -0.0854  -0.1237 
 
             | longru~e mixed_se dev~d_se dev~g_se transi~e unitar~e mixedc~e nation~e region~e   imf_se oth~s_se 
-------------+--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
  longrun_se |   1.0000 
    mixed_se |  -0.0160   1.0000 
developed_se |   0.0669  -0.0864   1.0000 
developing~e |  -0.1207  -0.0279  -0.1668   1.0000 
transition~e |  -0.2640  -0.0553  -0.3310  -0.1067   1.0000 
  unitary_se |  -0.2938  -0.0481  -0.2392   0.0007   0.7131   1.0000 
mixedconst~e |   0.5708   0.2877   0.0857  -0.0651  -0.3021  -0.3410   1.0000 
 national_se |   0.5642   0.2928   0.0057  -0.0971  -0.1552  -0.2444   0.9004   1.0000 
 regional_se |  -0.3084  -0.0665   0.7285   0.3296  -0.0238   0.0727  -0.3682  -0.4577   1.0000 
      imf_se |  -0.0145   0.4357  -0.1250  -0.0019   0.0432  -0.0383   0.4722   0.5758  -0.2751   1.0000 
otherso~s_se |  -0.0678  -0.0929   0.8040   0.3001  -0.1107  -0.0213  -0.1522  -0.2382   0.9333  -0.3844   1.0000 
   single_se |  -0.3169  -0.0683   0.7260   0.3307  -0.0297   0.0667  -0.3786  -0.4650   0.9984  -0.2828   0.9321 
    multi_se |   0.5693   0.2922   0.0170  -0.0963  -0.1442  -0.2314   0.9048   0.9939  -0.4416   0.5800  -0.2256 
    fdexp_se |  -0.1091   0.0944   0.7485   0.3419  -0.1831  -0.1749  -0.0754  -0.1462   0.8745  -0.0545   0.8636 
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    fdrev_se |  -0.0143  -0.0110   0.0251  -0.0384  -0.1234  -0.0382   0.2302   0.1713  -0.1018  -0.0681  -0.0077 
 fdexprev_se |   0.3786  -0.0466  -0.0252  -0.0505   0.1520   0.1106   0.1690   0.3076  -0.1468   0.0117  -0.0183 
  threefd_se |  -0.1459  -0.0306  -0.1430  -0.0590   0.2604   0.1669  -0.1693  -0.0089  -0.0884   0.1281  -0.1421 
  otherfd_se |  -0.1525  -0.0532  -0.0349  -0.0789   0.1734   0.3274  -0.0299  -0.0914   0.0095   0.0810  -0.0609 
 numberfd_se |  -0.1245  -0.0365   0.7607   0.3064  -0.0277  -0.0717  -0.1496  -0.1865   0.9063  -0.1431   0.9101 
   growth_se |  -0.0690   0.0704   0.7927   0.3229  -0.0713  -0.0362   0.0333  -0.0113   0.8751  -0.0315   0.9155 
    level_se |  -0.0219  -0.0336   0.0112  -0.0471  -0.1287   0.0039  -0.0514  -0.0822  -0.0162   0.0322  -0.0658 
   othery_se |  -0.0683  -0.0143  -0.0276  -0.0276  -0.0548  -0.0356  -0.0793  -0.0985  -0.0129  -0.0592  -0.0369 
nexplanato~e |  -0.1432  -0.0097   0.5576   0.2256  -0.0604   0.0342  -0.1023  -0.1709   0.6722  -0.1470   0.6740 
 midpoint_se |  -0.0793   0.0648   0.8229   0.3241  -0.1032  -0.0373   0.0138  -0.0396   0.9060  -0.0362   0.9365 
     span_se |  -0.0511  -0.0572   0.3459  -0.0452   0.0161   0.1443  -0.1441  -0.1218   0.3427  -0.1243   0.3448 
samplesize~e |  -0.0212   0.0746   0.8148   0.3147  -0.1352  -0.0562   0.0940   0.0362   0.8548  -0.0338   0.9160 
 
             | single~e multi_se fdexp_se fdrev_se fdexpr~e threef~e otherf~e number~e growth~e level_se othery~e 
-------------+--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
   single_se |   1.0000 
    multi_se |  -0.4540   1.0000 
    fdexp_se |   0.8739  -0.1366   1.0000 
    fdrev_se |  -0.1062   0.1747  -0.2119   1.0000 
 fdexprev_se |  -0.1479   0.3100  -0.1865  -0.1711   1.0000 
  threefd_se |  -0.0920  -0.0036  -0.1222  -0.1121  -0.0986   1.0000 
  otherfd_se |   0.0065  -0.0871  -0.2128  -0.1952  -0.1718  -0.1126   1.0000 
 numberfd_se |   0.9045  -0.1731   0.8834  -0.1509  -0.0061  -0.0510  -0.0473   1.0000 
   growth_se |   0.8706   0.0046   0.9048  -0.0231   0.0041  -0.1052  -0.0939   0.9171   1.0000 
    level_se |  -0.0140  -0.0891  -0.1086  -0.0390  -0.0453   0.0258   0.2577  -0.0909  -0.2468   1.0000 
   othery_se |  -0.0145  -0.0951  -0.0572  -0.0525  -0.0462  -0.0303   0.1176  -0.0421  -0.1103  -0.0333   1.0000 
nexplanato~e |   0.6673  -0.1545   0.5992   0.0451  -0.0250  -0.0575  -0.0290   0.6343   0.6709  -0.0911  -0.0675 
 midpoint_se |   0.9018  -0.0243   0.9145  -0.0346  -0.0155  -0.1047  -0.0359   0.9309   0.9791  -0.0593  -0.0622 
     span_se |   0.3387  -0.1113   0.3485  -0.0162  -0.0773   0.0454  -0.1369   0.2812   0.3382  -0.1332   0.0301 
samplesize~e |   0.8507   0.0499   0.8839   0.0022  -0.0111  -0.1098  -0.0351   0.8765   0.9641  -0.0788  -0.0819 
 
             | nexpla~e midpoi~e  span_se sampl~se 
-------------+------------------------------------ 
nexplanato~e |   1.0000 
 midpoint_se |   0.6739   1.0000 
     span_se |   0.3364   0.3275   1.0000 
samplesize~e |   0.6772   0.9786   0.3250   1.0000 
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Appendix 3.2.3 Moderator Variables Descriptive Statistics 
a) Full Sample 
 
. sum finsupport timeseries cross panel ols paneltech dynamic iv othertech longrun 
mixed developed developing transition  
> unitary mixed_const national regional imf othersources single multi fdexp fdrev 
fdexprev threefd otherfd numberfd growt 
> h level othery pubyear published nexplanatory midpoint span control samplesize 
 
    Variable |       Obs        Mean    Std. Dev.       Min        Max 
-------------+-------------------------------------------------------- 
  finsupport |      1001    .1018981    .3026655          0          1 
  timeseries |      1001    .0539461    .2260241          0          1 
       cross |      1001    .0729271    .2601467          0          1 
       panel |      1001    .8681319    .3385165          0          1 
         ols |      1001    .2477522     .431923          0          1 
-------------+-------------------------------------------------------- 
   paneltech |      1001    .5144855      .50004          0          1 
     dynamic |      1001    .1068931    .3091317          0          1 
          iv |      1001    .0719281    .2584979          0          1 
   othertech |      1001    .0529471    .2240397          0          1 
     longrun |      1001    .3086913    .4621844          0          1 
-------------+-------------------------------------------------------- 
       mixed |      1001     .021978     .146685          0          1 
   developed |      1001    .6813187    .4661981          0          1 
  developing |      1001    .1038961    .3052782          0          1 
  transition |      1001    .1928072    .3947002          0          1 
     unitary |      1001    .2547453    .4359357          0          1 
-------------+-------------------------------------------------------- 
 mixed_const |      1001    .3866134    .4872172          0          1 
    national |      1001    .5184815    .4999081          0          1 
    regional |      1001    .4675325    .4991942          0          1 
         imf |      1001    .2477522     .431923          0          1 
othersources |      1001    .7522478     .431923          0          1 
-------------+-------------------------------------------------------- 
      single |      1001    .5174825    .4999441          0          1 
       multi |      1001    .4825175    .4999441          0          1 
       fdexp |      1001    .3426573    .4748353          0          1 
       fdrev |      1001    .2117882    .4087798          0          1 
    fdexprev |      1001    .1558442    .3628888          0          1 
-------------+-------------------------------------------------------- 
     threefd |      1001    .0649351    .2465344          0          1 
     otherfd |      1001    .2237762    .4169822          0          1 
    numberfd |      1001    2.356643    1.813747          1          9 
      growth |      1001    .8841159    .3202459          0          1 
       level |      1001    .1038961    .3052782          0          1 
-------------+-------------------------------------------------------- 
      othery |      1001     .013986    .1174913          0          1 
     pubyear |      1001    2006.809    4.097872       1998       2013 
   published |      1001    .6693307    .4706893          0          1 
nexplanatory |      1000        8.69    7.123106          2         65 
    midpoint |      1001    1991.377    6.441342       1974       2005 
-------------+-------------------------------------------------------- 
        span |      1001    .5894106    .4921867          0          1 
     control |       988    .5799595     .493815          0          1 
  samplesize |      1001    .4995005    .5002497          0          1 
 
b) Output-Growth Studies 
 
. sum finsupport timeseries cross panel ols paneltech dynamic iv othertech longrun 
mixed developed developing transition  
> unitary mixed_const national regional imf othersources single multi fdexp fdrev 
fdexprev threefd otherfd numberfd pubye 
> ar published nexplanatory midpoint span control samplesize if growth==1 
 
    Variable |       Obs        Mean    Std. Dev.       Min        Max 
-------------+-------------------------------------------------------- 
  finsupport |       885    .1152542    .3195091          0          1 
  timeseries |       885    .0316384    .1751345          0          1 
       cross |       885    .0779661    .2682698          0          1 
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       panel |       885    .8847458    .3195091          0          1 
         ols |       885    .2711864    .4448235          0          1 
-------------+-------------------------------------------------------- 
   paneltech |       885    .5344633    .4990929          0          1 
     dynamic |       885     .120904       .3262          0          1 
          iv |       885    .0316384    .1751345          0          1 
   othertech |       885    .0350282    .1839552          0          1 
     longrun |       885    .3129944    .4639743          0          1 
-------------+-------------------------------------------------------- 
       mixed |       885    .0248588    .1557826          0          1 
   developed |       885    .6677966    .4712698          0          1 
  developing |       885    .0892655    .2852879          0          1 
  transition |       885    .2180791    .4131749          0          1 
     unitary |       885    .2813559     .449915          0          1 
-------------+-------------------------------------------------------- 
 mixed_const |       885    .4033898    .4908551          0          1 
    national |       885    .5276836    .4995153          0          1 
    regional |       885    .4564972    .4983856          0          1 
         imf |       885    .2463277    .4311153          0          1 
othersources |       885    .7536723    .4311153          0          1 
-------------+-------------------------------------------------------- 
      single |       885    .4881356    .5001419          0          1 
       multi |       885    .5118644    .5001419          0          1 
       fdexp |       885    .3683616    .4826329          0          1 
       fdrev |       885     .220339    .4147096          0          1 
    fdexprev |       885    .1649718    .3713649          0          1 
-------------+-------------------------------------------------------- 
     threefd |       885    .0553672     .228825          0          1 
     otherfd |       885    .1898305    .3923887          0          1 
    numberfd |       885    2.374011    1.891635          1          9 
     pubyear |       885     2006.52    4.182882       1998       2013 
   published |       885    .6734463    .4692176          0          1 
-------------+-------------------------------------------------------- 
nexplanatory |       884    8.973982    7.498464          2         65 
    midpoint |       885    1991.452     6.63041       1974       2005 
        span |       885    .5694915    .4954274          0          1 
     control |       872    .6020642     .489753          0          1 
  samplesize |       885    .5536723     .497392          0          1 
 
 
c) Output-Level Studies 
 
. sum finsupport timeseries cross panel ols paneltech dynamic iv othertech longrun 
mixed developed developing transition unitary mixed_const national regional imf 
othersources single multi fdexp fdrev fdexprev threefd otherfd numberfd pubyear 
published nexplanatory midpoint span control samplesize if level==1 
 
    Variable |       Obs        Mean    Std. Dev.       Min        Max 
-------------+-------------------------------------------------------- 
  finsupport |       104           0           0          0          0 
  timeseries |       104         .25    .4351096          0          1 
       cross |       104    .0192308    .1380002          0          1 
       panel |       104    .7307692    .4457081          0          1 
         ols |       104    .0576923    .2342898          0          1 
-------------+-------------------------------------------------------- 
   paneltech |       104    .4230769    .4964399          0          1 
     dynamic |       104           0           0          0          0 
          iv |       104    .3076923    .4637735          0          1 
   othertech |       104    .2115385     .410377          0          1 
     longrun |       104    .3076923    .4637735          0          1 
-------------+-------------------------------------------------------- 
       mixed |       104           0           0          0          0 
   developed |       104    .7596154    .4293864          0          1 
  developing |       104    .2403846    .4293864          0          1 
  transition |       104           0           0          0          0 
     unitary |       104    .0384615     .193239          0          1 
-------------+-------------------------------------------------------- 
 mixed_const |       104    .3076923    .4637735          0          1 
    national |       104    .5192308    .5020496          0          1 
    regional |       104    .4807692    .5020496          0          1 
         imf |       104    .3076923    .4637735          0          1 
othersources |       104    .6923077    .4637735          0          1 
-------------+-------------------------------------------------------- 
      single |       104    .6923077    .4637735          0          1 
       multi |       104    .3076923    .4637735          0          1 
309 
 
       fdexp |       104    .1634615     .371577          0          1 
       fdrev |       104    .1634615     .371577          0          1 
    fdexprev |       104    .1153846    .3210327          0          1 
-------------+-------------------------------------------------------- 
     threefd |       104    .1538462    .3625484          0          1 
     otherfd |       104    .4038462    .4930435          0          1 
    numberfd |       104    2.153846    1.049912          1          4 
     pubyear |       104    2009.404    2.257756       2004       2012 
   published |       104    .5961538    .4930435          0          1 
-------------+-------------------------------------------------------- 
nexplanatory |       104    6.471154    1.843154          3         12 
    midpoint |       104    1989.726    4.237993       1980       2002 
        span |       104    .8269231    .3801458          0          1 
     control |       104    .3846154    .4888602          0          1 
  samplesize |       104    .1153846    .3210327          0          1 
 
Appendix 3.2.4 Study Descriptive Statistics 
 
a) For the full sample: 
 
. sum study_1 study_2 study_3 study_4 study_5 study_6 study_7 study_8 study_9 study_10 
study_11 study_12 study_13 study_14 study_15 study_16 study_17 study_18 study_19 
study_20 study_21 study_22 study_23 study_24 study_25 study_26 study_27 study_28 
study_29 study_30 study_31 study_32 study_33 study_34 study_35 study_36 study_37 
study_38 study_39 study_40 study_41 study_42 study_43 study_44 study_45 study_46 
study_47 study_48 study_49 
 
    Variable |       Obs        Mean    Std. Dev.       Min        Max 
-------------+-------------------------------------------------------- 
     study_1 |      1001      .02997    .1705899          0          1 
     study_2 |      1001     .011988    .1088859          0          1 
     study_3 |      1001      .04995    .2179507          0          1 
     study_4 |      1001     .002997    .0546901          0          1 
     study_5 |      1001     .011988    .1088859          0          1 
-------------+-------------------------------------------------------- 
     study_6 |      1001     .002997    .0546901          0          1 
     study_7 |      1001     .011988    .1088859          0          1 
     study_8 |      1001      .01998    .1400014          0          1 
     study_9 |      1001     .005994    .0772272          0          1 
    study_10 |      1001     .036963    .1887654          0          1 
-------------+-------------------------------------------------------- 
    study_11 |      1001     .038961    .1935989          0          1 
    study_12 |      1001     .007992    .0890846          0          1 
    study_13 |      1001     .002997    .0546901          0          1 
    study_14 |      1001     .007992    .0890846          0          1 
    study_15 |      1001     .011988    .1088859          0          1 
-------------+-------------------------------------------------------- 
    study_16 |      1001     .013986    .1174913          0          1 
    study_17 |      1001     .002997    .0546901          0          1 
    study_18 |      1001     .003996    .0631191          0          1 
    study_19 |      1001     .001998    .0446767          0          1 
    study_20 |      1001     .024975    .1561269          0          1 
-------------+-------------------------------------------------------- 
    study_21 |      1001     .004995    .0705339          0          1 
    study_22 |      1001      .02997    .1705899          0          1 
    study_23 |      1001      .01998    .1400014          0          1 
    study_24 |      1001     .005994    .0772272          0          1 
    study_25 |      1001     .003996    .0631191          0          1 
-------------+-------------------------------------------------------- 
    study_26 |      1001     .011988    .1088859          0          1 
    study_27 |      1001     .031968    .1760029          0          1 
    study_28 |      1001     .007992    .0890846          0          1 
    study_29 |      1001     .002997    .0546901          0          1 
    study_30 |      1001    .0859141    .2803772          0          1 
-------------+-------------------------------------------------------- 
    study_31 |      1001     .004995    .0705339          0          1 
    study_32 |      1001     .007992    .0890846          0          1 
    study_33 |      1001     .007992    .0890846          0          1 
    study_34 |      1001     .047952    .2137716          0          1 
    study_35 |      1001     .025974    .1591373          0          1 
-------------+-------------------------------------------------------- 
    study_36 |      1001     .015984    .1254761          0          1 
    study_37 |      1001    .0679321    .2517551          0          1 
    study_38 |      1001     .026973    .1620856          0          1 
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    study_39 |      1001     .017982    .1329523          0          1 
    study_40 |      1001     .003996    .0631191          0          1 
-------------+-------------------------------------------------------- 
    study_41 |      1001     .011988    .1088859          0          1 
    study_42 |      1001    .0899101    .2861959          0          1 
    study_43 |      1001     .025974    .1591373          0          1 
    study_44 |      1001      .02997    .1705899          0          1 
    study_45 |      1001     .001998    .0446767          0          1 
-------------+-------------------------------------------------------- 
    study_46 |      1001     .003996    .0631191          0          1 
    study_47 |      1001     .011988    .1088859          0          1 
    study_48 |      1001     .035964    .1862936          0          1 
    study_49 |      1001    .0519481    .2220331          0          1 
 
 
b) For the output-growth literature 
c) For the output-level literature 
 
 
Appendix 3.3 Diagnostics 
Appendix 3.3.1 The letter-value approach 
 
. lv t 
 
 #   1000                  t-stat 
             --------------------------------- 
 M    500.5 |            -.0808377            |    spread  pseudosigma 
 F    250.5 | -1.846154  -.0818534   1.682447 |  3.528601    2.616773 
 E    125.5 |    -3.015     -.1095      2.796 |     5.811    2.527087 
 D     63   |    -4.625     -.3275       3.97 |     8.595    2.803443 
 C     32   | -6.090571  -.4806354     5.1293 |  11.21987    3.020979 
 B     16.5 |    -7.782  -.5995001      6.583 |    14.365    3.355683 
 A      8.5 |   -9.4215   -1.04275      7.336 |   16.7575    3.488961 
 Z      4.5 |       -15    -3.5595      7.881 |    22.881      4.3362 
 Y      2.5 |       -20  -5.548679   8.902643 |  28.90264    5.065441 
 X      1.5 |       -20   -5.41538    9.16924 |  29.16924    4.790863 
        1   |       -20  -5.388453   9.223094 |  29.22309    4.570633 
            |                                 | 
            |                                 |   # below     # above 
inner fence | -7.139055              6.975348 |        21          13 
outer fence | -12.43196              12.26825 |         4           0 
 
 
Appendix 3.3.2 The Extremes Approach 
 
. extremes t 
 
  +------------+ 
  | obs:     t | 
  |------------| 
  | 443.   -20 | 
  | 444.   -20 | 
  | 445.   -20 | 
  | 446.   -20 | 
  | 435.   -10 | 
  +------------+ 
 
  +----------------+ 
  | 938.     7.754 | 
  | 934.     8.008 | 
  | 348.    8.6899 | 
  | 108.   9.11539 | 
  | 268.   9.22309 | 
  +----------------+ 
 
note: 2 values of -10 
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Appendix 3.3.3 Testing for heterogeneity  
 
a) Cochran Q 
reg t invSE  [aweight=weights], noc 
(sum of wgt is   4.8967e+01) 
 
      Source |       SS       df       MS              Number of obs =    1000 
-------------+------------------------------           F(  1,   999) =    0.46 
       Model |  3.80323859     1  3.80323859           Prob > F      =  0.4980 
    Residual |  8268.09128   999  8.27636765           R-squared     =  0.0005 
-------------+------------------------------           Adj R-squared = -0.0005 
       Total |  8271.89452  1000  8.27189452           Root MSE      =  2.8769 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
           t |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
       invSE |  -.0034951   .0051559    -0.68   0.498    -.0136126    .0066225 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 
 
b) I2 
I2 using the sum of squared errors = 8268 
 
I2 = (8268-999/8268)*100 = 87% 
 
 
Appendix 3.3.4 Double Clustering 
. reg t invSE if t>-12, vce(cluster idstudy) 
 
Linear regression                                      Number of obs =     997 
                                                       F(  1,    48) =    2.37 
                                                       Prob > F      =  0.1303 
                                                       R-squared     =  0.0020 
                                                       Root MSE      =   2.827 
                               (Std. Err. adjusted for 49 clusters in idstudy) 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
             |               Robust 
           t |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
       invSE |  -.0074297   .0048264    -1.54   0.130    -.0171337    .0022744 
       _cons |   .0073965   .2363576     0.03   0.975    -.4678322    .4826253 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 
. cluster2 t invSE if t>-12, fcluster(idspec) tcluster(idstudy) 
  
Linear regression with 2D clustered SEs                Number of obs =     997 
                                                       F(  1,   618) =    1.32 
                                                       Prob > F      =  0.2509 
Number of clusters (idspec) =   619                    R-squared     =  0.0020 
Number of clusters (idstudy) =    49                   Root MSE      =  2.8270 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
           t |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
       invSE |  -.0074297   .0048264    -1.54   0.124    -.0169077    .0020484 
       _cons |   .0073965   .2363576     0.03   0.975    -.4567648    .4715579 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
  
     SE clustered by idspec and idstudy (multiple obs per idspec-idstudy) 
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Appendix 3.4 FAT-PET  
Appendix 3.4.1 Full Sample 
 
*WLS 
. regress t invSE if t>-7.138112 & t<=6.973776  [aweight=weights], vce(cluster 
idstudy) 
(sum of wgt is   4.7462e+01) 
 
Linear regression                                      Number of obs =     966 
                                                       F(  1,    48) =    2.10 
                                                       Prob > F      =  0.1538 
                                                       R-squared     =  0.0078 
                                                       Root MSE      =  2.3936 
 
                               (Std. Err. adjusted for 49 clusters in idstudy) 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
             |               Robust 
           t |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
       invSE |  -.0188568   .0130132    -1.45   0.154    -.0450215    .0073079 
       _cons |   .5650906   .2554129     2.21   0.032     .0515485    1.078633 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 
.  
. vif  
 
    Variable |       VIF       1/VIF   
-------------+---------------------- 
       invSE |      1.00    1.000000 
-------------+---------------------- 
    Mean VIF |      1.00 
 
.  
. estat ovtest 
 
Ramsey RESET test using powers of the fitted values of t 
       Ho:  model has no omitted variables 
                 F(3, 961) =      1.46 
                  Prob > F =      0.2253 
 
. outreg2 using 21oct3.doc 
21oct3.doc 
dir : seeout 
 
 
. *FE 
 
. regress t invSE invSE_study1 invSE_study2 invSE_study3 invSE_study4 invSE_study5 
invSE_study6 invSE_study8 invSE_study9 invSE_study10 invSE_study11 invSE_study12 
invSE_study13 invSE_study14 invSE_study15 invSE_study16 invSE_study17 invSE_study18 
invSE_study19 invSE_study20 invSE_study21 invSE_study22 invSE_study24 invSE_study25 
invSE_study26 invSE_study27 invSE_study28 invSE_study29 invSE_study30 invSE_study31 
invSE_study33 invSE_study34 invSE_study35 invSE_study36 invSE_study37 invSE_study38 
invSE_study39 invSE_study41 invSE_study40 invSE_study42 invSE_study43 invSE_study44 
invSE_study45 invSE_study46 invSE_study47 invSE_study48 invSE_study49 if t>-7.138112 
& t<=6.973776 [aweight=weights], vce(cluster idstudy) 
(sum of wgt is   4.7462e+01) 
 
Linear regression                                      Number of obs =     966 
                                                       F(  1,    48) =       . 
                                                       Prob > F      =       . 
                                                       R-squared     =  0.3275 
                                                       Root MSE      =  2.0193 
 
                                (Std. Err. adjusted for 49 clusters in idstudy) 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
              |               Robust 
            t |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
--------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
        invSE |  -.0245453   .0197184    -1.24   0.219    -.0641918    .0151013 
 invSE_study1 |  -.1052024   .0367456    -2.86   0.006    -.1790843   -.0313204 
 invSE_study2 |    .010171    .022593     0.45   0.655    -.0352553    .0555973 
 invSE_study3 |  -.0572324   .0254088    -2.25   0.029    -.1083202   -.0061447 
 invSE_study4 |   .1054477   .0212782     4.96   0.000     .0626651    .1482303 
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 invSE_study5 |   .1297655   .0153937     8.43   0.000     .0988145    .1607166 
 invSE_study6 |   .5037588   .0559614     9.00   0.000     .3912409    .6162767 
 invSE_study8 |   .1986192    .038312     5.18   0.000     .1215878    .2756506 
 invSE_study9 |  -.1378001   .0393194    -3.50   0.001    -.2168571   -.0587431 
invSE_study10 |   .1446016   .0213554     6.77   0.000     .1016637    .1875395 
invSE_study11 |   .0165904   .0168684     0.98   0.330    -.0173258    .0505065 
invSE_study12 |   .0041635   .0154483     0.27   0.789    -.0268975    .0352245 
invSE_study13 |   .0950123   .0411849     2.31   0.025     .0122044    .1778202 
invSE_study14 |   .2085884    .067507     3.09   0.003     .0728565    .3443204 
invSE_study15 |   .0693868   .0379388     1.83   0.074    -.0068943    .1456679 
invSE_study16 |   .3800798    .076422     4.97   0.000      .226423    .5337366 
invSE_study17 |   .1097999   .0218142     5.03   0.000     .0659394    .1536603 
invSE_study18 |  -.0048628   .0182995    -0.27   0.792    -.0416563    .0319307 
invSE_study19 |   .3606559   .0510485     7.06   0.000     .2580159    .4632958 
invSE_study20 |   .0104686   .0192538     0.54   0.589    -.0282437    .0491809 
invSE_study21 |   .1381792   .0810418     1.71   0.095    -.0247662    .3011246 
invSE_study22 |   .0226468   .0505773     0.45   0.656    -.0790457    .1243393 
invSE_study24 |   .0622358   .0146254     4.26   0.000     .0328295     .091642 
invSE_study25 |   .2172321   .0650139     3.34   0.002     .0865129    .3479514 
invSE_study26 |  -.0428336   .0184303    -2.32   0.024    -.0798903   -.0057769 
invSE_study27 |   .0364419    .018562     1.96   0.055    -.0008796    .0737634 
invSE_study28 |   .2572111   .0213521    12.05   0.000     .2142798    .3001425 
invSE_study29 |  -.1115502   .0949549    -1.17   0.246    -.3024697    .0793693 
invSE_study30 |   .0243994   .0162975     1.50   0.141     -.008369    .0571678 
invSE_study31 |  -.0046482   .0941252    -0.05   0.961    -.1938997    .1846033 
invSE_study33 |  -.0358538   .0146026    -2.46   0.018    -.0652142   -.0064933 
invSE_study34 |    -.01703   .0160703    -1.06   0.295    -.0493416    .0152816 
invSE_study35 |   .0021997   .0338613     0.06   0.948    -.0658831    .0702825 
invSE_study36 |   .1425462   .0180763     7.89   0.000     .1062012    .1788911 
invSE_study37 |   .0071175   .0411707     0.17   0.863    -.0756616    .0898967 
invSE_study38 |  -.1116156   .0242182    -4.61   0.000    -.1603094   -.0629217 
invSE_study39 |  -.0894144   .0405153    -2.21   0.032    -.1708759    -.007953 
invSE_study41 |   .0517144   .0253424     2.04   0.047     .0007601    .1026687 
invSE_study40 |  -.0461101    .068257    -0.68   0.503    -.1833499    .0911297 
invSE_study42 |   -.135711   .0213871    -6.35   0.000    -.1787127   -.0927094 
invSE_study43 |  -.0337597   .0228236    -1.48   0.146    -.0796497    .0121302 
invSE_study44 |   .1685694   .0297707     5.66   0.000     .1087113    .2284275 
invSE_study45 |   .6109236   .0912972     6.69   0.000     .4273583    .7944889 
invSE_study46 |   .6400767   .0450291    14.21   0.000     .5495396    .7306139 
invSE_study47 |  -.1245509   .1001082    -1.24   0.219     -.325832    .0767301 
invSE_study48 |   .0509604   .0280795     1.81   0.076    -.0054972    .1074179 
invSE_study49 |   .0075573   .0151149     0.50   0.619    -.0228332    .0379478 
        _cons |     .01405   .4148945     0.03   0.973    -.8201513    .8482514 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
 
.  
. outreg2 using 21oct3.doc 
21oct3.doc 
dir : seeout 
 
.  
. vif 
 
    Variable |       VIF       1/VIF   
-------------+---------------------- 
       invSE |      6.72    0.148737 
invSE_stu~30 |      4.46    0.224026 
invSE_stu~33 |      1.51    0.661265 
invSE_stu~24 |      1.47    0.679629 
invSE_stu~49 |      1.28    0.783126 
invSE_stu~47 |      1.27    0.786442 
invSE_stu~31 |      1.27    0.787041 
invSE_study5 |      1.27    0.790230 
invSE_stu~45 |      1.26    0.790819 
invSE_stu~29 |      1.26    0.790906 
invSE_stu~12 |      1.26    0.791515 
invSE_stu~21 |      1.26    0.794781 
invSE_stu~40 |      1.25    0.802707 
invSE_stu~14 |      1.24    0.803282 
invSE_stu~25 |      1.24    0.805180 
invSE_stu~16 |      1.23    0.813147 
invSE_stu~19 |      1.22    0.818204 
invSE_stu~22 |      1.21    0.826296 
invSE_stu~13 |      1.20    0.830025 
invSE_stu~46 |      1.20    0.830047 
invSE_stu~37 |      1.20    0.830416 
invSE_stu~39 |      1.20    0.830776 
314 
 
invSE_study9 |      1.20    0.832379 
invSE_stu~15 |      1.20    0.834238 
invSE_stu~11 |      1.19    0.838121 
invSE_study8 |      1.19    0.838674 
invSE_stu~36 |      1.19    0.839158 
invSE_stu~18 |      1.19    0.840530 
invSE_stu~27 |      1.19    0.842379 
invSE_study1 |      1.19    0.843663 
invSE_stu~26 |      1.18    0.845204 
invSE_stu~44 |      1.18    0.845885 
invSE_stu~34 |      1.18    0.847519 
invSE_stu~35 |      1.18    0.848508 
invSE_stu~42 |      1.18    0.850638 
invSE_stu~17 |      1.18    0.850767 
invSE_stu~28 |      1.17    0.851101 
invSE_stu~20 |      1.17    0.851756 
invSE_stu~38 |      1.17    0.853118 
invSE_study4 |      1.17    0.853292 
invSE_study3 |      1.16    0.862211 
invSE_study2 |      1.16    0.864532 
invSE_study6 |      1.15    0.866275 
invSE_stu~41 |      1.15    0.871800 
invSE_stu~10 |      1.14    0.875436 
invSE_stu~43 |      1.10    0.906014 
invSE_stu~48 |      1.08    0.925218 
-------------+---------------------- 
    Mean VIF |      1.40 
 
.  
. estat ovtest 
 
Ramsey RESET test using powers of the fitted values of t 
       Ho:  model has no omitted variables 
                 F(3, 915) =      6.54 
                  Prob > F =      0.0002 
 
 
Appendix 3.4.2 By Type of Study 
 
A. Output-Growth Studies 
*WLS, output-growth studies 
. regress t invSE if t>-7.138112 & t<=6.973776  & growth==1 [aweight=weights], 
vce(cluster idstudy) 
(sum of wgt is   3.8212e+01) 
 
Linear regression                                      Number of obs =     850 
                                                       F(  1,    40) =    0.61 
                                                       Prob > F      =  0.4400 
                                                       R-squared     =  0.0016 
                                                       Root MSE      =  2.3595 
 
                               (Std. Err. adjusted for 41 clusters in idstudy) 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
             |               Robust 
           t |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
       invSE |  -.0081382   .0104339    -0.78   0.440    -.0292259    .0129495 
       _cons |   .3414777   .2460163     1.39   0.173    -.1557398    .8386951 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 
.  
. outreg2 using 21oct3.doc 
21oct3.doc 
dir : seeout 
 
.  
. vif  
 
    Variable |       VIF       1/VIF   
-------------+---------------------- 
       invSE |      1.00    1.000000 
-------------+---------------------- 
    Mean VIF |      1.00 
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.  
. estat ovtest 
 
Ramsey RESET test using powers of the fitted values of t 
       Ho:  model has no omitted variables 
                 F(3, 845) =      0.44 
                  Prob > F =      0.7228 
 
 
*FE, output-growth studies 
 
. regress t invSE invSE_study1 invSE_study2 invSE_study3 invSE_study4 invSE_study5 
invSE_study6 invSE_study8 invSE_study9 invSE_study10 invSE_study11 invSE_study13 
invSE_study14 invSE_study16 invSE_study17 invSE_study18 invSE_study19 invSE_study20 
invSE_study21 invSE_study22 invSE_study24 invSE_study26 invSE_study27 invSE_study28 
invSE_study29 invSE_study30 invSE_study31 invSE_study33 invSE_study34 invSE_study35 
invSE_study36 invSE_study37 invSE_study38 invSE_study39 invSE_study41 invSE_study42 
invSE_study43 invSE_study48 invSE_study49 if t>-7.138112 & t<=6.973776 & growth==1  
[aweight=weights], vce(cluster idstudy) 
(sum of wgt is   3.8212e+01) 
 
Linear regression                                      Number of obs =     850 
                                                       F(  1,    40) =       . 
                                                       Prob > F      =       . 
                                                       R-squared     =  0.2798 
                                                       Root MSE      =  2.0505 
 
                                (Std. Err. adjusted for 41 clusters in idstudy) 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
              |               Robust 
            t |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
--------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
        invSE |    -.03478   .0185071    -1.88   0.068    -.0721842    .0026243 
 invSE_study1 |  -.1259902   .0373532    -3.37   0.002    -.2014839   -.0504965 
 invSE_study2 |   .0002061   .0219174     0.01   0.993    -.0440906    .0445029 
 invSE_study3 |  -.0695276   .0250557    -2.77   0.008    -.1201671   -.0188881 
 invSE_study4 |   .0966375   .0204307     4.73   0.000     .0553456    .1379294 
 invSE_study5 |   .1278098   .0134592     9.50   0.000     .1006078    .1550118 
 invSE_study6 |   .4696146   .0577343     8.13   0.000     .3529293       .5863 
 invSE_study8 |   .1767132   .0390286     4.53   0.000     .0978334     .255593 
 invSE_study9 |  -.1604212   .0401043    -4.00   0.000     -.241475   -.0793674 
invSE_study10 |    .135722   .0205185     6.61   0.000     .0942526    .1771913 
invSE_study11 |     .01236   .0152793     0.81   0.423    -.0185207    .0432407 
invSE_study13 |   .0710745   .0420926     1.69   0.099    -.0139978    .1561469 
invSE_study14 |    .166622     .06988     2.38   0.022     .0253893    .3078547 
invSE_study16 |   .3321206   .0792342     4.19   0.000     .1719824    .4922589 
invSE_study17 |   .1005123   .0210388     4.78   0.000     .0579913    .1430333 
invSE_study18 |  -.0107691   .0169877    -0.63   0.530    -.0451025    .0235644 
invSE_study19 |   .3298723   .0525499     6.28   0.000      .223665    .4360796 
invSE_study20 |   .0035718   .0181046     0.20   0.845     -.033019    .0401626 
invSE_study21 |   .0871255   .0840758     1.04   0.306     -.082798    .2570491 
invSE_study22 |  -.0078131    .052052    -0.15   0.881     -.113014    .0973879 
invSE_study24 |   .0649139   .0124409     5.22   0.000     .0397699     .090058 
invSE_study26 |  -.0488803   .0171418    -2.85   0.007    -.0835253   -.0142354 
invSE_study27 |   .0302554   .0172966     1.75   0.088    -.0047023    .0652131 
invSE_study28 |   .2483344   .0205148    12.11   0.000     .2068725    .2897963 
invSE_study29 |  -.1718916   .0986406    -1.74   0.089    -.3712516    .0274685 
invSE_study30 |   .0307328   .0144868     2.12   0.040     .0014539    .0600117 
invSE_study31 |  -.0644368   .0977727    -0.66   0.514    -.2620428    .1331691 
invSE_study33 |   .0125698   .0127214     0.99   0.329     -.013141    .0382806 
invSE_study34 |  -.0201462   .0143038    -1.41   0.167    -.0490553    .0087628 
invSE_study35 |  -.0165049   .0342573    -0.48   0.633    -.0857415    .0527316 
invSE_study36 |   .1368833   .0167243     8.18   0.000     .1030824    .1706843 
invSE_study37 |  -.0007903    .042229    -0.02   0.985    -.0861382    .0845576 
invSE_study38 |  -.1229445   .0237352    -5.18   0.000    -.1709152   -.0749738 
invSE_study39 |  -.1128806   .0413794    -2.73   0.009    -.1965115   -.0292498 
invSE_study41 |   .0394725   .0249824     1.58   0.122    -.0110187    .0899637 
invSE_study42 |  -.1446191   .0205545    -7.04   0.000    -.1861612   -.1030769 
invSE_study43 |  -.0439219   .0221766    -1.98   0.055    -.0887424    .0008987 
invSE_study48 |   .0365709   .0279908     1.31   0.199    -.0200007    .0931425 
invSE_study49 |   .0061966   .0131051     0.47   0.639    -.0202899     .032683 
        _cons |   .2872016   .4323113     0.66   0.510    -.5865321    1.160935 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
 
.  
. outreg2 using 21oct3.doc 
21oct3.doc 
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dir : seeout 
. vif 
 
    Variable |       VIF       1/VIF   
-------------+---------------------- 
       invSE |      6.42    0.155733 
invSE_stu~30 |      4.60    0.217187 
invSE_stu~24 |      1.47    0.679406 
invSE_stu~31 |      1.31    0.762126 
invSE_stu~29 |      1.31    0.766264 
invSE_stu~21 |      1.30    0.770835 
invSE_stu~14 |      1.28    0.780606 
invSE_stu~49 |      1.27    0.786472 
invSE_stu~16 |      1.26    0.790835 
invSE_stu~33 |      1.26    0.793131 
invSE_study5 |      1.26    0.793275 
invSE_stu~19 |      1.25    0.798079 
invSE_stu~22 |      1.24    0.806860 
invSE_stu~13 |      1.23    0.812417 
invSE_stu~39 |      1.23    0.813373 
invSE_study9 |      1.23    0.815377 
invSE_study8 |      1.22    0.822384 
invSE_study1 |      1.21    0.828162 
invSE_stu~35 |      1.20    0.834266 
invSE_stu~36 |      1.19    0.837632 
invSE_stu~11 |      1.19    0.838471 
invSE_stu~18 |      1.19    0.838664 
invSE_stu~27 |      1.19    0.840124 
invSE_stu~26 |      1.19    0.843158 
invSE_stu~17 |      1.18    0.844425 
invSE_stu~38 |      1.18    0.844524 
invSE_stu~42 |      1.18    0.844770 
invSE_stu~28 |      1.18    0.845285 
invSE_study4 |      1.18    0.847616 
invSE_stu~20 |      1.18    0.848587 
invSE_stu~34 |      1.18    0.848903 
invSE_study6 |      1.18    0.849852 
invSE_study3 |      1.17    0.853092 
invSE_study2 |      1.17    0.857830 
invSE_stu~41 |      1.16    0.863204 
invSE_stu~10 |      1.15    0.870282 
invSE_stu~37 |      1.12    0.895242 
invSE_stu~43 |      1.11    0.900796 
invSE_stu~48 |      1.09    0.918683 
-------------+---------------------- 
    Mean VIF |      1.43 
 
.  
. estat ovtest 
 
Ramsey RESET test using powers of the fitted values of t 
       Ho:  model has no omitted variables 
                 F(3, 807) =      4.33 
                  Prob > F =      0.0049 
 
 
B. Output-Level Studies 
 
 
. regress t invSE if t>-7.138112 & t<=6.973776  & level==1 [aweight=weights], 
vce(cluster idstudy) 
(sum of wgt is   8.0323e+00) 
 
Linear regression                                      Number of obs =     104 
                                                       F(  1,     9) =    7.25 
                                                       Prob > F      =  0.0247 
                                                       R-squared     =  0.1050 
                                                       Root MSE      =  2.3953 
 
                               (Std. Err. adjusted for 10 clusters in idstudy) 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
             |               Robust 
           t |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
       invSE |  -.0995338    .036959    -2.69   0.025    -.1831409   -.0159267 
       _cons |   1.728061   .7799853     2.22   0.054    -.0363885     3.49251 
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------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 
.  
end of do-file 
 
. do "C:\Users\PERDOR~1\AppData\Local\Temp\STD01000000.tmp" 
 
. estat ovtest 
 
Ramsey RESET test using powers of the fitted values of t 
       Ho:  model has no omitted variables 
                  F(3, 99) =      5.49 
                  Prob > F =      0.0016 
 
. vif  
 
    Variable |       VIF       1/VIF   
-------------+---------------------- 
       invSE |      1.00    1.000000 
-------------+---------------------- 
    Mean VIF |      1.00 
 
 
. regress t invSE invSE_study11 study_33 invSE_study37  invSE_study40  invSE_study45 
invSE_study46  study_47 if t>-7.138112 & t<=6.973776 & level==1 [ 
> aweight=weights], vce(cluster idstudy) 
(sum of wgt is   8.0323e+00) 
 
Linear regression                                      Number of obs =     104 
                                                       F(  1,     9) =       . 
                                                       Prob > F      =       . 
                                                       R-squared     =  0.5201 
                                                       Root MSE      =  1.8174 
 
                                (Std. Err. adjusted for 10 clusters in idstudy) 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
              |               Robust 
            t |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
--------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
        invSE |  -.0854166   .0254267    -3.36   0.008    -.1429358   -.0278974 
invSE_study11 |  -.0534097   .0145376    -3.67   0.005     -.086296   -.0205234 
     study_33 |  -1.549798   .3400024    -4.56   0.001    -2.318937   -.7806589 
invSE_study37 |  -.1480999   .0475131    -3.12   0.012     -.255582   -.0406179 
invSE_study40 |  -.2949418   .0833107    -3.54   0.006    -.4834037   -.1064799 
invSE_study45 |    .271415   .1133645     2.39   0.040     .0149668    .5278632 
invSE_study46 |   .4843564   .0528075     9.17   0.000     .3648977    .6038152 
     study_47 |  -1.791869   .4616823    -3.88   0.004    -2.836267   -.7474705 
        _cons |   1.619086    .537267     3.01   0.015      .403704    2.834469 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
 
.  
end of do-file 
 
. do "C:\Users\PERDOR~1\AppData\Local\Temp\STD01000000.tmp" 
 
. estat ovtest 
 
Ramsey RESET test using powers of the fitted values of t 
       Ho:  model has no omitted variables 
                  F(3, 92) =      6.25 
                  Prob > F =      0.0007 
 
. vif 
 
    Variable |       VIF       1/VIF   
-------------+---------------------- 
       invSE |      1.80    0.554392 
    study_47 |      1.39    0.718007 
invSE_stu~45 |      1.37    0.730174 
    study_33 |      1.34    0.747266 
invSE_stu~40 |      1.32    0.758098 
invSE_stu~46 |      1.23    0.812068 
invSE_stu~37 |      1.12    0.890982 
invSE_stu~11 |      1.01    0.987202 
-------------+---------------------- 
    Mean VIF |      1.32 
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Appendix 3.4.3 Robustness Check 
 
 
A. Full Sample 
 
. rreg t invSE 
 
   Huber iteration 1:  maximum difference in weights = .80333214 
   Huber iteration 2:  maximum difference in weights = .19541016 
   Huber iteration 3:  maximum difference in weights = .0379409 
Biweight iteration 4:  maximum difference in weights = .22027368 
Biweight iteration 5:  maximum difference in weights = .02829757 
Biweight iteration 6:  maximum difference in weights = .00793258 
 
Robust regression                                      Number of obs =    1001 
                                                       F(  1,   998) =    0.23 
                                                       Prob > F      =  0.6348 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
           t |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
       invSE |   -.002358   .0049623    -0.48   0.635    -.0120957    .0073798 
       _cons |   -.041733   .1231459    -0.34   0.735    -.2833876    .1999216 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 
B. Output-Growth Studies 
. rreg t invSE if growth ==1 
 
   Huber iteration 1:  maximum difference in weights = .79909233 
   Huber iteration 2:  maximum difference in weights = .19432345 
   Huber iteration 3:  maximum difference in weights = .0311748 
Biweight iteration 4:  maximum difference in weights = .21456302 
Biweight iteration 5:  maximum difference in weights = .0358598 
Biweight iteration 6:  maximum difference in weights = .00591671 
 
Robust regression                                      Number of obs =     884 
                                                       F(  1,   882) =    0.00 
                                                       Prob > F      =  0.9560 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
           t |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
       invSE |  -.0002869   .0051934    -0.06   0.956    -.0104798     .009906 
       _cons |  -.1346171   .1354307    -0.99   0.320    -.4004211    .1311869 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 
C. Output-Level Studies 
. rreg t invSE if level ==1 
 
   Huber iteration 1:  maximum difference in weights = .51953603 
   Huber iteration 2:  maximum difference in weights = .08708258 
   Huber iteration 3:  maximum difference in weights = .02007069 
Biweight iteration 4:  maximum difference in weights = .15509184 
Biweight iteration 5:  maximum difference in weights = .01126612 
Biweight iteration 6:  maximum difference in weights = .0044583 
 
Robust regression                                      Number of obs =     104 
                                                       F(  1,   102) =    2.48 
                                                       Prob > F      =  0.1181 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
           t |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
       invSE |  -.0539534   .0342299    -1.58   0.118    -.1218483    .0139415 
       _cons |   .7614895   .4036946     1.89   0.062    -.0392368    1.562216 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
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Appendix 3.5 Multivariate MRA 
 
Appendix 3.5.1 Full Sample 
a) WLS 
 
****************************Full Sample***************************************** 
  
.  
. *1* wls(positive publication bias and negative genuine effect) 
 
.  
. reg t invSE published puby_se finsupport cross_se timeseries_se ols_se dynamic_se 
iv_se othertech_se longrun_se mixed_se developing_se transition_se endog_se 
nonlinear_se national_se imf_se unitary_se  fdrev_se fdexprev_se  threefd_se 
otherfd_se level_se othery_se  span_se nexplanatory_se if t>-7.138112 & t<=6.973776  
[aweight=weights], vce(cluster idstudy) 
(sum of wgt is   4.7462e+01) 
 
Linear regression                                      Number of obs =     966 
                                                       F( 27,    48) =   10.21 
                                                       Prob > F      =  0.0000 
                                                       R-squared     =  0.1485 
                                                       Root MSE      =  2.2478 
 
                                  (Std. Err. adjusted for 49 clusters in idstudy) 
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
                |               Robust 
              t |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
----------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
          invSE |  -.0328132   .0500937    -0.66   0.516    -.1335332    .0679069 
      published |   .7266646   .3716102     1.96   0.056    -.0205079    1.473837 
        puby_se |    .005907   .0050357     1.17   0.247    -.0042178    .0160319 
     finsupport |  -2.446936   .6034069    -4.06   0.000    -3.660167   -1.233705 
       cross_se |  -.1182092   .0810379    -1.46   0.151    -.2811469    .0447285 
  timeseries_se |   .2320874   .1720986     1.35   0.184    -.1139399    .5781148 
         ols_se |  -.0264415   .0310018    -0.85   0.398    -.0887748    .0358919 
     dynamic_se |    .000616   .0685177     0.01   0.993    -.1371481    .1383802 
          iv_se |  -.0012782     .04872    -0.03   0.979    -.0992364    .0966799 
   othertech_se |  -.0293212   .0941917    -0.31   0.757    -.2187063     .160064 
     longrun_se |  -.0191876   .0348289    -0.55   0.584    -.0892159    .0508406 
       mixed_se |   .0259188   .0237328     1.09   0.280    -.0217993    .0736368 
  developing_se |   .0212738   .0109748     1.94   0.058    -.0007926    .0433402 
  transition_se |   .0342558   .0510641     0.67   0.506    -.0684155    .1369272 
       endog_se |   .0173012   .0295165     0.59   0.561    -.0420458    .0766482 
   nonlinear_se |   .0107708   .0325986     0.33   0.743    -.0547732    .0763147 
    national_se |  -.0873612   .0421644    -2.07   0.044    -.1721384    -.002584 
         imf_se |   .0677723   .0449375     1.51   0.138    -.0225806    .1581252 
     unitary_se |  -.0248098   .0417621    -0.59   0.555    -.1087781    .0591585 
       fdrev_se |  -.0306688   .0237581    -1.29   0.203    -.0784377    .0171001 
    fdexprev_se |  -.0363951   .0419444    -0.87   0.390      -.12073    .0479398 
     threefd_se |  -.2185626   .0696024    -3.14   0.003    -.3585076   -.0786176 
     otherfd_se |   .0044974   .0364677     0.12   0.902    -.0688258    .0778206 
       level_se |  -.0623799   .0256125    -2.44   0.019    -.1138772   -.0108825 
      othery_se |  -.1165163   .0389982    -2.99   0.004    -.1949274   -.0381052 
        span_se |   .0217177   .0158459     1.37   0.177    -.0101427    .0535781 
nexplanatory_se |  -.0018906   .0008981    -2.11   0.041    -.0036963   -.0000849 
          _cons |   .2459775   .4285345     0.57   0.569    -.6156488    1.107604 
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
 
.  
. outreg2 using finalchapter4.doc 
finalchapter4.doc 
dir : seeout 
 
.  
. lincom _cons + 0.6693307*published + 0.1018981*finsupport 
 
 ( 1)  .6693307*published + .1018981*finsupport + _cons = 0 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
           t |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
         (1) |   .4830183   .3546012     1.36   0.180    -.2299552    1.195992 
320 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 
.  
. lincom invSE + 9.809191*puby_se + 0.0539461*timeseries_se + 0.0729271*cross_se 
+0.2477522*ols_se + 0.3091317*dynamic_se>  + 0.0529471*othertech_se + 
0.3086913*longrun_se + 0.021978*mixed_se + 0.1038961*developing_se + 
0.1928072*transition_s> e + 0.2997003*endog_se + 0.2117882*nonlinear_se + 
0.5184815*national_se + 0.2317682*imf_se +0.3586414*unitary_se + 0.2117882*fdrev_se + 
0.1558442*fdexprev + 0.0649351*threefd + 0.2237762*otherfd_se + 0.1038961*level_se + 
0.013986*othery_se + 0.36*span_se +8.69*nexplanatory_se 
 
 ( 1)  invSE + 9.809191*puby_se + .0729271*cross_se + .0539461*timeseries_se + 
.2477522*ols_se + .3091317*dynamic_se +        .0529471*othertech_se + 
.3086913*longrun_se + .021978*mixed_se + .1038961*developing_se + 
.1928072*transition_se +       .2997003*endog_se + .2117882*nonlinear_se + 
.5184815*national_se + .2317682*imf_se + .3586414*unitary_se +       
.2117882*fdrev_se + .1558442*fdexprev_se + .0649351*threefd_se + .2237762*otherfd_se 
+ .1038961*level_se +       .013986*othery_se + .36*span_se + 8.69*nexplanatory_se = 
0 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
           t |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
         (1) |  -.0485157   .0267608    -1.81   0.076     -.102322    .0052906 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 
.  
. vif 
 
    Variable |       VIF       1/VIF   
-------------+---------------------- 
       invSE |     18.09    0.055276 
     puby_se |     15.68    0.063791 
      imf_se |      6.93    0.144233 
 national_se |      6.18    0.161925 
  unitary_se |      5.72    0.174755 
      ols_se |      5.13    0.194935 
transition~e |      3.93    0.254735 
    endog_se |      3.91    0.255570 
       iv_se |      3.40    0.294093 
  otherfd_se |      2.62    0.381061 
  dynamic_se |      2.52    0.397498 
 fdexprev_se |      2.43    0.410969 
nexplanato~e |      2.34    0.428111 
    level_se |      2.32    0.430440 
  longrun_se |      2.13    0.469140 
     span_se |      2.13    0.470066 
timeseries~e |      2.06    0.484303 
    mixed_se |      2.05    0.487176 
othertech_se |      1.77    0.563406 
  finsupport |      1.69    0.590191 
  threefd_se |      1.67    0.600312 
nonlinear_se |      1.61    0.620472 
    fdrev_se |      1.50    0.664491 
    cross_se |      1.48    0.676583 
developing~e |      1.44    0.696839 
   published |      1.36    0.735096 
   othery_se |      1.27    0.786687 
-------------+---------------------- 
    Mean VIF |      3.83 
 
.  
. estat ovtest 
 
Ramsey RESET test using powers of the fitted values of t 
       Ho:  model has no omitted variables 
                 F(3, 935) =     16.74 
                  Prob > F =      0.0000 
.  
 
 
.  
b) FE 
.  
. *2* fe 
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.  
. reg t invSE published puby_se finsupport  developing_se national_se imf_se 
threefd_se level_se othery_se   invSE_study3 
>  invSE_study5 invSE_study6 invSE_study8 invSE_study9  invSE_study11  invSE_study14 
invSE_study15 invSE_study16 invSE_st 
> udy17  invSE_study19 invSE_study22 invSE_study24 invSE_study25 invSE_study27 
invSE_study32 invSE_study33 invSE_study35  
>  invSE_study37 invSE_study39 invSE_study40 invSE_study41 invSE_study43 
invSE_study45 invSE_study46 invSE_study47 if t>- 
> 7.138112 & t<=6.973776  [aweight=weights], vce(cluster idstudy) 
(sum of wgt is   4.7462e+01) 
 
Linear regression                                      Number of obs =     966 
                                                       F(  9,    48) =       . 
                                                       Prob > F      =       . 
                                                       R-squared     =  0.2906 
                                                       Root MSE      =  2.0617 
 
                                (Std. Err. adjusted for 49 clusters in idstudy) 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
              |               Robust 
            t |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
--------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
        invSE |  -.0961189   .0238847    -4.02   0.000    -.1441424   -.0480954 
    published |   1.211209   .3484219     3.48   0.001     .5106599    1.911758 
      puby_se |   .0107809   .0024119     4.47   0.000     .0059315    .0156303 
   finsupport |  -2.194593   .2536155    -8.65   0.000    -2.704521   -1.684665 
developing_se |   .0140633   .0091306     1.54   0.130    -.0042949    .0324215 
  national_se |  -.1267055    .021155    -5.99   0.000    -.1692405   -.0841704 
       imf_se |    .143452   .0202597     7.08   0.000     .1027171    .1841868 
   threefd_se |  -.2282868    .039408    -5.79   0.000     -.307522   -.1490517 
     level_se |  -.0462935   .0171308    -2.70   0.009    -.0807373   -.0118497 
    othery_se |  -.1827798   .0231529    -7.89   0.000    -.2293319   -.1362278 
 invSE_study3 |   -.071097   .0372926    -1.91   0.063    -.1460788    .0038848 
 invSE_study5 |   .1286011   .0247348     5.20   0.000     .0788685    .1783337 
 invSE_study6 |    .522637   .0504206    10.37   0.000     .4212596    .6240143 
 invSE_study8 |   .1097836   .0422036     2.60   0.012     .0249276    .1946397 
 invSE_study9 |  -.0940969   .0270399    -3.48   0.001    -.1484643   -.0397295 
invSE_study11 |   .0140208   .0111237     1.26   0.214    -.0083449    .0363865 
invSE_study14 |   .3898926   .0468835     8.32   0.000     .2956271    .4841582 
invSE_study15 |   .1318688   .0367162     3.59   0.001      .058046    .2056915 
invSE_study16 |   .1725691   .0695648     2.48   0.017     .0326997    .3124385 
invSE_study17 |    .117001   .0154656     7.57   0.000     .0859053    .1480968 
invSE_study19 |   .1933135   .0408255     4.74   0.000     .1112283    .2753988 
invSE_study22 |   .1006232   .0331986     3.03   0.004     .0338729    .1673734 
invSE_study24 |   .0452485   .0094915     4.77   0.000     .0261644    .0643325 
invSE_study25 |   .1833087   .0394908     4.64   0.000     .1039071    .2627104 
invSE_study27 |  -.0542084   .0220793    -2.46   0.018    -.0986018    -.009815 
invSE_study32 |  -.0786206   .0204369    -3.85   0.000    -.1197118   -.0375294 
invSE_study33 |  -.0463675   .0115488    -4.01   0.000    -.0695878   -.0231472 
invSE_study35 |  -.1514937   .0351205    -4.31   0.000    -.2221083   -.0808791 
invSE_study37 |   .0597954   .0310299     1.93   0.060    -.0025944    .1221852 
invSE_study39 |  -.2588862   .0403078    -6.42   0.000    -.3399305    -.177842 
invSE_study40 |  -.1160304   .0384719    -3.02   0.004    -.1933834   -.0386775 
invSE_study41 |  -.1054078   .0272989    -3.86   0.000    -.1602959   -.0505197 
invSE_study43 |  -.0540022   .0104506    -5.17   0.000    -.0750147   -.0329898 
invSE_study45 |   .7668493   .0698362    10.98   0.000     .6264342    .9072643 
invSE_study46 |   .4708035   .0332819    14.15   0.000     .4038858    .5377212 
invSE_study47 |  -.3009923   .0604905    -4.98   0.000    -.4226166   -.1793681 
        _cons |  -.2920164   .2581995    -1.13   0.264    -.8111613    .2271286 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
 
. outreg2 using finalchapter4.doc 
finalchapter4.doc 
dir : seeout 
 
.  
. lincom _cons + 0.6693307*published + 0.1018981*finsupport 
 
 ( 1)  .6693307*published + .1018981*finsupport + _cons = 0 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
           t |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
         (1) |   .2950581   .2429937     1.21   0.231    -.1935134    .7836297 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
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.  
. lincom invSE + 9.809191*puby_se +0.1038961*developing_se + 0.5184815*national_se + 
0.2317682*imf_se + 0.0649351*threefd 
>  + 0.1038961*level_se + 0.013986*othery_se + 0.04995*invSE_study3 
+0.011988*invSE_study5 + 0.002997*invSE_study6 +0.01998* invSE_study8 + 
0.005994*invSE_study9 + 0.007992*invSE_study11 + 0.007992*invSE_study14 + 
0.011988*invSE_study15 + 0 .013986*invSE_study16 + 0.002997*invSE_study17 + 
0.001998*invSE_study19 + 0.02997*invSE_study22 + 0.005994*invSE_study24 + 
0.003996*invSE_study25 + 0.031968*invSE_study27 + 0.007992*invSE_study32 + 
0.007992*invSE_study33 + 0.025974*invSE_study35 + 0.0679321*invSE_study37 + 
0.017982*invSE_study39 + 0.003996*invSE_study40 + 0.011988*invSE_study41 
+0.025974*invSE_study43 + 0.001998*invSE_study45 + 0.003996*invSE_study46 + 
0.011988*invSE_study47 
 
 ( 1)  invSE + 9.809191*puby_se + .1038961*developing_se + .5184815*national_se + 
.2317682*imf_se + .0649351*threefd_se +       .1038961*level_se + .013986*othery_se + 
.04995*invSE_study3 + .011988*invSE_study5 + .002997*invSE_study6 +       
.01998*invSE_study8 + .005994*invSE_study9 + .007992*invSE_study11 + 
.007992*invSE_study14 + .011988*invSE_study15       + .013986*invSE_study16 + 
.002997*invSE_study17 + .001998*invSE_study19 + .02997*invSE_study22 +       
.005994*invSE_study24 + .003996*invSE_study25 + .031968*invSE_study27 + 
.007992*invSE_study32 +       .007992*invSE_study33 + .025974*invSE_study35 + 
.0679321*invSE_study37 + .017982*invSE_study39 +       .003996*invSE_study40 + 
.011988*invSE_study41 + .025974*invSE_study43 + .001998*invSE_study45 +       
.003996*invSE_study46 + .011988*invSE_study47 = 0 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
           t |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
         (1) |  -.0409624   .0183937    -2.23   0.031    -.0779455   -.0039794 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 
.  
. vif 
 
    Variable |       VIF       1/VIF   
-------------+---------------------- 
     puby_se |     17.56    0.056949 
       invSE |     17.54    0.057017 
      imf_se |      7.69    0.129978 
 national_se |      4.91    0.203529 
   othery_se |      4.63    0.216122 
invSE_stu~15 |      4.61    0.216937 
   published |      3.07    0.325968 
invSE_study5 |      1.75    0.571692 
    level_se |      1.52    0.658504 
invSE_stu~33 |      1.52    0.659130 
developing~e |      1.37    0.731086 
invSE_study3 |      1.35    0.741144 
invSE_stu~45 |      1.32    0.755819 
invSE_stu~14 |      1.31    0.762185 
invSE_stu~11 |      1.31    0.763247 
invSE_stu~37 |      1.30    0.771236 
invSE_study9 |      1.26    0.794858 
  threefd_se |      1.25    0.799072 
invSE_stu~22 |      1.25    0.801139 
invSE_stu~17 |      1.22    0.817760 
  finsupport |      1.21    0.827434 
invSE_stu~41 |      1.20    0.831237 
invSE_stu~24 |      1.19    0.840364 
invSE_stu~46 |      1.19    0.840671 
invSE_stu~32 |      1.13    0.882564 
invSE_stu~25 |      1.13    0.884245 
invSE_study6 |      1.13    0.887777 
invSE_study8 |      1.13    0.888683 
invSE_stu~27 |      1.11    0.901440 
invSE_stu~40 |      1.11    0.903258 
invSE_stu~43 |      1.10    0.906366 
invSE_stu~39 |      1.10    0.909515 
invSE_stu~47 |      1.10    0.911386 
invSE_stu~35 |      1.10    0.912221 
invSE_stu~16 |      1.09    0.921044 
invSE_stu~19 |      1.08    0.926321 
-------------+---------------------- 
    Mean VIF |      2.66 
. estat ovtest 
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Ramsey RESET test using powers of the fitted values of t 
       Ho:  model has no omitted variables 
                 F(3, 926) =      9.49 
                  Prob > F =      0.0000 
 
.  
.  
c) Robust Regression  
 
. *3* robust regression 
.  
  
.  
. rreg t invSE published puby_se finsupport cross_se timeseries_se ols_se dynamic_se 
iv_se othertech_se longrun_se mixed_ 
> se developing_se transition_se endog_se nonlinear_se national_se imf_se unitary_se  
fdrev_se fdexprev_se  threefd_se ot 
> herfd_se level_se othery_se  span_se nexplanatory_se 
 
   Huber iteration 1:  maximum difference in weights = .79780456 
   Huber iteration 2:  maximum difference in weights = .40190513 
   Huber iteration 3:  maximum difference in weights = .15121793 
   Huber iteration 4:  maximum difference in weights = .02704883 
Biweight iteration 5:  maximum difference in weights = .28722488 
Biweight iteration 6:  maximum difference in weights = .12459166 
Biweight iteration 7:  maximum difference in weights = .04463399 
Biweight iteration 8:  maximum difference in weights = .06053218 
Biweight iteration 9:  maximum difference in weights = .07969939 
Biweight iteration 10:  maximum difference in weights = .08538206 
Biweight iteration 11:  maximum difference in weights = .08572206 
Biweight iteration 12:  maximum difference in weights = .07112616 
Biweight iteration 13:  maximum difference in weights = .0388112 
Biweight iteration 14:  maximum difference in weights = .02355848 
Biweight iteration 15:  maximum difference in weights = .01219367 
Biweight iteration 16:  maximum difference in weights = .00794214 
 
Robust regression                                      Number of obs =    1001 
                                                       F( 27,   972) =   11.29 
                                                       Prob > F      =  0.0000 
 
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
              t |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
----------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
          invSE |   .1600016   .0268362     5.96   0.000      .107338    .2126652 
      published |   1.157554   .2194184     5.28   0.000     .7269658    1.588143 
        puby_se |  -.0040113   .0025274    -1.59   0.113    -.0089711    .0009485 
     finsupport |  -1.194885   .4542045    -2.63   0.009    -2.086219   -.3035503 
       cross_se |   -.030698   .0590518    -0.52   0.603    -.1465817    .0851856 
  timeseries_se |   .1375594   .1042383     1.32   0.187    -.0669986    .3421174 
         ols_se |  -.0988456   .0181829    -5.44   0.000    -.1345278   -.0631633 
     dynamic_se |   .0336894   .0272808     1.23   0.217    -.0198468    .0872255 
          iv_se |   .0322582    .043738     0.74   0.461    -.0535736    .1180901 
   othertech_se |  -.0342489   .0903404    -0.38   0.705    -.2115336    .1430358 
     longrun_se |   .0093112   .0212445     0.44   0.661    -.0323791    .0510014 
       mixed_se |   .0148483   .0297432     0.50   0.618      -.04352    .0732165 
  developing_se |    .020186   .0094356     2.14   0.033     .0016695    .0387026 
  transition_se |  -.0567702   .0290658    -1.95   0.051    -.1138091    .0002686 
       endog_se |  -.0819105   .0221183    -3.70   0.000    -.1253155   -.0385055 
   nonlinear_se |   .0951449   .0176361     5.39   0.000     .0605357    .1297541 
    national_se |  -.1227907   .0243632    -5.04   0.000    -.1706011   -.0749802 
         imf_se |   -.031428   .0265097    -1.19   0.236    -.0834508    .0205947 
     unitary_se |  -.0956827   .0247904    -3.86   0.000    -.1443317   -.0470338 
       fdrev_se |  -.0073263   .0175475    -0.42   0.676    -.0417616    .0271091 
    fdexprev_se |   .0160784   .0243219     0.66   0.509    -.0316511    .0638078 
     threefd_se |   .0352744    .039666     0.89   0.374    -.0425664    .1131151 
     otherfd_se |   .0331761   .0195392     1.70   0.090    -.0051677    .0715199 
       level_se |   -.041237   .0274835    -1.50   0.134    -.0951709    .0126968 
      othery_se |  -.0989288   .0820167    -1.21   0.228    -.2598789    .0620214 
        span_se |    .006643   .0082108     0.81   0.419      -.00947     .022756 
nexplanatory_se |  -.0024837   .0008708    -2.85   0.004    -.0041926   -.0007748 
          _cons |  -.7656064   .2642305    -2.90   0.004    -1.284134   -.2470785 
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
 
.  
. outreg2 using finalchapter4.doc 
finalchapter4.doc 
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dir : seeout 
 
Appendix 3.4.2 Output-Growth Studies  
a) WLS 
 
 
. ****************************Output-Growth*************************************** 
 
.  
. *4* wls(positive publication bias and negative genuine effect)WLS 
 
.  
. regress t invSE published puby_se finsupport cross_se timeseries_se ols_se 
dynamic_se iv_se othertech_se longrun_se mix 
> ed_se developing_se transition_se endog_se nonlinear_se national_se imf_se 
unitary_se  fdrev_se fdexprev_se  threefd_se 
>  otherfd_se  span_se nexplanatory_se if t>-7.138112 & t<=6.973776 & growth==1  
[aweight=weights], vce(cluster idstudy) 
(sum of wgt is   3.8212e+01) 
 
Linear regression                                      Number of obs =     850 
                                                       F( 24,    40) =       . 
                                                       Prob > F      =       . 
                                                       R-squared     =  0.1411 
                                                       Root MSE      =  2.2202 
 
                                  (Std. Err. adjusted for 41 clusters in idstudy) 
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
                |               Robust 
              t |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
----------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
          invSE |  -.0025661   .0521971    -0.05   0.961    -.1080605    .1029282 
      published |   .8363283   .4004686     2.09   0.043     .0269511    1.645706 
        puby_se |   .0033791   .0056839     0.59   0.556    -.0081085    .0148666 
     finsupport |  -2.372474   .6675263    -3.55   0.001    -3.721595   -1.023353 
       cross_se |  -.1375144   .0861728    -1.60   0.118    -.3116761    .0366472 
  timeseries_se |  -.0261869   .1261417    -0.21   0.837    -.2811289    .2287551 
         ols_se |  -.0305917   .0302515    -1.01   0.318    -.0917323     .030549 
     dynamic_se |  -.0158739    .070476    -0.23   0.823    -.1583113    .1265635 
          iv_se |   .0296372   .0462723     0.64   0.526    -.0638826     .123157 
   othertech_se |   .0617069   .0424168     1.45   0.154    -.0240207    .1474345 
     longrun_se |  -.0379974   .0325331    -1.17   0.250    -.1037493    .0277545 
       mixed_se |   .0055246   .0200951     0.27   0.785    -.0350891    .0461382 
  developing_se |   .0153244   .0113398     1.35   0.184    -.0075941    .0382429 
  transition_se |   .0256068   .0470471     0.54   0.589     -.069479    .1206926 
       endog_se |   .0224657   .0295789     0.76   0.452    -.0373155    .0822468 
   nonlinear_se |   .0009448   .0313149     0.03   0.976     -.062345    .0642347 
    national_se |     -.0583   .0416558    -1.40   0.169    -.1424894    .0258895 
         imf_se |   .0204849   .0466995     0.44   0.663    -.0738983    .1148682 
     unitary_se |  -.0296699   .0414918    -0.72   0.479     -.113528    .0541882 
       fdrev_se |  -.0398056   .0237904    -1.67   0.102    -.0878877    .0082766 
    fdexprev_se |  -.0258377   .0437471    -0.59   0.558    -.1142539    .0625785 
     threefd_se |   -.196738   .0774685    -2.54   0.015    -.3533078   -.0401682 
     otherfd_se |   .0170756   .0392706     0.43   0.666    -.0622932    .0964445 
        span_se |    .018343   .0151504     1.21   0.233    -.0122771     .048963 
nexplanatory_se |  -.0018345    .000907    -2.02   0.050    -.0036677   -1.30e-06 
          _cons |   .1924818   .4323765     0.45   0.659    -.6813838    1.066347 
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
 
.  
. outreg2 using finalchapter4.doc 
finalchapter4.doc 
dir : seeout 
 
.  
. lincom _cons + 0.6693307*published + 0.1018981*finsupport 
 
 ( 1)  .6693307*published + .1018981*finsupport + _cons = 0 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
           t |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
         (1) |   .5105114   .3453869     1.48   0.147    -.1875415    1.208564 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
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.  
. lincom invSE + 9.5*puby_se + 0.0539461*timeseries_se + 0.0729271*cross_se 
+0.2477522*ols_se + 0.3091317*dynamic_se + 0. 
> 0719281* iv_se + 0.0529471*othertech_se + 0.3086913*longrun_se + 0.021978*mixed_se 
+ 0.1038961*developing_se + 0.192807 
> 2*transition_se + 0.2997003*endog_se + 0.2117882*nonlinear_se + 
0.5184815*national_se + 0.2317682*imf_se +0.3586414*uni 
> tary_se + 0.2117882*fdrev_se + 0.1558442*fdexprev + 0.0649351*threefd + 
0.2237762*otherfd_se + 0.36*span_se +8.69*nexpl 
> anatory_se 
 
 ( 1)  invSE + 9.5*puby_se + .0729271*cross_se + .0539461*timeseries_se + 
.2477522*ols_se + .3091317*dynamic_se + 
       .0719281*iv_se + .0529471*othertech_se + .3086913*longrun_se + 
.021978*mixed_se + .1038961*developing_se + 
       .1928072*transition_se + .2997003*endog_se + .2117882*nonlinear_se + 
.5184815*national_se + .2317682*imf_se + 
       .3586414*unitary_se + .2117882*fdrev_se + .1558442*fdexprev_se + 
.0649351*threefd_se + .2237762*otherfd_se + 
       .36*span_se + 8.69*nexplanatory_se = 0 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
           t |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
         (1) |   -.054009   .0277763    -1.94   0.059    -.1101469    .0021289 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 
.  
. vif 
 
    Variable |       VIF       1/VIF   
-------------+---------------------- 
       invSE |     19.71    0.050746 
     puby_se |     18.63    0.053676 
      imf_se |      7.65    0.130786 
 national_se |      6.29    0.159019 
  unitary_se |      5.27    0.189721 
      ols_se |      5.18    0.192974 
transition~e |      4.04    0.247453 
    endog_se |      3.32    0.301034 
 fdexprev_se |      2.76    0.362557 
  dynamic_se |      2.54    0.393504 
nexplanato~e |      2.26    0.442442 
  longrun_se |      2.18    0.458972 
  otherfd_se |      2.18    0.459424 
    mixed_se |      2.13    0.470557 
     span_se |      2.08    0.480527 
  threefd_se |      1.81    0.552087 
  finsupport |      1.77    0.565907 
othertech_se |      1.70    0.589702 
nonlinear_se |      1.54    0.647763 
   published |      1.53    0.652957 
    cross_se |      1.52    0.660052 
    fdrev_se |      1.47    0.680299 
developing~e |      1.44    0.694943 
timeseries~e |      1.35    0.739631 
       iv_se |      1.20    0.831038 
-------------+---------------------- 
    Mean VIF |      4.06 
 
.  
. estat ovtest 
 
Ramsey RESET test using powers of the fitted values of t 
       Ho:  model has no omitted variables 
                 F(3, 821) =      1.32 
                  Prob > F =      0.2682 
 
.  
b) FE  
 
. *5* fe no publication bias, but negative genuine effect) 
 
. regress t invSE published puby_se finsupport  developing_se national_se imf_se 
threefd_se nexplanatory_se invSE_study3  
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> invSE_study5 invSE_study6 invSE_study8  invSE_study14 invSE_study16 invSE_study17  
invSE_study19  invSE_study22 invSE_s 
> tudy24 invSE_study27  invSE_study32 invSE_study33  invSE_study35  invSE_study37 
invSE_study39 invSE_study41 invSE_study 
> 43  if t>-7.138112 & t<=6.973776 & growth==1 [aweight=weights], vce(cluster 
idstudy) 
(sum of wgt is   3.8212e+01) 
 
Linear regression                                      Number of obs =     850 
                                                       F(  9,    40) =       . 
                                                       Prob > F      =       . 
                                                       R-squared     =  0.2243 
                                                       Root MSE      =  2.1124 
 
                                  (Std. Err. adjusted for 41 clusters in idstudy) 
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
                |               Robust 
              t |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
----------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
          invSE |  -.0984488   .0299307    -3.29   0.002     -.158941   -.0379566 
      published |   1.329566   .3782338     3.52   0.001     .5651273    2.094005 
        puby_se |   .0109954   .0028874     3.81   0.000     .0051596    .0168311 
     finsupport |  -2.230695   .2775939    -8.04   0.000    -2.791733   -1.669657 
  developing_se |   .0145166   .0103455     1.40   0.168    -.0063924    .0354257 
    national_se |  -.1257923   .0233879    -5.38   0.000     -.173061   -.0785236 
         imf_se |   .1478198   .0250997     5.89   0.000     .0970914    .1985481 
     threefd_se |   -.235956    .040686    -5.80   0.000    -.3181854   -.1537265 
nexplanatory_se |   .0002964   .0009423     0.31   0.755    -.0016081    .0022009 
   invSE_study3 |  -.0677841   .0392073    -1.73   0.092    -.1470251    .0114568 
   invSE_study5 |   .1300984   .0268529     4.84   0.000     .0758266    .1843702 
   invSE_study6 |   .5306005   .0544309     9.75   0.000     .4205916    .6406094 
   invSE_study8 |   .1143823   .0437964     2.61   0.013     .0258666    .2028981 
  invSE_study14 |   .4200998   .0534697     7.86   0.000     .3120335    .5281662 
  invSE_study16 |   .1801288   .0711444     2.53   0.015     .0363407     .323917 
  invSE_study17 |   .1265341   .0166322     7.61   0.000     .0929192     .160149 
  invSE_study19 |   .1922836   .0420963     4.57   0.000     .1072038    .2773635 
  invSE_study22 |   .1218554   .0373967     3.26   0.002     .0462739    .1974369 
  invSE_study24 |   .0478766   .0092268     5.19   0.000     .0292285    .0665246 
  invSE_study27 |   -.059602   .0218327    -2.73   0.009    -.1037275   -.0154765 
  invSE_study32 |  -.0796335   .0197921    -4.02   0.000    -.1196348   -.0396322 
  invSE_study33 |  -.0282435    .010956    -2.58   0.014    -.0503864   -.0061005 
  invSE_study35 |    -.14891   .0374195    -3.98   0.000    -.2245377   -.0732824 
  invSE_study37 |   .0731881    .032951     2.22   0.032     .0065916    .1397847 
  invSE_study39 |  -.2544051   .0447283    -5.69   0.000    -.3448043   -.1640059 
  invSE_study41 |  -.1131896   .0308322    -3.67   0.001    -.1755037   -.0508754 
  invSE_study43 |  -.0538129   .0113018    -4.76   0.000    -.0766547   -.0309711 
          _cons |  -.4582781   .2823581    -1.62   0.112    -1.028945    .1123889 
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
 
.  
. outreg2 using finalchapter4.doc 
finalchapter4.doc 
dir : seeout 
 
.  
. lincom invSE + 9.5*puby_se + 0.1038961*developing_se + 0.5184815*national_se + 
0.2317682*imf_se + 0.0649351*threefd + 8 
> .69*nexplanatory_se +  0.04995*invSE_study3 +0.011988*invSE_study5 + 
0.002997*invSE_study6 +0.01998* invSE_study8 +  0. 
> 007992*invSE_study14  + 0.013986*invSE_study16 + 0.002997*invSE_study17 + 
0.001998*invSE_study19  + 0.02997*invSE_study 
> 22 + 0.005994*invSE_study24  + 0.031968*invSE_study27 + 0.007992*invSE_study32 + 
0.007992*invSE_study33 + 0.025974*invS 
> E_study35 + 0.0679321*invSE_study37 + 0.017982*invSE_study39 + 
0.011988*invSE_study41 +0.025974* invSE_study43 
 
 ( 1)  invSE + 9.5*puby_se + .1038961*developing_se + .5184815*national_se + 
.2317682*imf_se + .0649351*threefd_se + 
       8.69*nexplanatory_se + .04995*invSE_study3 + .011988*invSE_study5 + 
.002997*invSE_study6 + .01998*invSE_study8 + 
       .007992*invSE_study14 + .013986*invSE_study16 + .002997*invSE_study17 + 
.001998*invSE_study19 + 
       .02997*invSE_study22 + .005994*invSE_study24 + .031968*invSE_study27 + 
.007992*invSE_study32 + 
       .007992*invSE_study33 + .025974*invSE_study35 + .0679321*invSE_study37 + 
.017982*invSE_study39 + 
       .011988*invSE_study41 + .025974*invSE_study43 = 0 
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------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
           t |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
         (1) |  -.0325562   .0170171    -1.91   0.063    -.0669491    .0018367 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 
.  
. lincom _cons + 0.6693307*published + 0.1018981*finsupport 
 
 ( 1)  .6693307*published + .1018981*finsupport + _cons = 0 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
           t |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
         (1) |   .2043379   .2550227     0.80   0.428    -.3110822    .7197579 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 
.  
. vif 
 
    Variable |       VIF       1/VIF   
-------------+---------------------- 
      imf_se |      5.44    0.183890 
 national_se |      4.52    0.221264 
nexplanato~e |      3.66    0.272900 
        puby |      3.19    0.313223 
       invSE |      2.81    0.355446 
   published |      2.17    0.461204 
invSE_stu~41 |      1.92    0.520405 
invSE_stu~27 |      1.88    0.533145 
invSE_study3 |      1.34    0.745284 
  threefd_se |      1.32    0.758508 
invSE_study5 |      1.32    0.759861 
developing~e |      1.29    0.773204 
invSE_stu~14 |      1.28    0.778279 
  finsupport |      1.25    0.798457 
invSE_stu~32 |      1.21    0.823468 
invSE_study6 |      1.21    0.824584 
invSE_stu~22 |      1.20    0.835481 
invSE_stu~39 |      1.19    0.838762 
invSE_stu~24 |      1.18    0.850452 
invSE_stu~35 |      1.17    0.853326 
invSE_stu~17 |      1.17    0.853795 
invSE_study8 |      1.13    0.884300 
invSE_stu~43 |      1.12    0.890002 
invSE_stu~37 |      1.12    0.894933 
invSE_stu~19 |      1.09    0.919114 
invSE_stu~16 |      1.08    0.923704 
invSE_stu~33 |      1.08    0.923833 
-------------+---------------------- 
    Mean VIF |      1.79 
 
.  
. estat ovtest 
 
Ramsey RESET test using powers of the fitted values of t 
       Ho:  model has no omitted variables 
                 F(3, 819) =      2.95 
                  Prob > F =      0.0319 
 
 
c) Robust Regression  
 
*6* robust regression  
 
. rreg t invSE published puby_se finsupport cross_se timeseries_se ols_se dynamic_se 
iv_se othertech_se longrun_se mixed_ 
> se developing_se transition_se endog_se nonlinear_se national_se imf_se unitary_se  
fdrev_se fdexprev_se  threefd_se ot 
> herfd_se  span_se nexplanatory_se if growth==1 
 
   Huber iteration 1:  maximum difference in weights = .79798412 
   Huber iteration 2:  maximum difference in weights = .40912522 
   Huber iteration 3:  maximum difference in weights = .14675949 
   Huber iteration 4:  maximum difference in weights = .03139976 
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Biweight iteration 5:  maximum difference in weights = .2865797 
Biweight iteration 6:  maximum difference in weights = .11333882 
Biweight iteration 7:  maximum difference in weights = .14292975 
Biweight iteration 8:  maximum difference in weights = .14197625 
Biweight iteration 9:  maximum difference in weights = .09456283 
Biweight iteration 10:  maximum difference in weights = .0575733 
Biweight iteration 11:  maximum difference in weights = .01996627 
Biweight iteration 12:  maximum difference in weights = .00973629 
 
Robust regression                                      Number of obs =     884 
                                                       F( 25,   858) =   12.95 
                                                       Prob > F      =  0.0000 
 
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
              t |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
----------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
          invSE |   .2220329   .0289861     7.66   0.000     .1651409     .278925 
      published |   1.138017   .2585733     4.40   0.000      .630507    1.645528 
        puby_se |  -.0104856   .0028129    -3.73   0.000    -.0160066   -.0049646 
     finsupport |  -1.215587   .4633233    -2.62   0.009    -2.124967   -.3062073 
       cross_se |  -.0249562   .0641528    -0.39   0.697    -.1508709    .1009585 
  timeseries_se |  -.0161344   .1362198    -0.12   0.906    -.2834974    .2512286 
         ols_se |  -.0920612    .018379    -5.01   0.000    -.1281342   -.0559881 
     dynamic_se |    .014132   .0275193     0.51   0.608     -.039881    .0681449 
          iv_se |    .075544    .060714     1.24   0.214    -.0436215    .1947094 
   othertech_se |   .1036318   .1032638     1.00   0.316    -.0990475    .3063111 
     longrun_se |  -.0061126   .0224174    -0.27   0.785    -.0501119    .0378868 
       mixed_se |  -.0001092   .0301026    -0.00   0.997    -.0591924    .0589741 
  developing_se |    .017776   .0094668     1.88   0.061    -.0008048    .0363569 
  transition_se |  -.1025303   .0297432    -3.45   0.001    -.1609082   -.0441523 
       endog_se |  -.0483438    .022601    -2.14   0.033    -.0927036    -.003984 
   nonlinear_se |     .08331   .0180235     4.62   0.000     .0479347    .1186854 
    national_se |  -.0902983    .025456    -3.55   0.000    -.1402615    -.040335 
         imf_se |  -.0852339   .0288599    -2.95   0.003    -.1418783   -.0285896 
     unitary_se |  -.0660982     .02599    -2.54   0.011    -.1171095   -.0150868 
       fdrev_se |  -.0067153   .0180152    -0.37   0.709    -.0420744    .0286438 
    fdexprev_se |   .0406065   .0260106     1.56   0.119    -.0104454    .0916585 
     threefd_se |   .1010407   .0442283     2.28   0.023     .0142324     .187849 
     otherfd_se |   .0471562   .0207718     2.27   0.023     .0063868    .0879256 
        span_se |   .0054367   .0082559     0.66   0.510    -.0107675    .0216409 
nexplanatory_se |  -.0024776     .00088    -2.82   0.005    -.0042047   -.0007505 
          _cons |  -.9932289   .3049085    -3.26   0.001    -1.591683    -.394775 
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
.  
.  
 
Appendix 3.4.3 Output-Level Studies  
 
a) WLS 
  
 
. *7* wls (positive publication bias and negative genuine effect) 
 
.  
. regress t invSE published puby_se cross_se ols_se imf_se fdrev_se threefd_se if t>-
7.138112 & t<=6.973776 & level==1  [ 
> aweight=weights], vce(cluster idstudy) 
(sum of wgt is   8.0323e+00) 
 
Linear regression                                      Number of obs =     104 
                                                       F(  5,     9) =       . 
                                                       Prob > F      =       . 
                                                       R-squared     =  0.4829 
                                                       Root MSE      =  1.8865 
 
                               (Std. Err. adjusted for 10 clusters in idstudy) 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
             |               Robust 
           t |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
       invSE |   .0423357   .0814332     0.52   0.616    -.1418789    .2265504 
   published |   -1.51973   .7814223    -1.94   0.084     -3.28743    .2479704 
     puby_se |  -.0169139   .0090915    -1.86   0.096    -.0374803    .0036524 
    cross_se |  -.8551241   .1155273    -7.40   0.000    -1.116465   -.5937832 
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      ols_se |   .7018152   .0712906     9.84   0.000     .5405446    .8630858 
      imf_se |   .2011442   .0915031     2.20   0.056    -.0058502    .4081386 
    fdrev_se |   .0642051   .0238585     2.69   0.025     .0102334    .1181769 
  threefd_se |  -.2698023   .0796119    -3.39   0.008     -.449897   -.0897077 
       _cons |   2.335406   .7772339     3.00   0.015     .5771802    4.093631 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 
.  
. outreg2 using finalchapter4.doc 
finalchapter4.doc 
dir : seeout 
 
.  
. lincom invSE+ 12.40*puby_se + 0.0192308*cross_se +0.0576923*ols_se + 
0.3076923*imf_se + 0.1538462*threefd_se + 0.16*fdr 
> ev_se 
 
 ( 1)  invSE + 12.4*puby_se + .0192308*cross_se + .0576923*ols_se + .3076923*imf_se + 
.16*fdrev_se + .1538462*threefd_se 
       = 0 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
           t |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
         (1) |  -.1126969   .0371514    -3.03   0.014    -.1967392   -.0286546 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 
.  
. lincom _cons+ 0.59*published 
 
 ( 1)  .59*published + _cons = 0 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
           t |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
         (1) |   1.438765   .4469919     3.22   0.011      .427599    2.449931 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 
.  
. vif  
 
    Variable |       VIF       1/VIF   
-------------+---------------------- 
     puby_se |     11.25    0.088901 
       invSE |     10.50    0.095280 
      ols_se |      1.72    0.580334 
    cross_se |      1.66    0.602616 
      imf_se |      1.62    0.617662 
   published |      1.57    0.636775 
    fdrev_se |      1.18    0.850476 
  threefd_se |      1.06    0.942631 
-------------+---------------------- 
    Mean VIF |      3.82 
 
.  
. estat ovtest 
 
Ramsey RESET test using powers of the fitted values of t 
       Ho:  model has no omitted variables 
                  F(3, 92) =      5.06 
                  Prob > F =      0.0027 
 
. 
 
  
b)  FE 
 
. *8* fe 
 
.  
. regress t invSE published puby_se cross_se ols_se imf_se fdrev_se threefd_se  
invSE_study37 invSE_study25 invSE_study11 
>  if t>-7.138112 & t<=6.973776 & level==1  [aweight=weights], vce(cluster idstudy) 
(sum of wgt is   8.0323e+00) 
 
Linear regression                                      Number of obs =     104 
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                                                       F(  4,     9) =       . 
                                                       Prob > F      =       . 
                                                       R-squared     =  0.5564 
                                                       Root MSE      =  1.7757 
 
                                (Std. Err. adjusted for 10 clusters in idstudy) 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
              |               Robust 
            t |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
--------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
        invSE |    .150392   .0186267     8.07   0.000     .1082554    .1925285 
    published |   -2.78266   .1756249   -15.84   0.000    -3.179951   -2.385369 
      puby_se |  -.0285834   .0024505   -11.66   0.000    -.0341267     -.02304 
     cross_se |  -1.048477   .0264073   -39.70   0.000    -1.108215   -.9887397 
       ols_se |   .8158441   .0269629    30.26   0.000     .7548498    .8768383 
       imf_se |   .3376589   .0207196    16.30   0.000     .2907879    .3845298 
     fdrev_se |   .0533821   .0161578     3.30   0.009     .0168305    .0899336 
   threefd_se |  -.1456766   .0014947   -97.46   0.000    -.1490579   -.1422954 
invSE_study37 |  -.2024735   .0104218   -19.43   0.000    -.2260492   -.1788978 
invSE_study25 |   .2317545   .0348418     6.65   0.000     .1529368    .3105722 
invSE_study11 |  -.5032132   .0259116   -19.42   0.000    -.5618294    -.444597 
        _cons |   3.163249   .1374177    23.02   0.000     2.852388    3.474109 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
 
.  
. outreg2 using finalchapter4.doc 
finalchapter4.doc 
dir : seeout 
 
.  
. lincom _cons+ 0.59*published  
 
 ( 1)  .59*published + _cons = 0 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
           t |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
         (1) |   1.521479   .1798436     8.46   0.000     1.114644    1.928314 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 
.  
. lincom invSE+ 12.40*puby + 0.0192308*cross_se +0.0576923*ols_se + 0.3076923*imf_se 
+ 0.1538462*threefd_se + 0.16*fdrev_ 
> se 
 
 ( 1)  invSE + 12.4*puby_se + .0192308*cross_se + .0576923*ols_se + .3076923*imf_se + 
.16*fdrev_se + .1538462*threefd_se 
       = 0 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
           t |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
         (1) |  -.0871125   .0161936    -5.38   0.000     -.123745   -.0504799 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 
.  
. vif 
 
    Variable |       VIF       1/VIF   
-------------+---------------------- 
     puby_se |     14.42    0.069370 
       invSE |     13.35    0.074896 
      imf_se |      2.37    0.422334 
   published |      2.29    0.436465 
      ols_se |      1.96    0.509045 
    cross_se |      1.84    0.543918 
invSE_stu~37 |      1.57    0.635437 
invSE_stu~11 |      1.52    0.659728 
  threefd_se |      1.25    0.798479 
    fdrev_se |      1.23    0.812421 
invSE_stu~25 |      1.22    0.819514 
-------------+---------------------- 
    Mean VIF |      3.91 
 
.  
. estat ovtest 
 
331 
 
Ramsey RESET test using powers of the fitted values of t 
       Ho:  model has no omitted variables 
                  F(3, 89) =      6.82 
                  Prob > F =      0.0003 
 
..  
.  
c) Robust Regression  
. *9* robust regression 
 
. *9* robust regression 
 
.  
. rreg t invSE published puby_se cross_se ols_se imf_se fdrev_se threefd_se if 
level==1 
 
   Huber iteration 1:  maximum difference in weights = .54261755 
   Huber iteration 2:  maximum difference in weights = .13062857 
   Huber iteration 3:  maximum difference in weights = .08182024 
   Huber iteration 4:  maximum difference in weights = .01327128 
Biweight iteration 5:  maximum difference in weights = .19821641 
Biweight iteration 6:  maximum difference in weights = .12235448 
Biweight iteration 7:  maximum difference in weights = .13001313 
Biweight iteration 8:  maximum difference in weights = .19051172 
Biweight iteration 9:  maximum difference in weights = .25486839 
Biweight iteration 10:  maximum difference in weights = .29183429 
Biweight iteration 11:  maximum difference in weights = .11200858 
Biweight iteration 12:  maximum difference in weights = .04741704 
Biweight iteration 13:  maximum difference in weights = .02100303 
Biweight iteration 14:  maximum difference in weights = .01454624 
Biweight iteration 15:  maximum difference in weights = .01725982 
Biweight iteration 16:  maximum difference in weights = .01684336 
Biweight iteration 17:  maximum difference in weights = .01575978 
Biweight iteration 18:  maximum difference in weights = .0141942 
Biweight iteration 19:  maximum difference in weights = .01238638 
Biweight iteration 20:  maximum difference in weights = .0106166 
Biweight iteration 21:  maximum difference in weights = .00898429 
 
Robust regression                                      Number of obs =     104 
                                                       F(  8,    95) =   33.07 
                                                       Prob > F      =  0.0000 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
           t |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
       invSE |   .3005103   .0497132     6.04   0.000     .2018171    .3992035 
   published |  -1.073239   .3732701    -2.88   0.005    -1.814274   -.3322045 
     puby_se |   -.039665   .0056086    -7.07   0.000    -.0507996   -.0285304 
    cross_se |   -.912587   .1609562    -5.67   0.000    -1.232125   -.5930486 
      ols_se |   .8470116    .103139     8.21   0.000     .6422547    1.051768 
      imf_se |   .4526883   .0330878    13.68   0.000     .3870008    .5183759 
    fdrev_se |   .0127642   .0384396     0.33   0.741    -.0635481    .0890765 
  threefd_se |  -.1600736    .061424    -2.61   0.011    -.2820156   -.0381316 
       _cons |   1.540679   .4208621     3.66   0.000     .7051622    2.376196 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
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Appendix 3.4.4 Publication Year as K-moderator Variable 
Table A4.1 Multivariate MRA Results (replication of Table 4.7) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
 WLS FE Robust Reg WLS FE Robust Reg WLS FE Robust Reg 
VARIABLES Full Sample Full Sample Full Sample Output-
Growth 
Output-
Growth 
Output-
Growth 
Output-
Level 
Output-
Level 
Output-
Level 
          
invSE 0.0175 0.00889 0.125*** 0.0259 0.00748 0.137*** -0.149*** -0.181*** -0.109*** 
 (0.0325) (0.00921) (0.0192) (0.0304) (0.0113) (0.0194) (0.0241) (0.0247) (0.0297) 
published 0.768** 1.504*** 1.151*** 0.870** 1.548*** 1.120*** -1.662* -2.783*** -0.128 
 (0.378) (0.344) (0.222) (0.416) (0.361) (0.266) (0.826) (0.427) (0.391) 
puby 0.0488 0.159*** -0.0170 0.0354 0.172*** -0.0759** -0.262** -0.432*** -0.396*** 
 (0.0632) (0.0405) (0.0283) (0.0690) (0.0476) (0.0327) (0.0954) (0.116) (0.0870) 
finsupport -2.341*** -2.282*** -1.078** -2.336*** -2.356*** -1.143**    
 (0.609) (0.202) (0.455) (0.661) (0.238) (0.467)    
developing_se 0.0165 0.0172* 0.0217** 0.0134 0.0160* 0.0202**    
 (0.0102) (0.00860) (0.00944) (0.0105) (0.00934) (0.00953)    
national_se -0.0817* -0.123*** -0.132*** -0.0561 -0.125*** -0.107***    
 (0.0434) (0.0216) (0.0237) (0.0441) (0.0240) (0.0249)    
imf_se 0.0511 0.117*** -0.0158 0.0131 0.127*** -0.0573** 0.196** 0.296*** 0.340*** 
 (0.0429) (0.0191) (0.0249) (0.0463) (0.0235) (0.0272) (0.0749) (0.0454) (0.0335) 
threefd_se -0.195*** -0.229*** 0.0175 -0.187*** -0.243*** 0.0622 -0.306** -0.151*** -0.145** 
 (0.0639) (0.0410) (0.0382) (0.0686) (0.0446) (0.0427) (0.101) (0.00417) (0.0652) 
level_se -0.0584** -0.0601*** -0.0462*       
 (0.0274) (0.0142) (0.0275)       
othery_se -0.110*** -0.200*** -0.104       
 (0.0401) (0.0232) (0.0820)       
cross_se -0.141*  -0.0229 -0.155*  0.00290 -0.923*** -1.124*** -0.821*** 
 (0.0812)  (0.0593) (0.0906)  (0.0660) (0.123) (0.0902) (0.172) 
timeseries_se 0.208  0.141 -0.0326  -0.0257    
 (0.174)  (0.105) (0.124)  (0.137)    
ols_se -0.0173  -0.106*** -0.0253  -0.113*** 0.721*** 0.792*** 0.754*** 
 (0.0296)  (0.0172) (0.0274)  (0.0174) (0.0516) (0.0585) (0.109) 
dynamic_se 0.00686  0.0370 -0.0117  0.00629    
 (0.0717)  (0.0282) (0.0708)  (0.0289)    
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iv_se -0.00996  0.0428 0.0308  0.0794    
 (0.0482)  (0.0436) (0.0477)  (0.0613)    
othertech_se -0.0330  -0.0338 0.0623  0.108    
 (0.0996)  (0.0908) (0.0456)  (0.104)    
longrun_se -0.0179  0.00743 -0.0374  -0.00866    
 (0.0353)  (0.0213) (0.0335)  (0.0227)    
mixed_se 0.0185  0.0236 0.00107  0.0196    
 (0.0253)  (0.0294) (0.0207)  (0.0299)    
transition_se 0.0172  -0.0414 0.0177  -0.0748**    
 (0.0463)  (0.0285) (0.0408)  (0.0294)    
endog_se 0.0178  -0.0942*** 0.0228  -0.0650***    
 (0.0295)  (0.0221) (0.0294)  (0.0226)    
nonlinear_se 0.0137  0.0917*** 0.00186  0.0784***    
 (0.0325)  (0.0176) (0.0312)  (0.0181)    
unitary_se -0.0190  -0.107*** -0.0271  -0.0836***    
 (0.0395)  (0.0247) (0.0399)  (0.0262)    
fdrev_se -0.0275  -0.00928 -0.0380  -0.0167 0.0779*** 0.0646*** 0.0289 
 (0.0243)  (0.0175) (0.0238)  (0.0181) (0.0218) (0.0174) (0.0407) 
fdexprev_se -0.0239  0.0106 -0.0206  0.0217    
 (0.0418)  (0.0234) (0.0419)  (0.0251)    
otherfd_se 0.00374  0.0363* 0.0168  0.0531**    
 (0.0360)  (0.0196) (0.0390)  (0.0209)    
span_se 0.0211  0.00710 0.0183  0.00549    
 (0.0159)  (0.00823) (0.0153)  (0.00833)    
nexplanatory_se -0.00203**  -0.00233*** -0.00194* 0.000261 -0.00231***    
 (0.000995)  (0.000872) (0.00102) (0.000870) (0.000887)    
Constant -0.164 -1.913*** -0.582 -0.104 -2.073*** -0.264 5.665** 8.876*** 5.688*** 
 (0.756) (0.446) (0.380) (0.800) (0.460) (0.432) (1.743) (1.743) (1.278) 
          
Observations 966 966 1,001 850 850 884 104 104 104 
R-squared 0.146 0.295 0.234 0.141 0.233 0.264 0.495 0.554 0.645 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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a) Full Sample 
 
. *1* wls(positive publication bias and negative genuine effect) 
 
.  
. reg t invSE published puby finsupport cross_se timeseries_se ols_se dynamic_se 
iv_se othertech_se longrun_se mixed_se developing_se transition_s 
> e endog_se nonlinear_se national_se imf_se unitary_se  fdrev_se fdexprev_se  
threefd_se otherfd_se level_se othery_se  span_se nexplanatory_se i 
> f t>-7.138112 & t<=6.973776  [aweight=weights], vce(cluster idstudy) 
(sum of wgt is   4.7462e+01) 
 
Linear regression                                      Number of obs =     966 
                                                       F( 27,    48) =    6.01 
                                                       Prob > F      =  0.0000 
                                                       R-squared     =  0.1462 
                                                       Root MSE      =  2.2509 
 
                                  (Std. Err. adjusted for 49 clusters in idstudy) 
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
                |               Robust 
              t |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
----------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
          invSE |   .0175346   .0325333     0.54   0.592     -.047878    .0829471 
      published |    .768377   .3781344     2.03   0.048     .0080868    1.528667 
           puby |   .0487723   .0631937     0.77   0.444     -.078287    .1758317 
     finsupport |  -2.341096   .6085776    -3.85   0.000    -3.564723   -1.117468 
       cross_se |  -.1410493   .0812152    -1.74   0.089    -.3043433    .0222447 
  timeseries_se |   .2080419   .1740757     1.20   0.238    -.1419608    .5580447 
         ols_se |  -.0172679   .0296124    -0.58   0.563    -.0768076    .0422717 
     dynamic_se |   .0068561   .0716852     0.10   0.924    -.1372766    .1509888 
          iv_se |  -.0099638   .0481668    -0.21   0.837    -.1068095     .086882 
   othertech_se |  -.0330269   .0996061    -0.33   0.742    -.2332983    .1672446 
     longrun_se |  -.0178759   .0352724    -0.51   0.615    -.0887958     .053044 
       mixed_se |   .0184551   .0253419     0.73   0.470    -.0324981    .0694083 
  developing_se |   .0165086   .0102406     1.61   0.114    -.0040816    .0370988 
  transition_se |   .0172288   .0463172     0.37   0.712    -.0758981    .1103556 
       endog_se |   .0178362   .0294618     0.61   0.548    -.0414008    .0770731 
   nonlinear_se |   .0136611    .032472     0.42   0.676    -.0516283    .0789505 
    national_se |  -.0816724   .0434216    -1.88   0.066    -.1689773    .0056326 
         imf_se |   .0511384   .0428986     1.19   0.239     -.035115    .1373918 
     unitary_se |  -.0190302   .0394725    -0.48   0.632    -.0983949    .0603345 
       fdrev_se |  -.0275272   .0242563    -1.13   0.262    -.0762978    .0212434 
    fdexprev_se |  -.0238963   .0418133    -0.57   0.570    -.1079675     .060175 
     threefd_se |  -.1946073   .0638644    -3.05   0.004    -.3230152   -.0661994 
     otherfd_se |   .0037428   .0360203     0.10   0.918    -.0686808    .0761664 
       level_se |     -.0584   .0273885    -2.13   0.038    -.1134684   -.0033317 
      othery_se |  -.1102281   .0401326    -2.75   0.008      -.19092   -.0295361 
        span_se |   .0211465   .0159382     1.33   0.191    -.0108993    .0531924 
nexplanatory_se |  -.0020325   .0009948    -2.04   0.047    -.0040327   -.0000323 
          _cons |  -.1635665   .7563375    -0.22   0.830    -1.684285    1.357152 
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
 
.  
. lincom _cons + 0.6693307*published + 9.809191*puby + 0.1018981*finsupport 
 
 ( 1)  .6693307*published + 9.809191*puby + .1018981*finsupport + _cons = 0 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
           t |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
         (1) |   .5905958   .3473705     1.70   0.096    -.1078394    1.289031 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 
.  
. lincom invSE + 0.0539461*timeseries_se + 0.0729271*cross_se +0.2477522*ols_se + 
0.3091317*dynamic_se + 0.0529471*othertech_se + 0.3086913*longru 
> n_se + 0.021978*mixed_se + 0.1038961*developing_se + 0.1928072*transition_se + 
0.2997003*endog_se + 0.2117882*nonlinear_se + 0.5184815*national_ 
> se + 0.2317682*imf_se +0.3586414*unitary_se + 0.2117882*fdrev_se + 
0.1558442*fdexprev + 0.0649351*threefd + 0.2237762*otherfd_se + 0.1038961*lev 
> el_se + 0.013986*othery_se + 0.36*span_se +8.69*nexplanatory_se 
 
 ( 1)  invSE + .0729271*cross_se + .0539461*timeseries_se + .2477522*ols_se + 
.3091317*dynamic_se + .0529471*othertech_se + .3086913*longrun_se + 
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       .021978*mixed_se + .1038961*developing_se + .1928072*transition_se + 
.2997003*endog_se + .2117882*nonlinear_se + .5184815*national_se + 
       .2317682*imf_se + .3586414*unitary_se + .2117882*fdrev_se + 
.1558442*fdexprev_se + .0649351*threefd_se + .2237762*otherfd_se + 
       .1038961*level_se + .013986*othery_se + .36*span_se + 8.69*nexplanatory_se = 0 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
           t |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
         (1) |  -.0536034   .0271288    -1.98   0.054    -.1081494    .0009426 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 
.  
. vif 
 
    Variable |       VIF       1/VIF   
-------------+---------------------- 
       invSE |      7.43    0.134552 
 national_se |      6.04    0.165502 
      imf_se |      5.97    0.167631 
  unitary_se |      5.66    0.176825 
      ols_se |      4.83    0.207020 
    endog_se |      3.92    0.254950 
transition~e |      3.36    0.297942 
       iv_se |      3.33    0.300696 
  otherfd_se |      2.63    0.380908 
  dynamic_se |      2.55    0.391769 
nexplanato~e |      2.32    0.430936 
    level_se |      2.30    0.434750 
 fdexprev_se |      2.20    0.454637 
timeseries~e |      2.19    0.457069 
  longrun_se |      2.13    0.469133 
     span_se |      2.13    0.470018 
    mixed_se |      2.04    0.490994 
        puby |      2.02    0.496065 
othertech_se |      1.79    0.559404 
  finsupport |      1.67    0.599931 
nonlinear_se |      1.60    0.625619 
  threefd_se |      1.50    0.665327 
    fdrev_se |      1.50    0.667294 
    cross_se |      1.49    0.672033 
developing~e |      1.40    0.714895 
   published |      1.38    0.726569 
   othery_se |      1.27    0.789807 
-------------+---------------------- 
    Mean VIF |      2.84 
 
.  
. estat ovtest 
 
Ramsey RESET test using powers of the fitted values of t 
       Ho:  model has no omitted variables 
                 F(3, 935) =     14.85 
                  Prob > F =      0.0000 
 
  
. *2* fe(positive publication bias and negative genuine effect) 
.  
. reg t invSE published puby finsupport  developing_se national_se imf_se threefd_se 
level_se othery_se   invSE_study3 invSE_study5 invSE_study6 i 
> nvSE_study8 invSE_study9  invSE_study11  invSE_study14 invSE_study15 invSE_study16 
invSE_study17  invSE_study19 invSE_study22 invSE_study24 invS 
> E_study25 invSE_study27 invSE_study32 invSE_study33 invSE_study35  invSE_study37 
invSE_study39 invSE_study40 invSE_study41 invSE_study43 invSE_s 
> tudy45 invSE_study46 invSE_study47 if t>-7.138112 & t<=6.973776  [aweight=weights], 
vce(cluster idstudy) 
(sum of wgt is   4.7462e+01) 
 
Linear regression                                      Number of obs =     966 
                                                       F(  9,    48) =       . 
                                                       Prob > F      =       . 
                                                       R-squared     =  0.2950 
                                                       Root MSE      =  2.0552 
 
                                (Std. Err. adjusted for 49 clusters in idstudy) 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
              |               Robust 
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            t |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
--------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
        invSE |    .008895   .0092098     0.97   0.339    -.0096226    .0274126 
    published |   1.504021   .3441259     4.37   0.000       .81211    2.195933 
         puby |    .158878   .0404841     3.92   0.000     .0774793    .2402768 
   finsupport |  -2.282373   .2023281   -11.28   0.000    -2.689181   -1.875565 
developing_se |    .017177   .0086029     2.00   0.052    -.0001203    .0344742 
  national_se |  -.1227869   .0216028    -5.68   0.000    -.1662222   -.0793517 
       imf_se |   .1171473   .0191437     6.12   0.000     .0786564    .1556383 
   threefd_se |  -.2289421   .0410139    -5.58   0.000    -.3114059   -.1464782 
     level_se |  -.0601233   .0142345    -4.22   0.000    -.0887437   -.0315029 
    othery_se |  -.2002561   .0231694    -8.64   0.000    -.2468414   -.1536708 
 invSE_study3 |  -.0689092   .0322263    -2.14   0.038    -.1337044    -.004114 
 invSE_study5 |   .0939199   .0172069     5.46   0.000     .0593232    .1285167 
 invSE_study6 |   .5843489   .0530465    11.02   0.000     .4776917    .6910061 
 invSE_study8 |    .121448   .0370374     3.28   0.002     .0469794    .1959166 
 invSE_study9 |  -.0541449   .0293172    -1.85   0.071    -.1130911    .0048013 
invSE_study11 |   .0343461   .0149543     2.30   0.026     .0042784    .0644138 
invSE_study14 |   .4536131   .0539576     8.41   0.000     .3451241     .562102 
invSE_study15 |    .137213   .0340258     4.03   0.000     .0687996    .2056265 
invSE_study16 |   .1659153   .0645405     2.57   0.013      .036148    .2956826 
invSE_study17 |   .1232253   .0145779     8.45   0.000     .0939144    .1525362 
invSE_study19 |   .2054707   .0397454     5.17   0.000     .1255574    .2853841 
invSE_study22 |   .1324955   .0345703     3.83   0.000     .0629872    .2020037 
invSE_study24 |   .0425408   .0074797     5.69   0.000     .0275019    .0575797 
invSE_study25 |   .1632517   .0331773     4.92   0.000     .0965443    .2299591 
invSE_study27 |   -.067098   .0217895    -3.08   0.003    -.1109089   -.0232872 
invSE_study32 |  -.0875915   .0208888    -4.19   0.000    -.1295912   -.0455918 
invSE_study33 |  -.0289278   .0070902    -4.08   0.000    -.0431835    -.014672 
invSE_study35 |  -.1884432   .0397876    -4.74   0.000    -.2684416   -.1084448 
invSE_study37 |   .0554983   .0313371     1.77   0.083    -.0075092    .1185058 
invSE_study39 |  -.3059228   .0458885    -6.67   0.000    -.3981878   -.2136578 
invSE_study40 |  -.1957359   .0419951    -4.66   0.000    -.2801727    -.111299 
invSE_study41 |  -.1340728   .0336232    -3.99   0.000    -.2016766   -.0664689 
invSE_study43 |  -.0789393   .0136416    -5.79   0.000    -.1063675   -.0515111 
invSE_study45 |   .6689962   .0767097     8.72   0.000      .514761    .8232314 
invSE_study46 |    .406472   .0474694     8.56   0.000     .3110283    .5019157 
invSE_study47 |  -.5234131   .0920359    -5.69   0.000    -.7084638   -.3383625 
        _cons |  -1.912709   .4462053    -4.29   0.000    -2.809865   -1.015553 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
 
.  
. lincom _cons + 0.6693307*published + 9.809191*puby + 0.1018981*finsupport 
 
 ( 1)  .6693307*published + 9.809191*puby + .1018981*finsupport + _cons = 0 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
           t |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
         (1) |   .4198745   .2379578     1.76   0.084    -.0585716    .8983207 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 
.  
. lincom invSE + 0.1038961*developing_se + 0.5184815*national_se + 0.2317682*imf_se + 
0.0649351*threefd + 0.1038961*level_se + 0.013986*othery_se  
> + 0.04995*invSE_study3 +0.011988*invSE_study5 + 0.002997*invSE_study6 +0.01998* 
invSE_study8 + 0.005994*invSE_study9 + 0.007992*invSE_study11 +  
> 0.007992*invSE_study14 + 0.011988*invSE_study15 + 0.013986*invSE_study16 + 
0.002997*invSE_study17 + 0.001998*invSE_study19 + 0.02997*invSE_study 
> 22 + 0.005994*invSE_study24 + 0.003996*invSE_study25 + 0.031968*invSE_study27 + 
0.007992*invSE_study32 + 0.007992*invSE_study33 + 0.025974*invSE 
> _study35 + 0.0679321*invSE_study37 + 0.017982*invSE_study39 + 
0.003996*invSE_study40 + 0.011988*invSE_study41 +0.025974* invSE_study43 + 0.00199 
> 8*invSE_study45 + 0.003996*invSE_study46 + 0.011988*invSE_study47 
 
 ( 1)  invSE + .1038961*developing_se + .5184815*national_se + .2317682*imf_se + 
.0649351*threefd_se + .1038961*level_se + .013986*othery_se + 
       .04995*invSE_study3 + .011988*invSE_study5 + .002997*invSE_study6 + 
.01998*invSE_study8 + .005994*invSE_study9 + .007992*invSE_study11 + 
       .007992*invSE_study14 + .011988*invSE_study15 + .013986*invSE_study16 + 
.002997*invSE_study17 + .001998*invSE_study19 + 
       .02997*invSE_study22 + .005994*invSE_study24 + .003996*invSE_study25 + 
.031968*invSE_study27 + .007992*invSE_study32 + 
       .007992*invSE_study33 + .025974*invSE_study35 + .0679321*invSE_study37 + 
.017982*invSE_study39 + .003996*invSE_study40 + 
       .011988*invSE_study41 + .025974*invSE_study43 + .001998*invSE_study45 + 
.003996*invSE_study46 + .011988*invSE_study47 = 0 
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------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
           t |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
         (1) |  -.0521408   .0181986    -2.87   0.006    -.0887315   -.0155502 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 
.  
. vif 
 
    Variable |       VIF       1/VIF   
-------------+---------------------- 
      imf_se |      5.05    0.197958 
   othery_se |      4.63    0.215781 
invSE_stu~15 |      4.61    0.216858 
 national_se |      4.50    0.221981 
   published |      3.16    0.316202 
        puby |      3.14    0.318651 
       invSE |      1.83    0.545369 
    level_se |      1.53    0.654574 
invSE_stu~33 |      1.46    0.683934 
developing~e |      1.38    0.724349 
invSE_stu~45 |      1.37    0.731133 
invSE_stu~14 |      1.36    0.733766 
invSE_study9 |      1.31    0.765988 
invSE_study3 |      1.30    0.768389 
invSE_stu~37 |      1.30    0.770759 
invSE_stu~46 |      1.29    0.774425 
invSE_study5 |      1.28    0.783160 
invSE_stu~11 |      1.28    0.783936 
invSE_stu~22 |      1.27    0.789708 
invSE_stu~41 |      1.26    0.791521 
invSE_stu~47 |      1.25    0.801292 
invSE_stu~17 |      1.23    0.814041 
  threefd_se |      1.22    0.819093 
  finsupport |      1.22    0.819183 
invSE_study6 |      1.19    0.840397 
invSE_stu~24 |      1.18    0.845403 
invSE_stu~39 |      1.15    0.868729 
invSE_stu~32 |      1.15    0.869986 
invSE_stu~35 |      1.14    0.876226 
invSE_stu~40 |      1.13    0.881752 
invSE_study8 |      1.13    0.882830 
invSE_stu~25 |      1.12    0.889591 
invSE_stu~27 |      1.12    0.892368 
invSE_stu~43 |      1.12    0.894138 
invSE_stu~16 |      1.08    0.921686 
invSE_stu~19 |      1.07    0.932476 
-------------+---------------------- 
    Mean VIF |      1.75 
 
.  
. estat ovtest 
 
Ramsey RESET test using powers of the fitted values of t 
       Ho:  model has no omitted variables 
                 F(3, 926) =      9.65 
                  Prob > F =      0.0000 
 
 
  
. *3* robust regression (no pub bias and no genuine effect, but the signs are ok) 
.  
. rreg t invSE published puby finsupport cross_se timeseries_se ols_se dynamic_se 
iv_se othertech_se longrun_se mixed_se developing_se transition_ 
> se endog_se nonlinear_se national_se imf_se unitary_se  fdrev_se fdexprev_se  
threefd_se otherfd_se level_se othery_se  span_se nexplanatory_se 
 
   Huber iteration 1:  maximum difference in weights = .79764759 
   Huber iteration 2:  maximum difference in weights = .38971082 
   Huber iteration 3:  maximum difference in weights = .15521599 
   Huber iteration 4:  maximum difference in weights = .02815885 
Biweight iteration 5:  maximum difference in weights = .29078739 
Biweight iteration 6:  maximum difference in weights = .12233304 
Biweight iteration 7:  maximum difference in weights = .03110156 
Biweight iteration 8:  maximum difference in weights = .03395306 
Biweight iteration 9:  maximum difference in weights = .04112835 
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Biweight iteration 10:  maximum difference in weights = .05917474 
Biweight iteration 11:  maximum difference in weights = .07317765 
Biweight iteration 12:  maximum difference in weights = .06785949 
Biweight iteration 13:  maximum difference in weights = .07566487 
Biweight iteration 14:  maximum difference in weights = .05966172 
Biweight iteration 15:  maximum difference in weights = .04612769 
Biweight iteration 16:  maximum difference in weights = .02676069 
Biweight iteration 17:  maximum difference in weights = .02009113 
Biweight iteration 18:  maximum difference in weights = .01677228 
Biweight iteration 19:  maximum difference in weights = .01446974 
Biweight iteration 20:  maximum difference in weights = .00760331 
 
Robust regression                                      Number of obs =    1000 
                                                       F( 27,   972) =   11.01 
                                                       Prob > F      =  0.0000 
 
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
              t |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
----------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
          invSE |   .1254338   .0191551     6.55   0.000     .0878437     .163024 
      published |    1.15101   .2219734     5.19   0.000     .7154075    1.586612 
           puby |  -.0170097   .0282931    -0.60   0.548    -.0725322    .0385128 
     finsupport |  -1.078389   .4552421    -2.37   0.018     -1.97176   -.1850187 
       cross_se |  -.0228743   .0593397    -0.39   0.700    -.1393229    .0935742 
  timeseries_se |   .1413764   .1047471     1.35   0.177      -.06418    .3469329 
         ols_se |  -.1059098   .0171652    -6.17   0.000     -.139595   -.0722247 
     dynamic_se |   .0370268   .0282012     1.31   0.190    -.0183155     .092369 
          iv_se |   .0428115   .0435875     0.98   0.326     -.042725    .1283479 
   othertech_se |  -.0338493   .0907768    -0.37   0.709    -.2119904    .1442917 
     longrun_se |    .007432    .021251     0.35   0.727    -.0342712    .0491352 
       mixed_se |   .0235731   .0293883     0.80   0.423    -.0340987    .0812449 
  developing_se |   .0216783    .009437     2.30   0.022     .0031591    .0401976 
  transition_se |  -.0413689   .0284597    -1.45   0.146    -.0972183    .0144806 
       endog_se |  -.0942249   .0220549    -4.27   0.000    -.1375056   -.0509442 
   nonlinear_se |   .0916582   .0175865     5.21   0.000     .0571463      .12617 
    national_se |  -.1319645   .0237081    -5.57   0.000    -.1784893   -.0854396 
         imf_se |  -.0158166   .0249242    -0.63   0.526     -.064728    .0330949 
     unitary_se |  -.1072216   .0246748    -4.35   0.000    -.1556436   -.0587996 
       fdrev_se |    -.00928   .0175013    -0.53   0.596    -.0436246    .0250646 
    fdexprev_se |   .0105569   .0233798     0.45   0.652    -.0353238    .0564376 
     threefd_se |   .0174564   .0382349     0.46   0.648     -.057576    .0924888 
     otherfd_se |   .0363279   .0195891     1.85   0.064    -.0021138    .0747697 
       level_se |  -.0461756   .0275387    -1.68   0.094    -.1002178    .0078666 
      othery_se |  -.1038064   .0820258    -1.27   0.206    -.2647746    .0571617 
        span_se |   .0070996   .0082287     0.86   0.388    -.0090484    .0232477 
nexplanatory_se |  -.0023278   .0008723    -2.67   0.008    -.0040396   -.0006161 
          _cons |   -.582126   .3798243    -1.53   0.126    -1.327496    .1632441 
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
 
b) Output-Growth Studies  
 
. *4* wls(positive publication bias and negative genuine effect)WLS 
.  
. regress t invSE published puby finsupport cross_se timeseries_se ols_se dynamic_se 
iv_se othertech_se longrun_se mixed_se developing_se transiti 
> on_se endog_se nonlinear_se national_se imf_se unitary_se  fdrev_se fdexprev_se  
threefd_se otherfd_se  span_se nexplanatory_se if t>-7.138112 & 
>  t<=6.973776 & growth==1  [aweight=weights], vce(cluster idstudy) 
(sum of wgt is   3.8212e+01) 
 
Linear regression                                      Number of obs =     850 
                                                       F( 24,    40) =       . 
                                                       Prob > F      =       . 
                                                       R-squared     =  0.1407 
                                                       Root MSE      =  2.2207 
 
                                  (Std. Err. adjusted for 41 clusters in idstudy) 
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
                |               Robust 
              t |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
----------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
          invSE |   .0259016   .0303632     0.85   0.399    -.0354646    .0872679 
      published |   .8697743    .416433     2.09   0.043     .0281318    1.711417 
           puby |   .0353588   .0689742     0.51   0.611    -.1040432    .1747608 
     finsupport |  -2.335932   .6614398    -3.53   0.001    -3.672752   -.9991124 
       cross_se |  -.1545457   .0906021    -1.71   0.096    -.3376595     .028568 
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  timeseries_se |  -.0326329   .1235622    -0.26   0.793    -.2823614    .2170957 
         ols_se |  -.0252567   .0274117    -0.92   0.362    -.0806578    .0301444 
     dynamic_se |  -.0116674   .0708219    -0.16   0.870    -.1548038     .131469 
          iv_se |    .030767   .0477157     0.64   0.523    -.0656701    .1272041 
   othertech_se |   .0623226   .0455975     1.37   0.179    -.0298334    .1544786 
     longrun_se |  -.0373577   .0334858    -1.12   0.271    -.1050349    .0303196 
       mixed_se |   .0010741   .0206542     0.05   0.959    -.0406697    .0428178 
  developing_se |   .0133603   .0104555     1.28   0.209    -.0077712    .0344918 
  transition_se |   .0176776   .0408183     0.43   0.667    -.0648193    .1001745 
       endog_se |   .0228006    .029373     0.78   0.442    -.0365644    .0821656 
   nonlinear_se |   .0018583   .0311901     0.06   0.953    -.0611792    .0648958 
    national_se |  -.0560872   .0440659    -1.27   0.210    -.1451477    .0329733 
         imf_se |   .0131088   .0462963     0.28   0.779    -.0804596    .1066771 
     unitary_se |  -.0271373   .0398704    -0.68   0.500    -.1077184    .0534438 
       fdrev_se |  -.0380083   .0237748    -1.60   0.118    -.0860589    .0100423 
    fdexprev_se |  -.0206264   .0419179    -0.49   0.625    -.1053456    .0640929 
     threefd_se |  -.1870561   .0685651    -2.73   0.009    -.3256314   -.0484809 
     otherfd_se |   .0168043   .0390463     0.43   0.669    -.0621112    .0957197 
        span_se |   .0183188   .0153134     1.20   0.239    -.0126308    .0492684 
nexplanatory_se |  -.0019379   .0010239    -1.89   0.066    -.0040073    .0001315 
          _cons |  -.1040688   .8000374    -0.13   0.897    -1.721005    1.512867 
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
 
.  
. lincom _cons + 0.6693307*published + 9.809191*puby + 0.1018981*finsupport 
 
 ( 1)  .6693307*published + 9.809191*puby + .1018981*finsupport + _cons = 0 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
           t |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
         (1) |   .5869124   .3374574     1.74   0.090    -.0951144    1.268939 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 
.  
. lincom invSE + 0.0539461*timeseries_se + 0.0729271*cross_se +0.2477522*ols_se + 
0.3091317*dynamic_se + 0.0719281* iv_se + 0.0529471*othertech_se 
>  + 0.3086913*longrun_se + 0.021978*mixed_se + 0.1038961*developing_se + 
0.1928072*transition_se + 0.2997003*endog_se + 0.2117882*nonlinear_se +  
> 0.5184815*national_se + 0.2317682*imf_se +0.3586414*unitary_se + 0.2117882*fdrev_se 
+ 0.1558442*fdexprev + 0.0649351*threefd + 0.2237762*otherfd 
> _se + 0.36*span_se +8.69*nexplanatory_se 
 
 ( 1)  invSE + .0729271*cross_se + .0539461*timeseries_se + .2477522*ols_se + 
.3091317*dynamic_se + .0719281*iv_se + .0529471*othertech_se + 
       .3086913*longrun_se + .021978*mixed_se + .1038961*developing_se + 
.1928072*transition_se + .2997003*endog_se + .2117882*nonlinear_se + 
       .5184815*national_se + .2317682*imf_se + .3586414*unitary_se + 
.2117882*fdrev_se + .1558442*fdexprev_se + .0649351*threefd_se + 
       .2237762*otherfd_se + .36*span_se + 8.69*nexplanatory_se = 0 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
           t |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
         (1) |  -.0566362   .0285752    -1.98   0.054    -.1143889    .0011166 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 
.  
. vif 
 
    Variable |       VIF       1/VIF   
-------------+---------------------- 
       invSE |      6.82    0.146651 
      imf_se |      6.50    0.153809 
 national_se |      6.14    0.162889 
  unitary_se |      5.26    0.190079 
      ols_se |      4.90    0.204007 
transition~e |      3.51    0.285130 
    endog_se |      3.32    0.300952 
  dynamic_se |      2.60    0.385322 
 fdexprev_se |      2.48    0.402467 
        puby |      2.38    0.420597 
nexplanato~e |      2.24    0.446043 
  longrun_se |      2.19    0.455634 
  otherfd_se |      2.18    0.459741 
    mixed_se |      2.09    0.477346 
     span_se |      2.08    0.480509 
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  finsupport |      1.74    0.574578 
othertech_se |      1.72    0.582533 
  threefd_se |      1.64    0.611092 
    cross_se |      1.60    0.625392 
   published |      1.57    0.637400 
nonlinear_se |      1.53    0.653084 
    fdrev_se |      1.46    0.685416 
developing~e |      1.40    0.712150 
timeseries~e |      1.35    0.741602 
       iv_se |      1.20    0.831829 
-------------+---------------------- 
    Mean VIF |      2.80 
 
.  
. estat ovtest 
 
Ramsey RESET test using powers of the fitted values of t 
       Ho:  model has no omitted variables 
                 F(3, 821) =      1.55 
                  Prob > F =      0.1994 
 
.  
.  
. *5* fe no publication bias, but negative genuine effect) 
 
. regress t invSE published puby finsupport  developing_se national_se imf_se 
threefd_se nexplanatory_se invSE_study3 invSE_study5 invSE_study6 in 
> vSE_study8  invSE_study14 invSE_study16 invSE_study17  invSE_study19  invSE_study22 
invSE_study24 invSE_study27  invSE_study32 invSE_study33  in 
> vSE_study35  invSE_study37 invSE_study39 invSE_study41 invSE_study43  if t>-
7.138112 & t<=6.973776 & growth==1 [aweight=weights], vce(cluster id 
> study) 
(sum of wgt is   3.8212e+01) 
 
Linear regression                                      Number of obs =     850 
                                                       F(  9,    40) =       . 
                                                       Prob > F      =       . 
                                                       R-squared     =  0.2330 
                                                       Root MSE      =  2.1006 
 
                                  (Std. Err. adjusted for 41 clusters in idstudy) 
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
                |               Robust 
              t |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
----------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
          invSE |   .0074762   .0112657     0.66   0.511    -.0152926     .030245 
      published |   1.547745   .3613932     4.28   0.000     .8173423    2.278148 
           puby |   .1718867   .0475911     3.61   0.001     .0757015    .2680718 
     finsupport |  -2.355573   .2378944    -9.90   0.000    -2.836376   -1.874771 
  developing_se |   .0159855   .0093425     1.71   0.095    -.0028963    .0348673 
    national_se |  -.1252276   .0240228    -5.21   0.000    -.1737794   -.0766758 
         imf_se |   .1268117   .0234924     5.40   0.000     .0793317    .1742916 
     threefd_se |  -.2426985   .0445923    -5.44   0.000    -.3328229   -.1525741 
nexplanatory_se |   .0002605   .0008704     0.30   0.766    -.0014985    .0020196 
   invSE_study3 |  -.0614015   .0330557    -1.86   0.071    -.1282094    .0054065 
   invSE_study5 |   .0967364   .0175053     5.53   0.000     .0613568     .132116 
   invSE_study6 |   .6002221   .0548704    10.94   0.000     .4893249    .7111192 
   invSE_study8 |   .1268657    .037302     3.40   0.002     .0514755    .2022559 
  invSE_study14 |   .4693258   .0528744     8.88   0.000     .3624627     .576189 
  invSE_study16 |    .167048   .0670466     2.49   0.017     .0315418    .3025541 
  invSE_study17 |   .1260292   .0139652     9.02   0.000     .0978044    .1542539 
  invSE_study19 |   .1983578   .0421552     4.71   0.000      .113159    .2835567 
  invSE_study22 |   .1397872   .0338466     4.13   0.000     .0713807    .2081937 
  invSE_study24 |     .04306   .0071504     6.02   0.000     .0286085    .0575115 
  invSE_study27 |  -.0739505     .02247    -3.29   0.002    -.1193641    -.028537 
  invSE_study32 |  -.0907448   .0211517    -4.29   0.000     -.133494   -.0479957 
  invSE_study33 |  -.0197696   .0081426    -2.43   0.020    -.0362264   -.0033127 
  invSE_study35 |  -.1932303   .0449407    -4.30   0.000    -.2840589   -.1024017 
  invSE_study37 |   .0446904   .0336616     1.33   0.192    -.0233421     .112723 
  invSE_study39 |  -.3104721   .0535583    -5.80   0.000    -.4187175   -.2022268 
  invSE_study41 |   -.145322   .0359191    -4.05   0.000    -.2179172   -.0727269 
  invSE_study43 |  -.0815879   .0158435    -5.15   0.000    -.1136088    -.049567 
          _cons |   -2.07261   .4602953    -4.50   0.000    -3.002901   -1.142318 
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
 
. lincom invSE + 0.1038961*developing_se + 0.5184815*national_se + 0.2317682*imf_se + 
0.0649351*threefd + 8.69*nexplanatory_se +  0.04995*invSE_st 
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> udy3 +0.011988*invSE_study5 + 0.002997*invSE_study6 +0.01998* invSE_study8 +  
0.007992*invSE_study14  + 0.013986*invSE_study16 + 0.002997*invSE_ 
> study17 + 0.001998*invSE_study19  + 0.02997*invSE_study22 + 0.005994*invSE_study24  
+ 0.031968*invSE_study27 + 0.007992*invSE_study32 + 0.007992 
> *invSE_study33 + 0.025974*invSE_study35 + 0.0679321*invSE_study37 + 
0.017982*invSE_study39 + 0.011988*invSE_study41 +0.025974* invSE_study43 
 
 ( 1)  invSE + .1038961*developing_se + .5184815*national_se + .2317682*imf_se + 
.0649351*threefd_se + 8.69*nexplanatory_se + .04995*invSE_study3 
       + .011988*invSE_study5 + .002997*invSE_study6 + .01998*invSE_study8 + 
.007992*invSE_study14 + .013986*invSE_study16 + .002997*invSE_study17 
       + .001998*invSE_study19 + .02997*invSE_study22 + .005994*invSE_study24 + 
.031968*invSE_study27 + .007992*invSE_study32 + 
       .007992*invSE_study33 + .025974*invSE_study35 + .0679321*invSE_study37 + 
.017982*invSE_study39 + .011988*invSE_study41 + 
       .025974*invSE_study43 = 0 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
           t |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
         (1) |  -.0408354   .0173497    -2.35   0.024    -.0759006   -.0057703 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 
. lincom _cons + 0.6693307*published + 9.809191*puby + 0.1018981*finsupport 
 
 ( 1)  .6693307*published + 9.809191*puby + .1018981*finsupport + _cons = 0 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
           t |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
         (1) |   .4093841   .2622058     1.56   0.126    -.1205535    .9393218 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 
. vif 
 
    Variable |       VIF       1/VIF   
-------------+---------------------- 
      imf_se |      5.44    0.183890 
 national_se |      4.52    0.221264 
nexplanato~e |      3.66    0.272900 
        puby |      3.19    0.313223 
       invSE |      2.81    0.355446 
   published |      2.17    0.461204 
invSE_stu~41 |      1.92    0.520405 
invSE_stu~27 |      1.88    0.533145 
invSE_study3 |      1.34    0.745284 
  threefd_se |      1.32    0.758508 
invSE_study5 |      1.32    0.759861 
developing~e |      1.29    0.773204 
invSE_stu~14 |      1.28    0.778279 
  finsupport |      1.25    0.798457 
invSE_stu~32 |      1.21    0.823468 
invSE_study6 |      1.21    0.824584 
invSE_stu~22 |      1.20    0.835481 
invSE_stu~39 |      1.19    0.838762 
invSE_stu~24 |      1.18    0.850452 
invSE_stu~35 |      1.17    0.853326 
invSE_stu~17 |      1.17    0.853795 
invSE_study8 |      1.13    0.884300 
invSE_stu~43 |      1.12    0.890002 
invSE_stu~37 |      1.12    0.894933 
invSE_stu~19 |      1.09    0.919114 
invSE_stu~16 |      1.08    0.923704 
invSE_stu~33 |      1.08    0.923833 
-------------+---------------------- 
    Mean VIF |      1.79 
 
. estat ovtest 
 
Ramsey RESET test using powers of the fitted values of t 
       Ho:  model has no omitted variables 
                 F(3, 819) =      2.38 
                  Prob > F =      0.0687 
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. *6* robust regression 
.  
. rreg t invSE published puby finsupport cross_se timeseries_se ols_se dynamic_se 
iv_se othertech_se longrun_se mixed_se developing_se transition_ 
> se endog_se nonlinear_se national_se imf_se unitary_se  fdrev_se fdexprev_se  
threefd_se otherfd_se  span_se nexplanatory_se if growth==1 
 
   Huber iteration 1:  maximum difference in weights = .79685157 
   Huber iteration 2:  maximum difference in weights = .41103096 
   Huber iteration 3:  maximum difference in weights = .14960152 
   Huber iteration 4:  maximum difference in weights = .02969872 
Biweight iteration 5:  maximum difference in weights = .28839198 
Biweight iteration 6:  maximum difference in weights = .12067707 
Biweight iteration 7:  maximum difference in weights = .09596647 
Biweight iteration 8:  maximum difference in weights = .11170723 
Biweight iteration 9:  maximum difference in weights = .1178338 
Biweight iteration 10:  maximum difference in weights = .08596264 
Biweight iteration 11:  maximum difference in weights = .04746533 
Biweight iteration 12:  maximum difference in weights = .02308486 
Biweight iteration 13:  maximum difference in weights = .01042802 
Biweight iteration 14:  maximum difference in weights = .00556722 
 
Robust regression                                      Number of obs =     884 
                                                       F( 25,   858) =   12.34 
                                                       Prob > F      =  0.0000 
 
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
              t |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
----------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
          invSE |   .1368691   .0193745     7.06   0.000      .098842    .1748961 
      published |   1.120154   .2658687     4.21   0.000     .5983249    1.641983 
           puby |  -.0759114   .0327069    -2.32   0.021    -.1401063   -.0117165 
     finsupport |  -1.142552   .4672681    -2.45   0.015    -2.059674   -.2254293 
       cross_se |   .0029025   .0659763     0.04   0.965    -.1265914    .1323963 
  timeseries_se |  -.0257056   .1373643    -0.19   0.852     -.295315    .2439039 
         ols_se |  -.1126984   .0174219    -6.47   0.000     -.146893   -.0785038 
     dynamic_se |    .006294   .0289286     0.22   0.828     -.050485     .063073 
          iv_se |   .0794489    .061255     1.30   0.195    -.0407783    .1996761 
   othertech_se |   .1077055   .1042677     1.03   0.302    -.0969442    .3123551 
     longrun_se |  -.0086643   .0226808    -0.38   0.703    -.0531807     .035852 
       mixed_se |   .0196312   .0299113     0.66   0.512    -.0390766    .0783391 
  developing_se |   .0201747   .0095338     2.12   0.035     .0014625    .0388869 
  transition_se |  -.0747963   .0294361    -2.54   0.011    -.1325715   -.0170211 
       endog_se |  -.0649648   .0226488    -2.87   0.004    -.1094183   -.0205113 
   nonlinear_se |   .0783544   .0181132     4.33   0.000     .0428031    .1139057 
    national_se |  -.1069998   .0248704    -4.30   0.000    -.1558138   -.0581858 
         imf_se |  -.0572509   .0271809    -2.11   0.035    -.1105998    -.003902 
     unitary_se |  -.0836494   .0261792    -3.20   0.001    -.1350322   -.0322667 
       fdrev_se |  -.0167295    .018068    -0.93   0.355    -.0521921    .0187332 
    fdexprev_se |   .0216634   .0250704     0.86   0.388     -.027543    .0708698 
     threefd_se |   .0621523   .0427164     1.46   0.146    -.0216884    .1459931 
     otherfd_se |    .053104   .0209417     2.54   0.011     .0120012    .0942069 
        span_se |    .005494   .0083268     0.66   0.510    -.0108494    .0218373 
nexplanatory_se |  -.0023102    .000887    -2.60   0.009    -.0040512   -.0005692 
          _cons |  -.2637092   .4323989    -0.61   0.542    -1.112393    .5849743 
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
 
.  
.  
 
c) Output-Level Studies  
 
 
. *7* wls (positive publication bias and negative genuine effect) 
.  
. regress t invSE published puby cross_se ols_se imf_se fdrev_se threefd_se if t>-
7.138112 & t<=6.973776 & level==1  [aweight=weights], vce(cluste 
> r idstudy) 
(sum of wgt is   8.0323e+00) 
 
Linear regression                                      Number of obs =     104 
                                                       F(  5,     9) =       . 
                                                       Prob > F      =       . 
                                                       R-squared     =  0.4954 
                                                       Root MSE      =  1.8636 
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                               (Std. Err. adjusted for 10 clusters in idstudy) 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
             |               Robust 
           t |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
       invSE |  -.1490909   .0241204    -6.18   0.000    -.2036549   -.0945268 
   published |  -1.661726   .8264092    -2.01   0.075    -3.531193    .2077418 
        puby |  -.2619807   .0954305    -2.75   0.023    -.4778595   -.0461019 
    cross_se |  -.9230726   .1229672    -7.51   0.000    -1.201244   -.6449015 
      ols_se |   .7212837   .0516362    13.97   0.000     .6044745     .838093 
      imf_se |    .196344   .0749284     2.62   0.028     .0268442    .3658438 
    fdrev_se |    .077855   .0218159     3.57   0.006      .028504     .127206 
  threefd_se |  -.3060625   .1007255    -3.04   0.014    -.5339193   -.0782057 
       _cons |   5.664663   1.743325     3.25   0.010     1.720987    9.608339 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 
.  
. lincom invSE+ 0.0192308*cross_se +0.0576923*ols_se + 0.3076923*imf_se + 
0.1538462*threefd_se + 0.16*fdrev_se 
 
 ( 1)  invSE + .0192308*cross_se + .0576923*ols_se + .3076923*imf_se + .16*fdrev_se + 
.1538462*threefd_se = 0 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
           t |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
         (1) |   -.099446   .0358638    -2.77   0.022    -.1805755   -.0183165 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 
.  
. lincom _cons+ 0.59*published + 12.40*puby 
 
 ( 1)  .59*published + 12.4*puby + _cons = 0 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
           t |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
         (1) |   1.435684   .4424252     3.25   0.010     .4348489     2.43652 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 
.  
. vif  
 
    Variable |       VIF       1/VIF   
-------------+---------------------- 
        puby |      2.14    0.466686 
    cross_se |      1.78    0.562002 
       invSE |      1.74    0.575200 
      ols_se |      1.73    0.578970 
   published |      1.60    0.623675 
      imf_se |      1.40    0.713210 
    fdrev_se |      1.15    0.869118 
  threefd_se |      1.07    0.935131 
-------------+---------------------- 
    Mean VIF |      1.58 
 
.  
. estat ovtest 
 
Ramsey RESET test using powers of the fitted values of t 
       Ho:  model has no omitted variables 
                  F(3, 92) =      4.67 
                  Prob > F =      0.0044 
 
.  
.  
 
. *8* fe (positive publication bias and negative genuine effect) 
 
. . regress t invSE published puby cross_se ols_se imf_se fdrev_se threefd_se  
invSE_study37 invSE_study25 invSE_study11 if t>-7.138112 & t<=6.97377 
> 6 & level==1  [aweight=weights], vce(cluster idstudy) 
(sum of wgt is   8.0323e+00) 
 
Linear regression                                      Number of obs =     104 
                                                       F(  4,     9) =       . 
                                                       Prob > F      =       . 
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                                                       R-squared     =  0.5537 
                                                       Root MSE      =   1.781 
 
                                (Std. Err. adjusted for 10 clusters in idstudy) 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
              |               Robust 
            t |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
--------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
        invSE |  -.1810614    .024659    -7.34   0.000     -.236844   -.1252789 
    published |  -2.782627   .4273606    -6.51   0.000    -3.749384   -1.815871 
         puby |  -.4319652   .1162998    -3.71   0.005    -.6950536   -.1688768 
     cross_se |  -1.123572   .0901621   -12.46   0.000    -1.327533    -.919611 
       ols_se |   .7923133   .0584585    13.55   0.000     .6600709    .9245557 
       imf_se |   .2962143   .0453565     6.53   0.000     .1936107    .3988179 
     fdrev_se |   .0646047   .0173711     3.72   0.005     .0253085    .1039009 
   threefd_se |  -.1514314   .0041706   -36.31   0.000    -.1608659   -.1419969 
invSE_study37 |  -.2787741   .0295038    -9.45   0.000    -.3455164   -.2120317 
invSE_study25 |  -.0315733   .0778825    -0.41   0.695    -.2077557    .1446091 
invSE_study11 |  -.4634708    .071659    -6.47   0.000    -.6255748   -.3013669 
        _cons |   8.875903   1.742624     5.09   0.001     4.933815    12.81799 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
 
.  
. vif 
 
    Variable |       VIF       1/VIF   
-------------+---------------------- 
        puby |      4.24    0.236082 
       invSE |      2.73    0.366150 
   published |      2.32    0.431126 
    cross_se |      2.09    0.478283 
invSE_stu~25 |      1.99    0.502302 
      imf_se |      1.93    0.518217 
      ols_se |      1.84    0.542140 
invSE_stu~37 |      1.71    0.586318 
invSE_stu~11 |      1.43    0.696959 
  threefd_se |      1.25    0.798178 
    fdrev_se |      1.20    0.832702 
-------------+---------------------- 
    Mean VIF |      2.07 
 
.  
. lincom _cons+ 0.59*published + 12.40*puby 
 
 ( 1)  .59*published + 12.4*puby + _cons = 0 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
           t |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
         (1) |   1.877785   .2850117     6.59   0.000     1.233044    2.522526 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 
.  
. lincom invSE+ 0.0192308*cross_se +0.0576923*ols_se + 0.3076923*imf_se + 
0.1538462*threefd_se + 0.16*fdrev_se 
 
 ( 1)  invSE + .0192308*cross_se + .0576923*ols_se + .3076923*imf_se + .16*fdrev_se + 
.1538462*threefd_se = 0 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
           t |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
         (1) |  -.0787757    .022651    -3.48   0.007    -.1300159   -.0275356 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 
.  
. outreg2 usign 26oct.doc 
  outreg2 usign 26oct.doc using `"26oct1.doc"' 
26oct1.doc 
dir : seeout 
 
.  
.  
. *9* robust regression 
 
.  
. rreg t invSE published puby cross_se ols_se imf_se fdrev_se threefd_se if level==1 
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   Huber iteration 1:  maximum difference in weights = .54024661 
   Huber iteration 2:  maximum difference in weights = .1158604 
   Huber iteration 3:  maximum difference in weights = .03276009 
Biweight iteration 4:  maximum difference in weights = .2563729 
Biweight iteration 5:  maximum difference in weights = .14343965 
Biweight iteration 6:  maximum difference in weights = .15198207 
Biweight iteration 7:  maximum difference in weights = .13513249 
Biweight iteration 8:  maximum difference in weights = .13345701 
Biweight iteration 9:  maximum difference in weights = .1335 
Biweight iteration 10:  maximum difference in weights = .12164479 
Biweight iteration 11:  maximum difference in weights = .09720437 
Biweight iteration 12:  maximum difference in weights = .06047851 
Biweight iteration 13:  maximum difference in weights = .01737281 
Biweight iteration 14:  maximum difference in weights = .02116871 
Biweight iteration 15:  maximum difference in weights = .01348459 
Biweight iteration 16:  maximum difference in weights = .0045696 
 
Robust regression                                      Number of obs =     104 
                                                       F(  8,    95) =   21.59 
                                                       Prob > F      =  0.0000 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
           t |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
       invSE |  -.1089921   .0296935    -3.67   0.000    -.1679411   -.0500431 
   published |   -.128219   .3910847    -0.33   0.744    -.9046203    .6481822 
        puby |  -.3959746   .0870092    -4.55   0.000    -.5687097   -.2232394 
    cross_se |  -.8214281   .1715207    -4.79   0.000     -1.16194   -.4809164 
      ols_se |   .7540629   .1090885     6.91   0.000     .5374949    .9706308 
      imf_se |   .3398445   .0335149    10.14   0.000      .273309      .40638 
    fdrev_se |   .0289499   .0407366     0.71   0.479    -.0519225    .1098223 
  threefd_se |  -.1446085    .065173    -2.22   0.029    -.2739933   -.0152236 
       _cons |   5.688484   1.277903     4.45   0.000     3.151526    8.225442 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
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Box 1 
The IMF Governmental Finance Statistics database organises government into 
institutional units according to the level of government in charged for. A general 
government consists of three layers of government: central, state and local 
government. Institutional units controlled by a single central authority across the 
country lie under the central government. On the other side, distinct institutional units 
from central government controlled by regional or provincial authorities across a sub-
section territory of a country are part of state government. A smaller geographical area 
than the one of state government where separate institutional units inherit fiscal, 
legislative and executive authority involves local government. 
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Appendix 4.1 Correlation Matrix 
. corr popgrowth educ2 educ3 dschooling laggdp gfcf_gdp trade govcons schooling_wb schooling_undp dschooling eu tindex rule_estimates 
rule_rank europe fdexp fdrev fdtax fiscalperform1 fiscalperform2 imbalance1 imbalance2 fdtax_l (obs=268) 
 
             | popgro~h    educ2    educ3 dschoo~g   laggdp gfcf_gdp    trade  govcons school~b school~p dschoo~g       eu   tindex 
-------------+--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
   popgrowth |   1.0000 
       educ2 |  -0.1163   1.0000 
       educ3 |  -0.1548   0.6970   1.0000 
  dschooling |  -0.0126   0.1614   0.1898   1.0000 
      laggdp |   0.1239   0.5539   0.4875   0.1044   1.0000 
    gfcf_gdp |   0.1295  -0.1798  -0.1906   0.1315   0.0436   1.0000 
       trade |   0.0495   0.1569   0.2393   0.0361   0.3334  -0.0394   1.0000 
     govcons |  -0.1899   0.1190   0.1291  -0.1540   0.2033  -0.2095   0.3218   1.0000 
schooling_wb |   0.2656   0.1230   0.2062   0.0706  -0.2134  -0.0057   0.1684  -0.3250   1.0000 
schooling_~p |   0.1181   0.6030   0.5271   0.2017   0.6621   0.1009   0.3364   0.2012   0.2142   1.0000 
  dschooling |  -0.0126   0.1614   0.1898   1.0000   0.1044   0.1315   0.0361  -0.1540   0.0706   0.2017   1.0000 
          eu |  -0.1120   0.4477   0.6206   0.0963   0.6952  -0.0445   0.5234   0.1781  -0.0441   0.5427   0.0963   1.0000 
      tindex |  -0.1173   0.3733   0.3505   0.1483   0.7129   0.1770   0.3997   0.3533  -0.3974   0.5511   0.1483   0.6918   1.0000 
rule_estim~s |  -0.1799   0.4434   0.3405   0.0327   0.7872   0.0473   0.3103   0.4577  -0.4323   0.5390   0.0327   0.5878   0.7868 
   rule_rank |  -0.1928   0.4250   0.3244   0.0388   0.7768   0.0552   0.2988   0.4576  -0.4368   0.5152   0.0388   0.5799   0.7790 
      europe |  -0.3118   0.2022   0.1715   0.0225   0.6298   0.0522   0.0885   0.3462  -0.7112   0.1388   0.0225   0.4471   0.6654 
       fdexp |   0.1230   0.3390   0.2089  -0.0409   0.0983  -0.2992  -0.0526   0.0666   0.3246   0.2349  -0.0409   0.0431  -0.1008 
       fdrev |   0.1334   0.2871   0.1731  -0.0354   0.0733  -0.3693  -0.0473   0.0873   0.3107   0.1975  -0.0354   0.0219  -0.1376 
       fdtax |   0.0628  -0.0106  -0.0282  -0.1708  -0.1575  -0.1998  -0.1570   0.0070   0.2448  -0.0397  -0.1708  -0.1292  -0.3568 
fiscalperf~1 |   0.1941  -0.2396  -0.3059  -0.0625  -0.3549  -0.0447  -0.3301  -0.2663   0.1563  -0.2388  -0.0625  -0.3488  -0.5070 
fiscalperf~2 |   0.2046  -0.2487  -0.2843  -0.0378  -0.4360   0.0303  -0.3185  -0.3474   0.3406  -0.2720  -0.0378  -0.4113  -0.6248 
  imbalance1 |  -0.1200   0.2202   0.2572   0.1332   0.2159   0.0928   0.2713   0.0501   0.0853   0.2314   0.1332   0.2375   0.3584 
  imbalance2 |   0.0362   0.1814   0.1795   0.1519   0.1091   0.0911   0.1845  -0.1158   0.2519   0.1831   0.1519   0.1028   0.1624 
     fdtax_l |   0.1203  -0.2560  -0.2671  -0.0875  -0.3941   0.0432  -0.3247  -0.2487   0.1906  -0.2860  -0.0875  -0.3622  -0.5403 
 
             | rule_e~s rule_r~k   europe    fdexp    fdrev    fdtax fiscal~1 fiscal~2 imbala~1 imbala~2  fdtax_l 
-------------+--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
rule_estim~s |   1.0000 
   rule_rank |   0.9943   1.0000 
      europe |   0.7478   0.7522   1.0000 
       fdexp |  -0.0577  -0.0994  -0.2461   1.0000 
       fdrev |  -0.0666  -0.1031  -0.2813   0.9436   1.0000 
       fdtax |  -0.2416  -0.2647  -0.3917   0.5771   0.6342   1.0000 
fiscalperf~1 |  -0.4285  -0.4221  -0.4592   0.0399   0.0804   0.6255   1.0000 
fiscalperf~2 |  -0.5765  -0.5775  -0.6156   0.1561   0.1929   0.7040   0.9013   1.0000 
  imbalance1 |   0.2385   0.2437   0.1986  -0.0903  -0.1050  -0.6774  -0.8884  -0.7445   1.0000 
  imbalance2 |   0.0472   0.0584  -0.0131  -0.0553  -0.0368  -0.5807  -0.7125  -0.5389   0.9310   1.0000 
     fdtax_l |  -0.4808  -0.4846  -0.4906   0.1166   0.1372   0.7395   0.8855   0.9614  -0.8314  -0.6964   1.0000 
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Appendix 4.2 Diagnostics 
Appendix 4.2.1 Summary Statistics 
. xtsum growth  fdexp fdrev fdtax fiscalperform1 fiscalperform2 imbalance1 imbalance2 
fdtax_l popgrowth educ2 educ3  schooling_wb schooling_undp dschooling laggdp lag2gdp 
lngdpini gfcf_gdp trade govcons tindex rule_estimates rule_rank europe eu 
 
Variable         |      Mean   Std. Dev.       Min        Max |    Observations 
-----------------+--------------------------------------------+---------------- 
growth   overall |  3.939919   4.547403  -15.73542   13.74634 |     N =     364 
         between |             1.531516   1.615957   6.853537 |     n =      21 
         within  |             4.306808  -16.80605   13.07969 | T-bar = 17.3333 
                 |                                            | 
fdexp    overall |  23.77712   9.338959       5.12      55.63 |     N =     358 
         between |             9.153969   7.565833   45.76941 |     n =      21 
         within  |             3.818539   9.117649   37.59765 | T-bar = 17.0476 
                 |                                            | 
fdrev    overall |  25.53412     9.9686        5.2      59.23 |     N =     359 
         between |             9.739891   7.816667   47.44471 |     n =      21 
         within  |             4.081196   13.86942   40.80362 | T-bar = 17.0952 
                 |                                            | 
fdtax    overall |  16.85992   12.93801        1.4      76.95 |     N =     358 
         between |             11.21796     1.9795   41.63353 |     n =      21 
         within  |             6.313699  -.8816625   67.00141 | T-bar = 17.0476 
                 |                                            | 
fiscal~1 overall |  55.38652   24.59587       9.63     118.67 |     N =     359 
         between |             22.36057     13.611   107.9991 |     n =      21 
         within  |             12.88486   18.37152    108.487 | T-bar = 17.0952 
                 |                                            | 
fiscal~2 overall |  39.65933   23.86436       3.03      98.31 |     N =     359 
         between |             20.19813      4.241   71.41412 |     n =      21 
         within  |             12.86277   .5676651   91.21683 | T-bar = 17.0952 
                 |                                            | 
imbala~1 overall |  48.75487   21.26715       4.65      90.33 |     N =     359 
         between |             17.67082   10.50091    86.2145 |     n =      21 
         within  |             12.73806  -1.885626   80.63432 | T-bar = 17.0952 
                 |                                            | 
imbala~2 overall |  51.51436   23.58207       5.62     120.47 |     N =     358 
         between |             17.29849   12.88545    85.2585 |     n =      21 
         within  |             16.80705   1.723858   115.6794 | T-bar = 17.0476 
                 |                                            | 
fdtax_l  overall |  36.79425   20.95755       3.18      83.83 |     N =     358 
         between |             16.70101      4.376   70.28941 |     n =      21 
         within  |             12.49957   3.278135   86.29225 | T-bar = 17.0476 
                 |                                            | 
popgro~h overall | -.3375207   .6854643      -2.26       2.64 |     N =     363 
         between |             .6007097     -1.142      1.432 |     n =      21 
         within  |             .4059679  -2.692784   1.677216 | T-bar = 17.2857 
                 |                                            | 
educ2    overall |  94.34234   8.378795         68   119.4924 |     N =     357 
         between |               6.2246   81.02554    101.771 |     n =      21 
         within  |             5.914394   80.20353   114.4996 | T-bar =      17 
                 |                                            | 
educ3    overall |  52.22902   16.90763   16.43171   90.43713 |     N =     353 
         between |             11.06993   35.82792   71.08829 |     n =      21 
         within  |             12.75114   14.52438   79.56836 | T-bar = 16.8095 
                 |                                            | 
school~b overall |  4.218182   1.111248         .5        6.9 |     N =     297 
         between |             1.044635      2.895   6.368421 |     n =      17 
         within  |               .48396   1.578182   5.278182 | T-bar = 17.4706 
                 |                                            | 
school~p overall |  10.98033   1.021451        8.6       13.1 |     N =     361 
         between |             .8052952   9.114286      12.62 |     n =      21 
         within  |             .6488077   8.945332   13.02151 | T-bar = 17.1905 
                 |                                            | 
dschoo~g overall |  .0094708    .447113         -4          1 |     N =     359 
         between |             .0565546  -.1090909   .1307692 |     n =      21 
         within  |             .4442649  -3.950529   .9544707 | T-bar = 17.0952 
                 |                                            | 
laggdp   overall |  14471.28   7498.841   2268.499   31137.78 |     N =     364 
         between |             6777.672   2789.771   25406.43 |     n =      21 
         within  |             3547.256   5520.984   23215.06 | T-bar = 17.3333 
                 |                                            | 
lag2gdp  overall |  14270.56   7406.592   2268.499   31137.78 |     N =     343 
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         between |             6722.239    2746.23   25245.72 |     n =      21 
         within  |             3446.855   5670.012   22370.88 | T-bar = 16.3333 
                 |                                            | 
lngdpini overall |   9.01878   .6023695   7.790522   9.856976 |     N =     364 
         between |             .6246839   7.790522   9.856976 |     n =      21 
         within  |                    0    9.01878    9.01878 | T-bar = 17.3333 
                 |                                            | 
gfcf_gdp overall |  24.47802   5.399173   5.385321   40.47286 |     N =     364 
         between |             3.633381   19.85558   32.71138 |     n =      21 
         within  |             4.223384   9.252266   38.17171 | T-bar = 17.3333 
                 |                                            | 
trade    overall |   105.556   30.13797   45.47565   184.5514 |     N =     364 
         between |             25.23123   69.34934   144.7662 |     n =      21 
         within  |             17.12333    50.6348   155.0891 | T-bar = 17.3333 
                 |                                            | 
govcons  overall |   17.8376   3.605838   8.538813   27.09808 |     N =     364 
         between |             3.135079   10.87151   22.09974 |     n =      21 
         within  |             2.096092   8.985127   28.09751 | T-bar = 17.3333 
                 |                                            | 
                 |                                            | 
tindex   overall |  74.68816   14.81082   16.81818        100 |     N =     344 
         between |             14.01776   27.72727    91.1244 |     n =      21 
         within  |             4.923805   47.96301   83.98109 |     T =  16.381 
                 |                                            | 
rule_e~s overall |  .0276648   .7111169      -1.46       1.36 |     N =     364 
         between |             .6968778     -1.221     .99675 |     n =      21 
         within  |             .2083533  -.8433878   .9166122 | T-bar = 17.3333 
                 |                                            | 
rule_r~k overall |  52.08778   21.96454       6.16       86.6 |     N =     364 
         between |             21.45243     10.181   81.44425 |     n =      21 
         within  |              7.09947   23.80015   82.48015 | T-bar = 17.3333 
                 |                                            | 
europe   overall |  .6840659   .4655267          0          1 |     N =     364 
         between |             .4830459          0          1 |     n =      21 
         within  |                    0   .6840659   .6840659 | T-bar = 17.3333 
  |        | 
eu       overall |  .3214286   .4676677          0          1 |     N =     364 
         between |              .288737          0         .6 |     n =      21 
         within  |             .3737237  -.2785714   1.121429 | T-bar = 17.3333 
 
 
Appendix 4.2.2 VIF command 
. reg growth fdexp fdtax_l popgrowth dschooling laggdp gfcf_gdp trade tindex year1 
year2 year3 year4 year5 year6 year7 year8 year9 yea 
> r10 year11 year12 year13 year14 year15 year16 year17 year18 if growth<=21.20154 & 
growth>=-12.55204 
 
      Source |       SS       df       MS              Number of obs =     328 
-------------+------------------------------           F( 26,   301) =   16.35 
       Model |  3107.94205    26  119.536233           Prob > F      =  0.0000 
    Residual |  2200.93038   301  7.31206108           R-squared     =  0.5854 
-------------+------------------------------           Adj R-squared =  0.5496 
       Total |  5308.87243   327  16.2350839           Root MSE      =  2.7041 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
      growth |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
       fdexp |   .0690888   .0189805     3.64   0.000     .0317375    .1064402 
     fdtax_l |  -.0124964   .0095545    -1.31   0.192    -.0312985    .0063058 
   popgrowth |  -1.021732   .2348323    -4.35   0.000    -1.483853   -.5596109 
  dschooling |   1.491129   .4514797     3.30   0.001     .6026723    2.379585 
      laggdp |  -.0001366   .0000286    -4.78   0.000    -.0001928   -.0000804 
    gfcf_gdp |   .1577501   .0319733     4.93   0.000     .0948306    .2206697 
       trade |   .0015034   .0055959     0.27   0.788    -.0095086    .0125154 
      tindex |  -.0033484   .0156646    -0.21   0.831    -.0341745    .0274776 
       year1 |   1.472597   1.307964     1.13   0.261    -1.101315    4.046509 
       year2 |   .8195724   .9922106     0.83   0.409    -1.132976     2.77212 
       year3 |  -1.228833   .9949355    -1.24   0.218    -3.186743     .729077 
       year4 |   -2.75268   .9714833    -2.83   0.005     -4.66444   -.8409214 
       year5 |   1.030182   .9679615     1.06   0.288    -.8746471    2.935011 
       year6 |   1.355603    .946637     1.43   0.153    -.5072621    3.218467 
       year7 |   1.419781   .9570908     1.48   0.139    -.4636556    3.303217 
       year8 |   2.582987   .9151989     2.82   0.005      .781988    4.383985 
       year9 |   2.854985   .9102835     3.14   0.002     1.063659     4.64631 
      year10 |   2.986381    .901463     3.31   0.001     1.212413    4.760349 
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      year11 |   3.137535   .8957269     3.50   0.001     1.374855    4.900215 
      year12 |   3.160169   .8950898     3.53   0.000     1.398742    4.921595 
      year13 |   .0129177   .8893653     0.01   0.988    -1.737243    1.763079 
      year14 |  -6.428777   .9324745    -6.89   0.000    -8.263772   -4.593783 
      year15 |  -.8386976   .8620914    -0.97   0.331    -2.535187    .8577918 
      year16 |   .8376386   .8698838     0.96   0.336    -.8741852    2.549462 
      year17 |   -1.69897   .8581205    -1.98   0.049    -3.387645    -.010295 
      year18 |  -.1708662   .8900214    -0.19   0.848    -1.922318    1.580586 
       _cons |    .438677   1.802041     0.24   0.808    -3.107517    3.984871 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 
. vif 
 
    Variable |       VIF       1/VIF   
-------------+---------------------- 
      tindex |      2.49    0.401866 
       year1 |      2.49    0.402041 
      year12 |      2.15    0.464326 
      year13 |      2.13    0.470322 
      year11 |      2.06    0.485268 
      year15 |      2.00    0.500552 
      year10 |      1.99    0.502696 
  dschooling |      1.98    0.503836 
      year17 |      1.98    0.505195 
      laggdp |      1.97    0.508416 
       year8 |      1.95    0.513155 
      year16 |      1.94    0.514530 
       year9 |      1.93    0.518712 
       year6 |      1.87    0.536133 
      year18 |      1.84    0.542598 
      year14 |      1.81    0.552542 
       year7 |      1.79    0.557663 
     fdtax_l |      1.74    0.574077 
       year4 |      1.73    0.578077 
       year5 |      1.72    0.582291 
       year3 |      1.69    0.591657 
       year2 |      1.68    0.594911 
       fdexp |      1.44    0.694131 
    gfcf_gdp |      1.32    0.756251 
       trade |      1.23    0.815945 
   popgrowth |      1.15    0.873213 
-------------+---------------------- 
    Mean VIF |      1.85 
 
. reg growth fdexp fdtax_l imbalance2 popgrowth dschooling laggdp gfcf_gdp trade tindex 
year1 year2 year3 year4 year5 year6 year7 year 
> 8 year9 year10 year11 year12 year13 year14 year15 year16 year17 year18 if 
growth<=21.20154 & growth>=-12.55204 
 
      Source |       SS       df       MS              Number of obs =     328 
-------------+------------------------------           F( 27,   300) =   16.06 
       Model |  3138.07041    27   116.22483           Prob > F      =  0.0000 
    Residual |  2170.80202   300  7.23600673           R-squared     =  0.5911 
-------------+------------------------------           Adj R-squared =  0.5543 
       Total |  5308.87243   327  16.2350839           Root MSE      =    2.69 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
      growth |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
       fdexp |   .0615038    .019244     3.20   0.002     .0236335    .0993741 
     fdtax_l |   .0124135   .0154715     0.80   0.423    -.0180329      .04286 
  imbalance2 |   .0242439   .0118813     2.04   0.042     .0008626    .0476251 
   popgrowth |  -1.077826   .2352197    -4.58   0.000    -1.540716   -.6149364 
  dschooling |   1.464095    .449321     3.26   0.001     .5798751    2.348315 
      laggdp |  -.0001152   .0000303    -3.80   0.000    -.0001748   -.0000555 
    gfcf_gdp |    .145944   .0323286     4.51   0.000     .0823245    .2095635 
       trade |   .0027956   .0056026     0.50   0.618    -.0082298     .013821 
      tindex |  -.0015168   .0156088    -0.10   0.923    -.0322334    .0291998 
       year1 |   1.867132   1.315432     1.42   0.157    -.7215105    4.455774 
       year2 |    1.19222    1.00379     1.19   0.236    -.7831406    3.167581 
       year3 |  -.9316103   1.000409    -0.93   0.352    -2.900318    1.037097 
       year4 |  -2.329673    .988402    -2.36   0.019    -4.274753    -.384594 
       year5 |    1.41619   .9813208     1.44   0.150    -.5149539    3.347334 
       year6 |   1.675181   .9546359     1.75   0.080    -.2034502    3.553811 
       year7 |   1.707697    .962499     1.77   0.077    -.1864072    3.601802 
       year8 |   2.783081   .9156927     3.04   0.003     .9810862    4.585075 
       year9 |   3.028212   .9095078     3.33   0.001     1.238389    4.818035 
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      year10 |   3.138493   .8998557     3.49   0.001     1.367665    4.909322 
      year11 |   3.310551   .8950815     3.70   0.000     1.549117    5.071984 
      year12 |   3.296119   .8929118     3.69   0.000     1.538956    5.053283 
      year13 |   .0574347   .8849969     0.06   0.948    -1.684153    1.799023 
      year14 |   -6.30579   .9295685    -6.78   0.000    -8.135091    -4.47649 
      year15 |  -.8376508   .8575964    -0.98   0.329    -2.525317    .8500158 
      year16 |   .8378454    .865348     0.97   0.334    -.8650756    2.540766 
      year17 |  -1.717432    .853694    -2.01   0.045    -3.397419   -.0374452 
      year18 |   -.156706   .8854079    -0.18   0.860    -1.899103    1.585691 
       _cons |  -2.015214   2.158655    -0.93   0.351    -6.263239     2.23281 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 
. vif 
 
    Variable |       VIF       1/VIF   
-------------+---------------------- 
     fdtax_l |      4.62    0.216663 
  imbalance2 |      3.43    0.291510 
       year1 |      2.54    0.393355 
      tindex |      2.50    0.400537 
      laggdp |      2.24    0.447290 
      year12 |      2.17    0.461741 
      year13 |      2.13    0.470037 
      year11 |      2.08    0.480913 
      year10 |      2.00    0.499246 
      year15 |      2.00    0.500552 
  dschooling |      1.99    0.503398 
      year17 |      1.98    0.505139 
       year8 |      1.97    0.507270 
       year9 |      1.94    0.514193 
      year16 |      1.94    0.514530 
       year6 |      1.92    0.521702 
      year18 |      1.84    0.542565 
       year7 |      1.83    0.545678 
      year14 |      1.82    0.550219 
       year4 |      1.81    0.552647 
       year5 |      1.78    0.560652 
       year2 |      1.74    0.575219 
       year3 |      1.73    0.579114 
       fdexp |      1.50    0.668232 
    gfcf_gdp |      1.37    0.732028 
       trade |      1.24    0.805519 
   popgrowth |      1.16    0.861286 
-------------+---------------------- 
    Mean VIF |      2.05 
 
 
Appendix 4.2.3 RESET test 
. xtreg growth fdexp fdtax_l popgrowth dschooling laggdp gfcf_gdp trade tindex year1 
year2 year3 year4 year5 year6 year7 year8 year9 y 
> ear10 year11 year12 year13 year14 year15 year16 year17 year18 if growth<=21.20154 & 
growth>=-12.55204 
 
Random-effects GLS regression                   Number of obs      =       328 
Group variable: id_country                      Number of groups   =        21 
 
R-sq:  within  = 0.5837                         Obs per group: min =         6 
       between = 0.6225                                        avg =      15.6 
       overall = 0.5854                                        max =        19 
 
                                                Wald chi2(26)      =    425.04 
corr(u_i, X)   = 0 (assumed)                    Prob > chi2        =    0.0000 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
      growth |      Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
       fdexp |   .0690888   .0189805     3.64   0.000     .0318877      .10629 
     fdtax_l |  -.0124964   .0095545    -1.31   0.191    -.0312229    .0062302 
   popgrowth |  -1.021732   .2348323    -4.35   0.000    -1.481995   -.5614691 
  dschooling |   1.491129   .4514797     3.30   0.001     .6062446    2.376013 
      laggdp |  -.0001366   .0000286    -4.78   0.000    -.0001926   -.0000806 
    gfcf_gdp |   .1577501   .0319733     4.93   0.000     .0950836    .2204167 
       trade |   .0015034   .0055959     0.27   0.788    -.0094643    .0124711 
      tindex |  -.0033484   .0156646    -0.21   0.831    -.0340506    .0273537 
       year1 |   1.472597   1.307964     1.13   0.260    -1.090965     4.03616 
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       year2 |   .8195724   .9922106     0.83   0.409    -1.125125    2.764269 
       year3 |  -1.228833   .9949355    -1.24   0.217    -3.178871    .7212045 
       year4 |   -2.75268   .9714833    -2.83   0.005    -4.656753   -.8486083 
       year5 |   1.030182   .9679615     1.06   0.287    -.8669881    2.927351 
       year6 |   1.355603    .946637     1.43   0.152    -.4997718    3.210977 
       year7 |   1.419781   .9570908     1.48   0.138    -.4560825    3.295644 
       year8 |   2.582987   .9151989     2.82   0.005     .7892296    4.376743 
       year9 |   2.854985   .9102835     3.14   0.002     1.070862    4.639108 
      year10 |   2.986381    .901463     3.31   0.001     1.219546    4.753216 
      year11 |   3.137535   .8957269     3.50   0.000     1.381943    4.893127 
      year12 |   3.160169   .8950898     3.53   0.000     1.405825    4.914512 
      year13 |   .0129177   .8893653     0.01   0.988    -1.730206    1.756042 
      year14 |  -6.428777   .9324745    -6.89   0.000    -8.256394   -4.601161 
      year15 |  -.8386976   .8620914    -0.97   0.331    -2.528366    .8509705 
      year16 |   .8376386   .8698838     0.96   0.336    -.8673022    2.542579 
      year17 |   -1.69897   .8581205    -1.98   0.048    -3.380855   -.0170849 
      year18 |  -.1708662   .8900214    -0.19   0.848    -1.915276    1.573544 
       _cons |    .438677   1.802041     0.24   0.808    -3.093258    3.970612 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
     sigma_u |          0 
     sigma_e |  2.3609404 
         rho |          0   (fraction of variance due to u_i) 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 
.  
. predict yhat 
(option xb assumed; fitted values) 
(31 missing values generated) 
 
.  
. gen yhat2 = yhat* yhat 
(31 missing values generated) 
 
.  
. gen yhat3 = yhat* yhat * yhat 
(31 missing values generated) 
 
.  
. xtreg growth fdexp fdtax_l popgrowth dschooling laggdp gfcf_gdp trade tindex yhat2 
yhat3 year1 year2 year3 year4 year5 year6 year7 y 
> ear8 year9 year10 year11 year12 year13 year14 year15 year16 year17 year18 if 
growth<=21.20154 & growth>=-12.55204 
 
Random-effects GLS regression                   Number of obs      =       328 
Group variable: id_country                      Number of groups   =        21 
 
R-sq:  within  = 0.5832                         Obs per group: min =         6 
       between = 0.6264                                        avg =      15.6 
       overall = 0.5857                                        max =        19 
 
                                                Wald chi2(28)      =    422.71 
corr(u_i, X)   = 0 (assumed)                    Prob > chi2        =    0.0000 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
      growth |      Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
       fdexp |   .0651882   .0215731     3.02   0.003     .0229057    .1074707 
     fdtax_l |  -.0122243   .0096266    -1.27   0.204    -.0310922    .0066435 
   popgrowth |  -.9646443   .3004806    -3.21   0.001    -1.553575   -.3757131 
  dschooling |   1.393244   .5243079     2.66   0.008     .3656198    2.420869 
      laggdp |  -.0001304   .0000332    -3.93   0.000    -.0001955   -.0000653 
    gfcf_gdp |    .148826   .0416956     3.57   0.000     .0671043    .2305478 
       trade |   .0013326   .0056358     0.24   0.813    -.0097134    .0123786 
      tindex |  -.0029989   .0157978    -0.19   0.849    -.0339619    .0279642 
       yhat2 |   .0126846   .0309751     0.41   0.682    -.0480255    .0733947 
       yhat3 |  -.0006551   .0029387    -0.22   0.824    -.0064149    .0051046 
       year1 |   1.347264   1.351944     1.00   0.319    -1.302497    3.997025 
       year2 |   .7509243   1.008899     0.74   0.457    -1.226482    2.728331 
       year3 |  -1.164279   1.022348    -1.14   0.255    -3.168044    .8394865 
       year4 |  -2.630745   1.017321    -2.59   0.010    -4.624657   -.6368324 
       year5 |   .9475951   .9901532     0.96   0.339    -.9930694     2.88826 
       year6 |    1.24009   .9836689     1.26   0.207    -.6878652    3.168046 
       year7 |   1.301229   .9957507     1.31   0.191    -.6504067    3.252864 
       year8 |    2.37031   1.046587     2.26   0.024     .3190377    4.421583 
       year9 |    2.62516   1.065918     2.46   0.014     .5359986    4.714322 
      year10 |   2.748679   1.075468     2.56   0.011     .6407996    4.856557 
      year11 |   2.887843   1.099044     2.63   0.009     .7337575    5.041929 
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      year12 |   2.910728   1.106841     2.63   0.009     .7413592    5.080097 
      year13 |   -.001509   .9007689    -0.00   0.999    -1.766984    1.763966 
      year14 |  -6.513839   1.016139    -6.41   0.000    -8.505435   -4.522242 
      year15 |  -.7972825   .8727843    -0.91   0.361    -2.507908    .9133433 
      year16 |     .77861   .8835241     0.88   0.378    -.9530654    2.510285 
      year17 |  -1.628128   .8760761    -1.86   0.063    -3.345205    .0889498 
      year18 |  -.1598754   .8932269    -0.18   0.858    -1.910568    1.590817 
       _cons |   .5132421   1.846617     0.28   0.781    -3.106061    4.132545 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
     sigma_u |          0 
     sigma_e |  2.3679194 
         rho |          0   (fraction of variance due to u_i) 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 
.  
. test yhat2=yhat3=0 
 
 ( 1)  yhat2 - yhat3 = 0 
 ( 2)  yhat2 = 0 
 
           chi2(  2) =    0.20 
         Prob > chi2 =    0.9031 
 
 
Appendix 4.2.4 Normality Assumption 
a. Histogram 
 
 
 
b. Box Plot 
 
 
c. Detection of Outliers 
. lv growth 
 
 #    364                GDPgrowth 
             --------------------------------- 
 M    182.5 |             4.169904            |    spread  pseudosigma 
 F     91.5 |  1.913781    4.32475    6.73572 |  4.821939    3.578326 
 E     46   | -.3364187   4.026436    8.38929 |  8.725709    3.798132 
 D     23.5 | -2.541421   3.779639    10.1007 |  12.64212    4.144019 
 C     12   | -6.061302   2.820477   11.70226 |  17.76356    4.796103 
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 B      6.5 | -9.471185   1.546197   12.56358 |  22.03476    5.192389 
 A      3.5 | -14.75126  -.6768351   13.39759 |  28.14885     5.91736 
 Z      2   | -15.57294  -.9512763   13.67039 |  29.24333    5.609843 
 Y      1.5 | -15.65418  -.9729087   13.70836 |  29.36254    5.385004 
        1   | -15.73542  -.9945412   13.74634 |  29.48175    5.095184 
            |                                 | 
            |                                 |   # below     # above 
inner fence | -5.319127              13.96863 |        15           0 
outer fence | -12.55204              21.20154 |         5           0 
 
. lv fdexp 
 
 #    358                  Fdexp 
             --------------------------------- 
 M    179.5 |                 24.2            |    spread  pseudosigma 
 F     90   |     17.87     22.695      27.52 |      9.65    7.161324 
 E     45.5 |     12.96     22.345      31.73 |     18.77      8.1945 
 D     23   |      9.37     24.375      39.38 |     30.01    9.820003 
 C     12   |      8.25      27.24      46.23 |     37.98     10.2957 
 B      6.5 |      6.64     29.385      52.13 |     45.49    10.75346 
 A      3.5 |     6.195    30.3975       54.6 |    48.405    10.20183 
 Z      2   |      5.18     30.315      55.45 |     50.27    9.664562 
 Y      1.5 |      5.15     30.345      55.54 |     50.39    9.260008 
        1   |      5.12     30.375      55.63 |     50.51    8.745164 
            |                                 | 
            |                                 |   # below     # above 
inner fence |  3.395001                41.995 |         0          16 
outer fence |    -11.08                 56.47 |         0           0 
 
. lv fdrev 
 
 #    359                  Fdrev 
             --------------------------------- 
 M    180   |                25.59            |    spread  pseudosigma 
 F     90.5 |     19.38    24.2475     29.115 |     9.735    7.247904 
 E     45.5 |     13.97     24.265      34.56 |     20.59    8.975775 
 D     23   |      9.99     25.925      41.86 |     31.87    10.41896 
 C     12   |      7.82      29.15      50.48 |     42.66    11.55656 
 B      6.5 |       6.9    30.9875     55.075 |    48.175    11.38212 
 A      3.5 |      6.24       31.4      56.56 |     50.32    10.60083 
 Z      2   |      5.67      31.83      57.99 |     52.32    10.05498 
 Y      1.5 |     5.435    32.0225      58.61 |    53.175    9.768492 
        1   |       5.2     32.215      59.23 |     54.03    9.351769 
            |                                 | 
            |                                 |   # below     # above 
inner fence |  4.777501               43.7175 |         0          18 
outer fence | -9.824999                 58.32 |         0           1 
 
. lv fdtax 
 
 #    358                  Fdtax 
             --------------------------------- 
 M    179.5 |               14.415            |    spread  pseudosigma 
 F     90   |      5.37      15.04      24.71 |     19.34    14.35233 
 E     45.5 |      2.92     18.895      34.87 |     31.95    13.94855 
 D     23   |      2.28     21.215      40.15 |     37.87    12.39199 
 C     12   |      1.93     23.585      45.24 |     43.31    11.74057 
 B      6.5 |      1.76    24.9575     48.155 |    46.395     10.9674 
 A      3.5 |       1.6     25.555      49.51 |     47.91     10.0975 
 Z      2   |      1.53     26.115       50.7 |     49.17    9.453083 
 Y      1.5 |     1.465     32.645     63.825 |     62.36     11.4597 
        1   |       1.4     39.175      76.95 |     75.55    13.08052 
            |                                 | 
            |                                 |   # below     # above 
inner fence |    -23.64                 53.72 |         0           1 
outer fence |    -52.65                 82.73 |         0           0 
 
. lv fdtax_l 
 
 #    358                 fdtax_l 
             --------------------------------- 
 M    179.5 |                37.62            |    spread  pseudosigma 
 F     90   |     18.95       35.6      52.25 |      33.3    24.71213 
 E     45.5 |      9.15      34.12      59.09 |     49.94    21.80252 
 D     23   |      5.02      38.16       71.3 |     66.28    21.68843 
 C     12   |      4.43     41.405      78.38 |     73.95    20.04653 
 B      6.5 |     3.835    42.4875      81.14 |    77.305    18.27426 
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 A      3.5 |      3.55      43.42      83.29 |     79.74    16.80598 
 Z      2   |      3.46      43.64      83.82 |     80.36    15.44946 
 Y      1.5 |      3.32    43.5725     83.825 |    80.505    14.79414 
        1   |      3.18     43.505      83.83 |     80.65    13.96352 
            |                                 | 
            |                                 |   # below     # above 
inner fence |       -31                 102.2 |         0           0 
outer fence |    -80.95                152.15 |         0           0 
 
. lv fiscalperform1 
 
 #    359                Coverage1 
             --------------------------------- 
 M    180   |                56.04            |    spread  pseudosigma 
 F     90.5 |    40.285     55.225     70.165 |     29.88    22.24626 
 E     45.5 |    22.915    53.9525      84.99 |    62.075    27.06028 
 D     23   |     14.88      56.62      98.36 |     83.48    27.29133 
 C     12   |     13.16     59.085     105.01 |     91.85    24.88209 
 B      6.5 |     11.37      59.01     106.65 |     95.28    22.51143 
 A      3.5 |    10.695    61.1575     111.62 |   100.925     21.2617 
 Z      2   |     10.57      62.84     115.11 |    104.54    20.09075 
 Y      1.5 |      10.1     63.495     116.89 |    106.79    19.61781 
        1   |      9.63      64.15     118.67 |    109.04    18.87316 
            |                                 | 
            |                                 |   # below     # above 
inner fence | -4.535002               114.985 |         0           2 
outer fence |   -49.355               159.805 |         0           0 
 
. lv fiscalperform2 
 
 #    359                Coverage2 
             --------------------------------- 
 M    180   |                 37.9            |    spread  pseudosigma 
 F     90.5 |     21.48    38.5125     55.545 |    34.065    25.36208 
 E     45.5 |      8.69    38.4175     68.145 |    59.455    25.91815 
 D     23   |      4.95     41.635      78.32 |     73.37    23.98617 
 C     12   |      4.23      46.48      88.73 |      84.5    22.89098 
 B      6.5 |      3.72    48.2725     92.825 |    89.105    21.05248 
 A      3.5 |       3.5    50.4175     97.335 |    93.835    19.76807 
 Z      2   |      3.38     50.605      97.83 |     94.45    18.15163 
 Y      1.5 |     3.205    50.6375      98.07 |    94.865    17.42714 
        1   |      3.03      50.67      98.31 |     95.28    16.49152 
            |                                 | 
            |                                 |   # below     # above 
inner fence |  -29.6175              106.6425 |         0           0 
outer fence |   -80.715                157.74 |         0           0 
 
. lv imbalance1 
 
 #    359                Imbalance 
             --------------------------------- 
 M    180   |                47.88            |    spread  pseudosigma 
 F     90.5 |    33.475    48.6625      63.85 |    30.375     22.6148 
 E     45.5 |    23.175     50.345     77.515 |     54.34    23.68837 
 D     23   |     14.56     49.475      84.39 |     69.83    22.82887 
 C     12   |      12.4      49.34      86.28 |     73.88    20.01403 
 B      6.5 |     10.36      49.37      88.38 |     78.02    18.43347 
 A      3.5 |     7.565    48.2525      88.94 |    81.375    17.14314 
 Z      2   |      5.67      47.41      89.15 |     83.48    16.04339 
 Y      1.5 |      5.16      47.45      89.74 |     84.58    15.53773 
        1   |      4.65      47.49      90.33 |     85.68     14.8299 
            |                                 | 
            |                                 |   # below     # above 
inner fence |  -12.0875              109.4125 |         0           0 
outer fence | -57.65001               154.975 |         0           0 
 
. lv imbalance2 
 
 #    358                Imbalance2 
             --------------------------------- 
 M    179.5 |               48.825            |    spread  pseudosigma 
 F     90   |     33.68     51.715      69.75 |     36.07    26.76777 
 E     45.5 |     23.92      52.38      80.84 |     56.92    24.84981 
 D     23   |     16.54      52.47       88.4 |     71.86    23.51434 
 C     12   |     13.75      55.63      97.51 |     83.76    22.70585 
 B      6.5 |    11.455     55.735    100.015 |     88.56    20.93485 
 A      3.5 |      8.02     58.145     108.27 |    100.25    21.12867 
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 Z      2   |      6.32     57.705     109.09 |    102.77    19.75785 
 Y      1.5 |      5.97     60.375     114.78 |    108.81    19.99566 
        1   |      5.62     63.045     120.47 |    114.85    19.88482 
            |                                 | 
            |                                 |   # below     # above 
inner fence |   -20.425               123.855 |         0           0 
outer fence |    -74.53                177.96 |         0           0 
 
 
b. Ladder command 
. ladder gfcf_gdp 
 
Transformation         formula               chi2(2)       P(chi2) 
------------------------------------------------------------------ 
cubic                  gfcf_gdp^3                 .        0.000 
square                 gfcf_gdp^2             54.03        0.000 
identity               gfcf_gdp               14.92        0.001 
square root            sqrt(gfcf_gdp)         10.15        0.006 
log                    log(gfcf_gdp)          58.01        0.000 
1/(square root)        1/sqrt(gfcf_gdp)           .        0.000 
inverse                1/gfcf_gdp                 .        0.000 
1/square               1/(gfcf_gdp^2)             .        0.000 
1/cubic                1/(gfcf_gdp^3)             .        0.000 
 
 
ladder educ2 
 
Transformation         formula               chi2(2)       P(chi2) 
------------------------------------------------------------------ 
cubic                  educ2^3                 7.50        0.024 
square                 educ2^2                 1.03        0.598 
identity               educ2                   6.48        0.039 
square root            sqrt(educ2)            12.44        0.002 
log                    log(educ2)             20.39        0.000 
1/(square root)        1/sqrt(educ2)          30.14        0.000 
inverse                1/educ2                41.42        0.000 
1/square               1/(educ2^2)            67.38        0.000 
1/cubic                1/(educ2^3)                .        0.000 
 
. ladder educ3 
 
Transformation         formula               chi2(2)       P(chi2) 
------------------------------------------------------------------ 
cubic                  educ3^3                48.95        0.000 
square                 educ3^2                22.97        0.000 
identity               educ3                  16.08        0.000 
square root            sqrt(educ3)             9.01        0.011 
log                    log(educ3)             16.23        0.000 
1/(square root)        1/sqrt(educ3)          47.70        0.000 
inverse                1/educ3                    .        0.000 
1/square               1/(educ3^2)                .        0.000 
1/cubic                1/(educ3^3)                .        0.000 
 
 
. ladder schooling_undp 
 
Transformation         formula               chi2(2)       P(chi2) 
------------------------------------------------------------------ 
cubic                  school~p^3             12.66        0.002 
square                 school~p^2             12.46        0.002 
identity               school~p               12.10        0.002 
square root            sqrt(school~p)         12.86        0.002 
log                    log(school~p)          14.70        0.001 
1/(square root)        1/sqrt(school~p)       17.72        0.000 
inverse                1/school~p             21.91        0.000 
1/square               1/(school~p^2)         33.16        0.000 
1/cubic                1/(school~p^3)         47.04        0.000 
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Appendix 4.2.5 Unit Root Test 
 
 xtunitroot fisher popgrowth , pp lag(1) demean 
 
Fisher-type unit-root test for popgrowth 
Based on Phillips-Perron tests 
---------------------------------------- 
Ho: All panels contain unit roots           Number of panels       =     21 
Ha: At least one panel is stationary        Avg. number of periods =  17.29 
 
AR parameter:    Panel-specific             Asymptotics: T -> Infinity 
Panel means:     Included 
Time trend:      Not included               Cross-sectional means removed 
Newey-West lags: 1 lag 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
                                  Statistic      p-value 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 Inverse chi-squared(42)   P        63.8067       0.0166 
 Inverse normal            Z        -1.9546       0.0253 
 Inverse logit t(109)      L*       -2.0116       0.0234 
 Modified inv. chi-squared Pm        2.3793       0.0087 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 P statistic requires number of panels to be finite. 
 Other statistics are suitable for finite or infinite number of panels. 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 
. . xtunitroot fisher gfcf_gdp , pp lag(1) demean 
 
Fisher-type unit-root test for gfcf_gdp 
Based on Phillips-Perron tests 
--------------------------------------- 
Ho: All panels contain unit roots           Number of panels       =     21 
Ha: At least one panel is stationary        Avg. number of periods =  17.33 
 
AR parameter:    Panel-specific             Asymptotics: T -> Infinity 
Panel means:     Included 
Time trend:      Not included               Cross-sectional means removed 
Newey-West lags: 1 lag 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
                                  Statistic      p-value 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 Inverse chi-squared(42)   P        64.5994       0.0141 
 Inverse normal            Z        -2.1388       0.0162 
 Inverse logit t(109)      L*       -2.3686       0.0098 
 Modified inv. chi-squared Pm        2.4658       0.0068 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 P statistic requires number of panels to be finite. 
 Other statistics are suitable for finite or infinite number of panels. 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 
. . xtunitroot fisher trade , pp lag(1) demean 
 
Fisher-type unit-root test for trade 
Based on Phillips-Perron tests 
------------------------------------ 
Ho: All panels contain unit roots           Number of panels       =     21 
Ha: At least one panel is stationary        Avg. number of periods =  17.33 
 
AR parameter:    Panel-specific             Asymptotics: T -> Infinity 
Panel means:     Included 
Time trend:      Not included               Cross-sectional means removed 
Newey-West lags: 1 lag 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
                                  Statistic      p-value 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 Inverse chi-squared(42)   P        51.3006       0.1539 
 Inverse normal            Z         0.6671       0.7476 
 Inverse logit t(109)      L*        0.2865       0.6125 
 Modified inv. chi-squared Pm        1.0148       0.1551 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 P statistic requires number of panels to be finite. 
 Other statistics are suitable for finite or infinite number of panels. 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 
. . xtunitroot fisher govcons , pp lag(1) demean 
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Fisher-type unit-root test for govcons 
Based on Phillips-Perron tests 
-------------------------------------- 
Ho: All panels contain unit roots           Number of panels       =     21 
Ha: At least one panel is stationary        Avg. number of periods =  17.33 
 
AR parameter:    Panel-specific             Asymptotics: T -> Infinity 
Panel means:     Included 
Time trend:      Not included               Cross-sectional means removed 
Newey-West lags: 1 lag 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
                                  Statistic      p-value 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 Inverse chi-squared(42)   P        97.8745       0.0000 
 Inverse normal            Z        -3.7096       0.0001 
 Inverse logit t(109)      L*       -4.3705       0.0000 
 Modified inv. chi-squared Pm        6.0964       0.0000 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 P statistic requires number of panels to be finite. 
 Other statistics are suitable for finite or infinite number of panels. 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 
. . xtunitroot fisher dschooling , pp lag(1) demean 
 
Fisher-type unit-root test for dschooling 
Based on Phillips-Perron tests 
----------------------------------------- 
Ho: All panels contain unit roots           Number of panels       =     21 
Ha: At least one panel is stationary        Avg. number of periods =  17.10 
 
AR parameter:    Panel-specific             Asymptotics: T -> Infinity 
Panel means:     Included 
Time trend:      Not included               Cross-sectional means removed 
Newey-West lags: 1 lag 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
                                  Statistic      p-value 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 Inverse chi-squared(42)   P       874.7980       0.0000 
 Inverse normal            Z       -25.4557       0.0000 
 Inverse logit t(109)      L*      -52.8348       0.0000 
 Modified inv. chi-squared Pm       90.8657       0.0000 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 P statistic requires number of panels to be finite. 
 Other statistics are suitable for finite or infinite number of panels. 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 
. . xtunitroot fisher educ2 , pp lag(1) demean 
 
Fisher-type unit-root test for educ2 
Based on Phillips-Perron tests 
------------------------------------ 
Ho: All panels contain unit roots           Number of panels       =     21 
Ha: At least one panel is stationary        Avg. number of periods =  17.00 
 
AR parameter:    Panel-specific             Asymptotics: T -> Infinity 
Panel means:     Included 
Time trend:      Not included               Cross-sectional means removed 
Newey-West lags: 1 lag 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
                                  Statistic      p-value 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 Inverse chi-squared(42)   P        40.3368       0.5441 
 Inverse normal            Z         0.3929       0.6528 
 Inverse logit t(109)      L*        0.3828       0.6487 
 Modified inv. chi-squared Pm       -0.1815       0.5720 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 P statistic requires number of panels to be finite. 
 Other statistics are suitable for finite or infinite number of panels. 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 
. . xtunitroot fisher educ3 , pp lag(1) demean 
 
Fisher-type unit-root test for educ3 
Based on Phillips-Perron tests 
------------------------------------ 
Ho: All panels contain unit roots           Number of panels       =     21 
Ha: At least one panel is stationary        Avg. number of periods =  16.81 
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AR parameter:    Panel-specific             Asymptotics: T -> Infinity 
Panel means:     Included 
Time trend:      Not included               Cross-sectional means removed 
Newey-West lags: 1 lag 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
                                  Statistic      p-value 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 Inverse chi-squared(42)   P        34.0335       0.8043 
 Inverse normal            Z         1.8245       0.9660 
 Inverse logit t(104)      L*        2.1962       0.9849 
 Modified inv. chi-squared Pm       -0.8692       0.8076 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 P statistic requires number of panels to be finite. 
 Other statistics are suitable for finite or infinite number of panels. 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 
. . xtunitroot fisher tindex , pp lag(1) demean 
 
Fisher-type unit-root test for tindex 
Based on Phillips-Perron tests 
------------------------------------- 
Ho: All panels contain unit roots           Number of panels       =     21 
Ha: At least one panel is stationary        Avg. number of periods =  16.38 
 
AR parameter:    Panel-specific             Asymptotics: T -> Infinity 
Panel means:     Included 
Time trend:      Not included               Cross-sectional means removed 
Newey-West lags: 1 lag 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
                                  Statistic      p-value 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 Inverse chi-squared(42)   P       127.1456       0.0000 
 Inverse normal            Z        -2.5638       0.0052 
 Inverse logit t(109)      L*       -5.1355       0.0000 
 Modified inv. chi-squared Pm        9.2901       0.0000 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 P statistic requires number of panels to be finite. 
 Other statistics are suitable for finite or infinite number of panels. 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 
. . xtunitroot fisher rule_rank , pp lag(1) demean 
 
Fisher-type unit-root test for rule_rank 
Based on Phillips-Perron tests 
---------------------------------------- 
Ho: All panels contain unit roots           Number of panels       =     21 
Ha: At least one panel is stationary        Avg. number of periods =  17.33 
 
AR parameter:    Panel-specific             Asymptotics: T -> Infinity 
Panel means:     Included 
Time trend:      Not included               Cross-sectional means removed 
Newey-West lags: 1 lag 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
                                  Statistic      p-value 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 Inverse chi-squared(42)   P       104.6251       0.0000 
 Inverse normal            Z        -3.9737       0.0000 
 Inverse logit t(109)      L*       -4.7315       0.0000 
 Modified inv. chi-squared Pm        6.8330       0.0000 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 P statistic requires number of panels to be finite. 
 Other statistics are suitable for finite or infinite number of panels. 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 
. . xtunitroot fisher fdexp, pp lag(1) demean 
 
Fisher-type unit-root test for fdexp 
Based on Phillips-Perron tests 
------------------------------------ 
Ho: All panels contain unit roots           Number of panels       =     21 
Ha: At least one panel is stationary        Avg. number of periods =  17.05 
 
AR parameter:    Panel-specific             Asymptotics: T -> Infinity 
Panel means:     Included 
Time trend:      Not included               Cross-sectional means removed 
Newey-West lags: 1 lag 
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------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
                                  Statistic      p-value 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 Inverse chi-squared(42)   P        51.5278       0.1488 
 Inverse normal            Z        -0.4281       0.3343 
 Inverse logit t(109)      L*       -0.5558       0.2897 
 Modified inv. chi-squared Pm        1.0396       0.1493 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 P statistic requires number of panels to be finite. 
 Other statistics are suitable for finite or infinite number of panels. 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 
. . xtunitroot fisher fdtax_l, pp lag(1) demean 
 
Fisher-type unit-root test for fdtax_l 
Based on Phillips-Perron tests 
-------------------------------------- 
Ho: All panels contain unit roots           Number of panels       =     21 
Ha: At least one panel is stationary        Avg. number of periods =  17.05 
 
AR parameter:    Panel-specific             Asymptotics: T -> Infinity 
Panel means:     Included 
Time trend:      Not included               Cross-sectional means removed 
Newey-West lags: 1 lag 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
                                  Statistic      p-value 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 Inverse chi-squared(42)   P        39.4703       0.5826 
 Inverse normal            Z         0.9485       0.8286 
 Inverse logit t(109)      L*        0.8586       0.8038 
 Modified inv. chi-squared Pm       -0.2760       0.6087 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 P statistic requires number of panels to be finite. 
 Other statistics are suitable for finite or infinite number of panels. 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 
. . xtunitroot fisher imbalance1, pp lag(1) demean 
 
Fisher-type unit-root test for imbalance1 
Based on Phillips-Perron tests 
----------------------------------------- 
Ho: All panels contain unit roots           Number of panels       =     21 
Ha: At least one panel is stationary        Avg. number of periods =  17.10 
 
AR parameter:    Panel-specific             Asymptotics: T -> Infinity 
Panel means:     Included 
Time trend:      Not included               Cross-sectional means removed 
Newey-West lags: 1 lag 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
                                  Statistic      p-value 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 Inverse chi-squared(42)   P        68.0940       0.0066 
 Inverse normal            Z        -1.6284       0.0517 
 Inverse logit t(109)      L*       -2.0300       0.0224 
 Modified inv. chi-squared Pm        2.8471       0.0022 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 P statistic requires number of panels to be finite. 
 Other statistics are suitable for finite or infinite number of panels. 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 
. . xtunitroot fisher imbalance2, pp lag(1) demean 
 
Fisher-type unit-root test for imbalance2 
Based on Phillips-Perron tests 
----------------------------------------- 
Ho: All panels contain unit roots           Number of panels       =     21 
Ha: At least one panel is stationary        Avg. number of periods =  17.05 
 
AR parameter:    Panel-specific             Asymptotics: T -> Infinity 
Panel means:     Included 
Time trend:      Not included               Cross-sectional means removed 
Newey-West lags: 1 lag 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
                                  Statistic      p-value 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 Inverse chi-squared(42)   P        52.6529       0.1255 
 Inverse normal            Z        -0.6776       0.2490 
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 Inverse logit t(109)      L*       -0.8684       0.1935 
 Modified inv. chi-squared Pm        1.1623       0.1226 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 P statistic requires number of panels to be finite. 
 Other statistics are suitable for finite or infinite number of panels. 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 
. . xtunitroot fisher fiscalperform1 , pp lag(1) demean 
 
Fisher-type unit-root test for fiscalperform1 
Based on Phillips-Perron tests 
--------------------------------------------- 
Ho: All panels contain unit roots           Number of panels       =     21 
Ha: At least one panel is stationary        Avg. number of periods =  17.10 
 
AR parameter:    Panel-specific             Asymptotics: T -> Infinity 
Panel means:     Included 
Time trend:      Not included               Cross-sectional means removed 
Newey-West lags: 1 lag 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
                                  Statistic      p-value 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 Inverse chi-squared(42)   P       122.3890       0.0000 
 Inverse normal            Z        -3.4968       0.0002 
 Inverse logit t(109)      L*       -5.6666       0.0000 
 Modified inv. chi-squared Pm        8.7712       0.0000 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 P statistic requires number of panels to be finite. 
 Other statistics are suitable for finite or infinite number of panels. 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 
. . xtunitroot fisher fiscalperform2 , pp lag(1) demean 
 
Fisher-type unit-root test for fiscalperform2 
Based on Phillips-Perron tests 
--------------------------------------------- 
Ho: All panels contain unit roots           Number of panels       =     21 
Ha: At least one panel is stationary        Avg. number of periods =  17.10 
 
AR parameter:    Panel-specific             Asymptotics: T -> Infinity 
Panel means:     Included 
Time trend:      Not included               Cross-sectional means removed 
Newey-West lags: 1 lag 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
                                  Statistic      p-value 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 Inverse chi-squared(42)   P        52.5704       0.1271 
 Inverse normal            Z        -0.3890       0.3486 
 Inverse logit t(109)      L*       -0.4507       0.3265 
 Modified inv. chi-squared Pm        1.1533       0.1244 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 P statistic requires number of panels to be finite. 
 Other statistics are suitable for finite or infinite number of panels. 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 
Appendix 4.2.6 Homoscedasticity 
. qui xtreg growth popgrowth educ2 educ3 laggdp gfcf_gdp trade fdexp fdtax_l imbalance1 
year1 year2 year3 year4 year5 year6 year7 year8 year9 year10 year11 year12 year13 
year14 year15 year16 year17 year18 year19 if growth<=21.20154 & growth>=-12.55204, fe 
 
. xttest3 
 
Modified Wald test for groupwise heteroskedasticity 
in fixed effect regression model 
 
H0: sigma(i)^2 = sigma^2 for all i 
 
chi2 (21)  =     140.60 
Prob>chi2 =      0.0000 
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Appendix 4.2.7 Serial Correlation 
. xtserial growth popgrowth educ2 educ3 laggdp gfcf_gdp trade fdexp fdtax_l 
imbalance1 year1 year2 year3 year4 year5 year6 year7 year8 year9 year10 year11 year12 
year13 year14 year15 year16 year17 year18 year19 if growth<=21.20154 & growth>=-
12.55204 
 
Wooldridge test for autocorrelation in panel data 
H0: no first order autocorrelation 
    F(  1,      20) =     11.107 
           Prob > F =      0.0033 
 
 
. xi: xtserial growth laggdp popgrowth gfcf_gdp educ2 educ3 trade tindex fdexp 
fdtax_l i.year 
i.year            _Iyear_1996-2015    (naturally coded; _Iyear_1996 omitted) 
 
Wooldridge test for autocorrelation in panel data 
H0: no first order autocorrelation 
    F(  1,      20) =     12.548 
           Prob > F =      0.0020 
 
 
Appendix 4.2.8 Cross Sectional Dependence 
. xtreg growth popgrowth educ2 educ3 laggdp gfcf_gdp trade fdexp year1 year2 year3 
year4 year5 year6 year7 year8 year9 year10 year11 year12 year13 year14 year15 year16 
year17 year18 year19 if growth<=21.20154 & growth>=-12.55204, fe 
 
Fixed-effects (within) regression               Number of obs      =       337 
Group variable: id_country                      Number of groups   =        21 
 
R-sq:  within  = 0.6100                         Obs per group: min =         6 
       between = 0.1675                                        avg =      16.0 
       overall = 0.3141                                        max =        20 
 
                                                F(26,290)          =     17.44 
corr(u_i, Xb)  = -0.7355                        Prob > F           =    0.0000 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
      growth |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
   popgrowth |  -.8671415   .4074067    -2.13   0.034     -1.66899   -.0652926 
       educ2 |   .0254119   .0334603     0.76   0.448    -.0404439    .0912677 
       educ3 |  -.0204842    .019679    -1.04   0.299    -.0592161    .0182477 
      laggdp |  -.0005851   .0001043    -5.61   0.000    -.0007903   -.0003798 
    gfcf_gdp |   .1756166   .0394499     4.45   0.000     .0979722     .253261 
       trade |   .0383917   .0116387     3.30   0.001     .0154847    .0612988 
       fdexp |   .0542558   .0386722     1.40   0.162    -.0218581    .1303696 
       year1 |  -4.406607   1.549694    -2.84   0.005     -7.45668   -1.356534 
       year2 |  -2.455699   1.440511    -1.70   0.089    -5.290881     .379482 
       year3 |  -4.049504   1.407715    -2.88   0.004    -6.820139    -1.27887 
       year4 |  -5.893325   1.341051    -4.39   0.000    -8.532752   -3.253898 
       year5 |  -2.383373   1.297284    -1.84   0.067    -4.936659    .1699139 
       year6 |  -1.488155   1.255483    -1.19   0.237    -3.959168     .982858 
       year7 |  -.8452197     1.2158    -0.70   0.487     -3.23813     1.54769 
       year8 |   .2954668   1.134939     0.26   0.795    -1.938296     2.52923 
       year9 |   1.018043   1.076497     0.95   0.345    -1.100695    3.136781 
      year10 |   1.249464   1.014188     1.23   0.219    -.7466391    3.245567 
      year11 |   1.960656   .9715642     2.02   0.045      .048445    3.872867 
      year12 |   2.425953    .948511     2.56   0.011     .5591146    4.292791 
      year13 |  -.2637225   .9336221    -0.28   0.778    -2.101257    1.573812 
      year14 |  -5.653907    .942311    -6.00   0.000    -7.508543   -3.799271 
      year15 |  -1.022935    .886892    -1.15   0.250    -2.768497    .7226258 
      year16 |   .4082957   .8844156     0.46   0.645    -1.332392    2.148983 
      year17 |  -1.975318   .8638957    -2.29   0.023    -3.675619   -.2750179 
      year18 |  -.2746814   .8771302    -0.31   0.754     -2.00103    1.451667 
      year19 |  -.1504953   .8642633    -0.17   0.862    -1.851519    1.550529 
       _cons |   2.365106   4.020722     0.59   0.557     -5.54839     10.2786 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
     sigma_u |  3.6954931 
     sigma_e |  2.3759065 
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         rho |  .70754076   (fraction of variance due to u_i) 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
F test that all u_i=0:     F(20, 290) =     5.09             Prob > F = 0.0000 
 
. . xtcsd, pesaran abs 
  
  
Pesaran's test of cross sectional independence =    -3.026, Pr = 0.0025 
  
Average absolute value of the off-diagonal elements =     0.320 
 
. . xtreg growth popgrowth educ2 educ3 laggdp gfcf_gdp trade fdexp fdtax_l year1 
year2 year3 year4 year5 year6 year7 year8 year9 year1 
> 0 year11 year12 year13 year14 year15 year16 year17 year18 year19 if 
growth<=21.20154 & growth>=-12.55204, fe 
 
Fixed-effects (within) regression               Number of obs      =       336 
Group variable: id_country                      Number of groups   =        21 
 
R-sq:  within  = 0.6105                         Obs per group: min =         6 
       between = 0.1743                                        avg =      16.0 
       overall = 0.3261                                        max =        20 
 
                                                F(27,288)          =     16.72 
corr(u_i, Xb)  = -0.7176                        Prob > F           =    0.0000 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
      growth |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
   popgrowth |  -.9007758   .4100249    -2.20   0.029    -1.707801   -.0937504 
       educ2 |   .0206944   .0339367     0.61   0.542     -.046101    .0874898 
       educ3 |  -.0186351   .0202006    -0.92   0.357    -.0583946    .0211244 
      laggdp |  -.0005686   .0001063    -5.35   0.000    -.0007778   -.0003593 
    gfcf_gdp |    .174195   .0400713     4.35   0.000     .0953252    .2530647 
       trade |   .0391879   .0117995     3.32   0.001     .0159638     .062412 
       fdexp |   .0520266   .0390561     1.33   0.184    -.0248451    .1288983 
     fdtax_l |  -.0078317   .0126122    -0.62   0.535    -.0326554    .0169921 
       year1 |  -4.241843   1.661058    -2.55   0.011    -7.511195   -.9724904 
       year2 |  -2.137194   1.539017    -1.39   0.166    -5.166342    .8919532 
       year3 |  -3.744626   1.497276    -2.50   0.013    -6.691618   -.7976337 
       year4 |  -5.578021    1.44204    -3.87   0.000    -8.416296   -2.739746 
       year5 |  -2.093894   1.383784    -1.51   0.131    -4.817505    .6297181 
       year6 |  -1.209196   1.338505    -0.90   0.367    -3.843689    1.425297 
       year7 |  -.6133478   1.275845    -0.48   0.631    -3.124511    1.897815 
       year8 |   .5108584   1.187861     0.43   0.667    -1.827131    2.848848 
       year9 |   1.194797   1.114634     1.07   0.285    -.9990637    3.388658 
      year10 |   1.400286   1.041389     1.34   0.180    -.6494117    3.449985 
      year11 |   2.067498   .9852303     2.10   0.037     .1283335    4.006663 
      year12 |   2.518089   .9582219     2.63   0.009     .6320825    4.404095 
      year13 |  -.2226372    .936725    -0.24   0.812    -2.066332    1.621058 
      year14 |  -5.622314    .945946    -5.94   0.000    -7.484158   -3.760469 
      year15 |  -.9819316   .8920633    -1.10   0.272    -2.737722    .7738586 
      year16 |    .414835   .8863711     0.47   0.640    -1.329752    2.159422 
      year17 |   -1.95834   .8662258    -2.26   0.025    -3.663276   -.2534037 
      year18 |  -.2445975   .8802107    -0.28   0.781    -1.977059    1.487864 
      year19 |  -.1320906   .8665776    -0.15   0.879    -1.837719    1.573538 
       _cons |    2.61601   4.044329     0.65   0.518    -5.344182     10.5762 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
     sigma_u |  3.5340941 
     sigma_e |   2.380562 
         rho |  .68788304   (fraction of variance due to u_i) 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
F test that all u_i=0:     F(20, 288) =     4.99             Prob > F = 0.0000 
 
. . xtcsd, pesaran abs 
  
  
Pesaran's test of cross sectional independence =    -3.019, Pr = 0.0025 
  
Average absolute value of the off-diagonal elements =     0.318 
 
. . xtreg growth popgrowth educ2 educ3 laggdp gfcf_gdp trade fdexp fdtax_l imbalance1 
year1 year2 year3 year4 year5 year6 year7 year8  
> year9 year10 year11 year12 year13 year14 year15 year16 year17 year18 year19 if 
growth<=21.20154 & growth>=-12.55204, fe 
 
Fixed-effects (within) regression               Number of obs      =       336 
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Group variable: id_country                      Number of groups   =        21 
 
R-sq:  within  = 0.6107                         Obs per group: min =         6 
       between = 0.1810                                        avg =      16.0 
       overall = 0.3266                                        max =        20 
 
                                                F(28,287)          =     16.08 
corr(u_i, Xb)  = -0.7209                        Prob > F           =    0.0000 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
      growth |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
   popgrowth |  -.8945561   .4109938    -2.18   0.030      -1.7035   -.0856118 
       educ2 |   .0209496    .033995     0.62   0.538    -.0459615    .0878607 
       educ3 |  -.0181232   .0202792    -0.89   0.372    -.0580381    .0217917 
      laggdp |  -.0005693   .0001065    -5.35   0.000    -.0007789   -.0003597 
    gfcf_gdp |   .1733556   .0401971     4.31   0.000     .0942372    .2524741 
       trade |   .0394565     .01184     3.33   0.001     .0161523    .0627608 
       fdexp |   .0507196   .0392775     1.29   0.198    -.0265889    .1280281 
     fdtax_l |  -.0008065   .0229687    -0.04   0.972     -.046015     .044402 
  imbalance1 |   .0086405   .0235949     0.37   0.714    -.0378005    .0550815 
       year1 |  -4.216139    1.66504    -2.53   0.012    -7.493379   -.9389001 
       year2 |  -2.129581   1.541476    -1.38   0.168    -5.163613    .9044511 
       year3 |  -3.755276   1.499814    -2.50   0.013    -6.707307   -.8032455 
       year4 |  -5.547204   1.446663    -3.83   0.000    -8.394618   -2.699789 
       year5 |  -2.071338   1.387237    -1.49   0.136    -4.801786    .6591107 
       year6 |  -1.209136   1.340522    -0.90   0.368    -3.847637    1.429365 
       year7 |  -.6186417   1.277849    -0.48   0.629    -3.133786    1.896503 
       year8 |   .4758994   1.193475     0.40   0.690    -1.873174    2.824973 
       year9 |    1.16108   1.120104     1.04   0.301     -1.04358     3.36574 
      year10 |   1.357509   1.049479     1.29   0.197    -.7081439    3.423161 
      year11 |   2.028777   .9923638     2.04   0.042     .0755433    3.982012 
      year12 |   2.469718    .968713     2.55   0.011     .5630351    4.376401 
      year13 |  -.2857673    .953844    -0.30   0.765    -2.163184     1.59165 
      year14 |  -5.684504   .9624721    -5.91   0.000    -7.578903   -3.790104 
      year15 |  -1.055141   .9155011    -1.15   0.250    -2.857089    .7468071 
      year16 |   .3574507   .9014312     0.40   0.692    -1.416804    2.131705 
      year17 |  -2.018236   .8828145    -2.29   0.023    -3.755848   -.2806235 
      year18 |  -.2853415   .8885303    -0.32   0.748    -2.034204    1.463521 
      year19 |  -.1625388   .8718569    -0.19   0.852    -1.878583    1.553506 
       _cons |   1.952713   4.436965     0.44   0.660    -6.780405    10.68583 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
     sigma_u |  3.5450471 
     sigma_e |  2.3841487 
         rho |   .6885649   (fraction of variance due to u_i) 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
F test that all u_i=0:     F(20, 287) =     4.95             Prob > F = 0.0000 
 
. . xtcsd, pesaran abs 
  
  
Pesaran's test of cross sectional independence =    -2.997, Pr = 0.0027 
  
Average absolute value of the off-diagonal elements =     0.318 
 
 
A. Alternative measure of Education: dschooling 
 
 
. . xtreg growth popgrowth dschooling laggdp gfcf_gdp trade fdexp year1 year2 year3 
year4 year5 year6 year7 year8 year9 year10 year11  
> year12 year13 year14 year15 year16 year17 year18 year19 if growth<=21.20154 & 
growth>=-12.55204, fe 
 
Fixed-effects (within) regression               Number of obs      =       348 
Group variable: id_country                      Number of groups   =        21 
 
R-sq:  within  = 0.6082                         Obs per group: min =         6 
       between = 0.1885                                        avg =      16.6 
       overall = 0.3433                                        max =        20 
 
                                                F(25,302)          =     18.75 
corr(u_i, Xb)  = -0.6799                        Prob > F           =    0.0000 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
      growth |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
366 
 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
   popgrowth |  -.4414347   .3562407    -1.24   0.216    -1.142463    .2595936 
  dschooling |   1.132162   .3991598     2.84   0.005     .3466749    1.917648 
      laggdp |  -.0005195   .0001027    -5.06   0.000    -.0007217   -.0003173 
    gfcf_gdp |   .2135623   .0391596     5.45   0.000      .136502    .2906225 
       trade |   .0524965   .0114319     4.59   0.000     .0300003    .0749928 
       fdexp |   .0570811   .0368522     1.55   0.122    -.0154385    .1296007 
       year1 |  -.5379923   1.646722    -0.33   0.744    -3.778495     2.70251 
       year2 |  -1.058696   1.365174    -0.78   0.439    -3.745154    1.627761 
       year3 |  -2.812264   1.322276    -2.13   0.034    -5.414305   -.2102235 
       year4 |  -4.096596   1.278126    -3.21   0.001    -6.611758   -1.581435 
       year5 |  -.5542304   1.244274    -0.45   0.656    -3.002775    1.894314 
       year6 |   .1895183   1.188056     0.16   0.873    -2.148398    2.527435 
       year7 |   .7000142    1.15501     0.61   0.545    -1.572872      2.9729 
       year8 |   1.720728   1.057083     1.63   0.105    -.3594536    3.800909 
       year9 |   1.969869   .9974519     1.97   0.049      .007033    3.932705 
      year10 |   2.123038   .9397325     2.26   0.025     .2737851    3.972291 
      year11 |   2.526039   .8913611     2.83   0.005     .7719737    4.280104 
      year12 |   2.809206   .8601829     3.27   0.001     1.116495    4.501917 
      year13 |   .1410026   .8274014     0.17   0.865    -1.487199    1.769205 
      year14 |  -5.206463   .8640105    -6.03   0.000    -6.906706    -3.50622 
      year15 |  -.3830264   .8091788    -0.47   0.636    -1.975369    1.209316 
      year16 |   .8181996   .8023736     1.02   0.309    -.7607516    2.397151 
      year17 |  -1.590391    .782096    -2.03   0.043    -3.129439   -.0513435 
      year18 |   .1907962   .8066042     0.24   0.813     -1.39648    1.778072 
      year19 |   .3345662   .7915308     0.42   0.673    -1.223048     1.89218 
       _cons |  -.5699817   2.531833    -0.23   0.822     -5.55225    4.412286 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
     sigma_u |  3.2959192 
     sigma_e |  2.4331601 
         rho |  .64725352   (fraction of variance due to u_i) 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
F test that all u_i=0:     F(20, 302) =     5.40             Prob > F = 0.0000 
 
. . xtcsd, pesaran abs 
  
  
Pesaran's test of cross sectional independence =    -2.724, Pr = 0.0064 
  
Average absolute value of the off-diagonal elements =     0.295 
 
. . xtreg growth popgrowth dschooling laggdp gfcf_gdp trade fdexp fdtax_l year1 year2 
year3 year4 year5 year6 year7 year8 year9 year10 
>  year11 year12 year13 year14 year15 year16 year17 year18 year19 if growth<=21.20154 
& growth>=-12.55204, fe 
 
Fixed-effects (within) regression               Number of obs      =       347 
Group variable: id_country                      Number of groups   =        21 
 
R-sq:  within  = 0.6085                         Obs per group: min =         6 
       between = 0.1940                                        avg =      16.5 
       overall = 0.3536                                        max =        20 
 
                                                F(26,300)          =     17.94 
corr(u_i, Xb)  = -0.6626                        Prob > F           =    0.0000 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
      growth |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
   popgrowth |  -.4629196   .3582684    -1.29   0.197    -1.167957    .2421178 
  dschooling |   1.152137   .4215502     2.73   0.007     .3225667    1.981707 
      laggdp |   -.000508   .0001041    -4.88   0.000    -.0007128   -.0003033 
    gfcf_gdp |   .2169767   .0395841     5.48   0.000      .139079    .2948745 
       trade |   .0537698   .0115653     4.65   0.000     .0310104    .0765292 
       fdexp |   .0547122   .0370459     1.48   0.141    -.0181907     .127615 
     fdtax_l |  -.0093133   .0126009    -0.74   0.460    -.0341106    .0154839 
       year1 |  -.1363723   1.742378    -0.08   0.938    -3.565204    3.292459 
       year2 |  -.7580559   1.422728    -0.53   0.595    -3.557847    2.041735 
       year3 |  -2.525971   1.379078    -1.83   0.068    -5.239863    .1879214 
       year4 |  -3.792885   1.341323    -2.83   0.005    -6.432478   -1.153293 
       year5 |  -.2890297   1.296597    -0.22   0.824    -2.840607    2.262547 
       year6 |   .4654083   1.244923     0.37   0.709    -1.984479    2.915296 
       year7 |   .9163254   1.193393     0.77   0.443    -1.432156    3.264807 
       year8 |   1.915116   1.092304     1.75   0.081    -.2344313    4.064664 
       year9 |   2.139161    1.02658     2.08   0.038     .1189504    4.159371 
      year10 |    2.26316   .9618894     2.35   0.019     .3702547    4.156065 
      year11 |   2.619529   .9035796     2.90   0.004     .8413716    4.397686 
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      year12 |   2.883284   .8703834     3.31   0.001     1.170454    4.596115 
      year13 |   .1699583   .8317671     0.20   0.838    -1.466879    1.806795 
      year14 |  -5.169596   .8681698    -5.95   0.000     -6.87807   -3.461122 
      year15 |  -.3311099   .8140354    -0.41   0.684    -1.933053    1.270833 
      year16 |   .8276693   .8043738     1.03   0.304    -.7552603    2.410599 
      year17 |  -1.569268   .7844045    -2.00   0.046      -3.1129   -.0256356 
      year18 |   .2116958   .8090125     0.26   0.794    -1.380362    1.803754 
      year19 |   .3446176   .7933767     0.43   0.664    -1.216671    1.905906 
       _cons |  -.6950123   2.541777    -0.27   0.785    -5.696983    4.306958 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
     sigma_u |  3.1764134 
     sigma_e |  2.4384868 
         rho |  .62919152   (fraction of variance due to u_i) 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
F test that all u_i=0:     F(20, 300) =     5.37             Prob > F = 0.0000 
 
. . xtcsd, pesaran abs 
  
  
Pesaran's test of cross sectional independence =    -2.711, Pr = 0.0067 
  
Average absolute value of the off-diagonal elements =     0.295 
 
. . xtreg growth popgrowth dschooling laggdp gfcf_gdp trade fdexp fdtax_l imbalance1 
year1 year2 year3 year4 year5 year6 year7 year8 y 
> ear9 year10 year11 year12 year13 year14 year15 year16 year17 year18 year19 if 
growth<=21.20154 & growth>=-12.55204, fe 
 
Fixed-effects (within) regression               Number of obs      =       347 
Group variable: id_country                      Number of groups   =        21 
 
R-sq:  within  = 0.6086                         Obs per group: min =         6 
       between = 0.1975                                        avg =      16.5 
       overall = 0.3536                                        max =        20 
 
                                                F(27,299)          =     17.22 
corr(u_i, Xb)  = -0.6651                        Prob > F           =    0.0000 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
      growth |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
   popgrowth |   -.461971   .3588655    -1.29   0.199    -1.168193     .244251 
  dschooling |   1.149599   .4223836     2.72   0.007     .3183779    1.980821 
      laggdp |  -.0005083   .0001042    -4.88   0.000    -.0007134   -.0003032 
    gfcf_gdp |   .2163773   .0397435     5.44   0.000     .1381648    .2945897 
       trade |   .0538678   .0115925     4.65   0.000     .0310544    .0766811 
       fdexp |    .053958   .0372677     1.45   0.149    -.0193822    .1272982 
     fdtax_l |  -.0051596   .0229459    -0.22   0.822    -.0503155    .0399964 
  imbalance1 |   .0051165   .0236047     0.22   0.829     -.041336    .0515689 
       year1 |  -.1261351   1.745791    -0.07   0.942     -3.56173     3.30946 
       year2 |  -.7519336   1.425273    -0.53   0.598    -3.556771    2.052904 
       year3 |  -2.530527   1.381434    -1.83   0.068    -5.249091     .188038 
       year4 |  -3.771039   1.347233    -2.80   0.005      -6.4223   -1.119779 
       year5 |  -.2705995   1.301442    -0.21   0.835    -2.831745    2.290546 
       year6 |   .4704246    1.24712     0.38   0.706    -1.983819    2.924668 
       year7 |   .9192164   1.195367     0.77   0.443    -1.433182    3.271615 
       year8 |   1.904712   1.095095     1.74   0.083    -.2503581    4.059783 
       year9 |    2.12763    1.02959     2.07   0.040     .1014688    4.153791 
      year10 |   2.247384   .9661661     2.33   0.021     .3460369    4.148731 
      year11 |   2.606179   .9071115     2.87   0.004      .821047     4.39131 
      year12 |   2.864662   .8759923     3.27   0.001     1.140771    4.588554 
      year13 |   .1450001   .8410109     0.17   0.863     -1.51005     1.80005 
      year14 |  -5.195139    .877501    -5.92   0.000       -6.922   -3.468279 
      year15 |  -.3631062   .8285862    -0.44   0.662    -1.993706    1.267493 
      year16 |   .8059779   .8118458     0.99   0.322    -.7916775    2.403633 
      year17 |  -1.592082   .7926726    -2.01   0.045    -3.152006   -.0321583 
      year18 |   .2011192   .8117684     0.25   0.804    -1.396384    1.798622 
      year19 |   .3396746    .794967     0.43   0.669    -1.224764    1.904114 
       _cons |  -1.060777   3.054289    -0.35   0.729    -7.071402    4.949848 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
     sigma_u |   3.184399 
     sigma_e |  2.4423693 
         rho |  .62962071   (fraction of variance due to u_i) 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
F test that all u_i=0:     F(20, 299) =     5.33             Prob > F = 0.0000 
 
. . xtcsd, pesaran abs 
368 
 
  
  
Pesaran's test of cross sectional independence =    -2.700, Pr = 0.0069 
  
Average absolute value of the off-diagonal elements =     0.294 
 
Appendix 4.2.9 Modified Hausman test 
. qui xtreg growth fdexp fdtax_l popgrowth dschooling laggdp gfcf_gdp trade tindex 
year1 year2 year3 year4 year5 year6 year7 year8 year9 year10 year11 year12 year13 
year14 year15 year16 year17 year18 if growth<=21.20154 & growth>=-12.55204, fe 
 
. est store feli 
 
. qui xtreg growth fdexp fdtax_l popgrowth dschooling laggdp gfcf_gdp trade tindex 
year1 year2 year3 year4 year5 year6 year7 year8 year9 year10 year11 year12 year13 
year14 year15 year16 year17 year18 if growth<=21.20154 & growth>=-12.55204, re 
 
. est store reli 
 
. hausman feli reli, sigmamore 
 
Note: the rank of the differenced variance matrix (19) does not equal the number of 
coefficients being tested (26); be sure this is what you expect, or there may be 
problems computing the test.  Examine the output of your estimators for anything 
unexpected and possibly consider scaling your variables so that the coefficients are 
on a similar scale. 
 
                 ---- Coefficients ---- 
             |      (b)          (B)            (b-B)     sqrt(diag(V_b-V_B)) 
             |      feli         reli        Difference          S.E. 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
       fdexp |    .0630018     .0690888       -.0060871        .0383868 
     fdtax_l |   -.0176564    -.0124964       -.0051601         .011142 
   popgrowth |   -.3483808    -1.021732         .673351        .3645085 
  dschooling |    1.024126     1.491129       -.4670022        .1411752 
      laggdp |   -.0005921    -.0001366       -.0004555        .0001198 
    gfcf_gdp |    .2092223     .1577501        .0514722        .0326543 
       trade |    .0489335     .0015034        .0474301        .0125859 
      tindex |   -.0415161    -.0033484       -.0381676        .0577388 
       year1 |   -2.171347     1.472597       -3.643945          1.7797 
       year2 |    -2.30937     .8195724       -3.128943        1.442017 
       year3 |   -3.999291    -1.228833       -2.770458        1.371364 
       year4 |   -5.291211     -2.75268        -2.53853        1.313651 
       year5 |   -1.669739     1.030182        -2.69992        1.203158 
       year6 |   -.7856582     1.355603       -2.141261        1.125712 
       year7 |   -.2468366     1.419781       -1.666618        1.017722 
       year8 |    .8341795     2.582987       -1.748807        .8744882 
       year9 |    1.189308     2.854985       -1.665677        .7442008 
      year10 |    1.477834     2.986381       -1.508547         .606336 
      year11 |    1.949491     3.137535       -1.188044        .4811338 
      year12 |    2.346729     3.160169       -.8134393        .4004334 
      year13 |    -.233056     .0129177       -.2459737        .2661853 
      year14 |    -5.61075    -6.428777        .8180278        .2633348 
      year15 |   -.8180228    -.8386976        .0206748        .2428751 
      year16 |    .4132497     .8376386       -.4243889        .1484674 
      year17 |   -1.915881     -1.69897       -.2169105        .0962459 
      year18 |   -.1221111    -.1708662         .048755        .0606531 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
                           b = consistent under Ho and Ha; obtained from xtreg 
            B = inconsistent under Ha, efficient under Ho; obtained from xtreg 
 
    Test:  Ho:  difference in coefficients not systematic 
 
                 chi2(19) = (b-B)'[(V_b-V_B)^(-1)](b-B) 
                          =       86.70 
                Prob>chi2 =      0.0000 
                (V_b-V_B is not positive definite) 
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Appendix 4.3 Model Estimation 
 
Appendix 4.3.1 Using fdexp and fdtax_l 
 
A. FE with Driscoll Kraay 
. xtscc growth fdexp fdtax_l popgrowth dschooling laggdp gfcf_gdp trade tindex year1 
year2 year3 year4 year5 year6 year7 year8 year9 year10 year11 year12 year13 year14 
year15 year16 year17 year18 if growth<=21.20154 & growth>=-12.55204, fe 
 
Regression with Driscoll-Kraay standard errors   Number of obs     =       328 
Method: Fixed-effects regression                 Number of groups  =        21 
Group variable (i): id_country                   F( 26,    18)     = 886947.22 
maximum lag: 2                                   Prob > F          =    0.0000 
                                                 within R-squared  =    0.6267 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
             |             Drisc/Kraay 
      growth |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
       fdexp |   .0630018   .0356049     1.77   0.094    -.0118014     .137805 
     fdtax_l |  -.0176564   .0095206    -1.85   0.080    -.0376585    .0023456 
   popgrowth |  -.3483808   .3516658    -0.99   0.335    -1.087203    .3904415 
  dschooling |   1.024126   .3505032     2.92   0.009     .2877466    1.760506 
      laggdp |  -.0005921   .0001962    -3.02   0.007    -.0010042     -.00018 
    gfcf_gdp |   .2092223   .0308515     6.78   0.000     .1444057     .274039 
       trade |   .0489335   .0125931     3.89   0.001     .0224763    .0753906 
      tindex |  -.0415161   .0526642    -0.79   0.441    -.1521594    .0691273 
       year1 |  -2.171347   2.409234    -0.90   0.379    -7.232961    2.890266 
       year2 |   -2.30937    1.90147    -1.21   0.240    -6.304211     1.68547 
       year3 |  -3.999291   1.810679    -2.21   0.040    -7.803387   -.1951954 
       year4 |  -5.291211   1.742231    -3.04   0.007    -8.951503   -1.630918 
       year5 |  -1.669739   1.648934    -1.01   0.325    -5.134021    1.794544 
       year6 |  -.7856582   1.516416    -0.52   0.611     -3.97153    2.400214 
       year7 |  -.2468366   1.344155    -0.18   0.856    -3.070801    2.577128 
       year8 |   .8341795   1.239263     0.67   0.509    -1.769415    3.437774 
       year9 |   1.189308   1.058016     1.12   0.276    -1.033502    3.412117 
      year10 |   1.477834   .8821567     1.68   0.111    -.3755084    3.331177 
      year11 |   1.949491   .7246475     2.69   0.015     .4270633    3.471919 
      year12 |   2.346729   .5692231     4.12   0.001     1.150836    3.542623 
      year13 |   -.233056   .3455049    -0.67   0.509    -.9589348    .4928228 
      year14 |   -5.61075   .3538228   -15.86   0.000    -6.354104   -4.867395 
      year15 |  -.8180228   .3239406    -2.53   0.021    -1.498597   -.1374487 
      year16 |   .4132497   .2596533     1.59   0.129    -.1322616     .958761 
      year17 |  -1.915881   .1713533   -11.18   0.000    -2.275881   -1.555881 
      year18 |  -.1221111   .0931082    -1.31   0.206    -.3177242     .073502 
       _cons |   5.304454   5.758621     0.92   0.369    -6.793961    17.40287 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 
 
. outreg2 using 05sept2.doc 
05sept2.doc 
dir : seeout 
 
 
B. FEVD 
. xtfevd growth fdexp fdtax_l popgrowth dschooling lngdpini gfcf_gdp trade tindex year1 
year2 year3 year4 year5 year6 year7 year8 year9 year10 year11 year12 year13 year14 
year15 year16 year17 year18 if growth<=21.20154 & growth>=-12.55204, invariant 
(lngdpini fdexp fdtax_l tindex) 
 
panel fixed effects regression with vector decomposition 
 
degrees of freedom fevd    =      281           number of obs       =      328 
mean squared error         = 5.290641           F( 28, 281)         = 13.77096 
root mean squared error    = 2.300139           Prob > F            = 1.59e-36 
Residual Sum of Squares    =  1735.33           R-squared           = .6731264 
Total Sum of Squares       = 5308.872           adj. R-squared      = .6196168 
Estimation Sum of Squares  = 3573.542 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
             |                fevd 
      growth |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
370 
 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
   popgrowth |  -.8589234   .5167255    -1.66   0.098    -1.876068    .1582209 
  dschooling |   1.419608   .4722639     3.01   0.003     .4899834    2.349232 
    gfcf_gdp |   .2044222   .0539372     3.79   0.000       .09825    .3105944 
       trade |   .0397358   .0205909     1.93   0.055    -.0007962    .0802679 
       year1 |   3.985347    1.66513     2.39   0.017     .7076359    7.263058 
       year2 |   2.996182   1.169012     2.56   0.011     .6950494    5.297315 
       year3 |   .9290639   1.179529     0.79   0.432     -1.39277    3.250898 
       year4 |  -.5469213   1.170183    -0.47   0.641    -2.850359    1.756517 
       year5 |   2.974979   1.074077     2.77   0.006     .8607216    5.089236 
       year6 |   3.457671   1.065755     3.24   0.001     1.359793    5.555549 
       year7 |   3.529826    1.06405     3.32   0.001     1.435305    5.624347 
       year8 |   4.178283   1.009918     4.14   0.000     2.190319    6.166248 
       year9 |   4.090332   .9664772     4.23   0.000     2.187877    5.992786 
      year10 |   3.862525   .9279168     4.16   0.000     2.035974    5.689075 
      year11 |   3.734838   .9170588     4.07   0.000      1.92966    5.540015 
      year12 |   3.490863   .8905476     3.92   0.000     1.737872    5.243854 
      year13 |     .19441   .8924932     0.22   0.828    -1.562411    1.951231 
      year14 |  -5.381051   1.039477    -5.18   0.000    -7.427202     -3.3349 
      year15 |  -.0884098   .8900596    -0.10   0.921    -1.840441    1.663621 
      year16 |   .9670699   .8603194     1.12   0.262     -.726419    2.660559 
      year17 |  -1.618451   .8411604    -1.92   0.055    -3.274226    .0373248 
      year18 |   .0455777   .8701383     0.05   0.958    -1.667239    1.758395 
    lngdpini |  -1.392949   .6589747    -2.11   0.035    -2.690102   -.0957951 
       fdexp |   .0245001   .0367029     0.67   0.505    -.0477474    .0967476 
     fdtax_l |   -.007523    .018464    -0.41   0.684    -.0438683    .0288223 
      tindex |  -.0266465   .0320243    -0.83   0.406    -.0896844    .0363915 
         eta |          1          .        .       .            .           . 
       _cons |   7.499719   6.169603     1.22   0.225    -4.644787    19.64422 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 
 
 
 
C. IV 
. xtivreg2 growth popgrowth fdexp tindex dschooling laggdp (gfcf_gdp trade  fdtax_l =   
l.gfcf_gdp l.trade l2.fdtax_l l4.fdtax_l) year1 year2 year3 year4 year5 year6 year7 
year8 year9 year10 year11 year12 year13 year14 year15 year16 year17 year18 if 
growth<=21.20154 
>  & growth>=-12.55204,  fe  endog(fdtax_l gfcf_gdp trade) small 
Warning - collinearities detected 
Vars dropped:       year1 year2 year3 year4 
 
FIXED EFFECTS ESTIMATION 
------------------------ 
Number of groups =        21                    Obs per group: min =         2 
                                                               avg =      11.8 
                                                               max =        15 
Warning - collinearities detected 
Vars dropped:  year1 year2 year3 year4 
 
IV (2SLS) estimation 
-------------------- 
 
Estimates efficient for homoskedasticity only 
Statistics consistent for homoskedasticity only 
 
                                                      Number of obs =      247 
                                                      F( 22,   204) =    15.78 
                                                      Prob > F      =   0.0000 
Total (centered) SS     =  2943.914767                Centered R2   =   0.6233 
Total (uncentered) SS   =  2943.914767                Uncentered R2 =   0.6233 
Residual SS             =  1108.854713                Root MSE      =    2.331 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
      growth |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
    gfcf_gdp |    .031164   .0757912     0.41   0.681    -.1182706    .1805987 
       trade |   .0439079   .0208109     2.11   0.036     .0028759      .08494 
     fdtax_l |  -.0375302    .031639    -1.19   0.237    -.0999115    .0248511 
   popgrowth |  -.8020887   .5235897    -1.53   0.127     -1.83443    .2302526 
       fdexp |   .0249935   .0484724     0.52   0.607    -.0705776    .1205645 
      tindex |   .0762657   .0862254     0.88   0.377    -.0937414    .2462729 
  dschooling |   1.402443   1.072779     1.31   0.193    -.7127131      3.5176 
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      laggdp |   -.000418   .0001332    -3.14   0.002    -.0006807   -.0001553 
       year1 |          0  (omitted) 
       year2 |          0  (omitted) 
       year3 |          0  (omitted) 
       year4 |          0  (omitted) 
       year5 |   .9899527   1.741849     0.57   0.570    -2.444384    4.424289 
       year6 |   1.301598   1.693033     0.77   0.443     -2.03649    4.639685 
       year7 |   1.601284   1.561142     1.03   0.306    -1.476759    4.679327 
       year8 |   2.726718   1.424164     1.91   0.057    -.0812512    5.534687 
       year9 |   3.268158   1.280816     2.55   0.011     .7428227    5.793494 
      year10 |   3.010773   1.153399     2.61   0.010     .7366623    5.284884 
      year11 |   3.929392   1.110016     3.54   0.000     1.740817    6.117967 
      year12 |   4.396587   1.097177     4.01   0.000     2.233327    6.559847 
      year13 |   .8601276   .9617462     0.89   0.372     -1.03611    2.756365 
      year14 |  -5.351213   .9448649    -5.66   0.000    -7.214166    -3.48826 
      year15 |  -.4296635   .8211869    -0.52   0.601    -2.048766    1.189439 
      year16 |   .7181164   .7792075     0.92   0.358    -.8182166    2.254449 
      year17 |  -1.573333   .7526282    -2.09   0.038    -3.057261   -.0894058 
      year18 |     -.0818   .7724969    -0.11   0.916    -1.604902    1.441302 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Underidentification test (Anderson canon. corr. LM statistic):          67.396 
                                                   Chi-sq(2) P-val =    0.0000 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Weak identification test (Cragg-Donald Wald F statistic):               21.565 
Stock-Yogo weak ID test critical values:                       <not available> 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Sargan statistic (overidentification test of all instruments):           0.057 
                                                   Chi-sq(1) P-val =    0.8107 
-endog- option: 
Endogeneity test of endogenous regressors:                              20.824 
                                                   Chi-sq(3) P-val =    0.0001 
Regressors tested:    fdtax_l gfcf_gdp trade 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Instrumented:         gfcf_gdp trade fdtax_l 
Included instruments: popgrowth fdexp tindex dschooling laggdp year5 year6 
                      year7 year8 year9 year10 year11 year12 year13 year14 
                      year15 year16 year17 year18 
Excluded instruments: L.gfcf_gdp L.trade L2.fdtax_l L4.fdtax_l 
Dropped collinear:    year1 year2 year3 year4 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 
 
Appendix 4.3.2 Using fdexp, fdtax_l and imbalance2 
A. FE with Driscoll Kraay SEs 
 . xtscc growth fdexp fdtax_l imbalance2 popgrowth dschooling laggdp gfcf_gdp trade 
tindex year1 year2 year3 year4 year5 year6 year7 year8 year9 year10 year11 year12 
year13 year14 year15 year16 year17 year18 if growth<=21.20154 & growth>=-12.55204, fe 
 
Regression with Driscoll-Kraay standard errors   Number of obs     =       328 
Method: Fixed-effects regression                 Number of groups  =        21 
Group variable (i): id_country                   F( 27,    18)     = 275173.74 
maximum lag: 2                                   Prob > F          =    0.0000 
                                                 within R-squared  =    0.6274 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
             |             Drisc/Kraay 
      growth |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
       fdexp |   .0659427   .0354054     1.86   0.079    -.0084412    .1403266 
     fdtax_l |  -.0042499   .0284997    -0.15   0.883    -.0641256    .0556259 
  imbalance2 |   .0124955   .0244299     0.51   0.615    -.0388299    .0638208 
   popgrowth |  -.3791887   .3565506    -1.06   0.302    -1.128274    .3698964 
  dschooling |     1.0214   .3483119     2.93   0.009      .289624    1.753176 
      laggdp |  -.0005907   .0001955    -3.02   0.007    -.0010015   -.0001799 
    gfcf_gdp |   .2093069   .0311018     6.73   0.000     .1439645    .2746493 
       trade |   .0495282    .012047     4.11   0.001     .0242183    .0748381 
      tindex |  -.0330343   .0507487    -0.65   0.523    -.1396534    .0735849 
       year1 |  -1.969776   2.510813    -0.78   0.443    -7.244797    3.305245 
       year2 |  -2.133861   2.010089    -1.06   0.302    -6.356902     2.08918 
       year3 |  -3.871841   1.883164    -2.06   0.055    -7.828223    .0845403 
       year4 |  -5.096532   1.858016    -2.74   0.013    -9.000078   -1.192986 
       year5 |  -1.507055   1.755269    -0.86   0.402    -5.194738    2.180628 
       year6 |  -.6718706   1.588501    -0.42   0.677    -4.009187    2.665446 
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       year7 |  -.1546289   1.404307    -0.11   0.914    -3.104968     2.79571 
       year8 |     .90268   1.279779     0.71   0.490    -1.786036    3.591396 
       year9 |   1.251257     1.0957     1.14   0.268    -1.050723    3.553236 
      year10 |   1.510054   .9008924     1.68   0.111    -.3826507    3.402759 
      year11 |   1.981423    .741213     2.67   0.016     .4241923    3.538654 
      year12 |   2.353728   .5738838     4.10   0.001     1.148043    3.559413 
      year13 |  -.2655687   .3556909    -0.75   0.465    -1.012848    .4817101 
      year14 |  -5.597396   .3543896   -15.79   0.000    -6.341941   -4.852851 
      year15 |  -.8571017   .3215177    -2.67   0.016    -1.532585   -.1816181 
      year16 |   .3763869    .237532     1.58   0.130    -.1226494    .8754232 
      year17 |  -1.954038   .1552219   -12.59   0.000    -2.280147   -1.627928 
      year18 |  -.1314212   .0890979    -1.48   0.157    -.3186089    .0557664 
       _cons |   3.321357   6.716641     0.49   0.627    -10.78978     17.4325 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 
 
B. FEVD 
. xtfevd growth fdexp fdtax_l imbalance2 popgrowth dschooling lngdpini gfcf_gdp trade 
tindex year1 year2 year3 year4 year5 year6 year7year8 year9 year10 year11 year12 
year13 year14 year15 year16 year17 year18 if growth<=21.20154 & growth>=-12.55204, 
invariant (lngdpini fdexp fdtax_l tindex) 
 
panel fixed effects regression with vector decomposition 
 
degrees of freedom fevd    =      280           number of obs       =      328 
mean squared error         = 5.279537           F( 29, 280)         = 13.37714 
root mean squared error    = 2.297724           Prob > F            = 2.44e-36 
Residual Sum of Squares    = 1731.688           R-squared           = .6738124 
Total Sum of Squares       = 5308.872           adj. R-squared      = .6190595 
Estimation Sum of Squares  = 3577.184 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
             |                fevd 
      growth |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
  imbalance2 |   .0143607   .0399167     0.36   0.719    -.0642142    .0929355 
   popgrowth |  -.8928975   .5287633    -1.69   0.092    -1.933753    .1479584 
  dschooling |   1.415365   .4687859     3.02   0.003     .4925727    2.338157 
    gfcf_gdp |   .2045328   .0538278     3.80   0.000     .0985744    .3104913 
       trade |   .0404452   .0204587     1.98   0.049     .0001727    .0807176 
       year1 |   4.199734   1.693539     2.48   0.014     .8660491     7.53342 
       year2 |   3.183005   1.193432     2.67   0.008     .8337664    5.532243 
       year3 |   1.061712   1.180935     0.90   0.369    -1.262926     3.38635 
       year4 |  -.3364933    1.21993    -0.28   0.783    -2.737892    2.064905 
       year5 |   3.148916   1.117396     2.82   0.005     .9493529    5.348479 
       year6 |   3.576539   1.077786     3.32   0.001     1.454947    5.698131 
       year7 |   3.625202   1.082607     3.35   0.001      1.49412    5.756284 
       year8 |   4.247627    1.01048     4.20   0.000     2.258525    6.236728 
       year9 |   4.153389   .9645836     4.31   0.000     2.254633    6.052145 
      year10 |   3.892864   .9257475     4.21   0.000     2.070555    5.715172 
      year11 |   3.766527   .9133892     4.12   0.000     1.968546    5.564509 
      year12 |   3.495697   .8909009     3.92   0.000     1.741983    5.249411 
      year13 |    .155845   .9038574     0.17   0.863    -1.623373    1.935063 
      year14 |  -5.366349   1.043545    -5.14   0.000    -7.420539   -3.312159 
      year15 |  -.1353688   .8940076    -0.15   0.880    -1.895198    1.624461 
      year16 |   .9231509   .8617515     1.07   0.285    -.7731831    2.619485 
      year17 |  -1.663138    .846269    -1.97   0.050    -3.328995    .0027196 
      year18 |   .0344075   .8698202     0.04   0.968     -1.67781    1.746625 
    lngdpini |  -1.236349   .8738286    -1.41   0.158    -2.956456    .4837589 
       fdexp |   .0212954   .0368757     0.58   0.564    -.0512933    .0938841 
     fdtax_l |   .0072596   .0495535     0.15   0.884    -.0902851    .1048043 
      tindex |  -.0243286   .0326107    -0.75   0.456    -.0885218    .0398647 
         eta |          1          .        .       .            .           . 
       _cons |   4.568719   11.45677     0.40   0.690    -17.98362    27.12106 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 
C. IV 
 
. xtivreg2 growth fdexp popgrowth laggdp dschooling tindex ( gfcf_gdp trade   fdtax_l 
imbalance2 = l3.imbalance2  l3.gfcf_gdp l.gfcf_gdp l.trade l2.trade l2.fdtax_l)  year4 
year5 year6 year7 year8 year9 year10 year11 year12 year13 year14 year15 year16 year17 
year18 if growth<=21.20154 & growth>=-12.55204,  fe  endog(fdtax_l gfcf_gdp trade) 
small 
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FIXED EFFECTS ESTIMATION 
------------------------ 
Number of groups =        21                    Obs per group: min =         3 
                                                               avg =      12.7 
                                                               max =        16 
 
IV (2SLS) estimation 
-------------------- 
 
Estimates efficient for homoskedasticity only 
Statistics consistent for homoskedasticity only 
 
                                                      Number of obs =      267 
                                                      F( 24,   222) =    11.26 
                                                      Prob > F      =   0.0000 
Total (centered) SS     =  3338.198869                Centered R2   =   0.4683 
Total (uncentered) SS   =  3338.198869                Uncentered R2 =   0.4683 
Residual SS             =  1774.800307                Root MSE      =    2.827 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
      growth |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
    gfcf_gdp |    .056603   .0937367     0.60   0.547    -.1281246    .2413306 
       trade |   .0504642   .0247329     2.04   0.042     .0017229    .0992054 
     fdtax_l |   .1957239   .1281591     1.53   0.128    -.0568402    .4482879 
  imbalance2 |    .211798     .10626     1.99   0.047     .0023906    .4212054 
       fdexp |   .1114789    .065057     1.71   0.088    -.0167294    .2396871 
   popgrowth |  -.9849171    .591807    -1.66   0.097    -2.151196    .1813614 
      laggdp |  -.0003638   .0001541    -2.36   0.019    -.0006674   -.0000601 
  dschooling |   1.502875   1.240575     1.21   0.227    -.9419354    3.947685 
      tindex |   .2518131   .1070248     2.35   0.020     .0408985    .4627277 
       year4 |   1.156932   2.523022     0.46   0.647    -3.815206    6.129069 
       year5 |    4.15608   2.397973     1.73   0.084    -.5696234    8.881784 
       year6 |   3.680723   2.126319     1.73   0.085    -.5096292    7.871074 
       year7 |   3.560216   1.917926     1.86   0.065    -.2194547    7.339886 
       year8 |   3.876032   1.671079     2.32   0.021     .5828242    7.169241 
       year9 |   4.382012   1.495526     2.93   0.004     1.434767    7.329257 
      year10 |   4.044191    1.40029     2.89   0.004      1.28463    6.803752 
      year11 |   4.726616   1.293645     3.65   0.000      2.17722    7.276013 
      year12 |   4.579853   1.309748     3.50   0.001     1.998722    7.160983 
      year13 |   .3565979   1.214338     0.29   0.769    -2.036507    2.749703 
      year14 |  -4.990009   1.091981    -4.57   0.000    -7.141984   -2.838033 
      year15 |  -1.111517   1.004925    -1.11   0.270     -3.09193    .8688963 
      year16 |   .0858253   .9761461     0.09   0.930    -1.837873    2.009524 
      year17 |  -2.273266    .972757    -2.34   0.020    -4.190286    -.356247 
      year18 |  -.1907848   .9391243    -0.20   0.839    -2.041524    1.659954 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Underidentification test (Anderson canon. corr. LM statistic):          15.620 
                                                   Chi-sq(3) P-val =    0.0014 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Weak identification test (Cragg-Donald Wald F statistic):                2.486 
Stock-Yogo weak ID test critical values:                       <not available> 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Sargan statistic (overidentification test of all instruments):           1.006 
                                                   Chi-sq(2) P-val =    0.6047 
-endog- option: 
Endogeneity test of endogenous regressors:                              13.223 
                                                   Chi-sq(3) P-val =    0.0042 
Regressors tested:    fdtax_l gfcf_gdp trade 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Instrumented:         gfcf_gdp trade fdtax_l imbalance2 
Included instruments: fdexp popgrowth laggdp dschooling tindex year4 year5 
                      year6 year7 year8 year9 year10 year11 year12 year13 year14 
                      year15 year16 year17 year18 
Excluded instruments: L3.imbalance2 L3.gfcf_gdp L.gfcf_gdp L.trade L2.trade 
                      L2.fdtax_l 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
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Appendix 4.3.3 Stages of transition as a moderator 
A. FE cluster robust SEs 
xtreg growth laggdp popgrowth dschooling gfcf_gdp c.fdexp c.fdtax_l trade 
c.tindex#c.fdexp c.tindex#c.fdtax_l c.imbalance2 c.tindex#c.imbalance2 year1 year2 
year3 year4 year5 year6 year7 year8 year9 year10 year11 year12 year13 year14 year15 
year16 year17 year18, fe vce(robust) 
note: imbalance2 omitted because of collinearity 
 
Fixed-effects (within) regression               Number of obs      =       333 
Group variable: id_country                      Number of groups   =        21 
 
R-sq:  within  = 0.6756                         Obs per group: min =         6 
       between = 0.1826                                        avg =      15.9 
       overall = 0.3241                                        max =        19 
 
                                                F(20,20)           =         . 
corr(u_i, Xb)  = -0.7773                        Prob > F           =         . 
 
                                     (Std. Err. adjusted for 21 clusters in 
id_country) 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
-- 
                      |               Robust 
               growth |    Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
----------------------+--------------------------------------------------------------
-- 
               laggdp |-.0007692   .0001499    -5.13   0.000    -.0010819   -.0004566 
            popgrowth |-.1494441   .5490437    -0.27   0.788    -1.294729     .995841 
           dschooling | 1.085799   .3903247     2.78   0.012     .2715959    1.900002 
             gfcf_gdp | .2010536    .074579     2.70   0.014     .0454845    .3566227 
                fdexp |-.2206368   .1017931    -2.17   0.042    -.4329735      -.0083 
              fdtax_l | .2501647   .1481342     1.69   0.107    -.0588378    .5591671 
                trade | .0652097   .0217466     3.00   0.007      .019847    .1105724 
     c.tindex#c.fdexp | .0048061   .0012403     3.87   0.001     .0022189    .0073933 
   c.tindex#c.fdtax_l |-.0035469   .0021034    -1.69   0.107    -.0079345    .0008406 
               tindex | .1356539   .1786949     0.76   0.457    -.2370972     .508405 
           imbalance2 | .2513122   .1497575     1.68   0.109    -.0610766     .563701 
c.tindex#c.imbalance2 |-.0032369   .0020306    -1.59   0.127    -.0074728    .0009989 
                year1 |-2.867191   2.475784    -1.16   0.260    -8.031587    2.297205 
                year2 |-2.910092   2.295825    -1.27   0.220    -7.699098    1.878910 
                year3 |-4.466895   2.501974    -1.79   0.089    -9.685922    .7521319 
                year4 |-5.622791   2.175105    -2.59   0.018    -10.15998   -1.085601 
                year5 |-2.125269   1.700472    -1.25   0.226    -5.672391    1.421852 
                year6 |-1.313641   1.704962    -0.77   0.450    -4.870129    2.242848 
                year7 |-.6768696   1.472212    -0.46   0.651    -3.747851    2.394110 
                 year8| .241794    1.572272     0.15   0.879    -3.037908    3.521496 
                year9 | .6058746   1.361446     0.45   0.661    -2.234052    3.445801 
               year10 | 1.000579   1.157564     0.86   0.398    -1.414057    3.415216 
               year11 | 1.537518   1.092117     1.41   0.175    -.7405992    3.815634 
               year12 | 2.108362   1.229509     1.71   0.102    -.4563497    4.673073 
               year13 |-.4002549    1.07256    -0.37   0.713    -2.637575    1.837065 
               year14 |-8.390345   1.225105    -6.85   0.000    -10.94587   -5.834821 
               year15 | -1.03721   .8205573    -1.26   0.221    -2.748862    .6744431 
               year16 | .0635448   .6163427     0.10   0.919    -1.222124    1.349213 
               year17 |-2.100546   .6411073    -3.28   0.004    -3.437872   -.7632192 
               year18 |-.2116126   .5877515    -0.36   0.723    -1.437641    1.014416 
                _cons |-8.897512    15.9502    -0.56   0.583    -42.16904    24.37402 
----------------------+-------------------------------------------------------------- 
              sigma_u |  4.7836312 
              sigma_e |   2.703656 
                  rho |  .75789805   (fraction of variance due to u_i) 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
-- 
 
. margins, dydx (fdexp fdtax_l imbalance2) at (tindex=(10 (10) 100)) 
 
Average marginal effects                          Number of obs   =        333 
Model VCE    : Robust 
Expression   : Linear prediction, predict() 
dy/dx w.r.t. : fdexp fdtax_l imbalance2 
 
1._at        : tindex          =          10 
2._at        : tindex          =          20 
3._at        : tindex          =          30 
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4._at        : tindex          =          40 
5._at        : tindex          =          50 
6._at        : tindex          =          60 
7._at        : tindex          =          70 
8._at        : tindex          =          80 
9._at        : tindex          =          90 
10._at       : tindex          =         100 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
             |            Delta-method 
             |      dy/dx   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
fdexp        | 
         _at | 
          1  |  -.1725758   .0909621    -1.90   0.058    -.3508583    .0057067 
          2  |  -.1245148   .0805857    -1.55   0.122    -.2824598    .0334303 
          3  |  -.0764538   .0708637    -1.08   0.281     -.215344    .0624365 
          4  |  -.0283928   .0621043    -0.46   0.648    -.1501149    .0933294 
          5  |   .0196682   .0547713     0.36   0.720    -.0876815     .127018 
          6  |   .0677293   .0495027     1.37   0.171    -.0292943    .1647528 
          7  |   .1157903    .046998     2.46   0.014     .0236759    .2079046 
          8  |   .1638513   .0476946     3.44   0.001     .0703716     .257331 
          9  |   .2119123   .0514627     4.12   0.000     .1110473    .3127773 
         10  |   .2599733   .0577037     4.51   0.000     .1468762    .3730704 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
fdtax_l      | 
         _at | 
          1  |   .2146953   .1273757     1.69   0.092    -.0349565    .4643471 
          2  |    .179226   .1067251     1.68   0.093    -.0299513    .3884033 
          3  |   .1437567   .0862598     1.67   0.096    -.0253095    .3128228 
          4  |   .1082873   .0661522     1.64   0.102    -.0213687    .2379433 
          5  |    .072818   .0468649     1.55   0.120    -.0190355    .1646715 
          6  |   .0373487   .0300226     1.24   0.213    -.0214946     .096192 
          7  |   .0018793    .022164     0.08   0.932    -.0415613    .0453199 
          8  |    -.03359     .03108    -1.08   0.280    -.0945057    .0273256 
          9  |  -.0690593   .0482238    -1.43   0.152    -.1635762    .0254575 
         10  |  -.1045287   .0676013    -1.55   0.122    -.2370248    .0279675 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
imbalance2   | 
         _at | 
          1  |   .2189427   .1296049     1.69   0.091    -.0350782    .4729637 
          2  |   .1865733   .1095092     1.70   0.088    -.0280608    .4012073 
          3  |   .1542038   .0895086     1.72   0.085    -.0212298    .3296374 
          4  |   .1218343   .0696851     1.75   0.080    -.0147461    .2584147 
          5  |   .0894648    .050249     1.78   0.075    -.0090214    .1879511 
          6  |   .0570954   .0319157     1.79   0.074    -.0054583     .119649 
          7  |   .0247259   .0183568     1.35   0.178    -.0112527    .0607045 
          8  |  -.0076436   .0219097    -0.35   0.727    -.0505858    .0352987 
          9  |   -.040013   .0380501    -1.05   0.293    -.1145898    .0345637 
         10  |  -.0723825   .0569235    -1.27   0.204    -.1839506    .0391855 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
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B. FE with Driscoll Kraay 
 
. *greater than the mean tindex = 74 
. xtscc growth fdexp fdtax_l imbalance2 popgrowth dschooling laggdp gfcf_gdp trade 
tindex year1 year2 year3 year4 year5 year6 year7 ye 
> ar8 year9 year10 year11 year12 year13 year14 year15 year16 year17 year18 if 
growth<=21.20154 & growth>=-12.55204 & tindex>=74, fe 
 
Regression with Driscoll-Kraay standard errors   Number of obs     =       200 
Method: Fixed-effects regression                 Number of groups  =        14 
Group variable (i): id_country                   F( 27,    18)     = 714929.37 
maximum lag: 2                                   Prob > F          =    0.0000 
                                                 within R-squared  =    0.7233 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
             |             Drisc/Kraay 
      growth |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
       fdexp |   .1248107   .0670248     1.86   0.079    -.0160031    .2656246 
     fdtax_l |  -.0015842   .0394163    -0.04   0.968    -.0843947    .0812263 
  imbalance2 |   -.003964   .0310957    -0.13   0.900    -.0692936    .0613656 
   popgrowth |   -.917845   .3096534    -2.96   0.008    -1.568403   -.2672873 
  dschooling |   .5139345   .3780738     1.36   0.191    -.2803691    1.308238 
      laggdp |  -.0005689    .000275    -2.07   0.053    -.0011467    8.98e-06 
    gfcf_gdp |   .2637609   .0728798     3.62   0.002     .1106462    .4168757 
       trade |   .0696362   .0171828     4.05   0.001     .0335364    .1057359 
      tindex |   .0808655   .0894851     0.90   0.378    -.1071356    .2688667 
       year1 |  -.2111199   2.039026    -0.10   0.919    -4.494954    4.072714 
       year2 |  -.0791682   2.185455    -0.04   0.972    -4.670639    4.512302 
       year3 |  -1.744283   2.052691    -0.85   0.407    -6.056826     2.56826 
       year4 |  -2.168406   1.825751    -1.19   0.250    -6.004168    1.667355 
       year5 |  -.0754991   1.770415    -0.04   0.966    -3.795004    3.644005 
       year6 |  -.1873153   1.520494    -0.12   0.903    -3.381754    3.007124 
       year7 |   .8525953   1.365876     0.62   0.540    -2.017004    3.722195 
       year8 |   1.756863    1.19253     1.47   0.158     -.748549    4.262276 
       year9 |   1.542665   1.084897     1.42   0.172    -.7366188     3.82195 
      year10 |   2.004469   .9729731     2.06   0.054    -.0396722    4.048609 
      year11 |   2.609889   .8997125     2.90   0.010      .719663    4.500115 
      year12 |    3.06217   .6770493     4.52   0.000     1.639742    4.484598 
      year13 |  -1.093969   .4799391    -2.28   0.035    -2.102284   -.0856548 
      year14 |  -5.678103   .2689792   -21.11   0.000    -6.243207   -5.112998 
      year15 |  -1.225921   .3240065    -3.78   0.001    -1.906633   -.5452086 
      year16 |  -.0461165   .3565492    -0.13   0.899    -.7951985    .7029655 
      year17 |  -1.535119   .1545824    -9.93   0.000    -1.859885   -1.210354 
      year18 |  -1.309977    .111306   -11.77   0.000    -1.543822   -1.076132 
       _cons |  -9.476086   4.211515    -2.25   0.037    -18.32415   -.6280217 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 
 
. *lower than the mean tindex = 74 
. xtscc growth fdexp fdtax_l imbalance2 popgrowth dschooling laggdp gfcf_gdp trade 
tindex year1 year2 year3 year4 year5 year6 year7 ye 
> ar8 year9 year10 year11 year12 year13 year14 year15 year16 year17 year18 if 
growth<=21.20154 & growth>=-12.55204 & tindex<=74, fe 
 
Regression with Driscoll-Kraay standard errors   Number of obs     =       128 
Method: Fixed-effects regression                 Number of groups  =        15 
Group variable (i): id_country                   F( 27,    18)     =   2497.82 
maximum lag: 2                                   Prob > F          =    0.0000 
                                                 within R-squared  =    0.6462 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
             |             Drisc/Kraay 
      growth |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
       fdexp |   .0259734   .0562988     0.46   0.650    -.0923061    .1442528 
     fdtax_l |  -.0111872   .0580578    -0.19   0.849    -.1331622    .1107877 
  imbalance2 |   .0095063   .0503937     0.19   0.852     -.096367    .1153795 
   popgrowth |  -.5537335   .5745711    -0.96   0.348    -1.760863    .6533956 
  dschooling |   .5475631   .5530992     0.99   0.335    -.6144552    1.709581 
      laggdp |  -.0006429   .0002942    -2.19   0.042    -.0012609   -.0000249 
    gfcf_gdp |   .1717247   .0676571     2.54   0.021     .0295825    .3138669 
       trade |    .004939   .0258075     0.19   0.850    -.0492805    .0591584 
      tindex |  -.2244058   .0458432    -4.90   0.000    -.3207187   -.1280929 
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       year1 |  -6.308997   3.432474    -1.84   0.083    -13.52036     .902364 
       year2 |  -4.742287   2.165843    -2.19   0.042    -9.292554     -.19202 
       year3 |  -6.633026   1.969263    -3.37   0.003    -10.77029   -2.495758 
       year4 |  -8.154913    1.94232    -4.20   0.001    -12.23558    -4.07425 
       year5 |  -1.845213   1.833562    -1.01   0.328    -5.697384    2.006959 
       year6 |   .5179548   1.676976     0.31   0.761    -3.005241    4.041151 
       year7 |   .1362782   1.411815     0.10   0.924    -2.829836    3.102392 
       year8 |    1.79027   1.330199     1.35   0.195    -1.004376    4.584915 
       year9 |   2.497634   1.140203     2.19   0.042     .1021561    4.893113 
      year10 |   1.457316   1.047802     1.39   0.181    -.7440357    3.658667 
      year11 |   1.301663   .7931889     1.64   0.118     -.364765    2.968091 
      year12 |   1.764093   .7019763     2.51   0.022     .2892956    3.238891 
      year13 |   2.192723   .5665796     3.87   0.001     1.002383    3.383062 
      year14 |   -4.71932   .4965287    -9.50   0.000    -5.762488   -3.676152 
      year15 |   .7189382   .4692604     1.53   0.143    -.2669414    1.704818 
      year16 |   1.828506   .4687872     3.90   0.001     .8436204    2.813391 
      year17 |  -2.109531   .3283675    -6.42   0.000    -2.799406   -1.419656 
      year18 |   2.865199   .2233986    12.83   0.000     2.395856    3.334542 
       _cons |   19.71245   6.806559     2.90   0.010     5.412397     34.0125 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 
C. Calculations of Marginal Effects (By hand) 
. xtscc growth fdexp fdtax_l imbalance2 popgrowth dschooling laggdp gfcf_gdp trade 
tindex interaction_exp interaction_tax interaction_ 
> imb year1 year2 year3 year4 year5 year6 year7 year8 year9 year10 year11 year12 
year13 year14 year15 year16 year17 year18 if growth<= 
> 21.20154 & growth>=-12.55204, fe 
 
Regression with Driscoll-Kraay standard errors   Number of obs     =       328 
Method: Fixed-effects regression                 Number of groups  =        21 
Group variable (i): id_country                   F( 30,    18)     =  29343.26 
maximum lag: 2                                   Prob > F          =    0.0000 
                                                 within R-squared  =    0.6348 
 
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
                |             Drisc/Kraay 
         growth |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
----------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
          fdexp |  -.1523874   .0831224    -1.83   0.083     -.327021    .0222463 
        fdtax_l |   .2142518   .1321701     1.62   0.122    -.0634273     .491931 
     imbalance2 |    .210142   .1357444     1.55   0.139    -.0750463    .4953303 
      popgrowth |  -.5175082   .3361188    -1.54   0.141    -1.223668    .1886511 
     dschooling |   .9912013   .3120882     3.18   0.005     .3355284    1.646874 
         laggdp |  -.0006626     .00021    -3.16   0.005    -.0011038   -.0002214 
       gfcf_gdp |   .1946843   .0416682     4.67   0.000     .1071425     .282226 
          trade |   .0533012   .0159541     3.34   0.004      .019783    .0868194 
         tindex |   .1073104   .1466287     0.73   0.474    -.2007451    .4153658 
interaction_exp |   .0036629   .0014084     2.60   0.018      .000704    .0066218 
interaction_tax |  -.0029143   .0018748    -1.55   0.137    -.0068532    .0010245 
interaction_imb |  -.0026168   .0019178    -1.36   0.189     -.006646    .0014123 
          year1 |  -2.580521   2.297297    -1.12   0.276    -7.406962    2.245919 
          year2 |  -2.515846   1.942345    -1.30   0.212    -6.596562     1.56487 
          year3 |  -4.159962   1.854808    -2.24   0.038    -8.056768   -.2631559 
          year4 |  -5.351894   1.850987    -2.89   0.010    -9.240673   -1.463115 
          year5 |  -1.764049   1.754046    -1.01   0.328    -5.449163    1.921065 
          year6 |   -1.04251   1.617688    -0.64   0.527    -4.441146    2.356126 
          year7 |  -.4784925   1.430787    -0.33   0.742    -3.484464    2.527479 
          year8 |   .4810452   1.332009     0.36   0.722    -2.317403    3.279493 
          year9 |   .8486963   1.124548     0.75   0.460     -1.51389    3.211283 
         year10 |   1.211401   .9200071     1.32   0.204    -.7214625    3.144264 
         year11 |   1.727596   .7575705     2.28   0.035     .1359996    3.319193 
         year12 |   2.228169   .5765073     3.86   0.001     1.016972    3.439366 
         year13 |  -.3703775   .3880301    -0.95   0.352    -1.185599    .4448435 
         year14 |  -5.680404   .4000611   -14.20   0.000    -6.520901   -4.839907 
         year15 |  -1.036329   .3264014    -3.18   0.005    -1.722073    -.350585 
         year16 |   .1732837   .2679505     0.65   0.526    -.3896594    .7362269 
         year17 |  -2.029217   .1534819   -13.22   0.000    -2.351671   -1.706764 
         year18 |  -.1303741   .0874141    -1.49   0.153    -.3140243    .0532761 
          _cons |  -7.481331   8.868047    -0.84   0.410    -26.11241    11.14975 
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
 
. xtivreg2 growth fdexp interaction_exp popgrowth laggdp dschooling tindex (gfcf_gdp 
trade interaction_tax interaction_imb fdtax_l imb 
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> alance2 = l4.imbalance2 l.imbalance2 l.interaction_imb interaction_imb 
l4.interaction_imb  l3.gfcf_gdp l.gfcf_gdp l.trade l2.trade l 
> 3.trade l4.trade l.fdtax_l l2.fdtax_l l2.interaction_tax)  year4 year5 year6 year7 
year8 year9 year10 year11 year12 year13 year14 ye 
> ar15 year16 year17 year18 if growth<=21.20154,  fe  endog(fdtax_l gfcf_gdp trade 
imbalance2 interaction_tax interaction_imb ) small 
Warning - duplicate variables detected 
Duplicates:         interaction_imb 
Warning - collinearities detected 
Vars dropped:       year4 
 
FIXED EFFECTS ESTIMATION 
------------------------ 
Number of groups =        21                    Obs per group: min =         2 
                                                               avg =      11.9 
                                                               max =        15 
Warning - duplicate variables detected 
Duplicates:    interaction_imb 
Warning - collinearities detected 
Vars dropped:  year4 
 
IV (2SLS) estimation 
-------------------- 
 
Estimates efficient for homoskedasticity only 
Statistics consistent for homoskedasticity only 
 
                                                      Number of obs =      250 
                                                      F( 26,   203) =    14.99 
                                                      Prob > F      =   0.0000 
Total (centered) SS     =  4931.120337                Centered R2   =   0.6327 
Total (uncentered) SS   =  4931.120337                Uncentered R2 =   0.6327 
Residual SS             =  1811.309591                Root MSE      =    2.987 
 
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
         growth |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
----------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
       gfcf_gdp |    .098978   .1111205     0.89   0.374    -.1201204    .3180764 
          trade |   .1081297   .0322206     3.36   0.001     .0445997    .1716597 
interaction_tax |  -.0028581   .0118272    -0.24   0.809     -.026178    .0204617 
interaction_imb |  -.0032064    .010442    -0.31   0.759     -.023795    .0173823 
        fdtax_l |   .4028552   .9338166     0.43   0.667    -1.438369    2.244079 
     imbalance2 |   .4265033   .8008137     0.53   0.595    -1.152476    2.005483 
          fdexp |  -.4733834   .2680836    -1.77   0.079    -1.001969    .0552021 
interaction_exp |   .0096813   .0040882     2.37   0.019     .0016205    .0177421 
      popgrowth |   .0111047   .7337766     0.02   0.988    -1.435696    1.457906 
         laggdp |  -.0006408   .0001866    -3.43   0.001    -.0010087   -.0002728 
     dschooling |   1.451487   1.442668     1.01   0.316    -1.393048    4.296022 
         tindex |   .0276875   .9211328     0.03   0.976    -1.788527    1.843902 
          year4 |          0  (omitted) 
          year5 |   2.122494   2.681152     0.79   0.429    -3.163984    7.408971 
          year6 |   1.877178   2.328879     0.81   0.421    -2.714717    6.469073 
          year7 |   2.554463   2.226548     1.15   0.253    -1.835664    6.944591 
          year8 |   2.463095   1.853389     1.33   0.185    -1.191266    6.117457 
          year9 |   2.867931   1.676397     1.71   0.089    -.4374529    6.173314 
         year10 |   2.922904   1.531748     1.91   0.058    -.0972722     5.94308 
         year11 |   3.296299   1.418142     2.32   0.021     .5001221    6.092477 
         year12 |   3.876668   1.378238     2.81   0.005      1.15917    6.594165 
         year13 |   .3544622   1.307317     0.27   0.787    -2.223198    2.932123 
         year14 |  -7.412885   1.237947    -5.99   0.000    -9.853769   -4.972001 
         year15 |  -.5515119   1.061721    -0.52   0.604    -2.644927    1.541903 
         year16 |    .283594   1.036611     0.27   0.785    -1.760312      2.3275 
         year17 |  -1.985501   .9810997    -2.02   0.044    -3.919953    -.051048 
         year18 |  -.0301208   1.019142    -0.03   0.976    -2.039582     1.97934 
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Underidentification test (Anderson canon. corr. LM statistic):          17.417 
                                                   Chi-sq(8) P-val =    0.0261 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Weak identification test (Cragg-Donald Wald F statistic):                1.241 
Stock-Yogo weak ID test critical values:                       <not available> 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Sargan statistic (overidentification test of all instruments):           5.947 
                                                   Chi-sq(7) P-val =    0.5459 
-endog- option: 
Endogeneity test of endogenous regressors:                              30.516 
                                                   Chi-sq(6) P-val =    0.0000 
Regressors tested:    fdtax_l gfcf_gdp trade imbalance2 interaction_tax 
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                      interaction_imb 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Instrumented:         gfcf_gdp trade interaction_tax interaction_imb fdtax_l 
                      imbalance2 
Included instruments: fdexp interaction_exp popgrowth laggdp dschooling tindex 
                      year5 year6 year7 year8 year9 year10 year11 year12 year13 
                      year14 year15 year16 year17 year18 
Excluded instruments: L4.imbalance2 L.imbalance2 L.interaction_imb 
                      L4.interaction_imb L3.gfcf_gdp L.gfcf_gdp L.trade L2.trade 
                      L3.trade L4.trade L.fdtax_l L2.fdtax_l L2.interaction_tax 
Duplicates:           interaction_imb 
Dropped collinear:    year4 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
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 FE with D-K SEs    IV approach  
         
fdexp 
coefficent 
Interacti
on 
coefficen
t  
tinde
x 
Margin
al 
Effect 
 
fdexp 
coefficent 
Interacti
on 
coefficen
t  
tinde
x 
Margin
al 
Effect 
-0.152 0.0036 10 -0.116  -0.47 0.0096 10 -0.374 
-0.152 0.0036 20 -0.08  -0.47 0.0096 20 -0.278 
-0.152 0.0036 30 -0.044  -0.47 0.0096 30 -0.182 
-0.152 0.0036 40 -0.008  -0.47 0.0096 40 -0.086 
-0.152 0.0036 50 0.028  -0.47 0.0096 50 0.01 
-0.152 0.0036 60 0.064  -0.47 0.0096 60 0.106 
-0.152 0.0036 70 0.1  -0.47 0.0096 70 0.202 
-0.152 0.0036 80 0.136  -0.47 0.0096 80 0.298 
-0.152 0.0036 90 0.172  -0.47 0.0096 90 0.394 
-0.152 0.0036 100 0.208  -0.47 0.0096 100 0.49 
         
fdtax_l 
coefficent 
Interacti
on 
coefficen
t  
tinde
x 
Margin
al 
Effect 
 
fdtax_l 
coefficent 
Interacti
on 
coefficen
t  
tinde
x 
Margin
al 
Effect 
0.214 -0.003 10 0.184  0.402 -0.0028 10 0.374 
0.214 -0.003 20 0.154  0.402 -0.0028 20 0.346 
0.214 -0.003 30 0.124  0.402 -0.0028 30 0.318 
0.214 -0.003 40 0.094  0.402 -0.0028 40 0.29 
0.214 -0.003 50 0.064  0.402 -0.0028 50 0.262 
0.214 -0.003 60 0.034  0.402 -0.0028 60 0.234 
0.214 -0.003 70 0.004  0.402 -0.0028 70 0.206 
0.214 -0.003 80 -0.026  0.402 -0.0028 80 0.178 
0.214 -0.003 90 -0.056  0.402 -0.0028 90 0.15 
0.214 -0.003 100 -0.086  0.402 -0.0028 100 0.122 
         
imbalanc
e2 
coefficent 
Interacti
on 
coefficen
t  
tinde
x 
Margin
al 
Effect 
 
imbalanc
e2 
coefficent 
Interacti
on 
coefficen
t  
tinde
x 
Margin
al 
Effect 
0.21 -0.0026 10 0.184  0.42 -0.0032 10 0.388 
0.21 -0.0026 20 0.158  0.42 -0.0032 20 0.356 
0.21 -0.0026 30 0.132  0.42 -0.0032 30 0.324 
0.21 -0.0026 40 0.106  0.42 -0.0032 40 0.292 
0.21 -0.0026 50 0.08  0.42 -0.0032 50 0.26 
0.21 -0.0026 60 0.054  0.42 -0.0032 60 0.228 
0.21 -0.0026 70 0.028  0.42 -0.0032 70 0.196 
0.21 -0.0026 80 0.002  0.42 -0.0032 80 0.164 
0.21 -0.0026 90 -0.024  0.42 -0.0032 90 0.132 
0.21 -0.0026 100 -0.05  0.42 -0.0032 100 0.1 
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D. FEVD 
. *greater than the mean tindex >= 74 
. xtfevd growth fdexp fdtax_l imbalance2 popgrowth dschooling lngdpini gfcf_gdp trade 
tindex year1 year2 year3 year4 year5 year6 year7 year8 year9 year10 year11 year12 
year13 year14 year15 year16 year17 year18 if growth<=21.20154 & growth>=-12.55204 & 
tindex>=74, invariant (lngdpini fdexp fdtax_l tindex) 
 
panel fixed effects regression with vector decomposition 
 
degrees of freedom fevd    =      159           number of obs       =      200 
mean squared error         = 3.523556           F( 29, 159)         = 14.29874 
root mean squared error    = 1.877114           Prob > F            = 3.79e-30 
Residual Sum of Squares    = 704.7113           R-squared           = .7691173 
Total Sum of Squares       = 3052.248           adj. R-squared      = .7110336 
Estimation Sum of Squares  = 2347.537 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
             |                fevd 
      growth |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
  imbalance2 |  -.0026385   .0404129    -0.07   0.948    -.0824538    .0771769 
   popgrowth |  -1.127424   .4982025    -2.26   0.025    -2.111372   -.1434763 
  dschooling |   .7431662   .9744131     0.76   0.447    -1.181296    2.667628 
    gfcf_gdp |   .2218638   .0973832     2.28   0.024     .0295324    .4141952 
       trade |   .0710516   .0181803     3.91   0.000     .0351455    .1069576 
       year1 |   6.124503   2.275967     2.69   0.008     1.629476    10.61953 
       year2 |   5.670285    1.77359     3.20   0.002     2.167452    9.173118 
       year3 |   3.674622   1.732998     2.12   0.036     .2519575    7.097287 
       year4 |   3.069301    1.53268     2.00   0.047     .0422639    6.096338 
       year5 |   4.979225   1.473473     3.38   0.001     2.069122    7.889328 
       year6 |   4.356617   1.369055     3.18   0.002     1.652738    7.060495 
       year7 |   5.023567    1.36814     3.67   0.000     2.321496    7.725639 
       year8 |   5.580171   1.288911     4.33   0.000     3.034577    8.125766 
       year9 |   4.865771   1.225528     3.97   0.000     2.445359    7.286183 
      year10 |   4.688013   1.108722     4.23   0.000     2.498292    6.877735 
      year11 |   4.748152   1.116975     4.25   0.000     2.542131    6.954172 
      year12 |   4.500977   1.210331     3.72   0.000     2.110578    6.891377 
      year13 |  -.4623091   1.202235    -0.38   0.701    -2.836718      1.9121 
      year14 |  -5.219891   1.082717    -4.82   0.000    -7.358253    -3.08153 
      year15 |  -.2570286   .9369556    -0.27   0.784    -2.107512    1.593455 
      year16 |   .7183902   .8817753     0.81   0.416    -1.023113    2.459893 
      year17 |  -1.160929   .8241164    -1.41   0.161    -2.788555    .4666982 
      year18 |   -1.16961   .8314553    -1.41   0.161    -2.811731    .4725108 
    lngdpini |  -5.050043   1.397076    -3.61   0.000    -7.809263   -2.290823 
       fdexp |   .1371573   .0846863     1.62   0.107    -.0300978    .3044123 
     fdtax_l |   .0119553   .0486817     0.25   0.806    -.0841908    .1081014 
      tindex |  -.0887705   .0806755    -1.10   0.273    -.2481043    .0705633 
         eta |          1          .        .       .            .           . 
       _cons |    39.1363   14.75385     2.65   0.009     9.997497    68.27511 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 
  
. *lower than the mean tindex <= 74 
. xtfevd growth fdexp fdtax_l imbalance2 popgrowth dschooling lngdpini gfcf_gdp trade 
tindex year3 year4 year5 year6 year7 year8 year9 year10 year11 year12 year13 year14 
year15 year16 year17 year18 if growth<=21.20154 & growth>=-12.55204 & tindex<=74, 
invariant (lngdpini fdexp fdtax_l tindex) 
 
panel fixed effects regression with vector decomposition 
 
degrees of freedom fevd    =       88           number of obs       =      128 
mean squared error         = 5.306125           F( 27, 88)          = 5.247519 
root mean squared error    = 2.303503           Prob > F            = 3.12e-09 
Residual Sum of Squares    =  679.184           R-squared           = .6952985 
Total Sum of Squares       = 2229.014           adj. R-squared      = .5602603 
Estimation Sum of Squares  =  1549.83 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
             |                fevd 
      growth |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
  imbalance2 |   .0270138   .1134676     0.24   0.812    -.1984793    .2525068 
   popgrowth |  -1.561195   1.334031    -1.17   0.245    -4.212301    1.089911 
  dschooling |   1.065814    .492124     2.17   0.033     .0878207    2.043807 
    gfcf_gdp |    .168395   .0981459     1.72   0.090    -.0266493    .3634393 
       trade |   .0032068   .0434828     0.07   0.941    -.0832062    .0896198 
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       year3 |  -2.308322   1.585298    -1.46   0.149    -5.458768    .8421247 
       year4 |  -3.831582   1.515512    -2.53   0.013    -6.843343   -.8198205 
       year5 |   2.372075    1.63385     1.45   0.150    -.8748578    5.619008 
       year6 |   3.983187   1.737034     2.29   0.024     .5311961    7.435177 
       year7 |   3.079076   1.741949     1.77   0.081    -.3826813    6.540834 
       year8 |   4.616593   1.616247     2.86   0.005     1.404642    7.828544 
       year9 |   5.154875   1.587372     3.25   0.002     2.000307    8.309444 
      year10 |   4.037999     1.6078     2.51   0.014     .8428356    7.233163 
      year11 |   3.165813   1.615279     1.96   0.053    -.0442149     6.37584 
      year12 |   3.172334   1.606617     1.97   0.051    -.0204809    6.365148 
      year13 |   3.030458    1.59837     1.90   0.061    -.1459669    6.206882 
      year14 |  -4.027393   1.659532    -2.43   0.017    -7.325365   -.7294213 
      year15 |   1.356022   1.438115     0.94   0.348     -1.50193    4.213974 
      year16 |   2.174423   1.422493     1.53   0.130    -.6524824    5.001329 
      year17 |  -2.036734   1.407126    -1.45   0.151    -4.833101    .7596321 
      year18 |   3.300958   1.628027     2.03   0.046     .0655969    6.536319 
    lngdpini |   1.354002   1.741967     0.78   0.439    -2.107791    4.815796 
       fdexp |   .0883482   .0849487     1.04   0.301    -.0804696     .257166 
     fdtax_l |   .0160614   .1270591     0.13   0.900    -.2364418    .2685646 
      tindex |   .0236695   .0660215     0.36   0.721    -.1075343    .1548733 
         eta |          1          .        .       .            .           . 
       _cons |  -18.82705   25.70499    -0.73   0.466    -69.91032    32.25622 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 
E. IV 
. *greater than the mean tindex >= 74 
. xtivreg2 growth fdexp popgrowth laggdp dschooling tindex (gfcf_gdp trade   fdtax_l 
imbalance2 = l3.imbalance2 l2.imbalance2  l.gfcf_ 
> gdp l3.gfcf_gdp l2.trade l3.trade l2.fdtax_l l3.fdtax_l)  year4 year5 year6 year7 
year8 year9 year10 year11 year12 year13 year14 yea 
> r15 year16 year17 year18 if growth<=21.20154 & growth>=-12.55204 & tindex>=74,  fe  
endog(fdtax_l gfcf_gdp trade imbalance2) small 
 
FIXED EFFECTS ESTIMATION 
------------------------ 
Number of groups =        14                    Obs per group: min =         6 
                                                               avg =      12.8 
                                                               max =        16 
 
IV (2SLS) estimation 
-------------------- 
 
Estimates efficient for homoskedasticity only 
Statistics consistent for homoskedasticity only 
 
                                                      Number of obs =      179 
                                                      F( 24,   141) =     9.72 
                                                      Prob > F      =   0.0000 
Total (centered) SS     =  2143.590709                Centered R2   =   0.5748 
Total (uncentered) SS   =  2143.590709                Uncentered R2 =   0.5748 
Residual SS             =  911.4982538                Root MSE      =    2.543 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
      growth |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
    gfcf_gdp |   .0533276   .1279872     0.42   0.678    -.1996943    .3063495 
       trade |    .087678   .0550205     1.59   0.113    -.0210938    .1964499 
     fdtax_l |   .1499585   .0986257     1.52   0.131    -.0450177    .3449348 
  imbalance2 |   .1661963   .0841976     1.97   0.050    -.0002565    .3326491 
       fdexp |   .1650968   .1142981     1.44   0.151    -.0608627    .3910564 
   popgrowth |  -1.253741   .7457556    -1.68   0.095    -2.728048    .2205669 
      laggdp |  -.0004184   .0002124    -1.97   0.051    -.0008383    1.39e-06 
  dschooling |    .620071   1.533133     0.40   0.686    -2.410828    3.650971 
      tindex |   .1076649    .106453     1.01   0.314    -.1027854    .3181152 
       year4 |   1.945482   3.495406     0.56   0.579    -4.964696    8.855661 
       year5 |    3.88415   3.394325     1.14   0.254    -2.826198     10.5945 
       year6 |   2.984779   3.104656     0.96   0.338    -3.152913    9.122471 
       year7 |   3.569296   3.076846     1.16   0.248    -2.513417    9.652009 
       year8 |   3.877285   2.879429     1.35   0.180    -1.815148    9.569719 
       year9 |   3.474745   2.306719     1.51   0.134    -1.085482    8.034971 
      year10 |   4.006669   1.976963     2.03   0.045     .0983498    7.914989 
      year11 |   4.803401   1.682067     2.86   0.005     1.478069    8.128732 
      year12 |   5.197734   1.647094     3.16   0.002     1.941541    8.453927 
      year13 |   .1408647   1.478077     0.10   0.924    -2.781192    3.062921 
      year14 |  -4.334697   1.714243    -2.53   0.013    -7.723637   -.9457567 
      year15 |  -1.301369   1.290198    -1.01   0.315    -3.852002    1.249264 
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      year16 |   -.128897   1.069301    -0.12   0.904    -2.242832    1.985038 
      year17 |  -1.753315   1.006577    -1.74   0.084    -3.743248    .2366181 
      year18 |  -1.401569   .9985222    -1.40   0.163    -3.375579     .572441 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Underidentification test (Anderson canon. corr. LM statistic):          18.427 
                                                   Chi-sq(5) P-val =    0.0025 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Weak identification test (Cragg-Donald Wald F statistic):                2.153 
Stock-Yogo weak ID test critical values:                       <not available> 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Sargan statistic (overidentification test of all instruments):           1.603 
                                                   Chi-sq(4) P-val =    0.8082 
-endog- option: 
Endogeneity test of endogenous regressors:                              33.607 
                                                   Chi-sq(4) P-val =    0.0000 
Regressors tested:    fdtax_l gfcf_gdp trade imbalance2 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Instrumented:         gfcf_gdp trade fdtax_l imbalance2 
Included instruments: fdexp popgrowth laggdp dschooling tindex year4 year5 
                      year6 year7 year8 year9 year10 year11 year12 year13 year14 
                      year15 year16 year17 year18 
Excluded instruments: L3.imbalance2 L2.imbalance2 L.gfcf_gdp L3.gfcf_gdp 
                      L2.trade L3.trade L2.fdtax_l L3.fdtax_l 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 
. *lower than the mean tindex <= 74 
. xtivreg2 growth fdexp popgrowth laggdp dschooling tindex (gfcf_gdp trade   fdtax_l 
imbalance2 = l2.imbalance2 l.gfcf_gdp l2.gfcf_gdp 
>  l.trade l2.trade l.fdtax_l l2.fdtax_l) year1 year2 year3 year4 year5 year6 year7 
year8 year9 year10 year11 year12 year13 year14 yea 
> r15 year16 year17 year18 year19 year20 if growth<=21.20154 & growth>=-12.55204 & 
tindex<74,  fe  endog(fdtax_l gfcf_gdp trade imbala 
> nce2) small 
Warning - singleton groups detected.  2 observation(s) not used. 
Warning - collinearities detected 
Vars dropped:       year1 year2 year19 year20 
 
FIXED EFFECTS ESTIMATION 
------------------------ 
Number of groups =        11                    Obs per group: min =         2 
                                                               avg =       8.7 
                                                               max =        17 
Warning - collinearities detected 
Vars dropped:  year1 year2 year19 year20 
 
IV (2SLS) estimation 
-------------------- 
 
Estimates efficient for homoskedasticity only 
Statistics consistent for homoskedasticity only 
 
                                                      Number of obs =       96 
                                                      F( 25,    60) =     3.83 
                                                      Prob > F      =   0.0000 
Total (centered) SS     =  1306.369426                Centered R2   =   0.5796 
Total (uncentered) SS   =  1306.369426                Uncentered R2 =   0.5796 
Residual SS             =  549.2529518                Root MSE      =    3.026 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
      growth |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
    gfcf_gdp |   .0396282   .2098627     0.19   0.851    -.3801596     .459416 
       trade |  -.0068853   .0913759    -0.08   0.940    -.1896643    .1758936 
     fdtax_l |  -.2632122   .2276431    -1.16   0.252    -.7185661    .1921418 
  imbalance2 |  -.2408733   .1900163    -1.27   0.210    -.6209625    .1392158 
       fdexp |  -.0435798   .1130646    -0.39   0.701    -.2697427    .1825831 
   popgrowth |    .050563   1.806273     0.03   0.978     -3.56252    3.663646 
      laggdp |   -.000524   .0003964    -1.32   0.191     -.001317     .000269 
  dschooling |  -1.418772   3.060453    -0.46   0.645    -7.540589    4.703045 
      tindex |  -.6732582   .5196938    -1.30   0.200    -1.712801    .3662842 
       year1 |          0  (omitted) 
       year2 |          0  (omitted) 
       year3 |   -12.1543   7.211658    -1.69   0.097    -26.57976    2.271169 
       year4 |  -17.05308    8.31543    -2.05   0.045    -33.68642   -.4197489 
       year5 |  -8.785443    7.12267    -1.23   0.222     -23.0329    5.462019 
       year6 |  -4.198583   6.128729    -0.69   0.496    -16.45787    8.060701 
       year7 |  -3.981064   5.197288    -0.77   0.447    -14.37719     6.41506 
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       year8 |  -1.846707   4.788826    -0.39   0.701    -11.42579    7.732372 
       year9 |   .1789849   4.886973     0.04   0.971    -9.596416    9.954386 
      year10 |  -1.212423   3.830208    -0.32   0.753    -8.873979    6.449133 
      year11 |   .5747463   3.323239     0.17   0.863    -6.072722    7.222215 
      year12 |   1.254031   3.106159     0.40   0.688    -4.959213    7.467274 
      year13 |   3.263471   2.280756     1.43   0.158    -1.298719    7.825662 
      year14 |  -4.275222   2.253091    -1.90   0.063    -8.782075    .2316318 
      year15 |   1.442484   2.040309     0.71   0.482    -2.638741    5.523709 
      year16 |   2.486763   2.077101     1.20   0.236    -1.668057    6.641584 
      year17 |  -1.300618   1.938825    -0.67   0.505    -5.178845    2.577609 
      year18 |   2.218832   2.011493     1.10   0.274    -1.804753    6.242416 
      year19 |          0  (omitted) 
      year20 |          0  (omitted) 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Underidentification test (Anderson canon. corr. LM statistic):          11.168 
                                                   Chi-sq(4) P-val =    0.0247 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Weak identification test (Cragg-Donald Wald F statistic):                1.232 
Stock-Yogo weak ID test critical values:                       <not available> 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Sargan statistic (overidentification test of all instruments):           2.613 
                                                   Chi-sq(3) P-val =    0.4552 
-endog- option: 
Endogeneity test of endogenous regressors:                               9.920 
                                                   Chi-sq(4) P-val =    0.0418 
Regressors tested:    fdtax_l gfcf_gdp trade imbalance2 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Instrumented:         gfcf_gdp trade fdtax_l imbalance2 
Included instruments: fdexp popgrowth laggdp dschooling tindex year3 year4 
                      year5 year6 year7 year8 year9 year10 year11 year12 year13 
                      year14 year15 year16 year17 year18 
Excluded instruments: L2.imbalance2 L.gfcf_gdp L2.gfcf_gdp L.trade L2.trade 
                      L.fdtax_l L2.fdtax_l 
Dropped collinear:    year1 year2 year19 year20 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 
Appendix 4.3.4 Geographical location (Europe vs CIS) as a moderator 
A. FE with Driscoll Kraay 
.*europe =1 and FE with DK 
. xtscc growth fdexp fdtax_l imbalance2 popgrowth dschooling laggdp gfcf_gdp trade 
tindex year1 year2 year3 year4 year5 year6 year7 ye 
> ar8 year9 year10 year11 year12 year13 year14 year15 year16 year17 year18 if 
growth<=21.20154 & growth>=-12.55204 & europe==1, fe 
 
Regression with Driscoll-Kraay standard errors   Number of obs     =       227 
Method: Fixed-effects regression                 Number of groups  =        14 
Group variable (i): id_country                   F( 27,    18)     = 169021.61 
maximum lag: 2                                   Prob > F          =    0.0000 
                                                 within R-squared  =    0.6876 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
             |             Drisc/Kraay 
      growth |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
       fdexp |   .1366509   .0526782     2.59   0.018      .025978    .2473237 
     fdtax_l |   .0151543    .033271     0.46   0.654    -.0547455    .0850542 
  imbalance2 |   .0230102   .0228556     1.01   0.327    -.0250077    .0710281 
   popgrowth |  -.7904485   .4002789    -1.97   0.064    -1.631403    .0505062 
  dschooling |   .0329299   .3835504     0.09   0.933    -.7728796    .8387394 
      laggdp |   -.000661   .0002521    -2.62   0.017    -.0011906   -.0001314 
    gfcf_gdp |   .2393758   .0293241     8.16   0.000     .1777682    .3009835 
       trade |   .0697254   .0205649     3.39   0.003     .0265201    .1129307 
      tindex |   .0334906   .0834585     0.40   0.693    -.1418492    .2088303 
       year1 |  -1.925715   2.210603    -0.87   0.395    -6.570019    2.718589 
       year2 |  -1.625314   1.906648    -0.85   0.405    -5.631033    2.380405 
       year3 |  -2.272926   1.735546    -1.31   0.207    -5.919172    1.373321 
       year4 |  -4.191769   1.706877    -2.46   0.024    -7.777784   -.6057541 
       year5 |  -.8197401   1.641458    -0.50   0.624    -4.268315    2.628835 
       year6 |  -1.043329   1.485575    -0.70   0.491    -4.164406    2.077748 
       year7 |   .0057161   1.310003     0.00   0.997    -2.746498     2.75793 
       year8 |   .7213022   1.181192     0.61   0.549    -1.760291    3.202895 
       year9 |   .9500913   1.039811     0.91   0.373    -1.234471    3.134654 
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      year10 |   1.278924   .9043675     1.41   0.174    -.6210813     3.17893 
      year11 |   1.752083   .7306028     2.40   0.028     .2171436    3.287023 
      year12 |   2.135251   .5113268     4.18   0.001     1.060993    3.209509 
      year13 |  -.4735788   .3060288    -1.55   0.139    -1.116521    .1693638 
      year14 |   -5.34468   .4029414   -13.26   0.000    -6.191229   -4.498132 
      year15 |  -1.188938   .3178719    -3.74   0.001    -1.856763   -.5211142 
      year16 |  -.2617427    .312169    -0.84   0.413    -.9175853    .3940999 
      year17 |  -2.216537   .1862715   -11.90   0.000    -2.607879   -1.825195 
      year18 |   -1.16672   .0762272   -15.31   0.000    -1.326867   -1.006573 
       _cons |  -4.906632   8.133233    -0.60   0.554    -21.99392    12.18066 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 
 
. *europe =0 and FE with DK 
. xtscc growth fdexp fdtax_l imbalance2 popgrowth dschooling laggdp gfcf_gdp trade 
tindex year1 year2 year3 year4 year5 year6 year7 ye 
> ar8 year9 year10 year11 year12 year13 year14 year15 year16 year17 year18 if 
growth<=21.20154 & growth>=-12.55204 & europe==0, fe 
 
Regression with Driscoll-Kraay standard errors   Number of obs     =       101 
Method: Fixed-effects regression                 Number of groups  =         7 
Group variable (i): id_country                   F( 27,    18)     =  54184.85 
maximum lag: 2                                   Prob > F          =    0.0000 
                                                 within R-squared  =    0.6388 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
             |             Drisc/Kraay 
      growth |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
       fdexp |  -.0065854   .0788334    -0.08   0.934    -.1722082    .1590374 
     fdtax_l |  -.0159196   .0641624    -0.25   0.807    -.1507198    .1188806 
  imbalance2 |    .003886    .042944     0.09   0.929     -.086336     .094108 
   popgrowth |  -.3774396   .9050338    -0.42   0.682    -2.278845    1.523966 
  dschooling |   1.550913   .8338509     1.86   0.079    -.2009424    3.302769 
      laggdp |  -.0005304   .0002743    -1.93   0.069    -.0011066    .0000459 
    gfcf_gdp |   .1620398   .0755136     2.15   0.046     .0033917    .3206879 
       trade |    .003958   .0299672     0.13   0.896    -.0590009    .0669168 
      tindex |  -.0975432   .1551021    -0.63   0.537    -.4234006    .2283142 
       year1 |  -1.115468   4.428194    -0.25   0.804    -10.41876    8.187823 
       year2 |   .0413972   2.327322     0.02   0.986    -4.848124    4.930919 
       year3 |  -6.292844   2.327388    -2.70   0.015    -11.18251   -1.403182 
       year4 |  -4.500097   2.603465    -1.73   0.101    -9.969774    .9695803 
       year5 |   .1883509   2.547061     0.07   0.942    -5.162825    5.539527 
       year6 |   2.137199   2.340074     0.91   0.373    -2.779114    7.053511 
       year7 |   1.732855   1.964635     0.88   0.389    -2.394691      5.8604 
       year8 |   3.643578   1.882962     1.94   0.069    -.3123793    7.599535 
       year9 |   3.674664   1.565873     2.35   0.031      .384887    6.964441 
      year10 |    3.02148   1.334434     2.26   0.036     .2179374    5.825023 
      year11 |   3.157844   .9417633     3.35   0.004     1.179273    5.136415 
      year12 |   3.499882    .893828     3.92   0.001     1.622019    5.377745 
      year13 |   .9570887   .9841675     0.97   0.344    -1.110571    3.024748 
      year14 |  -5.188099   .7160355    -7.25   0.000    -6.692433   -3.683764 
      year15 |   .7763278    .615937     1.26   0.224    -.5177078    2.070363 
      year16 |   2.269544   .4362481     5.20   0.000     1.353021    3.186067 
      year17 |  -.8599084   .3460453    -2.48   0.023    -1.586923   -.1328942 
      year18 |   2.702314   .2059234    13.12   0.000     2.269685    3.134943 
       _cons |   11.03278   10.42716     1.06   0.304    -10.87387    32.93942 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 
B. FEVD 
 
. *europe =1 and FEVD 
. xtfevd growth fdexp fdtax_l imbalance2 popgrowth dschooling lngdpini gfcf_gdp trade 
tindex year1 year2 year3 year4 year5 year6 year7 
>  year8 year9 year10 year11 year12 year13 year14 year15 year16 year17 year18 if 
growth<=21.20154 & growth>=-12.55204 & europe==1, inv 
> ariant (lngdpini fdexp fdtax_l tindex) 
 
panel fixed effects regression with vector decomposition 
 
degrees of freedom fevd    =      186           number of obs       =      227 
mean squared error         = 3.981724           F( 29, 186)         = 12.33304 
root mean squared error    = 1.995426           Prob > F            = 8.49e-29 
Residual Sum of Squares    = 903.8512           R-squared           = .7091005 
Total Sum of Squares       = 3107.091           adj. R-squared      = .6465415 
Estimation Sum of Squares  =  2203.24 
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------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
             |                fevd 
      growth |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
  imbalance2 |   .0272762   .1027324     0.27   0.791    -.1753942    .2299466 
   popgrowth |  -1.206999    .696001    -1.73   0.085     -2.58007    .1660721 
  dschooling |   .2614843   .7039178     0.37   0.711    -1.127205    1.650174 
    gfcf_gdp |   .2238164   .0977917     2.29   0.023      .030893    .4167398 
       trade |   .0658893   .0225384     2.92   0.004     .0214255    .1103531 
       year1 |   5.354932   1.758903     3.04   0.003     1.884967    8.824896 
       year2 |   5.054715   1.291903     3.91   0.000      2.50605    7.603381 
       year3 |   4.023733   1.441187     2.79   0.006     1.180558    6.866908 
       year4 |   1.926845   1.282072     1.50   0.135    -.6024276    4.456117 
       year5 |   5.003596    1.26205     3.96   0.000     2.513823    7.493369 
       year6 |     4.2674   1.133126     3.77   0.000     2.031969    6.502831 
       year7 |   4.770336   1.140035     4.18   0.000     2.521274    7.019398 
       year8 |    4.92549    1.15231     4.27   0.000     2.652213    7.198766 
       year9 |   4.627525   1.143701     4.05   0.000     2.371232    6.883818 
      year10 |   4.333782   1.074389     4.03   0.000     2.214228    6.453336 
      year11 |   4.128852   1.144634     3.61   0.000     1.870718    6.386986 
      year12 |   3.677091   1.240123     2.97   0.003     1.230576    6.123606 
      year13 |   .1490374   1.073629     0.14   0.890    -1.969018    2.267093 
      year14 |  -4.919639   1.134395    -4.34   0.000    -7.157574   -2.681704 
      year15 |  -.2317404   .9877327    -0.23   0.815     -2.18034    1.716859 
      year16 |   .4576004   .8944896     0.51   0.610    -1.307049    2.222249 
      year17 |  -1.848336   .8622542    -2.14   0.033    -3.549391   -.1472806 
      year18 |  -.9938454   .8734039    -1.14   0.257    -2.716897     .729206 
    lngdpini |  -3.475161   2.033214    -1.71   0.089    -7.486287    .5359651 
       fdexp |   .1706199   .0959659     1.78   0.077    -.0187017    .3599415 
     fdtax_l |   .0268761   .1143594     0.24   0.814    -.1987321    .2524843 
      tindex |  -.0978926   .0753979    -1.30   0.196    -.2466374    .0508523 
         eta |          1          .        .       .            .           . 
       _cons |    22.9937   24.73623     0.93   0.354    -25.80594    71.79334 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 
 
  
. *europe =0 and FEVD 
. xtfevd growth fdexp fdtax_l imbalance2 popgrowth dschooling lngdpini gfcf_gdp trade 
tindex year1 year2 year3 year4 year5 year6 year7 
>  year8 year9 year10 year11 year12 year13 year14 year15 year16 year17 year18 if 
growth<=21.20154 & growth>=-12.55204 & europe==0, inv 
> ariant (lngdpini fdexp fdtax_l tindex) 
 
panel fixed effects regression with vector decomposition 
 
degrees of freedom fevd    =       67           number of obs       =      101 
mean squared error         = 6.216112           F( 29, 67)          = 4.363526 
root mean squared error    = 2.493213           Prob > F            = 4.96e-07 
Residual Sum of Squares    = 627.8273           R-squared           = .6795694 
Total Sum of Squares       = 1959.324           adj. R-squared      = .5217454 
Estimation Sum of Squares  = 1331.497 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
             |                fevd 
      growth |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
  imbalance2 |   .0088624   .0347666     0.25   0.800    -.0605319    .0782568 
   popgrowth |  -1.237046   .7834189    -1.58   0.119    -2.800757    .3266646 
  dschooling |   1.982649   1.026916     1.93   0.058    -.0670835    4.032382 
    gfcf_gdp |   .1099303   .1256963     0.87   0.385    -.1409605    .3608211 
       trade |    .010505   .0478704     0.22   0.827    -.0850446    .1060547 
       year1 |   2.724187   4.842295     0.56   0.576    -6.941074    12.38945 
       year2 |   3.051677   2.811413     1.09   0.282    -2.559926    8.663281 
       year3 |  -3.558979   2.604435    -1.37   0.176    -8.757453    1.639495 
       year4 |  -1.599201   2.481508    -0.64   0.521    -6.552311    3.353909 
       year5 |   2.465666   2.688473     0.92   0.362    -2.900549    7.831882 
       year6 |    4.05983   2.390669     1.70   0.094    -.7119647    8.831626 
       year7 |   3.352024   2.450501     1.37   0.176    -1.539196    8.243244 
       year8 |    5.03587   2.190192     2.30   0.025     .6642285    9.407511 
       year9 |   5.117134   2.057084     2.49   0.015     1.011176    9.223091 
      year10 |    4.20917   2.014052     2.09   0.040     .1891052    8.229236 
      year11 |   4.285563   1.806043     2.37   0.021      .680686     7.89044 
      year12 |   4.243396    1.83673     2.31   0.024     .5772678    7.909523 
      year13 |   1.354697   1.867898     0.73   0.471    -2.373644    5.083038 
      year14 |  -4.738409   1.894222    -2.50   0.015    -8.519293   -.9575256 
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      year15 |   1.000074   1.790249     0.56   0.578    -2.573279    4.573427 
      year16 |   2.310046   1.769079     1.31   0.196    -1.221051    5.841143 
      year17 |  -.9986678   1.752569    -0.57   0.571    -4.496811    2.499475 
      year18 |   2.695466   1.866827     1.44   0.153    -1.030738    6.421669 
    lngdpini |   2.764671   2.451853     1.13   0.264    -2.129248     7.65859 
       fdexp |  -.0364001   .0849637    -0.43   0.670    -.2059884    .1331882 
     fdtax_l |   .0198602   .0604733     0.33   0.744     -.100845    .1405655 
      tindex |   .0285701   .0623174     0.46   0.648     -.095816    .1529562 
         eta |          1          .        .       .            .           . 
       _cons |  -25.77078   27.25609    -0.95   0.348    -80.17416    28.63259 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 
C. IV 
 
. *europe=1 and IV 
. xtivreg2 growth popgrowth fdexp dschooling tindex laggdp (gfcf_gdp trade  fdtax_l 
imbalance2 =  l2.imbalance2 l.gfcf_gdp  l3.gfcf_gd 
> p  l.trade l2.trade l3.trade  l.fdtax_l)  year4 year5 year6 year7 year8 year9 
year10 year11 year12 year13 year14 year15 year16 year1 
> 7 year18 if growth<=21.20154 & growth>=-12.55204 & europe==1,  fe  endog(fdtax_l 
gfcf_gdp trade imbalance2) small 
 
FIXED EFFECTS ESTIMATION 
------------------------ 
Number of groups =        14                    Obs per group: min =         3 
                                                               avg =      13.4 
                                                               max =        16 
 
IV (2SLS) estimation 
-------------------- 
 
Estimates efficient for homoskedasticity only 
Statistics consistent for homoskedasticity only 
 
                                                      Number of obs =      187 
                                                      F( 24,   149) =    12.61 
                                                      Prob > F      =   0.0000 
Total (centered) SS     =  2169.099465                Centered R2   =   0.6596 
Total (uncentered) SS   =  2169.099465                Uncentered R2 =   0.6596 
Residual SS             =  738.3485516                Root MSE      =    2.226 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
      growth |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
    gfcf_gdp |   .3148091   .2174907     1.45   0.150    -.1149553    .7445736 
       trade |   .1024496   .0337291     3.04   0.003     .0358005    .1690987 
     fdtax_l |   .2163598   .1893469     1.14   0.255    -.1577922    .5905118 
  imbalance2 |   .2043468   .1674396     1.22   0.224    -.1265161    .5352096 
   popgrowth |    -.98197   .6608738    -1.49   0.139    -2.287865    .3239254 
       fdexp |   .1478968   .1026711     1.44   0.152    -.0549826    .3507763 
  dschooling |   .7681003   1.340303     0.57   0.567    -1.880356    3.416556 
      tindex |    .140512   .0910399     1.54   0.125    -.0393841    .3204081 
      laggdp |  -.0005934   .0001726    -3.44   0.001    -.0009344   -.0002524 
       year4 |  -.1593742   2.533955    -0.06   0.950    -5.166504    4.847755 
       year5 |   3.086704   2.542861     1.21   0.227    -1.938022     8.11143 
       year6 |   1.816685   2.122412     0.86   0.393    -2.377229    6.010599 
       year7 |   2.523594   2.057164     1.23   0.222    -1.541389    6.588578 
       year8 |    2.87855   1.805088     1.59   0.113    -.6883272    6.445428 
       year9 |    2.61952   1.541212     1.70   0.091    -.4259352    5.664976 
      year10 |   2.801963    1.38529     2.02   0.045     .0646124    5.539314 
      year11 |   2.754781   1.491625     1.85   0.067    -.1926894    5.702251 
      year12 |   2.561422   1.851529     1.38   0.169    -1.097224    6.220068 
      year13 |  -.2263698   1.489138    -0.15   0.879    -3.168927    2.716187 
      year14 |  -4.183229   1.180212    -3.54   0.001    -6.515343   -1.851115 
      year15 |  -.1774143    1.20635    -0.15   0.883    -2.561178    2.206349 
      year16 |  -.1227678   .9277988    -0.13   0.895     -1.95611    1.710575 
      year17 |  -2.139797   .8740356    -2.45   0.016    -3.866903   -.4126915 
      year18 |  -.9274684   .9122949    -1.02   0.311    -2.730175    .8752384 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Underidentification test (Anderson canon. corr. LM statistic):           8.472 
                                                   Chi-sq(4) P-val =    0.0757 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Weak identification test (Cragg-Donald Wald F statistic):                1.074 
Stock-Yogo weak ID test critical values:                       <not available> 
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------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Sargan statistic (overidentification test of all instruments):           3.101 
                                                   Chi-sq(3) P-val =    0.3763 
-endog- option: 
Endogeneity test of endogenous regressors:                              21.421 
                                                   Chi-sq(4) P-val =    0.0003 
Regressors tested:    fdtax_l gfcf_gdp trade imbalance2 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Instrumented:         gfcf_gdp trade fdtax_l imbalance2 
Included instruments: popgrowth fdexp dschooling tindex laggdp year4 year5 
                      year6 year7 year8 year9 year10 year11 year12 year13 year14 
                      year15 year16 year17 year18 
Excluded instruments: L2.imbalance2 L.gfcf_gdp L3.gfcf_gdp L.trade L2.trade 
                      L3.trade L.fdtax_l 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 
  
. *europe=0 and IV 
. xtivreg2 growth popgrowth fdexp dschooling tindex laggdp (gfcf_gdp trade  fdtax_l 
imbalance2 =  l2.imbalance2 l.gfcf_gdp  l2.gfcf_gd 
> p  l.trade l2.trade  l.fdtax_l)  year4 year5 year6 year7 year8 year9 year10 year11 
year12 year13 year14 year15 year16 year17 year18  
> if growth<=21.20154 & growth>=-12.55204 & europe==0,  fe  endog(fdtax_l gfcf_gdp 
trade imbalance2) small 
 
FIXED EFFECTS ESTIMATION 
------------------------ 
Number of groups =         7                    Obs per group: min =         7 
                                                               avg =      12.3 
                                                               max =        17 
 
IV (2SLS) estimation 
-------------------- 
 
Estimates efficient for homoskedasticity only 
Statistics consistent for homoskedasticity only 
 
                                                      Number of obs =       86 
                                                      F( 24,    55) =     0.59 
                                                      Prob > F      =   0.9186 
Total (centered) SS     =  1336.769635                Centered R2   =  -1.4306 
Total (uncentered) SS   =  1336.769635                Uncentered R2 =  -1.4306 
Residual SS             =  3249.214875                Root MSE      =    7.686 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
      growth |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
    gfcf_gdp |   .5211071   .9371096     0.56   0.580    -1.356902    2.399117 
       trade |  -.0227329   .1771912    -0.13   0.898     -.377832    .3323663 
     fdtax_l |  -1.032597   1.595204    -0.65   0.520    -4.229457    2.164263 
  imbalance2 |  -.6186967    1.02238    -0.61   0.548    -2.667593    1.430199 
   popgrowth |   4.541945   9.771811     0.46   0.644     -15.0412    24.12509 
       fdexp |  -.0897086   .3220834    -0.28   0.782    -.7351781    .5557608 
  dschooling |  -4.222776   7.909834    -0.53   0.596    -20.07444    11.62889 
      tindex |  -.4694647   1.305334    -0.36   0.720    -3.085412    2.146483 
      laggdp |  -.0008197   .0010508    -0.78   0.439    -.0029255    .0012861 
       year4 |  -10.83126   15.67779    -0.69   0.493    -42.25026    20.58774 
       year5 |   5.456223   7.940143     0.69   0.495    -10.45618    21.36863 
       year6 |   8.284693   7.651902     1.08   0.284    -7.050061    23.61945 
       year7 |   7.293549    7.31176     1.00   0.323    -7.359545    21.94664 
       year8 |   11.14015    10.0676     1.11   0.273    -9.035764    31.31607 
       year9 |   8.953832   6.045607     1.48   0.144    -3.161834     21.0695 
      year10 |     10.668   8.917147     1.20   0.237    -7.202364    28.53836 
      year11 |   4.119583   5.888256     0.70   0.487    -7.680746    15.91991 
      year12 |    4.54296   5.710301     0.80   0.430     -6.90074    15.98666 
      year13 |   6.531732   8.432075     0.77   0.442    -10.36652    23.42999 
      year14 |  -4.345744   5.707818    -0.76   0.450    -15.78447    7.092979 
      year15 |   6.607596   11.11418     0.59   0.555    -15.66572    28.88091 
      year16 |   3.421689   4.986608     0.69   0.495    -6.571697    13.41507 
      year17 |   .3529555   5.006509     0.07   0.944    -9.680312    10.38622 
      year18 |   3.786316   5.046818     0.75   0.456    -6.327733    13.90036 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Underidentification test (Anderson canon. corr. LM statistic):           0.652 
                                                   Chi-sq(3) P-val =    0.8844 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Weak identification test (Cragg-Donald Wald F statistic):                0.074 
Stock-Yogo weak ID test critical values:                       <not available> 
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------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Sargan statistic (overidentification test of all instruments):           1.575 
                                                   Chi-sq(2) P-val =    0.4550 
-endog- option: 
Endogeneity test of endogenous regressors:                              11.441 
                                                   Chi-sq(4) P-val =    0.0220 
Regressors tested:    fdtax_l gfcf_gdp trade imbalance2 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Instrumented:         gfcf_gdp trade fdtax_l imbalance2 
Included instruments: popgrowth fdexp dschooling tindex laggdp year4 year5 
                      year6 year7 year8 year9 year10 year11 year12 year13 year14 
                      year15 year16 year17 year18 
Excluded instruments: L2.imbalance2 L.gfcf_gdp L2.gfcf_gdp L.trade L2.trade 
                      L.fdtax_l 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 
Appendix 4.4 Sensitivity Analysis  
Appendix 4.4.1. Optimal Size 
* 2 measures 
. xtscc growth popgrowth dschooling laggdp gfcf_gdp trade tindex fdexp fdtax_l fdexp2 
fdtax_l2 year1 year2 year3 year4 year5 year6 year7 year8 year9 year10 year11 year12 
year13 year14 year15 year16 year17 year18 if growth<=21.20154 & growth>=-12.55204, fe 
 
Regression with Driscoll-Kraay standard errors   Number of obs     =       328 
Method: Fixed-effects regression                 Number of groups  =        21 
Group variable (i): id_country                   F( 28,    18)     = 320444.02 
maximum lag: 2                                   Prob > F          =    0.0000 
                                                 within R-squared  =    0.6300 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
             |             Drisc/Kraay 
      growth |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
   popgrowth |  -.3385293    .359089    -0.94   0.358    -1.092947    .4158888 
  dschooling |   .9892502   .3343674     2.96   0.008     .2867703     1.69173 
      laggdp |  -.0006353   .0002039    -3.12   0.006    -.0010637   -.0002069 
    gfcf_gdp |   .2136546   .0314248     6.80   0.000     .1476336    .2796755 
       trade |   .0530631   .0160122     3.31   0.004     .0194227    .0867036 
      tindex |  -.0384293   .0517204    -0.74   0.467    -.1470898    .0702311 
       fdexp |   .2171541   .1368018     1.59   0.130    -.0702558    .5045639 
     fdtax_l |   .0282562   .0676274     0.42   0.681    -.1138237    .1703361 
      fdexp2 |  -.0022744   .0019136    -1.19   0.250    -.0062946    .0017459 
    fdtax_l2 |  -.0004852   .0007837    -0.62   0.544    -.0021318    .0011614 
       year1 |  -2.534557    2.22947    -1.14   0.271      -7.2185    2.149386 
       year2 |   -2.63578   1.810029    -1.46   0.163     -6.43851     1.16695 
       year3 |  -4.246299    1.72649    -2.46   0.024     -7.87352   -.6190786 
       year4 |  -5.461078   1.650107    -3.31   0.004    -8.927824   -1.994333 
       year5 |  -1.771386   1.577008    -1.12   0.276    -5.084558    1.541786 
       year6 |   -.955618   1.450953    -0.66   0.518    -4.003957    2.092721 
       year7 |  -.4622652    1.29812    -0.36   0.726    -3.189515    2.264985 
       year8 |   .6313606   1.196419     0.53   0.604    -1.882222    3.144943 
       year9 |   .9319493   1.036973     0.90   0.381     -1.24665    3.110548 
      year10 |   1.201698   .8797013     1.37   0.189    -.6464858    3.049882 
      year11 |   1.658065   .7443144     2.23   0.039      .094319    3.221812 
      year12 |   2.082613   .5969558     3.49   0.003     .8284555    3.336771 
      year13 |  -.3955798   .3559563    -1.11   0.281    -1.143416    .3522566 
      year14 |  -5.714475   .3490485   -16.37   0.000    -6.447798   -4.981151 
      year15 |  -.9537424   .3318133    -2.87   0.010    -1.650856   -.2566286 
      year16 |   .2349766   .3414008     0.69   0.500    -.4822798    .9522331 
      year17 |  -2.056611      .2383    -8.63   0.000    -2.557261   -1.555961 
      year18 |  -.1758904   .1473885    -1.19   0.248    -.4855423    .1337614 
       _cons |   2.327756   6.803943     0.34   0.736     -11.9668    16.62231 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 
 
*3 measures 
xtscc growth popgrowth dschooling laggdp gfcf_gdp trade tindex fdexp fdtax_l fdexp2 
fdtax_l2 imbalance2 year1 year2 year3 year4 year5 year6 year7 year8 year9 year10 
year11 year12 year13 year14 year15 year16 year17 year18 if growth<=21.20154 & 
growth>=-12.55204, fe 
 
Regression with Driscoll-Kraay standard errors   Number of obs     =       328 
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Method: Fixed-effects regression                 Number of groups  =        21 
Group variable (i): id_country                   F( 29,    18)     = 445468.32 
maximum lag: 2                                   Prob > F          =    0.0000 
                                                 within R-squared  =    0.6310 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
             |             Drisc/Kraay 
      growth |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
   popgrowth |  -.3760354   .3527651    -1.07   0.301    -1.117167    .3650965 
  dschooling |   .9839703   .3293835     2.99   0.008     .2919613    1.675979 
      laggdp |  -.0006359   .0002012    -3.16   0.005    -.0010587   -.0002131 
    gfcf_gdp |   .2140009   .0319715     6.69   0.000     .1468312    .2811707 
       trade |   .0540237   .0154168     3.50   0.003     .0216343    .0864131 
      tindex |  -.0277836   .0488148    -0.57   0.576    -.1303397    .0747724 
       fdexp |     .22929    .132865     1.73   0.102     -.049849    .5084289 
     fdtax_l |   .0473223   .0616335     0.77   0.453    -.0821649    .1768096 
      fdexp2 |     -.0024   .0018725    -1.28   0.216    -.0063339    .0015339 
    fdtax_l2 |  -.0005116   .0007606    -0.67   0.510    -.0021094    .0010863 
  imbalance2 |    .015441    .022817     0.68   0.507    -.0324957    .0633776 
       year1 |  -2.305527   2.324929    -0.99   0.335    -7.190021    2.578966 
       year2 |  -2.436916   1.899282    -1.28   0.216     -6.42716    1.553327 
       year3 |  -4.102443    1.78333    -2.30   0.034     -7.84908   -.3558055 
       year4 |   -5.22994   1.737955    -3.01   0.008    -8.881249   -1.578631 
       year5 |  -1.575974   1.657404    -0.95   0.354     -5.05805    1.906102 
       year6 |   -.824396   1.508695    -0.55   0.591    -3.994047    2.345255 
       year7 |  -.3601808   1.349383    -0.27   0.793    -3.195129    2.474768 
       year8 |   .7047939   1.226648     0.57   0.573    -1.872297    3.281885 
       year9 |   .9943043   1.065407     0.93   0.363    -1.244033    3.232641 
      year10 |   1.226277   .8907613     1.38   0.186    -.6451434    3.097697 
      year11 |   1.681494   .7551485     2.23   0.039     .0949859    3.268002 
      year12 |   2.076748   .5976408     3.47   0.003     .8211518    3.332345 
      year13 |  -.4446826   .3609913    -1.23   0.234    -1.203097    .3137319 
      year14 |  -5.703697   .3512826   -16.24   0.000    -6.441715    -4.96568 
      year15 |  -1.009485   .3200358    -3.15   0.005    -1.681856   -.3371152 
      year16 |   .1796509   .3081759     0.58   0.567    -.4678025    .8271044 
      year17 |  -2.111473   .2093886   -10.08   0.000    -2.551382   -1.671564 
      year18 |  -.1903294    .142524    -1.34   0.198    -.4897613    .1091025 
       _cons |  -.2856857   6.787521    -0.04   0.967    -14.54574    13.97437 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 
Appendix 4.4.2. Controlling for Government Size 
 
 
. *2 measures (using FE with D-K SEs, FEVD and IV approach) 
 
. xtscc growth fdexp fdtax_l popgrowth dschooling laggdp gfcf_gdp trade tindex 
govcons year1 year2 year3 year4 year5 year6 year7 year8 
>  year9 year10 year11 year12 year13 year14 year15 year16 year17 year18 if 
growth<=21.20154 & growth>=-12.55204, fe 
 
Regression with Driscoll-Kraay standard errors   Number of obs     =       328 
Method: Fixed-effects regression                 Number of groups  =        21 
Group variable (i): id_country                   F( 27,    18)     = 409286.04 
maximum lag: 2                                   Prob > F          =    0.0000 
                                                 within R-squared  =    0.6312 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
             |             Drisc/Kraay 
      growth |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
       fdexp |   .0677556   .0392565     1.73   0.101    -.0147192    .1502304 
     fdtax_l |   -.021353   .0103164    -2.07   0.053    -.0430269    .0003209 
   popgrowth |  -.3447516   .3920026    -0.88   0.391    -1.168318    .4788153 
  dschooling |   .8196617    .368479     2.22   0.039     .0455159    1.593807 
      laggdp |   -.000699   .0002493    -2.80   0.012    -.0012228   -.0001751 
    gfcf_gdp |    .202559   .0336099     6.03   0.000     .1319471    .2731709 
       trade |   .0471503   .0123056     3.83   0.001     .0212973    .0730034 
      tindex |  -.0500964   .0458878    -1.09   0.289    -.1465031    .0463104 
     govcons |  -.1459687   .0986865    -1.48   0.156    -.3533013    .0613639 
       year1 |  -3.563006   2.911848    -1.22   0.237    -9.680572    2.554559 
       year2 |   -3.38393   2.290198    -1.48   0.157    -8.195458    1.427598 
       year3 |  -5.003335   2.164543    -2.31   0.033    -9.550871   -.4557996 
       year4 |  -6.195375   2.058213    -3.01   0.008    -10.51952    -1.87123 
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       year5 |   -2.53914   1.971326    -1.29   0.214    -6.680742    1.602462 
       year6 |  -1.607722   1.851881    -0.87   0.397     -5.49838    2.282936 
       year7 |  -.9131643   1.593909    -0.57   0.574    -4.261843    2.435515 
       year8 |   .2610291   1.471685     0.18   0.861    -2.830867    3.352925 
       year9 |   .6291818   1.289788     0.49   0.632    -2.080563    3.338927 
      year10 |   1.038973   1.071971     0.97   0.345    -1.213155    3.291102 
      year11 |    1.60688   .8749318     1.84   0.083    -.2312834    3.445044 
      year12 |   2.135629   .6623553     3.22   0.005     .7440723    3.527186 
      year13 |  -.2374708   .3668808    -0.65   0.526    -1.008259    .5333172 
      year14 |  -5.449309   .3421104   -15.93   0.000    -6.168057   -4.730562 
      year15 |  -.8439406   .3397953    -2.48   0.023    -1.557824    -.130057 
      year16 |   .3161806   .3052458     1.04   0.314    -.3251169    .9574782 
      year17 |  -1.949865   .1884897   -10.34   0.000    -2.345867   -1.553862 
      year18 |  -.1460331   .1001996    -1.46   0.162    -.3565447    .0644785 
       _cons |   10.89142   6.710909     1.62   0.122    -3.207679    24.99052 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 
 
.  
. xtfevd growth fdexp fdtax_l popgrowth dschooling lngdpini gfcf_gdp trade tindex 
govcons year1 year2 year3 year4 year5 year6 year7 ye 
> ar8 year9 year10 year11 year12 year13 year14 year15 year16 year17 year18 if 
growth<=21.20154 & growth>=-12.55204, invariant (lngdpin 
> i fdexp fdtax_l tindex) 
 
panel fixed effects regression with vector decomposition 
 
degrees of freedom fevd    =      280           number of obs       =      328 
mean squared error         = 5.273523           F( 29, 280)         = 12.92418 
root mean squared error    = 2.296415           Prob > F            = 3.00e-35 
Residual Sum of Squares    = 1729.716           R-squared           =  .674184 
Total Sum of Squares       = 5308.872           adj. R-squared      = .6194935 
Estimation Sum of Squares  = 3579.157 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
             |                fevd 
      growth |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
   popgrowth |   -.816404   .5377264    -1.52   0.130    -1.874904    .2420957 
  dschooling |   1.483582   .4903163     3.03   0.003     .5184076    2.448756 
    gfcf_gdp |   .2080406   .0563767     3.69   0.000     .0970647    .3190165 
       trade |   .0413902   .0214449     1.93   0.055    -.0008236     .083604 
     govcons |   .0701499   .1095342     0.64   0.522    -.1454653     .285765 
       year1 |   4.120373   1.701807     2.42   0.016     .7704132    7.470333 
       year2 |    3.05261   1.190638     2.56   0.011     .7088709    5.396348 
       year3 |   .9843056   1.201915     0.82   0.414    -1.381632    3.350243 
       year4 |  -.5237218   1.196564    -0.44   0.662    -2.879126    1.831682 
       year5 |   2.990105   1.093747     2.73   0.007     .8370934    5.143116 
       year6 |   3.484847     1.0814     3.22   0.001     1.356141    5.613553 
       year7 |   3.522618   1.088883     3.24   0.001     1.379182    5.666054 
       year8 |   4.163798   1.029111     4.05   0.000     2.138021    6.189575 
       year9 |   4.108002   .9783745     4.20   0.000     2.182099    6.033905 
      year10 |   3.866683   .9391427     4.12   0.000     2.018006    5.715359 
      year11 |   3.744703   .9272456     4.04   0.000     1.919445     5.56996 
      year12 |   3.493119   .8980891     3.89   0.000     1.725255    5.260982 
      year13 |   .1594708   .9047289     0.18   0.860    -1.621463    1.940405 
      year14 |  -5.478551   1.082185    -5.06   0.000    -7.608802   -3.348299 
      year15 |  -.1392109    .908616    -0.15   0.878    -1.927797    1.649375 
      year16 |   .9657039   .8686394     1.11   0.267    -.7441889    2.675597 
      year17 |  -1.627906   .8485462    -1.92   0.056    -3.298246    .0424343 
      year18 |   .0425358   .8809245     0.05   0.962     -1.69154    1.776611 
    lngdpini |  -1.497382   .7050313    -2.12   0.035    -2.885217   -.1095471 
       fdexp |   .0222416   .0381024     0.58   0.560    -.0527619     .097245 
     fdtax_l |  -.0061928   .0198939    -0.31   0.756    -.0453534    .0329677 
      tindex |  -.0271291   .0337867    -0.80   0.423    -.0936372    .0393791 
         eta |          1          .        .       .            .           . 
       _cons |   6.971205   6.736317     1.03   0.302     -6.28905    20.23146 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 
 
.  
. xtivreg2 growth popgrowth fdexp tindex dschooling laggdp (gfcf_gdp trade  fdtax_l 
govcons =   l.govcons l2.gfcf_gdp l2.trade l.trade 
>  l2.fdtax_l l4.fdtax_l) year1 year2 year3 year4 year5 year6 year7 year8 year9 
year10 year11 year12 year13 year14 year15 year16 year1 
> 7 year18 if growth<=21.20154 & growth>=-12.55204,  fe  endog(fdtax_l gfcf_gdp trade 
govcons) small 
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Warning - collinearities detected 
Vars dropped:       year1 year2 year3 year4 
 
FIXED EFFECTS ESTIMATION 
------------------------ 
Number of groups =        21                    Obs per group: min =         2 
                                                               avg =      11.8 
                                                               max =        15 
Warning - collinearities detected 
Vars dropped:  year1 year2 year3 year4 
 
IV (2SLS) estimation 
-------------------- 
 
Estimates efficient for homoskedasticity only 
Statistics consistent for homoskedasticity only 
 
                                                      Number of obs =      247 
                                                      F( 23,   203) =    12.83 
                                                      Prob > F      =   0.0000 
Total (centered) SS     =  2943.914767                Centered R2   =   0.5536 
Total (uncentered) SS   =  2943.914767                Uncentered R2 =   0.5536 
Residual SS             =  1314.195244                Root MSE      =    2.544 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
      growth |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
    gfcf_gdp |  -.2259262   .1427851    -1.58   0.115    -.5074582    .0556058 
       trade |   .0192266   .0253053     0.76   0.448    -.0306684    .0691216 
     fdtax_l |   -.047561   .0335484    -1.42   0.158     -.113709     .018587 
     govcons |  -.3094773   .1874542    -1.65   0.100    -.6790843    .0601298 
   popgrowth |  -1.096051   .5865223    -1.87   0.063    -2.252508    .0604059 
       fdexp |   .0212944   .0526805     0.40   0.686    -.0825768    .1251656 
      tindex |   .1420981   .1004539     1.41   0.159    -.0559687    .3401649 
  dschooling |   1.391351   1.169865     1.19   0.236    -.9152932    3.697995 
      laggdp |  -.0005966   .0001851    -3.22   0.001    -.0009615   -.0002317 
       year1 |          0  (omitted) 
       year2 |          0  (omitted) 
       year3 |          0  (omitted) 
       year4 |          0  (omitted) 
       year5 |  -.1885807   2.110374    -0.09   0.929    -4.349645    3.972484 
       year6 |   .2880896   2.003514     0.14   0.886    -3.662277    4.238456 
       year7 |   .6100521   1.838566     0.33   0.740    -3.015083    4.235187 
       year8 |   2.160508   1.638364     1.32   0.189    -1.069886    5.390901 
       year9 |   2.948178   1.480134     1.99   0.048     .0297701    5.866586 
      year10 |   3.235793   1.320078     2.45   0.015     .6329703    5.838616 
      year11 |   4.944101   1.333672     3.71   0.000     2.314475    7.573728 
      year12 |   5.988176   1.418411     4.22   0.000     3.191468    8.784883 
      year13 |   2.537276   1.296682     1.96   0.052    -.0194166    5.093969 
      year14 |  -4.594702   1.093014    -4.20   0.000    -6.749819   -2.439585 
      year15 |  -.4756606   .8964855    -0.53   0.596    -2.243278    1.291957 
      year16 |   .6926567   .8561895     0.81   0.419    -.9955082    2.380822 
      year17 |  -1.356791   .8278578    -1.64   0.103    -2.989094    .2755119 
      year18 |  -.0720083   .8433474    -0.09   0.932    -1.734852    1.590836 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Underidentification test (Anderson canon. corr. LM statistic):          41.130 
                                                   Chi-sq(3) P-val =    0.0000 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Weak identification test (Cragg-Donald Wald F statistic):                7.453 
Stock-Yogo weak ID test critical values:                       <not available> 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Sargan statistic (overidentification test of all instruments):           1.192 
                                                   Chi-sq(2) P-val =    0.5509 
-endog- option: 
Endogeneity test of endogenous regressors:                              27.152 
                                                   Chi-sq(4) P-val =    0.0000 
Regressors tested:    fdtax_l gfcf_gdp trade govcons 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Instrumented:         gfcf_gdp trade fdtax_l govcons 
Included instruments: popgrowth fdexp tindex dschooling laggdp year5 year6 
                      year7 year8 year9 year10 year11 year12 year13 year14 
                      year15 year16 year17 year18 
Excluded instruments: L.govcons L2.gfcf_gdp L2.trade L.trade L2.fdtax_l 
                      L4.fdtax_l 
Dropped collinear:    year1 year2 year3 year4 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
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.  
. *3 measures (using FE with D-K SEs, FEVD and IV approach) 
 
. xtscc growth fdexp fdtax_l imbalance2 popgrowth dschooling laggdp gfcf_gdp trade 
tindex govcons year1 year3 year4 year5 year6 year7  
> year8 year9 year10 year11 year12 year13 year14 year15 year16 year17 year18 if 
growth<=21.20154 & growth>=-12.55204, fe 
 
Regression with Driscoll-Kraay standard errors   Number of obs     =       328 
Method: Fixed-effects regression                 Number of groups  =        21 
Group variable (i): id_country                   F( 27,    18)     =  77470.77 
maximum lag: 2                                   Prob > F          =    0.0000 
                                                 within R-squared  =    0.6274 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
             |             Drisc/Kraay 
      growth |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
       fdexp |   .0608786   .0319926     1.90   0.073    -.0063353    .1280925 
     fdtax_l |  -.0019968   .0280837    -0.07   0.944    -.0609985    .0570048 
  imbalance2 |   .0209983   .0216429     0.97   0.345    -.0244717    .0664682 
   popgrowth |   -.329053   .4112553    -0.80   0.434    -1.193068    .5349624 
  dschooling |   1.024898   .2826804     3.63   0.002     .4310088    1.618788 
      laggdp |  -.0005424   .0001328    -4.08   0.001    -.0008214   -.0002634 
    gfcf_gdp |   .2024952   .0348484     5.81   0.000     .1292815     .275709 
       trade |    .053561    .013004     4.12   0.001     .0262407    .0808814 
      tindex |    .005974   .0422995     0.14   0.889    -.0828938    .0948419 
     govcons |  -.1037448   .0760041    -1.36   0.189    -.2634236    .0559339 
       year1 |   -.112405   .6784102    -0.17   0.870    -1.537692    1.312882 
       year3 |  -2.324974   .3840336    -6.05   0.000    -3.131798   -1.518149 
       year4 |  -3.513458   .3798056    -9.25   0.000      -4.3114   -2.715516 
       year5 |  -.0733745   .3714398    -0.20   0.846    -.8537405    .7069916 
       year6 |   .6563525   .3728619     1.76   0.095    -.1270013    1.439706 
       year7 |   1.123599   .3149177     3.57   0.002     .4619811    1.785216 
       year8 |   2.041699   .3105425     6.57   0.000     1.389273    2.694125 
       year9 |   2.228753   .3055398     7.29   0.000     1.586837    2.870668 
      year10 |   2.363113   .3465392     6.82   0.000     1.635061    3.091165 
      year11 |   2.721888   .3920945     6.94   0.000     1.898128    3.545648 
      year12 |    3.00796   .4871429     6.17   0.000     1.984511     4.03141 
      year13 |   .2836616   .5639625     0.50   0.621    -.9011797    1.468503 
      year14 |  -4.921105   .5543088    -8.88   0.000    -6.085664   -3.756545 
      year15 |  -.2845718   .4694478    -0.61   0.552    -1.270845    .7017014 
      year16 |    .770453   .4087024     1.89   0.076    -.0881988    1.629105 
      year17 |  -1.593921   .4388807    -3.63   0.002    -2.515975   -.6718666 
      year18 |   .2339381   .4498176     0.52   0.609    -.7110936     1.17897 
       _cons |   .0489536   4.770484     0.01   0.992    -9.973461    10.07137 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 
 
.  
. xtfevd growth fdexp fdtax_l imbalance2 popgrowth dschooling lngdpini gfcf_gdp trade 
tindex govcons year1 year2 year3 year4 year5 yea 
> r6 year7 year8 year9 year10 year11 year12 year13 year14 year15 year16 year17 year18 
if growth<=21.20154 & growth>=-12.55204, invaria 
> nt (lngdpini fdexp fdtax_l tindex) 
 
panel fixed effects regression with vector decomposition 
 
degrees of freedom fevd    =      279           number of obs       =      328 
mean squared error         = 5.265611           F( 30, 279)         = 12.60649 
root mean squared error    = 2.294692           Prob > F            = 3.70e-35 
Residual Sum of Squares    =  1727.12           R-squared           = .6746728 
Total Sum of Squares       = 5308.872           adj. R-squared      = .6187026 
Estimation Sum of Squares  = 3581.752 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
             |                fevd 
      growth |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
  imbalance2 |   .0122281    .043496     0.28   0.779    -.0733938    .0978501 
   popgrowth |  -.8491661   .5504929    -1.54   0.124    -1.932813     .234481 
  dschooling |   1.474202   .4877855     3.02   0.003     .5139947    2.434409 
    gfcf_gdp |   .2078086   .0559866     3.71   0.000     .0975989    .3180183 
       trade |   .0418451   .0212119     1.97   0.050     .0000894    .0836008 
     govcons |   .0638261   .1150448     0.55   0.579      -.16264    .2902922 
       year1 |   4.290753   1.722722     2.49   0.013     .8995687    7.681936 
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       year2 |   3.206603   1.219361     2.63   0.009     .8062865    5.606919 
       year3 |   1.092276    1.20291     0.91   0.365    -1.275656    3.460208 
       year4 |  -.3466332   1.257643    -0.28   0.783    -2.822307    2.129041 
       year5 |   3.136849   1.148755     2.73   0.007     .8755206    5.398177 
       year6 |   3.583614   1.095542     3.27   0.001     1.427035    5.740192 
       year7 |   3.604481   1.117765     3.22   0.001     1.404156    5.804805 
       year8 |    4.22415   1.031061     4.10   0.000     2.194504    6.253796 
       year9 |   4.160102   .9764945     4.26   0.000      2.23787    6.082335 
      year10 |   3.892142   .9362399     4.16   0.000     2.049151    5.735133 
      year11 |   3.770797   .9235125     4.08   0.000      1.95286    5.588734 
      year12 |   3.497031   .8977022     3.90   0.000     1.729902    5.264161 
      year13 |   .1297822   .9135378     0.14   0.887     -1.66852    1.928084 
      year14 |  -5.457243   1.092875    -4.99   0.000    -7.608571   -3.305914 
      year15 |   -.174617   .9086359    -0.19   0.848     -1.96327    1.614036 
      year16 |   .9284299   .8687221     1.07   0.286    -.7816523    2.638512 
      year17 |  -1.665104   .8522054    -1.95   0.052    -3.342673    .0124647 
      year18 |   .0332985   .8806447     0.04   0.970    -1.700253     1.76685 
    lngdpini |  -1.354622   .9712799    -1.39   0.164     -3.26659    .5573452 
       fdexp |   .0197164   .0382376     0.52   0.607    -.0555545    .0949873 
     fdtax_l |   .0062747   .0527882     0.12   0.905    -.0976391    .1101884 
      tindex |  -.0251119   .0342193    -0.73   0.464    -.0924726    .0422489 
         eta |          1          .        .       .            .           . 
       _cons |   4.523095   12.05369     0.38   0.708    -19.20463    28.25082 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 
 
.  
. xtivreg2 growth fdexp popgrowth laggdp dschooling tindex ( govcons gfcf_gdp trade   
fdtax_l imbalance2 = l3.govcons l.govcons l3.imb 
> alance2  l3.gfcf_gdp l.gfcf_gdp l.trade l2.trade l2.fdtax_l)  year4 year5 year6 
year7 year8 year9 year10 year11 year12 year13 year14 
>  year15 year16 year17 year18 if growth<=21.20154 & growth>=-12.55204,  fe  
endog(fdtax_l gfcf_gdp trade imbalance2 govcons) small 
 
FIXED EFFECTS ESTIMATION 
------------------------ 
Number of groups =        21                    Obs per group: min =         3 
                                                               avg =      12.7 
                                                               max =        16 
 
IV (2SLS) estimation 
-------------------- 
 
Estimates efficient for homoskedasticity only 
Statistics consistent for homoskedasticity only 
 
                                                      Number of obs =      267 
                                                      F( 25,   221) =    10.83 
                                                      Prob > F      =   0.0000 
Total (centered) SS     =  3338.198869                Centered R2   =   0.4717 
Total (uncentered) SS   =  3338.198869                Uncentered R2 =   0.4717 
Residual SS             =  1763.614578                Root MSE      =    2.825 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
      growth |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
     govcons |  -.2611274   .2003971    -1.30   0.194    -.6560613    .1338065 
    gfcf_gdp |   .0246529   .0999124     0.25   0.805    -.1722501    .2215559 
       trade |   .0458533   .0249453     1.84   0.067    -.0033078    .0950143 
     fdtax_l |   .2138735   .1317806     1.62   0.106    -.0458339    .4735808 
  imbalance2 |   .2239452   .1097946     2.04   0.043     .0075667    .4403237 
       fdexp |   .1167088   .0660486     1.77   0.079    -.0134569    .2468746 
   popgrowth |  -.9824768   .5914738    -1.66   0.098    -2.148127    .1831739 
      laggdp |  -.0005579    .000203    -2.75   0.006     -.000958   -.0001578 
  dschooling |   1.450775   1.238425     1.17   0.243    -.9898588    3.891409 
      tindex |   .2222805   .1045731     2.13   0.035     .0161924    .4283686 
       year4 |  -.8084574   2.586309    -0.31   0.755    -5.905443    4.288528 
       year5 |   2.231503   2.477904     0.90   0.369    -2.651841    7.114847 
       year6 |   1.908873   2.234324     0.85   0.394    -2.494435     6.31218 
       year7 |   2.135156   2.006197     1.06   0.288     -1.81857    6.088881 
       year8 |   2.601338   1.785935     1.46   0.147     -.918304    6.120981 
       year9 |   3.239637   1.595816     2.03   0.044     .0946733    6.384601 
      year10 |   3.170604   1.431523     2.21   0.028     .3494217    5.991786 
      year11 |   4.117563   1.291367     3.19   0.002     1.572594    6.662532 
      year12 |   4.212673   1.296968     3.25   0.001     1.656666    6.768681 
      year13 |    .389196   1.214403     0.32   0.749    -2.004096    2.782488 
      year14 |   -4.71836   1.121628    -4.21   0.000    -6.928816   -2.507903 
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      year15 |  -1.215812   1.013571    -1.20   0.232    -3.213313     .781689 
      year16 |  -.0965963   .9971143    -0.10   0.923    -2.061665    1.868473 
      year17 |   -2.33876    .977162    -2.39   0.018    -4.264508   -.4130117 
      year18 |  -.2650862   .9401755    -0.28   0.778    -2.117943    1.587771 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Underidentification test (Anderson canon. corr. LM statistic):          14.776 
                                                   Chi-sq(4) P-val =    0.0052 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Weak identification test (Cragg-Donald Wald F statistic):                1.741 
Stock-Yogo weak ID test critical values:                       <not available> 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Sargan statistic (overidentification test of all instruments):           1.410 
                                                   Chi-sq(3) P-val =    0.7032 
-endog- option: 
Endogeneity test of endogenous regressors:                              38.209 
                                                   Chi-sq(5) P-val =    0.0000 
Regressors tested:    fdtax_l gfcf_gdp trade imbalance2 govcons 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Instrumented:         govcons gfcf_gdp trade fdtax_l imbalance2 
Included instruments: fdexp popgrowth laggdp dschooling tindex year4 year5 
                      year6 year7 year8 year9 year10 year11 year12 year13 year14 
                      year15 year16 year17 year18 
Excluded instruments: L3.govcons L.govcons L3.imbalance2 L3.gfcf_gdp L.gfcf_gdp 
                      L.trade L2.trade L2.fdtax_l 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
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Appendix 5.1. Correlation Matrix 
Appendix 5.1.1 Correlation Matrix – All the Independent Variables  
 
. corr fdexp fdtax fdgrant lag1realgdp realgdpini popgrowth lngfcf_gdp educ2 educ3_n trade eu capital size size1 surf fdexp2 fdtax2 
fdgrant2 expsize revsize grantsize 
(obs=681) 
 
             |  FDexp      FDtax    FDgran  GDPt-1   GDP0   Popgrowth    Inv     Educ2     Educ3_n  Trade    EU      Capital    Size    
Size1     Surf   Exp2 
-------------+--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
---------------------- 
       fdexp |   1.0000 
       fdtax |   0.9789   1.0000 
     fdgrant |   0.0303  -0.0247   1.0000 
 lag1realgdp |   0.4515   0.4969  -0.4163   1.0000 
  realgdpini |   0.5049   0.5430  -0.2878   0.9067   1.0000 
   popgrowth |   0.1425   0.1889  -0.2358   0.1889   0.2095   1.0000 
  lngfcf_gdp |   0.3278   0.3258   0.2592  -0.1555  -0.1231  -0.0703   1.0000 
       educ2 |   0.0851   0.0876   0.2834  -0.0468  -0.0829  -0.1829   0.6207   1.0000 
     educ3_n |   0.0782   0.0921  -0.2654   0.6068   0.4861  -0.0033  -0.0092   0.3166   1.0000 
       trade |   0.3334   0.3543  -0.1511   0.4652   0.3861  -0.0439   0.3821   0.5122   0.2846   1.0000 
          eu |   0.2901   0.3499  -0.4917   0.5978   0.4546   0.0894   0.0092   0.1549   0.4052   0.5550   1.0000 
     capital |   0.2319   0.2481  -0.2620   0.4616   0.4084   0.1671  -0.0815  -0.0268   0.4433   0.0288  -0.0130   1.0000 
        size |  -0.5645  -0.5207  -0.7146   0.0187  -0.0715   0.1259  -0.5763  -0.5010   0.0896  -0.3431   0.1214   0.0279   1.0000 
       size1 |  -0.1241  -0.0780  -0.6421   0.4072   0.4537   0.2233  -0.6139  -0.6522   0.0724  -0.1488   0.3141   0.0190   0.7476   
1.0000 
        surf |  -0.4004  -0.3609  -0.5050   0.0658   0.0032   0.1440  -0.6026  -0.4864   0.1539  -0.5389   0.1635  -0.0288   0.8354   
0.7005   1.0000 
      fdexp2 |   0.9696   0.9494   0.0410   0.4540   0.5472   0.1860   0.2328  -0.0160   0.0214   0.2705   0.2222   0.2293  -0.5096  -
0.0150  -0.3412   1.0000 
      fdtax2 |   0.9646   0.9648   0.0218   0.4785   0.5681   0.2075   0.2322  -0.0132   0.0255   0.2842   0.2531   0.2339  -0.4966   
0.0041  -0.3279   0.9945 
    fdgrant2 |  -0.1043  -0.1549   0.9571  -0.4572  -0.3540  -0.2387   0.1642   0.1968  -0.3051  -0.1963  -0.5365  -0.2150  -0.5990  -
0.5936  -0.4871  -0.0838 
    expsize1 |   0.4817   0.5072  -0.3360   0.6020   0.7038   0.2118  -0.3464  -0.4871   0.0874   0.0761   0.4326   0.0749   0.2037   
0.7510   0.2853   0.5632 
    revsize1 |   0.4713   0.5041  -0.3471   0.6045   0.7010   0.2137  -0.3529  -0.4918   0.0894   0.0700   0.4320   0.0857   0.2157   
0.7572   0.2927   0.5511 
  grantsize1 |   0.1321   0.1574  -0.1826   0.3889   0.5526   0.2061  -0.4851  -0.5264  -0.0242  -0.1675   0.1647  -0.0776   0.3077   
0.7854   0.5014   0.2797 
 
             |    Tax2      Grant2 Expsize Taxsize Grantsize 
-------------+--------------------------------------------- 
      fdtax2 |   1.0000 
    fdgrant2 |  -0.1012   1.0000 
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    expsize1 |   0.5785  -0.3488   1.0000 
    revsize1 |   0.5698  -0.3563   0.9973   1.0000 
  grantsize1 |   0.2933  -0.2610   0.7640   0.7603   1.0000 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
. pwcorr fdexp fdtax fdgrant lag1realgdp realgdpini popgrowth lngfcf_gdp educ2 educ3_n trade eu capital size size1 surf fdexp2 fdtax2 
fdgrant2 expsize revsize grantsize 
 
             |    fdexp    fdtax   fdgrant lag1re~p realgd~i popgro~h lngfcf~p 
-------------+--------------------------------------------------------------- 
       fdexp |   1.0000  
       fdtax |   0.9795   1.0000  
     fdgrant |   0.0527  -0.0009   1.0000  
 lag1realgdp |   0.4417   0.4863  -0.4246   1.0000  
  realgdpini |   0.5124   0.5465  -0.2680   0.8886   1.0000  
   popgrowth |   0.1401   0.1854  -0.2367   0.1951   0.2068   1.0000  
  lngfcf_gdp |   0.3238   0.3233   0.2772  -0.1461  -0.0985  -0.0695   1.0000  
       educ2 |   0.0851   0.0898   0.2834  -0.0547  -0.1036  -0.1870   0.6147  
     educ3_n |   0.0782   0.0941  -0.2654   0.5815   0.4393  -0.0072  -0.0072  
       trade |   0.3409   0.3561  -0.1388   0.4540   0.4027  -0.0364   0.3436  
          eu |   0.2745   0.3351  -0.5065   0.6041   0.4581   0.0986   0.0008  
     capital |   0.2307   0.2483  -0.2507   0.4735   0.4041   0.1637  -0.0723  
        size |  -0.5740  -0.5336  -0.7240   0.0184  -0.1298   0.1157  -0.5353  
       size1 |  -0.1257  -0.0858  -0.6548   0.4363   0.4617   0.2292  -0.5693  
        surf |  -0.4069  -0.3655  -0.5238   0.0864  -0.0343   0.1400  -0.5652  
      fdexp2 |   0.9698   0.9502   0.0654   0.4389   0.5486   0.1821   0.2351  
      fdtax2 |   0.9649   0.9652   0.0467   0.4621   0.5675   0.2033   0.2345  
    fdgrant2 |  -0.0841  -0.1337   0.9576  -0.4646  -0.3383  -0.2413   0.1833  
    expsize1 |   0.4826   0.5063  -0.3412   0.6148   0.7044   0.2150  -0.3526  
    revsize1 |   0.4724   0.5023  -0.3519   0.6161   0.7007   0.2170  -0.3592  
  grantsize1 |   0.1443   0.1673  -0.1822   0.3952   0.5540   0.2083  -0.4817  
 
             |    educ2  educ3_n    trade       eu  capital     size    size1 
-------------+--------------------------------------------------------------- 
       educ2 |   1.0000  
     educ3_n |   0.3240   1.0000  
       trade |   0.4946   0.2553   1.0000  
          eu |   0.1395   0.3556   0.6416   1.0000  
     capital |  -0.0172   0.4608   0.0282  -0.0120   1.0000  
        size |  -0.4738   0.0911  -0.3356   0.1333   0.0227   1.0000  
       size1 |  -0.6573   0.0417  -0.0933   0.3634   0.0125   0.6934   1.0000  
        surf |  -0.4708   0.1499  -0.5314   0.1928  -0.0289   0.8318   0.6652  
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      fdexp2 |  -0.0160   0.0214   0.2800   0.2062   0.2286  -0.5243  -0.0265  
      fdtax2 |  -0.0132   0.0255   0.2920   0.2362   0.2335  -0.5113  -0.0085  
    fdgrant2 |   0.1968  -0.3051  -0.1861  -0.5506  -0.2058  -0.6081  -0.6098  
    expsize1 |  -0.4871   0.0874   0.1010   0.4455   0.0787   0.1898   0.7520  
    revsize1 |  -0.4916   0.0891   0.0930   0.4421   0.0897   0.2017   0.7564  
  grantsize1 |  -0.5264  -0.0242  -0.1356   0.1803  -0.0801   0.2789   0.7781  
 
             |     surf   fdexp2   fdtax2   fdgrant2 expsize1 revsize1 grants~1 
-------------+--------------------------------------------------------------- 
        surf |   1.0000  
      fdexp2 |  -0.3560   1.0000  
      fdtax2 |  -0.3428   0.9946   1.0000  
    fdgrant2 |  -0.5024  -0.0619  -0.0790   1.0000  
    expsize1 |   0.2783   0.5550   0.5693  -0.3585   1.0000  
    revsize1 |   0.2862   0.5436   0.5614  -0.3656   0.9973   1.0000  
  grantsize1 |   0.4720   0.2830   0.2955  -0.2644   0.7675   0.7636   1.0000 
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Appendix 5.1.2 Correlation between FD variables  
 
corr fdexp fdgrant fdtax 
 
             |   fdexp  fdgrant  fdtax 
-------------+--------------------------- 
       fdexp |   1.0000 
     fdgrant |   0.0527   1.0000 
       fdtax |   0.9795  -0.0009   1.0000 
 
qui reg realgrowth lag1realgdp popgrowth educ2 educ3_n lngfcf_gdp fdexp fdtax fdgrant 
trade eu year2 year3 year4 year5 year6 year7 yea 
> r8 year9 year10 year11 year12 year13 year14 
 
. estat vif 
 
    Variable |       VIF       1/VIF   
-------------+---------------------- 
       fdtax |     39.58    0.025266 
       fdexp |     36.73    0.027225 
 lag1realgdp |      6.07    0.164688 
      year11 |      5.13    0.195024 
      year10 |      5.00    0.200055 
      year12 |      4.96    0.201801 
       year7 |      4.92    0.203174 
       year8 |      4.88    0.204809 
       year9 |      4.55    0.219948 
          eu |      4.38    0.228454 
       educ2 |      4.09    0.244305 
       year4 |      4.04    0.247704 
       year5 |      4.01    0.249437 
       year6 |      3.93    0.254638 
       trade |      3.69    0.271193 
       year3 |      3.14    0.318016 
      year13 |      3.11    0.321785 
     educ3_n |      3.06    0.326312 
  lngfcf_gdp |      2.60    0.385327 
       year2 |      2.53    0.395389 
     fdgrant |      2.29    0.437180 
      year14 |      2.11    0.472932 
   popgrowth |      1.26    0.794156 
-------------+---------------------- 
    Mean VIF |      6.78 
 
 
 
Appendix 5.1.3 Correlation between FD variables and their interaction with size  
 
corr fdexp fdgrant grantsize1 expsize1 revsize1 fdtax 
      
             |    fdexp   fdgrant grants~1 expsize1 revsize1  fdtax 
-------------+------------------------------------------------------ 
       fdexp |   1.0000 
     fdgrant |   0.0527   1.0000 
  grantsize  |   0.1443  -0.1822   1.0000 
    expsize  |   0.4826  -0.3412   0.7675   1.0000 
    revsize  |   0.4724  -0.3519   0.7636   0.9973   1.0000 
       fdtax |   0.9795  -0.0009   0.1673   0.5063   0.5035   1.0000 
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Appendix 5.2 Descriptive Statistics 
Appendix 5.2.1 Individual Country Descriptive Statistics 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
-------------------------------------------------------- 
-> country = Albania 
 
   stats |    fdexp    fdtax    fdgrant   realgr~h   lag1re~p  realgd~i  popgro~h  
lngfcf~p     educ2       
   educ3_n    trade      eu     capital 
---------+---------------------------------------------------------------------------
------------------------------------------------------- 
    mean |  39.35214  35.65545  60.64786  6.907813  2010.214   1260.26 -1.198582  
3.395231  47.77939   34.5575  78.51983         0  .0833333 
variance |   329.115  340.8626   329.115  65.26814  627568.3    246335   27.4278  
.2134439  178.1575  231.1244  90.35452         0  .0769231 
     min |  4.922366  4.922366  18.33286   -39.103  679.3678  687.8272  -26.8453  
.9368505     12.15     16.43  63.93424         0         0 
     max |  81.66714  81.66714  95.07764  27.27601  4502.565  2711.739  15.42908   
4.32923    103.44     62.55  90.76286         0         1 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
------------------------------------------------------- 
 
   stats |      size     size1      surf   fdexp2    fdtax2    fdgrant  expsize1  
revsize1  grants~1 
---------+---------------------------------------------------------------------------
--------------- 
    mean |         0  .0069444     28748  1875.213  1713.866  4004.784         0         
0         0 
variance |         0  .0069444         0   2636210   2510067   4375352         0         
0         0 
     min |         0         0     28748  24.22969  24.22969  336.0937         0         
0         0 
     max |         0         1     28748  6669.522  6669.522  9039.757         0         
0         0 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
--------------- 
 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
--------------------------------------------------------- 
-> country = Czech Rep 
 
   stats |    fdexp     fdtax    fdgrant  realgr~h  lag1re~p  realgd~i  popgro~h  
lngfcf~p     educ2 
   educ3_n     trade        eu   capital 
---------+---------------------------------------------------------------------------
------------------------------------------------------- 
    mean |  66.19634  65.84668  40.13339  2.208453   11394.7  10529.85  .2278225  
3.255151  42.07214  51.14635  134.1353         1  .0714286 
variance |  253.2818  258.0433  34.06834  50.53532  1.88e+07  1.45e+07  .2631987  
.0198591  40.86339  1899.045  173.3825         0  .0668037 
     min |  27.10056  25.97637  27.51727 -13.11161  7505.736  8430.477 -.4757891  
2.820141      28.8       4.9  113.7411         1         0 
     max |  90.41772  87.73891  51.61188  20.36015  29976.58  24029.87  2.375263   
3.66625      66.5     222.7   158.727         1         1 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
------------------------------------------------------- 
 
   stats |      size     size1      surf    fdexp2    fdtax2    fdgrant  expsize1  
revsize1  grants~1 
---------+---------------------------------------------------------------------------
--------------- 
    mean |         0         1     78870  4632.975  4608.667  1644.453  66.19634  
65.84668  40.13339 
variance |         0         0         0   3378771   3265901  214931.7  253.2818  
258.0433  34.06834 
     min |         0         1     78870  734.4405  703.9743  757.2004  27.10056  
25.97637  27.51727 
     max |         0         1     78870  8175.364  7933.152  2663.786  90.41772  
87.73891  51.61188 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
--------------- 
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-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
--------------------------------------------------------- 
-> country = Estonia 
 
   stats |     fdexp    fdtax    fdgrant  realgr~h  lag1re~p  realgd~i  popgro~h  
lngfcf~p     educ2 
   educ3_n     trade        eu   capital 
---------+---------------------------------------------------------------------------
------------------------------------------------------- 
    mean |  44.15157  44.53743  43.07976  8.077229  6765.563  4310.535 -1.108035  
3.663858  95.29433     68.65  144.0701  .9166667  .0666667 
variance |  54.76583  56.07403  79.79397  77.38451   8772379   2383971  .4866112  
.0992028  347.2948  7.407901   308.626  .0768156  .0625698 
     min |   29.2938  28.71533   17.0141 -15.82306  2485.352  2755.138    -2.425  
2.715302     63.22      64.4  116.6497         0         0 
     max |  66.36042  68.56834  66.76267  29.80765  20088.56  9459.616  .9974343  
4.254229    162.07     73.11  170.4284         1         1 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
------------------------------------------------------- 
 
   stats |      size     size1      surf    fdexp2    fdtax2    fdgran2  expsize1  
revsize1  grants~1 
---------+---------------------------------------------------------------------------
--------------- 
    mean |         0         0     45230  2003.823   2020.24  1935.217         0         
0         0 
variance |         0         0         0  462800.3  471633.5  523259.4         0         
0         0 
     min |         0         0     45230  858.1267  846.5408  289.4798         0         
0         0 
     max |         0         0     45230  4403.706  4550.224  4457.254         0         
0         0 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
--------------- 
 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
--------------------------------------------------------- 
-> country = Hungary 
 
   stats |    fdexp     fdtax    fdgrant  realgr~h  lag1re~p  realgd~i  popgro~h  
lngfcf~p     educ2  
   educ3_n     trade        eu   capital 
---------+---------------------------------------------------------------------------
------------------------------------------------------- 
    mean |  25.03838  25.63191  8.859151  5.701941  7190.891  4866.562 -.3665942  
3.211485  46.32976  51.02143  145.1178  .7692308  .1428571 
variance |  35.91507  51.00652  4.501282  68.69379   9770305   2682880  .2591754  
.0266403  10.87175  446.0482  343.6389  .1794872  .1238095 
     min |  15.85525  16.15864  3.975631 -19.99322   2914.39  3571.428 -1.335535  
2.592237      39.5      19.2  116.8041         0         0 
     max |  42.79121  47.75184      14.7  24.87003  16682.38  8516.483  1.132156  
3.543625      52.3     105.8  168.2131         1         1 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
------------------------------------------------------- 
 
   stats |      size     size1      surf     fdexp2    fdtax2  fdgrant  expsize1  
revsize1  grants~1 
---------+---------------------------------------------------------------------------
--------------- 
    mean |         1         1     93028  662.4082  683.7686  82.93224  25.03838  
25.63191  8.859151 
variance |         0         0         0  112820.6  140891.1  1427.488  35.91507  
51.00652  4.501282 
     min |         1         1     93028  251.3889  335.5226  15.80564  15.85525  
16.15864  3.975631 
     max |         1         1     93028  1831.088  1901.868    216.09  42.79121  
47.75184      14.7 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
--------------- 
 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
--------------------------------------------------------- 
-> country = Poland 
 
   stats |    fdexp     fdtax    fdgrant  realgr~h  lag1re~p  realgd~i  popgro~h  
lngfcf~p     educ2   
   educ3_n     trade        eu   capital 
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---------+---------------------------------------------------------------------------
------------------------------------------------------- 
    mean |  27.65938  28.10996   23.6329  6.088062  6694.193  4098.547 -.0968429  
2.979717  38.10625  60.50625  77.66429  .7857143     .0625 
variance |  154.5129  154.4515  95.28051  84.35699   5599119  716647.7  .2198908  
.0201126  7.074935   309.781  109.4121  .1691224  .0588565 
     min |      5.72      5.84     10.71   -18.834   3178.93  3178.928   -5.7534   
2.68444      33.6      30.2     58.08         0         0 
     max |     68.64     64.63     48.31    21.234  16269.84   6721.16     .6934  
3.378611      48.8       118     93.74         1         1 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
------------------------------------------------------- 
 
   stats |      size     size1      surf   fdexp2     fdtax2   fdgrant  expsize1  
revsize1  grants~1 
---------+---------------------------------------------------------------------------
--------------- 
    mean |         1         1    312679  918.8641  930.1409  653.3692  27.65938  
28.10996   23.6329 
variance |         0         0         0  578949.7  576804.1  329180.2  154.5129  
154.4515  95.28051 
     min |         1         1    312679   32.7184   33.4048  114.7041      5.72      
5.84     10.71 
     max |         1         1    312679   4711.45  4077.902  2333.856     68.64     
64.63     48.31 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
--------------- 
 
 
405 
 
Appendix 5.2.2 Detailed Descriptive Statistics  
 
xtsum fdexp fdtax fdgrant realgrowth lag1realgdp realgdpini popgrowth lngfcf_gdp 
educ2 educ3_n trade eu capital size size1 surf fdexp2 fdtax2 fdgrant2 
>  expsize revsize grantsize 
 
Variable         |      Mean   Std. Dev.       Min        Max |    Observations 
-----------------+--------------------------------------------+---------------- 
  fdexp  overall |  39.41896   18.53587   4.922366   90.41772 |     N =     732 
         between |             17.05992   14.33743   72.64894 |     n =      64 
         within  |             9.420385  -2.237592   61.92396 | T-bar = 11.4375 
                 |                                            | 
  fdtax  overall |  38.92707   18.52447   4.922366   87.73891 |     N =     736 
         between |              16.9299   12.00239   72.00077 |     n =      64 
         within  |             9.678486  -3.232688   62.44801 | T-bar =    11.5 
                 |                                            | 
 fdgrant overall |  35.91906   19.22077   3.975631   95.07764 |     N =     732 
         between |             17.80925   5.752301   85.66257 |     n =      64 
         within  |             7.053193   16.91472   72.95858 | T-bar = 11.4375 
                 |                                            | 
realgr~h overall |  5.956884   8.643167    -39.103   29.80765 |     N =     779 
         between |             2.274794   .9929062   10.08993 |     n =      64 
         within  |             8.376556  -39.46042   27.86751 | T-bar = 12.1719 
                 |                                            | 
lag1re~p overall |  6747.625    4036.11   679.3678   29976.58 |     N =     779 
         between |             3954.981   1371.709   26213.91 |     n =      64 
         within  |             1518.756   469.1519   12349.03 | T-bar = 12.1719 
                 |                                            | 
realgd~i overall |  4868.402   3481.345   687.8272   24029.87 |     N =     779 
         between |             3749.006   687.8272   24029.87 |     n =      64 
         within  |                    0   4868.402   4868.402 | T-bar = 12.1719 
                 |                                            | 
popgro~h overall | -.5073167   2.369253   -26.8453   15.42908 |     N =     779 
         between |             .9642852  -3.550927   2.327851 |     n =      64 
         within  |             2.173322  -23.80169   13.54085 | T-bar = 12.1719 
                 |                                            | 
lngfcf~p overall |  3.297713   .3713231   .9368505    4.32923 |     N =     763 
         between |             .3248788    2.60045   4.025808 |     n =      64 
         within  |             .1765277   1.152132   4.216605 | T-bar = 11.9219 
                 |                                            | 
educ2    overall |  55.97906    25.7697      12.15     162.07 |     N =     714 
         between |               23.601   30.19222   111.1575 |     n =      64 
         within  |             9.387768   11.12997   106.8916 |     T = 11.1563 
                 |                                            | 
educ3_n  overall |  54.65664   25.47748        4.9      222.7 |     N =     726 
         between |             25.50393   6.088889   189.9222 |     n =      64 
         within  |             8.766747   26.53442   87.43442 |     T = 11.3438 
                 |                                            | 
trade    overall |  111.1951   34.50187      58.08   170.4284 |     N =     779 
         between |             31.42097   77.66429   145.1178 |     n =      64 
         within  |             13.77338   82.88135   137.5533 | T-bar = 12.1719 
                 |                                            | 
eu       overall |  .7073171   .4552864          0          1 |     N =     779 
         between |              .355957          0          1 |     n =      64 
         within  |             .2948097  -.2093496   .9380863 | T-bar = 12.1719 
                 |                                            | 
capital  overall |  .0783055   .2688244          0          1 |     N =     779 
         between |             .2704897          0          1 |     n =      64 
         within  |                    0   .0783055   .0783055 | T-bar = 12.1719 
                 |                                            | 
size     overall |  .4043646   .4910839          0          1 |     N =     779 
         between |             .4836103          0          1 |     n =      64 
         within  |                    0   .4043646   .4043646 | T-bar = 12.1719 
                 |                                            | 
size1    overall |  .5853659   .4929753          0          1 |     N =     779 
         between |             .4963335          0          1 |     n =      64 
         within  |             .0343254   .5020325   1.502033 | T-bar = 12.1719 
                 |                                            | 
surf     overall |    130717   117465.7      28748     312679 |     N =     779 
         between |               113137      28748     312679 |     n =      64 
         within  |                    0     130717     130717 | T-bar = 12.1719 
                 |                                            | 
  fdexp2 overall |  1896.964   1704.803   24.22969   8175.364 |     N =     732 
         between |             1612.685   226.4088    5621.46 |     n =      64 
         within  |             854.1651  -2744.279   4450.867 | T-bar = 11.4375 
406 
 
                 |                                            | 
 fdtax2 overall |  1874.088   1686.612   24.22969   7933.152 |     N =     732 
         between |             1595.647   187.5087   5569.518 |     n =      64 
         within  |              850.337  -2761.155   4477.108 | T-bar = 11.4375 
                 |                                            | 
 fdgrant overall |  1659.112   1628.876   15.80564   9039.757 |     N =     732 
         between |             1523.031   34.84422   7358.923 |     n =      64 
         within  |             594.4738  -933.0373   4975.472 | T-bar = 11.4375 
                 |                                            | 
expsize1 overall |  21.46573   24.61945          0   90.41772 |     N =     732 
         between |             25.74051          0   72.64894 |     n =      64 
         within  |             8.427286  -20.19082   43.97073 | T-bar = 11.4375 
                 |                                            | 
revsize1 overall |  21.64004    24.5582          0   87.73891 |     N =     736 
         between |             25.67181          0   72.00077 |     n =      64 
         within  |             8.419279  -20.51972   39.47989 | T-bar =    11.5 
                 |                                            | 
grants~1 overall |  14.38918    15.9488          0   51.61188 |     N =     732 
         between |             16.23175          0   44.39889 |     n =      64 
         within  |             5.613671   2.268464   40.46418 | T-bar = 11.4375 
 
 
Appendix 5.3 Diagnostics 
Appendix 5.3.1 Ladder Stata command for Investment 
 
. ladder gfcf_gdp 
 
Transformation         formula               chi2(2)       P(chi2) 
------------------------------------------------------------------ 
cubic                  gfcf_gdp^3                 .        0.000 
square                 gfcf_gdp^2                 .        0.000 
identity               gfcf_gdp                   .        0.000 
square root            sqrt(gfcf_gdp)         47.98        0.000 
log                    log(gfcf_gdp)          25.89        0.000 
1/(square root)        1/sqrt(gfcf_gdp)           .        0.000 
inverse                1/gfcf_gdp                 .        0.000 
1/square               1/(gfcf_gdp^2)             .            . 
1/cubic                1/(gfcf_gdp^3)             .            . 
 
 
 
Before     After 
 
 
 
Appendix 5.3.2 Unit Root Test 
. xtunitroot fisher  fdexp, pp lag(1) demean 
Fisher-type unit-root test for fdexp 
Based on Phillips-Perron tests 
-------------------------------------- 
Ho: All panels contain unit roots           Number of panels       =     64 
Ha: At least one panel is stationary        Avg. number of periods =  11.44 
 
AR parameter:    Panel-specific             Asymptotics: T -> Infinity 
Panel means:     Included 
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Time trend:      Not included               Cross-sectional means removed 
Newey-West lags: 1 lag 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
                                  Statistic      p-value 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 Inverse chi-squared(128)  P       292.7475       0.0000 
 Inverse normal            Z        -8.2429       0.0000 
 Inverse logit t(324)      L*       -8.5783       0.0000 
 Modified inv. chi-squared Pm       10.2967       0.0000 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 P statistic requires number of panels to be finite. 
 Other statistics are suitable for finite or infinite number of panels. 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 
. xtunitroot fisher  fdtax, pp lag(1) demean 
 
Fisher-type unit-root test for fdtax 
Based on Phillips-Perron tests 
-------------------------------------- 
Ho: All panels contain unit roots           Number of panels       =     64 
Ha: At least one panel is stationary        Avg. number of periods =  11.50 
 
AR parameter:    Panel-specific             Asymptotics: T -> Infinity 
Panel means:     Included 
Time trend:      Not included               Cross-sectional means removed 
Newey-West lags: 1 lag 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
                                  Statistic      p-value 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 Inverse chi-squared(128)  P       278.6194       0.0000 
 Inverse normal            Z        -6.4581       0.0000 
 Inverse logit t(324)      L*       -7.0034       0.0000 
 Modified inv. chi-squared Pm        9.4137       0.0000 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 P statistic requires number of panels to be finite. 
 Other statistics are suitable for finite or infinite number of panels. 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 
. xtunitroot fisher  fdgrant, pp lag(1) demean 
 
Fisher-type unit-root test for fdgrant 
Based on Phillips-Perron tests 
---------------------------------------- 
Ho: All panels contain unit roots           Number of panels       =     64 
Ha: At least one panel is stationary        Avg. number of periods =  11.44 
 
AR parameter:    Panel-specific             Asymptotics: T -> Infinity 
Panel means:     Included 
Time trend:      Not included               Cross-sectional means removed 
Newey-West lags: 1 lag 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
                                  Statistic      p-value 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 Inverse chi-squared(128)  P       535.5551       0.0000 
 Inverse normal            Z       -14.0915       0.0000 
 Inverse logit t(324)      L*      -17.5739       0.0000 
 Modified inv. chi-squared Pm       25.4722       0.0000 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 P statistic requires number of panels to be finite. 
 Other statistics are suitable for finite or infinite number of panels. 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
xtunitroot fisher realgdppercapita , pp lag(1) demean 
 
Fisher-type unit-root test for realgdppercapita 
Based on Phillips-Perron tests 
----------------------------------------------- 
Ho: All panels contain unit roots           Number of panels       =     64 
Ha: At least one panel is stationary        Avg. number of periods =  12.17 
 
AR parameter:    Panel-specific             Asymptotics: T -> Infinity 
Panel means:     Included 
Time trend:      Not included               Cross-sectional means removed 
Newey-West lags: 1 lag 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
                                  Statistic      p-value 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 Inverse chi-squared(128)  P       176.2696       0.0030 
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 Inverse normal            Z        -0.8299       0.2033 
 Inverse logit t(284)      L*       -1.6563       0.0494 
 Modified inv. chi-squared Pm        3.0168       0.0013 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 P statistic requires number of panels to be finite. 
 Other statistics are suitable for finite or infinite number of panels. 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 
. xtunitroot fisher reallngdpini , pp lag(1) demean 
 
Fisher-type unit-root test for reallngdpini 
Based on Phillips-Perron tests 
------------------------------------------- 
Ho: All panels contain unit roots           Number of panels       =     64 
Ha: At least one panel is stationary        Avg. number of periods =  12.17 
 
AR parameter:    Panel-specific             Asymptotics: T -> Infinity 
Panel means:     Included 
Time trend:      Not included               Cross-sectional means removed 
Newey-West lags: 1 lag 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
                                  Statistic      p-value 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 Inverse chi-squared(128)  P       157.9698       0.0371 
 Inverse normal            Z        -3.0588       0.0011 
 Inverse logit t(254)      L*       -3.3769       0.0004 
 Modified inv. chi-squared Pm        1.8731       0.0305 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 P statistic requires number of panels to be finite. 
 Other statistics are suitable for finite or infinite number of panels. 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 
. xtunitroot fisher lag1realgdp , pp lag(1) demean 
 
Fisher-type unit-root test for lag1realgdp 
Based on Phillips-Perron tests 
------------------------------------------ 
Ho: All panels contain unit roots           Number of panels       =     64 
Ha: At least one panel is stationary        Avg. number of periods =  12.17 
 
AR parameter:    Panel-specific             Asymptotics: T -> Infinity 
Panel means:     Included 
Time trend:      Not included               Cross-sectional means removed 
Newey-West lags: 1 lag 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
                                  Statistic      p-value 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 Inverse chi-squared(128)  P       144.8426       0.1466 
 Inverse normal            Z         1.3723       0.9150 
 Inverse logit t(314)      L*        1.2360       0.8913 
 Modified inv. chi-squared Pm        1.0527       0.1462 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 P statistic requires number of panels to be finite. 
 Other statistics are suitable for finite or infinite number of panels. 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 
. xtunitroot fisher popgrowth , pp lag(1) demean 
 
Fisher-type unit-root test for popgrowth 
Based on Phillips-Perron tests 
---------------------------------------- 
Ho: All panels contain unit roots           Number of panels       =     64 
Ha: At least one panel is stationary        Avg. number of periods =  12.17 
 
AR parameter:    Panel-specific             Asymptotics: T -> Infinity 
Panel means:     Included 
Time trend:      Not included               Cross-sectional means removed 
Newey-West lags: 1 lag 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
                                  Statistic      p-value 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 Inverse chi-squared(128)  P       409.0381       0.0000 
 Inverse normal            Z       -13.3690       0.0000 
 Inverse logit t(324)      L*      -13.7616       0.0000 
 Modified inv. chi-squared Pm       17.5649       0.0000 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 P statistic requires number of panels to be finite. 
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 Other statistics are suitable for finite or infinite number of panels. 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 
. xtunitroot fisher educ2 , pp lag(1) demean 
 
Fisher-type unit-root test for educ2 
Based on Phillips-Perron tests 
------------------------------------ 
Ho: All panels contain unit roots           Number of panels       =     64 
Ha: At least one panel is stationary        Avg. number of periods =  11.16 
 
AR parameter:    Panel-specific             Asymptotics: T -> Infinity 
Panel means:     Included 
Time trend:      Not included               Cross-sectional means removed 
Newey-West lags: 1 lag 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
                                  Statistic      p-value 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 Inverse chi-squared(128)  P       246.4743       0.0000 
 Inverse normal            Z        -1.9537       0.0254 
 Inverse logit t(319)      L*       -1.9246       0.0276 
 Modified inv. chi-squared Pm        7.4046       0.0000 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 P statistic requires number of panels to be finite. 
 Other statistics are suitable for finite or infinite number of panels. 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 
. xtunitroot fisher educ3_n , pp lag(1) demean 
 
Fisher-type unit-root test for educ3_n 
Based on Phillips-Perron tests 
-------------------------------------- 
Ho: All panels contain unit roots           Number of panels       =     64 
Ha: At least one panel is stationary        Avg. number of periods =  11.34 
 
AR parameter:    Panel-specific             Asymptotics: T -> Infinity 
Panel means:     Included 
Time trend:      Not included               Cross-sectional means removed 
Newey-West lags: 1 lag 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
                                  Statistic      p-value 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 Inverse chi-squared(128)  P        82.2326       0.9994 
 Inverse normal            Z         9.2537       1.0000 
 Inverse logit t(324)      L*       10.4652       1.0000 
 Modified inv. chi-squared Pm       -2.8605       0.9979 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 P statistic requires number of panels to be finite. 
 Other statistics are suitable for finite or infinite number of panels. 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 
. xtunitroot fisher lngfcf_gdp , pp lag(1) demean 
 
Fisher-type unit-root test for lngfcf_gdp 
Based on Phillips-Perron tests 
----------------------------------------- 
Ho: All panels contain unit roots           Number of panels       =     64 
Ha: At least one panel is stationary        Avg. number of periods =  11.92 
 
AR parameter:    Panel-specific             Asymptotics: T -> Infinity 
Panel means:     Included 
Time trend:      Not included               Cross-sectional means removed 
Newey-West lags: 1 lag 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
                                  Statistic      p-value 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 Inverse chi-squared(128)  P       414.8845       0.0000 
 Inverse normal            Z        -8.1305       0.0000 
 Inverse logit t(324)      L*      -11.5602       0.0000 
 Modified inv. chi-squared Pm       17.9303       0.0000 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 P statistic requires number of panels to be finite. 
 Other statistics are suitable for finite or infinite number of panels. 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 
. xtunitroot fisher trade, pp lag(1) demean 
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Fisher-type unit-root test for trade 
Based on Phillips-Perron tests 
------------------------------------ 
Ho: All panels contain unit roots           Number of panels       =     64 
Ha: At least one panel is stationary        Avg. number of periods =  12.17 
 
AR parameter:    Panel-specific             Asymptotics: T -> Infinity 
Panel means:     Included 
Time trend:      Not included               Cross-sectional means removed 
Newey-West lags: 1 lag 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
                                  Statistic      p-value 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 Inverse chi-squared(128)  P       126.0572       0.5320 
 Inverse normal            Z        -0.3825       0.3510 
 Inverse logit t(324)      L*       -0.4277       0.3346 
 Modified inv. chi-squared Pm       -0.1214       0.5483 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 P statistic requires number of panels to be finite. 
 Other statistics are suitable for finite or infinite number of panels. 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 
. xtunitroot fisher eu, pp lag(1) demean 
 
Fisher-type unit-root test for eu 
Based on Phillips-Perron tests 
--------------------------------- 
Ho: All panels contain unit roots           Number of panels       =     64 
Ha: At least one panel is stationary        Avg. number of periods =  12.17 
 
AR parameter:    Panel-specific             Asymptotics: T -> Infinity 
Panel means:     Included 
Time trend:      Not included               Cross-sectional means removed 
Newey-West lags: 1 lag 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
                                  Statistic      p-value 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 Inverse chi-squared(128)  P       363.3001       0.0000 
 Inverse normal            Z       -11.9667       0.0000 
 Inverse logit t(254)      L*      -13.5747       0.0000 
 Modified inv. chi-squared Pm       14.7063       0.0000 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 P statistic requires number of panels to be finite. 
 Other statistics are suitable for finite or infinite number of panels. 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 
 
Appendix 5.3.3 Identifying outliers 
 
. lv realgrowth 
 
 #    779                realgrowth 
             --------------------------------- 
 M    390   |               6.1308            |    spread  pseudosigma 
 F    195.5 |  1.402649   6.626893   11.85114 |  10.44849    7.760956 
 E     98   | -3.858819    5.92945   15.71772 |  19.57654    8.520485 
 D     49.5 | -7.804677   5.304547   18.41377 |  26.21845    8.571728 
 C     25   |   -12.702   3.789001      20.28 |    32.982    8.880144 
 B     13   |   -15.212   3.379586   21.97117 |  37.18317    8.695266 
 A      7   |   -16.264   3.969118   24.20224 |  40.46624    8.485748 
 Z      4   |   -18.686   3.993143   26.67229 |  45.35829    8.733507 
 Y      2.5 | -19.41361   4.209615   27.83284 |  47.24645    8.520111 
 X      1.5 | -29.54811  -.2247248   29.09866 |  58.64677    9.878676 
        1   |   -39.103  -4.647674   29.80765 |  68.91065    11.02885 
            |                                 | 
            |                                 |   # below     # above 
inner fence | -14.27008              27.52387 |        19           2 
outer fence | -29.94282               43.1966 |         1           0 
 
. lv fdexp 
 
 #    732                 fdexp 
             --------------------------------- 
 M    366.5 |             37.00857            |    spread  pseudosigma 
 F    183.5 |     25.53   37.42872   49.32744 |  23.79744    17.65044 
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 E     92   |     20.45   42.71342   64.97684 |  44.52684    19.36757 
 D     46.5 |     12.32   43.34182   74.36364 |  62.04364    20.27914 
 C     23.5 |     9.315   44.16348   79.01197 |  69.69697    18.76295 
 B     12   |      8.08   44.78739   81.49479 |  73.41479     17.1039 
 A      6.5 |     7.435   46.11491   84.79481 |  77.35981    16.18299 
 Z      3.5 |     6.885   47.42155    87.9581 |   81.0731    15.43862 
 Y      2   |      5.72   46.88139   88.04278 |  82.32278    14.50795 
 X      1.5 |  5.321183   47.27572   89.23025 |  83.90906    14.22582 
        1   |  4.922366   47.67004   90.41772 |  85.49535    13.76399 
            |                                 | 
            |                                 |   # below     # above 
inner fence | -10.16616               85.0236 |         0           6 
outer fence | -45.86232              120.7198 |         0           0 
 
. lv fdtax 
 
 #    736                 fdtax 
             --------------------------------- 
 M    368.5 |             36.79296            |    spread  pseudosigma 
 F    184.5 |  24.84435   36.93457   49.02479 |  24.18044    17.93446 
 E     92.5 |  19.85934   42.61022   65.36109 |  45.50174    19.79154 
 D     46.5 |     12.09   43.07323   74.05647 |  61.96647    20.21728 
 C     23.5 |     9.435   43.89562   78.35623 |  68.92123    18.52995 
 B     12   |      7.66   44.57739   81.49479 |  73.83479    17.18433 
 A      6.5 |  7.231351   45.34619   83.46102 |  76.22967    15.93325 
 Z      3.5 |  5.565439   45.16452   84.76359 |  79.19815    15.07094 
 Y      2   |  4.954809   45.21889   85.48298 |  80.52817    14.18299 
 X      1.5 |  4.938588   45.77477   86.61094 |  81.67236    13.83871 
        1   |  4.922366   46.33064   87.73891 |  82.81654    13.32582 
            |                                 | 
            |                                 |   # below     # above 
inner fence | -11.42632              85.29546 |         0           2 
outer fence | -47.69698              121.5661 |         0           0 
 
. lv fdgrant 
 
 #    732                fdgrant 
             --------------------------------- 
 M    366.5 |             37.98702            |    spread  pseudosigma 
 F    183.5 |    18.585   32.60136   46.61771 |  28.03271    20.79172 
 E     92   |     13.36   34.96509   56.57019 |  43.21019    18.79487 
 D     46.5 |   9.13951    38.4163   67.69308 |  58.55357     19.1384 
 C     23.5 |  7.713619    42.7428   77.77198 |  70.05837    18.86024 
 B     12   |  6.754138   46.15072   85.54729 |  78.79316    18.35693 
 A      6.5 |  5.362568   46.20354   87.04452 |  81.68195    17.08715 
 Z      3.5 |   4.65778   47.57298   90.48819 |  85.83041    16.34455 
 Y      2   |  4.342444   48.55487    92.7673 |  88.42485    15.58333 
 X      1.5 |  4.159038   49.04075   93.92247 |  89.76343    15.21836 
        1   |  3.975631   49.52663   95.07764 |  91.10201    14.66661 
            |                                 | 
            |                                 |   # below     # above 
inner fence | -23.46407              88.66678 |         0           5 
outer fence | -65.51313              130.7158 |         0           0 
 
 
Appendix 5.3.4 Normality test 
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Appendix 5.3.5 Homoscedasticity 
 
****With outliers*** 
. qui xtreg realgrowth popgrowth educ2 educ3_n lag1realgdp lngfcf_gdp fdexp fdgrant 
trade year2 year3 year4 year5 year6 year7 year8 year9 year10 year11 year12 year13 
year14, fe 
 
. xttest3 
Modified Wald test for groupwise heteroskedasticity 
in fixed effect regression model 
H0: sigma(i)^2 = sigma^2 for all i 
 
chi2 (64)  =     749.86 
Prob>chi2 =      0.0000 
 
 
***Dropping outliers**** 
. qui xtreg realgrowth popgrowth educ2 educ3_n lag1realgdp lngfcf_gdp fdexp fdgrant 
trade year2 year3 year4 year5 year6 year7 year8 year9 year10 year11 year12 year13 
year14 if realgrowth<=30 & realgrowth>=-15, fe 
 
. xttest3 
Modified Wald test for groupwise heteroskedasticity 
in fixed effect regression model 
H0: sigma(i)^2 = sigma^2 for all i 
 
chi2 (64)  =    1003.62 
Prob>chi2 =      0.0000 
 
Appendix 5.3.6 Autocorrelation 
 
xtserial realgrowth popgrowth educ2 educ3_n lag1realgdp lngfcf_gdp fdexp fdgrant 
trade year2 year3 year4 year5 year6 year7 year8 yea 
> r9 year10 year11 year12 year13 year14 
 
Wooldridge test for autocorrelation in panel data 
H0: no first order autocorrelation 
    F(  1,      63) =     38.231 
           Prob > F =      0.0000 
 
 
Appendix 5.3.7 Cross-Sectional Dependence 
 
*****without time dummies****** 
 
. xtreg realgrowth popgrowth educ2 educ3_n lag1realgdp lngfcf_gdp fdexp fdgrant trade 
if realgrowth<=30 & realgrowth>=-15, fe 
 
Fixed-effects (within) regression               Number of obs      =       669 
Group variable: idall                           Number of groups   =        64 
 
R-sq:  within  = 0.2902                         Obs per group: min =         7 
       between = 0.1194                                        avg =      10.5 
       overall = 0.0794                                        max =        12 
 
                                                F(8,597)           =     30.52 
corr(u_i, Xb)  = -0.9028                        Prob > F           =    0.0000 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
  realgrowth |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
   popgrowth |  -.4183127    .118117    -3.54   0.000     -.650288   -.1863375 
       educ2 |   .0076948   .0327736     0.23   0.814    -.0566708    .0720603 
     educ3_n |  -.0459317    .049002    -0.94   0.349     -.142169    .0503055 
 lag1realgdp |  -.0031765   .0002737   -11.60   0.000    -.0037141   -.0026389 
  lngfcf_gdp |   4.067299   1.946801     2.09   0.037     .2438886     7.89071 
       fdexp |   .2383808   .0341916     6.97   0.000     .1712304    .3055312 
     fdgrant |   -.045293   .0501883    -0.90   0.367    -.1438601    .0532742 
       trade |   .1243071   .0285906     4.35   0.000     .0681568    .1804575 
       _cons |   -6.11794   7.992235    -0.77   0.444    -21.81426    9.578376 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
     sigma_u |  11.163831 
     sigma_e |  6.9652431 
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         rho |  .71980477   (fraction of variance due to u_i) 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
F test that all u_i=0:     F(63, 597) =     2.97             Prob > F = 0.0000 
 
. xtcsd, pesaran abs 
  
  
Pesaran's test of cross sectional independence =    33.628, Pr = 0.0000 
  
Average absolute value of the off-diagonal elements =     0.394 
 
 
****including time dummies*** 
 
. xtreg realgrowth popgrowth educ2 educ3_n lag1realgdp lngfcf_gdp fdexp fdgrant trade 
year2 year3 year4 year5 year6 year7 year8 year9  
> year10 year11 year12 year13 year14 if realgrowth<=30 & realgrowth>=-15, fe 
 
Fixed-effects (within) regression               Number of obs      =       669 
Group variable: idall                           Number of groups   =        64 
 
R-sq:  within  = 0.5306                         Obs per group: min =         7 
       between = 0.1953                                        avg =      10.5 
       overall = 0.1804                                        max =        12 
 
                                                F(21,584)          =     31.43 
corr(u_i, Xb)  = -0.8681                        Prob > F           =    0.0000 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
  realgrowth |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
   popgrowth |   -.242587   .1002954    -2.42   0.016    -.4395707   -.0456033 
       educ2 |   .0081899   .0283083     0.29   0.772    -.0474086    .0637885 
     educ3_n |  -.0801628   .0483738    -1.66   0.098    -.1751705     .014845 
 lag1realgdp |  -.0026865   .0003303    -8.13   0.000    -.0033352   -.0020379 
  lngfcf_gdp |   1.259192   1.714181     0.73   0.463    -2.107517    4.625902 
       fdexp |   .1778083   .0365334     4.87   0.000     .1060554    .2495612 
     fdgrant |  -.0709146    .056173    -1.26   0.207    -.1812404    .0394112 
       trade |  -.1246322   .0400838    -3.11   0.002    -.2033583   -.0459062 
       year2 |  -8.820741   1.662856    -5.30   0.000    -12.08665   -5.554834 
       year3 |  -12.73947   1.737666    -7.33   0.000     -16.1523   -9.326632 
       year4 |  -9.043643   1.937196    -4.67   0.000    -12.84836   -5.238925 
       year5 |  -1.376149   2.108844    -0.65   0.514    -5.517991    2.765692 
       year6 |  -2.096433   2.269688    -0.92   0.356    -6.554179    2.361313 
       year7 |    .533932   2.398841     0.22   0.824    -4.177473    5.245337 
       year8 |  -1.469232   2.536233    -0.58   0.563     -6.45048    3.512016 
       year9 |  -13.52662    2.50869    -5.39   0.000    -18.45377   -8.599464 
      year10 |  -.6514758   2.673554    -0.24   0.808    -5.902428    4.599476 
      year11 |  -.0353899   3.041463    -0.01   0.991    -6.008927    5.938147 
      year12 |  -1.420576   3.245357    -0.44   0.662    -7.794568    4.953416 
      year13 |   1.404725   3.796158     0.37   0.711     -6.05106    8.860509 
      year14 |   4.828693   3.893724     1.24   0.215    -2.818715     12.4761 
       _cons |   36.36807   7.952961     4.57   0.000     20.74818    51.98796 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
     sigma_u |  11.336428 
     sigma_e |  5.7272126 
         rho |  .79666585   (fraction of variance due to u_i) 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
F test that all u_i=0:     F(63, 584) =     1.96             Prob > F = 0.0000 
 
. xtcsd, pesaran abs 
  
  
Pesaran's test of cross sectional independence =     2.308, Pr = 0.0210 
 
Average absolute value of the off-diagonal elements =     0.397 
 
 
Appendix 5.3.8 Functional Form 
 
***RESET for xtreg*** 
. xtreg realgrowth popgrowth educ2 educ3_n lag1realgdp lngfcf_gdp fdexp fdgrant trade 
year2 year3 year4 year5 year6 year7 year8 year9 year10 year11 year12 year13 year14 if 
realgrowth<=30 & realgrowth>=-15 
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Random-effects GLS regression                   Number of obs      =       669 
Group variable: idall                           Number of groups   =        64 
 
R-sq:  within  = 0.4744                         Obs per group: min =         7 
       between = 0.7475                                        avg =      10.5 
       overall = 0.5002                                        max =        12 
 
                                                Wald chi2(21)      =    647.43 
corr(u_i, X)   = 0 (assumed)                    Prob > chi2        =    0.0000 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
  realgrowth |      Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
   popgrowth |  -.3053841     .10075    -3.03   0.002    -.5028505   -.1079177 
       educ2 |   .0403119   .0172398     2.34   0.019     .0065225    .0741013 
     educ3_n |   .0497641   .0158726     3.14   0.002     .0186543    .0808739 
 lag1realgdp |  -.0007108    .000132    -5.39   0.000    -.0009695   -.0004521 
  lngfcf_gdp |  -.9404628   .9832033    -0.96   0.339    -2.867506    .9865802 
       fdexp |   .0712317   .0195578     3.64   0.000     .0328992    .1095642 
     fdgrant |  -.0355276    .016337    -2.17   0.030    -.0675476   -.0035076 
       trade |  -.0127822   .0124326    -1.03   0.304    -.0371496    .0115853 
       year2 |  -11.00391   1.666136    -6.60   0.000    -14.26948   -7.738343 
       year3 |  -14.29718   1.574477    -9.08   0.000     -17.3831   -11.21126 
       year4 |  -10.41351   1.608699    -6.47   0.000     -13.5665   -7.260514 
       year5 |  -4.138969   1.611203    -2.57   0.010    -7.296869   -.9810696 
       year6 |  -7.116558    1.59485    -4.46   0.000    -10.24241    -3.99071 
       year7 |  -6.079895   1.575838    -3.86   0.000     -9.16848    -2.99131 
       year8 |  -9.593036   1.578768    -6.08   0.000    -12.68736   -6.498708 
       year9 |  -22.57517   1.594258   -14.16   0.000    -25.69986   -19.45048 
      year10 |  -10.03412   1.575501    -6.37   0.000    -13.12205   -6.946198 
      year11 |  -11.88917   1.619493    -7.34   0.000    -15.06332   -8.715025 
      year12 |  -14.28328     1.6162    -8.84   0.000    -17.45098   -11.11559 
      year13 |  -14.42433   1.865947    -7.73   0.000    -18.08152   -10.76714 
      year14 |  -9.363481   2.174853    -4.31   0.000    -13.62611   -5.100848 
       _cons |   19.69646   3.044443     6.47   0.000     13.72946    25.66346 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
     sigma_u |          0 
     sigma_e |  5.7272126 
         rho |          0   (fraction of variance due to u_i) 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 
. gen yhat2 = yhat^2 
(120 missing values generated) 
 
. gen yhat3 = yhat^3 
(120 missing values generated) 
 
. xtreg realgrowth popgrowth educ2 educ3_n lag1realgdp lngfcf_gdp fdexp fdgrant trade 
year2 year3 year4 year5 year6 year7 year8 year9 year10 year11 year12 year13 year14 
yhat2 yhat3 if realgrowth<=30 & realgrowth>=-15 
 
Random-effects GLS regression                   Number of obs      =       669 
Group variable: idall                           Number of groups   =        64 
 
R-sq:  within  = 0.4748                         Obs per group: min =         7 
       between = 0.7475                                        avg =      10.5 
       overall = 0.5006                                        max =        12 
 
                                                Wald chi2(23)      =    646.51 
corr(u_i, X)   = 0 (assumed)                    Prob > chi2        =    0.0000 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
  realgrowth |      Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
   popgrowth |  -.2983005   .1263398    -2.36   0.018    -.5459219   -.0506791 
       educ2 |   .0393466   .0189375     2.08   0.038     .0022297    .0764634 
     educ3_n |   .0491711   .0162728     3.02   0.003      .017277    .0810651 
 lag1realgdp |  -.0006927   .0001429    -4.85   0.000    -.0009729   -.0004126 
  lngfcf_gdp |  -.8775312   .9881047    -0.89   0.374    -2.814181    1.059118 
       fdexp |   .0700181   .0209014     3.35   0.001     .0290521    .1109841 
     fdgrant |  -.0350289   .0166132    -2.11   0.035    -.0675901   -.0024677 
       trade |  -.0130207   .0131055    -0.99   0.320     -.038707    .0126656 
       year2 |  -10.46563   3.858258    -2.71   0.007    -18.02768   -2.903587 
       year3 |  -13.74227   4.123849    -3.33   0.001    -21.82487   -5.659678 
       year4 |  -9.755506   3.658801    -2.67   0.008    -16.92663   -2.584388 
       year5 |  -3.869517   1.978495    -1.96   0.050    -7.747295    .0082606 
       year6 |  -6.514919   3.049158    -2.14   0.033    -12.49116   -.5386796 
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       year7 |  -5.508926   2.926745    -1.88   0.060    -11.24524    .2273892 
       year8 |  -9.008699   3.646635    -2.47   0.013    -16.15597   -1.861425 
       year9 |  -21.60192   4.093737    -5.28   0.000    -29.62549   -13.57834 
      year10 |   -9.44166   3.661181    -2.58   0.010    -16.61744   -2.265877 
      year11 |  -11.35544   3.862532    -2.94   0.003    -18.92587   -3.785019 
      year12 |  -13.81131   3.992568    -3.46   0.001     -21.6366    -5.98602 
      year13 |  -13.98936   3.959244    -3.53   0.000    -21.74933   -6.229382 
      year14 |  -8.730653   3.932239    -2.22   0.026     -16.4377   -1.023606 
       yhat2 |  -.0075022   .0121593    -0.62   0.537     -.031334    .0163296 
       yhat3 |   .0005404   .0008324     0.65   0.516    -.0010911    .0021719 
       _cons |    19.0862   4.839946     3.94   0.000     9.600084    28.57232 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
     sigma_u |          0 
     sigma_e |  5.7280388 
         rho |          0   (fraction of variance due to u_i) 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 
. xtreg realgrowth popgrowth educ2 educ3_n lag1realgdp lngfcf_gdp fdexp fdgrant trade 
year2 year3 year4 year5 year6 year7 year8 year9 year10 year11 year12 year13 year14 
yhat2 if realgrowth<=30 & realgrowth>=-15 
 
Random-effects GLS regression                   Number of obs      =       669 
Group variable: idall                           Number of groups   =        64 
 
R-sq:  within  = 0.4742                         Obs per group: min =         7 
       between = 0.7492                                        avg =      10.5 
       overall = 0.5003                                        max =        12 
 
                                                Wald chi2(22)      =    646.67 
corr(u_i, X)   = 0 (assumed)                    Prob > chi2        =    0.0000 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
  realgrowth |      Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
   popgrowth |  -.3267993   .1184153    -2.76   0.006    -.5588891   -.0947095 
       educ2 |   .0424383   .0183207     2.32   0.021     .0065303    .0783463 
     educ3_n |   .0506723   .0161004     3.15   0.002     .0191161    .0822286 
 lag1realgdp |  -.0007216   .0001358    -5.32   0.000    -.0009877   -.0004556 
  lngfcf_gdp |  -.9229541   .9851831    -0.94   0.349    -2.853877    1.007969 
       fdexp |   .0731339   .0203338     3.60   0.000     .0332803    .1129875 
     fdgrant |  -.0362808   .0164935    -2.20   0.028    -.0686074   -.0039541 
       trade |  -.0140797   .0129978    -1.08   0.279    -.0395548    .0113955 
       year2 |  -11.92088   3.138915    -3.80   0.000    -18.07304   -5.768716 
       year3 |  -15.31218   3.338948    -4.59   0.000     -21.8564   -8.767965 
       year4 |  -11.23105   2.865968    -3.92   0.000    -16.84824   -5.613856 
       year5 |  -4.410145   1.793905    -2.46   0.014    -7.926135    -.894155 
       year6 |  -7.734754   2.400368    -3.22   0.001    -12.43939   -3.030119 
       year7 |  -6.666535   2.319825    -2.87   0.004    -11.21331   -2.119762 
       year8 |  -10.43522    2.90899    -3.59   0.000    -16.13673     -4.7337 
       year9 |  -23.43562   2.961932    -7.91   0.000     -29.2409   -17.63034 
      year10 |  -10.87923   2.914346    -3.73   0.000    -16.59124   -5.167215 
      year11 |  -12.81586   3.138473    -4.08   0.000    -18.96715   -6.664562 
      year12 |  -15.27326   3.295433    -4.63   0.000     -21.7322   -8.814334 
      year13 |  -15.37594   3.332273    -4.61   0.000    -21.90708   -8.844806 
      year14 |  -10.18602   3.229201    -3.15   0.002    -16.51514   -3.856905 
       yhat2 |  -.0036609   .0106178    -0.34   0.730    -.0244714    .0171496 
       _cons |   20.67851   4.170599     4.96   0.000     12.50429    28.85273 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
     sigma_u |          0 
     sigma_e |   5.724321 
         rho |          0   (fraction of variance due to u_i) 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
*RESET Test FEVD 
. xtfevd realgrowth popgrowth educ2_n educ3_n  lngfcf_gdp reallngdpini fdexp fdgrant 
trade  yhat2 yhat3 year3 year4 year5 year6 year7 year8 year9 year10 year11 year12 
year13 year14 if realgrowth<=30 & realgrowth>=-13, invariant(educ2_n educ3_n 
reallngdpini) 
 
panel fixed effects regression with vector decomposition 
 
degrees of freedom fevd    =      575           number of obs       =      661 
mean squared error         = 31.26329           F( 24, 575)         = 18.12829 
root mean squared error    = 5.591359           Prob > F            = 2.95e-52 
Residual Sum of Squares    = 20665.03           R-squared           = .5184994 
Total Sum of Squares       = 42917.98           adj. R-squared      =  .447321 
Estimation Sum of Squares  = 22252.95 
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------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
             |                fevd 
  realgrowth |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
   popgrowth |  -.2724502   .1266528    -2.15   0.032    -.5212087   -.0236917 
  lngfcf_gdp |  -1.010445   2.059429    -0.49   0.624    -5.055366    3.034475 
       fdexp |   .1597166   .0340486     4.69   0.000     .0928419    .2265913 
     fdgrant |  -.1501723    .062525    -2.40   0.017    -.2729776    -.027367 
       trade |  -.0581034   .0436191    -1.33   0.183    -.1437756    .0275687 
       yhat2 |   .0084141   .0158427     0.53   0.596    -.0227025    .0395306 
       yhat3 |  -.0004634   .0007851    -0.59   0.555    -.0020053    .0010785 
       year3 |  -9.820639   2.026451    -4.85   0.000    -13.80079   -5.840491 
       year4 |  -6.728839   1.973726    -3.41   0.001    -10.60543   -2.852248 
       year5 |   .2051343   1.931182     0.11   0.915    -3.587897    3.998166 
       year6 |  -2.312014   1.732616    -1.33   0.183    -5.715041    1.091014 
       year7 |  -1.215559   1.680642    -0.72   0.470    -4.516505    2.085387 
       year8 |  -5.146013   1.867608    -2.76   0.006    -8.814178   -1.477848 
       year9 |  -17.21488   2.035661    -8.46   0.000    -21.21311   -13.21664 
      year10 |  -3.580859   1.913578    -1.87   0.062    -7.339314    .1775962 
      year11 |  -4.916126   2.185113    -2.25   0.025    -9.207903   -.6243489 
      year12 |  -7.762492   2.335994    -3.32   0.001    -12.35061   -3.174371 
      year13 |  -5.830134   2.552403    -2.28   0.023     -10.8433   -.8169629 
      year14 |  -5.101441   3.335199    -1.53   0.127     -11.6521    1.449217 
     educ2_n |   .1091982   .0595806     1.83   0.067    -.0078239    .2262203 
     educ3_n |   .0102609   .0260056     0.39   0.693    -.0408166    .0613383 
reallngdpini |  -3.153497   1.619467    -1.95   0.052    -6.334289    .0272957 
         eta |          1          .        .       .            .           . 
       _cons |   38.93111    13.1591     2.96   0.003     13.08535    64.77688 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 
 
. . test yhat2=yhat3=0 
 
 ( 1)  yhat2 - yhat3 = 0 
 ( 2)  yhat2 = 0 
 
       F(  2,   575) =    0.18 
            Prob > F =    0.8333 
 
*RESET Test Dynamic 
. xtabond2 realgrowth l.realgrowth reallngdpini popgrowth l.educ2_n l.educ3_n 
lngfcf_gdp fdexp fdgrant l.trade yhat2 yhat3 year3 year4 year5 year6 year7 year8 
year9 year10 year11 year12 year13 year14  if realgrowth <=30, gmm( l.realgrowth, 
laglimits(2 4)collapse) gmm(lngfcf_gdp, laglimits(2 3) collapse)  iv( popgrowth 
l.educ2_n l.educ3_n fdgrant fdexp l.trade year3-year14) 
>  two robust small 
Favoring speed over space. To switch, type or click on mata: mata set matafavor 
space, perm. 
 
Dynamic panel-data estimation, two-step system GMM 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Group variable: idall                           Number of obs      =       667 
Time variable : year                            Number of groups   =        64 
Number of instruments = 26                      Obs per group: min =         7 
F(23, 63)     =     76.74                                      avg =     10.42 
Prob > F      =     0.000                                      max =        12 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
             |              Corrected 
  realgrowth |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
  realgrowth | 
         L1. |  -.0009635   .3929579    -0.00   0.998    -.7862272    .7843002 
             | 
reallngdpini |  -19.70279   7.357228    -2.68   0.009    -34.40504   -5.000545 
   popgrowth |   .0050057   .1624543     0.03   0.976    -.3196332    .3296447 
             | 
     educ2_n | 
         L1. |  -.3386138   .1606796    -2.11   0.039    -.6597063   -.0175213 
             | 
     educ3_n | 
         L1. |   .1948775   .0625555     3.12   0.003     .0698703    .3198847 
             | 
  lngfcf_gdp |   11.28738   5.354646     2.11   0.039     .5869737    21.98779 
       fdexp |   .1906859   .0861288     2.21   0.030     .0185711    .3628007 
     fdgrant |    .050353   .0421773     1.19   0.237    -.0339316    .1346375 
             | 
       trade | 
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         L1. |   .1789727   .0840319     2.13   0.037     .0110482    .3468971 
             | 
       yhat2 |   .0132235   .0150384     0.88   0.383    -.0168283    .0432754 
       yhat3 |  -.0017391   .0017593    -0.99   0.327    -.0052549    .0017767 
       year3 |  -14.64703   3.266658    -4.48   0.000    -21.17493   -8.119136 
       year4 |  -6.591996   4.301584    -1.53   0.130    -15.18803    2.004034 
       year5 |   .7643628   5.706901     0.13   0.894    -10.63997     12.1687 
       year6 |  -7.906766   2.203418    -3.59   0.001    -12.30995   -3.503585 
       year7 |  -9.133904   2.698658    -3.38   0.001    -14.52674   -3.741066 
       year8 |  -15.26392   4.351717    -3.51   0.001    -23.96013   -6.567703 
       year9 |  -31.78117   6.265399    -5.07   0.000    -44.30157   -19.26077 
      year10 |  -11.94481   7.893823    -1.51   0.135    -27.71935    3.829739 
      year11 |  -16.95982   4.285321    -3.96   0.000    -25.52335   -8.396294 
      year12 |  -22.36979   4.963173    -4.51   0.000     -32.2879   -12.45168 
      year13 |  -19.45937   4.911118    -3.96   0.000    -29.27346   -9.645287 
      year14 |  -18.30647   5.016179    -3.65   0.001     -28.3305   -8.282435 
       _cons |   126.8855   47.71868     2.66   0.010      31.5273    222.2436 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Instruments for first differences equation 
  Standard 
    D.(popgrowth L.educ2_n L.educ3_n fdgrant fdexp L.trade year3 year4 
    year5 year6 year7 year8 year9 year10 year11 year12 year13 year14) 
  GMM-type (missing=0, separate instruments for each period unless collapsed) 
    L(2/3).lngfcf_gdp collapsed 
    L(2/4).L.realgrowth collapsed 
Instruments for levels equation 
  Standard 
    popgrowth L.educ2_n L.educ3_n fdgrant fdexp L.trade year3 year4 year5 
    year6 year7 year8 year9 year10 year11 year12 year13 year14 
    _cons 
  GMM-type (missing=0, separate instruments for each period unless collapsed) 
    DL.lngfcf_gdp collapsed 
    DL.L.realgrowth collapsed 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Arellano-Bond test for AR(1) in first differences: z =  -1.85  Pr > z =  0.064 
Arellano-Bond test for AR(2) in first differences: z =   0.63  Pr > z =  0.528 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Sargan test of overid. restrictions: chi2(2)    =   1.40  Prob > chi2 =  0.495 
  (Not robust, but not weakened by many instruments.) 
Hansen test of overid. restrictions: chi2(2)    =   1.91  Prob > chi2 =  0.385 
  (Robust, but weakened by many instruments.) 
 
Difference-in-Hansen tests of exogeneity of instrument subsets: 
  GMM instruments for levels 
    Hansen test excluding group:     chi2(0)    =   0.00  Prob > chi2 =      . 
    Difference (null H = exogenous): chi2(2)    =   1.91  Prob > chi2 =  0.385 
 
 
. . test yhat2=yhat3=0 
 
 ( 1)  yhat2 - yhat3 = 0 
 ( 2)  yhat2 = 0 
 
       F(  2,    63) =    0.58 
            Prob > F =    0.5607 
 
Appendix 5.3.9 Coefficent of the lagged dependent variable 
 
a) Using fdexp and fdgrant 
 
. xtabond2 realgrowth l.realgrowth reallngdpini popgrowth l.educ2_n l.educ3_n 
lngfcf_gdp fdexp fdgrant l.trade year3 year4 year5 year6 year7 year8 year9  
> year10 year11 year12 year13 year14  if realgrowth <=30, gmm( l.realgrowth, 
laglimits(2 4)collapse) gmm(lngfcf_gdp, laglimits(2 3) collapse)  iv( popgrowth  
> l.educ2_n l.educ3_n fdgrant fdexp l.trade year3-year14) two robust small 
Favoring speed over space. To switch, type or click on mata: mata set matafavor 
space, perm. 
 
Dynamic panel-data estimation, two-step system GMM 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Group variable: idall                           Number of obs      =       667 
Time variable : year                            Number of groups   =        64 
Number of instruments = 26                      Obs per group: min =         7 
F(21, 63)     =     60.70                                      avg =     10.42 
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Prob > F      =     0.000                                      max =        12 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
             |              Corrected 
  realgrowth |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
  realgrowth | 
         L1. |  -.0215056    .257595    -0.08   0.934    -.5362681     .493257 
             | 
reallngdpini |  -14.23625   2.348011    -6.06   0.000    -18.92837   -9.544124 
   popgrowth |   .0322902   .1460944     0.22   0.826    -.2596561    .3242365 
             | 
     educ2_n | 
         L1. |  -.2424439   .0554968    -4.37   0.000    -.3533455   -.1315423 
             | 
     educ3_n | 
         L1. |   .1527514   .0318387     4.80   0.000     .0891268     .216376 
             | 
  lngfcf_gdp |   9.449319   4.546604     2.08   0.042     .3636563    18.53498 
       fdexp |   .1291647   .0411546     3.14   0.003     .0469237    .2114056 
     fdgrant |   .0390249   .0367483     1.06   0.292    -.0344107    .1124605 
             | 
       trade | 
         L1. |   .1277195   .0378302     3.38   0.001     .0521218    .2033172 
             | 
       year3 |  -12.37479   2.375815    -5.21   0.000    -17.12248   -7.627101 
       year4 |   -5.70202   3.259109    -1.75   0.085    -12.21483    .8107892 
       year5 |  -.9707039   2.739709    -0.35   0.724    -6.445575    4.504167 
       year6 |  -6.530602   1.641922    -3.98   0.000    -9.811722   -3.249482 
       year7 |  -7.205479   2.112292    -3.41   0.001    -11.42656     -2.9844 
       year8 |  -11.67449   2.167961    -5.39   0.000    -16.00682   -7.342166 
       year9 |  -25.28787   2.344321   -10.79   0.000    -29.97262   -20.60311 
      year10 |  -9.884496   6.053253    -1.63   0.107    -21.98096    2.211966 
      year11 |  -13.30136   2.647067    -5.02   0.000    -18.59111   -8.011622 
      year12 |  -18.10939   2.723987    -6.65   0.000    -23.55284   -12.66593 
      year13 |  -16.02542    3.76306    -4.26   0.000    -23.54529    -8.50554 
      year14 |  -14.85026   3.901311    -3.81   0.000    -22.64641   -7.054114 
       _cons |    89.5537   20.36747     4.40   0.000     48.85256    130.2548 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Instruments for first differences equation 
  Standard 
    D.(popgrowth L.educ2_n L.educ3_n fdgrant fdexp L.trade year3 year4 
    year5 year6 year7 year8 year9 year10 year11 year12 year13 year14) 
  GMM-type (missing=0, separate instruments for each period unless collapsed) 
    L(2/3).lngfcf_gdp collapsed 
    L(2/4).L.realgrowth collapsed 
Instruments for levels equation 
  Standard 
    popgrowth L.educ2_n L.educ3_n fdgrant fdexp L.trade year3 year4 year5 
    year6 year7 year8 year9 year10 year11 year12 year13 year14 
    _cons 
  GMM-type (missing=0, separate instruments for each period unless collapsed) 
    DL.lngfcf_gdp collapsed 
    DL.L.realgrowth collapsed 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Arellano-Bond test for AR(1) in first differences: z =  -2.61  Pr > z =  0.009 
Arellano-Bond test for AR(2) in first differences: z =   0.94  Pr > z =  0.346 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Sargan test of overid. restrictions: chi2(4)    =   2.25  Prob > chi2 =  0.689 
  (Not robust, but not weakened by many instruments.) 
Hansen test of overid. restrictions: chi2(4)    =   2.77  Prob > chi2 =  0.596 
  (Robust, but weakened by many instruments.) 
 
Difference-in-Hansen tests of exogeneity of instrument subsets: 
  GMM instruments for levels 
    Hansen test excluding group:     chi2(2)    =   0.05  Prob > chi2 =  0.976 
    Difference (null H = exogenous): chi2(2)    =   2.73  Prob > chi2 =  0.256 
  gmm(L.realgrowth, collapse lag(2 4)) 
    Hansen test excluding group:     chi2(0)    =   0.00  Prob > chi2 =      . 
    Difference (null H = exogenous): chi2(4)    =   2.77  Prob > chi2 =  0.596 
  gmm(lngfcf_gdp, collapse lag(2 3)) 
    Hansen test excluding group:     chi2(1)    =   1.46  Prob > chi2 =  0.227 
    Difference (null H = exogenous): chi2(3)    =   1.32  Prob > chi2 =  0.725 
 
 
. xtreg realgrowth l.realgrowth reallngdpini popgrowth l.educ2_n l.educ3_n lngfcf_gdp 
fdexp fdgrant l.trade year3 year4 year5 year6 year7 year8 year9 yea 
> r10 year11 year12 year13 year14  if realgrowth <=30 
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Random-effects GLS regression                   Number of obs      =       667 
Group variable: idall                           Number of groups   =        64 
 
R-sq:  within  = 0.5171                         Obs per group: min =         7 
       between = 0.7876                                        avg =      10.4 
       overall = 0.5459                                        max =        12 
 
                                                Wald chi2(21)      =    775.45 
corr(u_i, X)   = 0 (assumed)                    Prob > chi2        =    0.0000 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
  realgrowth |      Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
  realgrowth | 
         L1. |   -.072779   .0390392    -1.86   0.062    -.1492944    .0037364 
             | 
reallngdpini |  -4.948618   .7701883    -6.43   0.000    -6.458159   -3.439076 
   popgrowth |  -.2693042   .1029602    -2.62   0.009    -.4711024    -.067506 
             | 
     educ2_n | 
         L1. |   .0276192   .0203987     1.35   0.176    -.0123616       .0676 
             | 
     educ3_n | 
         L1. |   .0275357   .0127629     2.16   0.031     .0025209    .0525506 
             | 
  lngfcf_gdp |  -1.542935   1.070919    -1.44   0.150    -3.641897    .5560269 
       fdexp |   .0877579   .0197154     4.45   0.000     .0491164    .1263993 
     fdgrant |  -.0600467   .0196918    -3.05   0.002    -.0986419   -.0214515 
             | 
       trade | 
         L1. |   .0274704   .0129218     2.13   0.034     .0021441    .0527967 
             | 
       year3 |  -9.984609   1.733652    -5.76   0.000     -13.3825   -6.586713 
       year4 |  -3.831231   1.727011    -2.22   0.027     -7.21611   -.4463514 
       year5 |   2.655208   1.689345     1.57   0.116     -.655847    5.966262 
       year6 |  -.4229342    1.63342    -0.26   0.796    -3.624378     2.77851 
       year7 |  -.3245804   1.654308    -0.20   0.844    -3.566965    2.917804 
       year8 |  -4.586645     1.6682    -2.75   0.006    -7.856257   -1.317032 
       year9 |  -19.94905   1.661123   -12.01   0.000    -23.20479   -16.69331 
      year10 |  -5.827508   1.898897    -3.07   0.002    -9.549278   -2.105738 
      year11 |  -7.305296   1.725583    -4.23   0.000    -10.68738   -3.923215 
      year12 |  -10.47275   1.792599    -5.84   0.000    -13.98618   -6.959324 
      year13 |  -9.180348   1.811875    -5.07   0.000    -12.73156   -5.629139 
      year14 |  -8.810776   2.095283    -4.21   0.000    -12.91746   -4.704096 
       _cons |   50.44317   6.919431     7.29   0.000     36.88134    64.00501 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
     sigma_u |          0 
     sigma_e |  5.8195132 
         rho |          0   (fraction of variance due to u_i) 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 
. xtreg realgrowth l.realgrowth reallngdpini popgrowth l.educ2_n l.educ3_n lngfcf_gdp 
fdexp fdgrant l.trade year3 year4 year5 year6 year7 year8 year9 yea 
> r10 year11 year12 year13 year14  if realgrowth <=30, fe 
note: reallngdpini omitted because of collinearity 
 
Fixed-effects (within) regression               Number of obs      =       667 
Group variable: idall                           Number of groups   =        64 
 
R-sq:  within  = 0.5527                         Obs per group: min =         7 
       between = 0.0093                                        avg =      10.4 
       overall = 0.1935                                        max =        12 
 
                                                F(20,583)          =     36.02 
corr(u_i, Xb)  = -0.7077                        Prob > F           =    0.0000 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
  realgrowth |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
  realgrowth | 
         L1. |  -.1474614   .0405483    -3.64   0.000    -.2270999   -.0678228 
             | 
reallngdpini |          0  (omitted) 
   popgrowth |  -.3157947   .1047889    -3.01   0.003    -.5216044   -.1099849 
             | 
     educ2_n | 
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         L1. |   .0922034    .034999     2.63   0.009     .0234639     .160943 
             | 
     educ3_n | 
         L1. |  -.1899787   .0527734    -3.60   0.000     -.293628   -.0863295 
             | 
  lngfcf_gdp |   .8518609   1.892637     0.45   0.653    -2.865356    4.569078 
       fdexp |   .1509231   .0334451     4.51   0.000     .0852356    .2166107 
      fdgrant |  -.0858196   .0560904    -1.53   0.127    -.1959834    .0243443 
             | 
       trade | 
         L1. |   .1492256   .0406274     3.67   0.000     .0694317    .2290195 
             | 
       year3 |  -10.36309    1.80732    -5.73   0.000    -13.91274   -6.813435 
       year4 |  -5.513337   1.920255    -2.87   0.004    -9.284797   -1.741877 
       year5 |   1.495242   1.962297     0.76   0.446     -2.35879    5.349275 
       year6 |  -.9241435   1.948156    -0.47   0.635    -4.750402    2.902115 
       year7 |  -2.006022   2.012716    -1.00   0.319     -5.95908    1.947035 
       year8 |  -6.162189   2.078339    -2.96   0.003    -10.24413   -2.080246 
       year9 |  -20.90535   2.103326    -9.94   0.000    -25.03637   -16.77433 
      year10 |  -6.457066   2.210416    -2.92   0.004    -10.79841   -2.115719 
      year11 |  -7.852106    2.24909    -3.49   0.001    -12.26941     -3.4348 
      year12 |  -12.14036   2.527083    -4.80   0.000    -17.10365    -7.17706 
      year13 |  -11.50789   2.680381    -4.29   0.000    -16.77227   -6.243507 
      year14 |  -11.15938   3.046645    -3.66   0.000    -17.14311   -5.175642 
       _cons |  -3.856166   8.145727    -0.47   0.636    -19.85471    12.14238 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
     sigma_u |  8.1098291 
     sigma_e |  5.8195132 
         rho |  .66009562   (fraction of variance due to u_i) 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
F test that all u_i=0:     F(63, 583) =     2.04             Prob > F = 0.0000 
 
 
b) Using fdtax and fdgrant 
 
. xtabond2 realgrowth l.realgrowth reallngdpini popgrowth l.educ2_n l.educ3_n 
lngfcf_gdp fdtax fdgrant l.trade year3 year4 year5 year6 year7 year8 year9  
> year10 year11 year12 year13 year14  if realgrowth <=30, gmm( l.realgrowth, 
laglimits(2 3)collapse) gmm(lngfcf_gdp, laglimits(2 4) collapse)  iv( popgrowth  
> l.educ2_n l.educ3_n fdgrant fdtax l.trade  year3-year14) two robust small 
Favoring speed over space. To switch, type or click on mata: mata set matafavor 
space, perm. 
 
Dynamic panel-data estimation, two-step system GMM 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Group variable: idall                           Number of obs      =       667 
Time variable : year                            Number of groups   =        64 
Number of instruments = 26                      Obs per group: min =         7 
F(21, 63)     =     63.68                                      avg =     10.42 
Prob > F      =     0.000                                      max =        12 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
             |              Corrected 
  realgrowth |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
  realgrowth | 
         L1. |  -.1419756   .2603648    -0.55   0.587    -.6622731    .3783219 
             | 
reallngdpini |  -15.73245   2.480122    -6.34   0.000    -20.68858   -10.77632 
   popgrowth |  -.0115606   .1772633    -0.07   0.948    -.3657931    .3426719 
             | 
     educ2_n | 
         L1. |  -.2266404   .0585138    -3.87   0.000     -.343571   -.1097099 
             | 
     educ3_n | 
         L1. |   .1500531   .0301169     4.98   0.000     .0898693     .210237 
             | 
  lngfcf_gdp |   8.157901   3.800084     2.15   0.036     .5640378    15.75176 
       fdtax |   .1859658   .0462113     4.02   0.000       .09362    .2783116 
     fdgrant |   .0205592   .0414437     0.50   0.622    -.0622594    .1033779 
             | 
       trade | 
         L1. |   .1276025   .0391622     3.26   0.002      .049343     .205862 
             | 
       year3 |  -13.75813   2.361802    -5.83   0.000    -18.47781   -9.038441 
       year4 |  -7.847596   3.608922    -2.17   0.033    -15.05945   -.6357411 
       year5 |  -2.174529   3.085238    -0.70   0.484    -8.339884    3.990827 
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       year6 |  -6.615933   1.760505    -3.76   0.000    -10.13402   -3.097844 
       year7 |  -7.922245   2.128078    -3.72   0.000    -12.17487   -3.669621 
       year8 |   -13.2305   2.293328    -5.77   0.000    -17.81335    -8.64765 
       year9 |  -27.13567   2.809651    -9.66   0.000    -32.75031   -21.52103 
      year10 |  -13.33582   6.510628    -2.05   0.045    -26.34627   -.3253692 
      year11 |  -14.66722   3.106959    -4.72   0.000    -20.87598   -8.458455 
      year12 |  -20.31179   3.017584    -6.73   0.000    -26.34195   -14.28163 
      year13 |  -17.87656   4.067021    -4.40   0.000    -26.00385   -9.749266 
      year14 |  -17.48385   4.208439    -4.15   0.000    -25.89375   -9.073956 
       _cons |   106.4017   21.63519     4.92   0.000     63.16719    149.6361 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Instruments for first differences equation 
  Standard 
    D.(popgrowth L.educ2_n L.educ3_n fdgrant fdtax L.trade year3 year4 
    year5 year6 year7 year8 year9 year10 year11 year12 year13 year14) 
  GMM-type (missing=0, separate instruments for each period unless collapsed) 
    L(2/4).lngfcf_gdp collapsed 
    L(2/3).L.realgrowth collapsed 
Instruments for levels equation 
  Standard 
    popgrowth L.educ2_n L.educ3_n fdgrant fdtax L.trade year3 year4 year5 
    year6 year7 year8 year9 year10 year11 year12 year13 year14 
    _cons 
  GMM-type (missing=0, separate instruments for each period unless collapsed) 
    DL.lngfcf_gdp collapsed 
    DL.L.realgrowth collapsed 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Arellano-Bond test for AR(1) in first differences: z =  -2.24  Pr > z =  0.025 
Arellano-Bond test for AR(2) in first differences: z =   0.52  Pr > z =  0.604 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Sargan test of overid. restrictions: chi2(4)    =   4.55  Prob > chi2 =  0.337 
  (Not robust, but not weakened by many instruments.) 
Hansen test of overid. restrictions: chi2(4)    =   4.26  Prob > chi2 =  0.372 
  (Robust, but weakened by many instruments.) 
 
Difference-in-Hansen tests of exogeneity of instrument subsets: 
  GMM instruments for levels 
    Hansen test excluding group:     chi2(2)    =   0.38  Prob > chi2 =  0.828 
    Difference (null H = exogenous): chi2(2)    =   3.89  Prob > chi2 =  0.143 
  gmm(L.realgrowth, collapse lag(2 3)) 
    Hansen test excluding group:     chi2(1)    =   3.72  Prob > chi2 =  0.054 
    Difference (null H = exogenous): chi2(3)    =   0.54  Prob > chi2 =  0.909 
  gmm(lngfcf_gdp, collapse lag(2 4)) 
    Hansen test excluding group:     chi2(0)    =   0.00  Prob > chi2 =      . 
    Difference (null H = exogenous): chi2(4)    =   4.26  Prob > chi2 =  0.372 
 
 
. xtreg realgrowth l.realgrowth reallngdpini popgrowth l.educ2_n l.educ3_n lngfcf_gdp 
fdtax fdgrant l.trade year3 year4 year5 year6 year7 year8 year9 yea 
> r10 year11 year12 year13 year14  if realgrowth <=30 
 
Random-effects GLS regression                   Number of obs      =       667 
Group variable: idall                           Number of groups   =        64 
 
R-sq:  within  = 0.5277                         Obs per group: min =         7 
       between = 0.7837                                        avg =      10.4 
       overall = 0.5546                                        max =        12 
 
                                                Wald chi2(21)      =    803.28 
corr(u_i, X)   = 0 (assumed)                    Prob > chi2        =    0.0000 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
  realgrowth |      Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
  realgrowth | 
         L1. |  -.0791386   .0386965    -2.05   0.041    -.1549823    -.003295 
             | 
reallngdpini |  -5.693035   .7824621    -7.28   0.000    -7.226632   -4.159437 
   popgrowth |  -.3111691   .1026406    -3.03   0.002    -.5123409   -.1099972 
             | 
     educ2_n | 
         L1. |   .0309598   .0201758     1.53   0.125    -.0085841    .0705037 
             | 
     educ3_n | 
         L1. |   .0307171    .012597     2.44   0.015     .0060274    .0554067 
             | 
  lngfcf_gdp |  -2.271227   1.077219    -2.11   0.035    -4.382538   -.1599159 
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       fdtax |   .1165167   .0203332     5.73   0.000     .0766645     .156369 
     fdgrant |  -.0685605   .0195611    -3.50   0.000    -.1068996   -.0302215 
             | 
       trade | 
         L1. |   .0303207   .0127105     2.39   0.017     .0054086    .0552329 
             | 
       year3 |  -10.50502   1.721527    -6.10   0.000    -13.87915   -7.130886 
       year4 |  -4.571366   1.716992    -2.66   0.008    -7.936609   -1.206123 
       year5 |    1.77418   1.686351     1.05   0.293    -1.531007    5.079367 
       year6 |  -1.105234   1.623108    -0.68   0.496    -4.286468       2.076 
       year7 |  -.9980931   1.635388    -0.61   0.542    -4.203395    2.207209 
       year8 |  -5.358999   1.650589    -3.25   0.001    -8.594093   -2.123905 
       year9 |  -20.84808   1.657412   -12.58   0.000    -24.09654   -17.59961 
      year10 |  -6.409421   1.871195    -3.43   0.001     -10.0769   -2.741946 
      year11 |  -7.926905   1.696632    -4.67   0.000    -11.25224   -4.601567 
      year12 |  -11.18331   1.761021    -6.35   0.000    -14.63485   -7.731774 
      year13 |  -9.710675   1.788893    -5.43   0.000    -13.21684   -6.204508 
      year14 |  -9.588007    2.06305    -4.65   0.000    -13.63151   -5.544502 
       _cons |   58.17324   7.111111     8.18   0.000     44.23572    72.11076 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
     sigma_u |          0 
     sigma_e |  5.7658724 
         rho |          0   (fraction of variance due to u_i) 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 
 
. xtreg realgrowth l.realgrowth reallngdpini popgrowth l.educ2_n l.educ3_n lngfcf_gdp 
fdtax fdgrant l.trade year3 year4 year5 year6 year7 year8 year9 yea 
> r10 year11 year12 year13 year14  if realgrowth <=30, fe 
note: reallngdpini omitted because of collinearity 
 
Fixed-effects (within) regression               Number of obs      =       667 
Group variable: idall                           Number of groups   =        64 
 
R-sq:  within  = 0.5609                         Obs per group: min =         7 
       between = 0.0136                                        avg =      10.4 
       overall = 0.1816                                        max =        12 
 
                                                F(20,583)          =     37.24 
corr(u_i, Xb)  = -0.7289                        Prob > F           =    0.0000 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
  realgrowth |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
  realgrowth | 
         L1. |  -.1456837   .0401016    -3.63   0.000     -.224445   -.0669224 
             | 
reallngdpini |          0  (omitted) 
   popgrowth |  -.3520739   .1042348    -3.38   0.001    -.5567954   -.1473524 
             | 
     educ2_n | 
         L1. |   .1163874   .0353995     3.29   0.001     .0468613    .1859135 
             | 
     educ3_n | 
         L1. |  -.1618967   .0528602    -3.06   0.002    -.2657164    -.058077 
             | 
  lngfcf_gdp |  -.4329691   1.888143    -0.23   0.819     -4.14136    3.275422 
       fdtax |   .1863825    .033134     5.63   0.000     .1213058    .2514591 
     fdgrant |  -.0766169   .0553145    -1.39   0.167    -.1852569    .0320232 
             | 
       trade | 
         L1. |   .1657165   .0402019     4.12   0.000     .0867583    .2446746 
             | 
       year3 |  -10.56633   1.791404    -5.90   0.000    -14.08472   -7.047936 
       year4 |  -6.111884   1.907776    -3.20   0.001    -9.858835   -2.364933 
       year5 |   .6271252   1.961855     0.32   0.749     -3.22604     4.48029 
       year6 |   -1.67647   1.943557    -0.86   0.389    -5.493696    2.140757 
       year7 |  -2.706148   2.003354    -1.35   0.177    -6.640818    1.228522 
       year8 |  -7.105887   2.078218    -3.42   0.001    -11.18759   -3.024181 
       year9 |  -22.05531   2.107888   -10.46   0.000    -26.19529   -17.91533 
      year10 |  -6.798347   2.186525    -3.11   0.002    -11.09277   -2.503921 
      year11 |  -8.637126   2.240798    -3.85   0.000    -13.03815   -4.236106 
      year12 |  -13.22349   2.525023    -5.24   0.000    -18.18274    -8.26424 
      year13 |  -12.30996   2.656919    -4.63   0.000    -17.52826   -7.091659 
      year14 |  -12.17663   3.030236    -4.02   0.000    -18.12814   -6.225122 
       _cons |  -5.411605   8.042776    -0.67   0.501    -21.20795    10.38474 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
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     sigma_u |  8.4958517 
     sigma_e |  5.7658724 
         rho |  .68465398   (fraction of variance due to u_i) 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
F test that all u_i=0:     F(63, 583) =     2.22             Prob > F = 0.0000 
 
Appendix 5.4 Static  
Appendix 5.4.1 FE vs RE 
 
Appendix 5.4.2  FE with Driscoll-Kraay SEs 
. xtscc realgrowth popgrowth educ2_n educ3_n lag1realgdp lngfcf_gdp fdexp fdgrant trade 
year2 year3 year4 year5 year6 year7 year8 year9 year10 year11 year12 year13 year14 if 
realgrowth<=30 & realgrowth>=-15, fe ase 
 
Regression with Driscoll-Kraay standard errors   Number of obs     =       669 
Method: Fixed-effects regression                 Number of groups  =        64 
Group variable (i): idall                        F( 21,    13)     =9515766.36 
maximum lag: 2                                   Prob > F          =    0.0000 
                                                 within R-squared  =    0.5403 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
             |             Drisc/Kraay 
  realgrowth |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
   popgrowth |  -.2274672   .1276371    -1.78   0.098    -.5032103    .0482759 
     educ2_n |   .1128129   .0602703     1.87   0.084    -.0173932     .243019 
     educ3_n |  -.1386301   .0563061    -2.46   0.029     -.260272   -.0169882 
 lag1realgdp |  -.0025648   .0006905    -3.71   0.003    -.0040565    -.001073 
  lngfcf_gdp |   .2050885   2.768467     0.07   0.942     -5.77582    6.185997 
       fdexp |   .1930638   .0935809     2.06   0.060    -.0091054    .3952331 
     fdgrant |    -.09527   .1203717    -0.79   0.443    -.3553171    .1647772 
       trade |  -.1156998    .126169    -0.92   0.376    -.3882713    .1568716 
       year2 |  -7.960085   1.288373    -6.18   0.000    -10.74344   -5.176726 
       year3 |  -13.07735   1.904099    -6.87   0.000    -17.19091   -8.963795 
       year4 |  -9.402944   2.091447    -4.50   0.001    -13.92124   -4.884648 
       year5 |  -1.504252   2.361936    -0.64   0.535    -6.606905    3.598401 
       year6 |  -1.970548   2.706815    -0.73   0.480    -7.818265     3.87717 
       year7 |   .6417761   2.907795     0.22   0.829    -5.640132    6.923684 
       year8 |  -1.410353   3.369087    -0.42   0.682    -8.688824    5.868118 
       year9 |   -13.3551   4.476218    -2.98   0.011    -23.02539   -3.684823 
      year10 |  -.3744608   4.081756    -0.09   0.928    -9.192558    8.443636 
      year11 |   .2358591   4.808068     0.05   0.962    -10.15134    10.62306 
      year12 |  -1.219533   5.291292    -0.23   0.821    -12.65068    10.21161 
      year13 |   2.259697   8.120588     0.28   0.785    -15.28377    19.80316 
      year14 |   5.191583   7.300607     0.71   0.490    -10.58042    20.96358 
       _cons |    34.7774    22.6646     1.53   0.149     -14.1865     83.7413 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 
  
. xtscc realgrowth popgrowth educ2_n educ3_n lag1realgdp lngfcf_gdp fdtax fdgrant trade 
year2 year3 year4 year5 year6 year7 year8 year9 year10 year11 year12 year13 year14 if 
realgrowth<=30 & realgrowth>=-15, fe ase 
 
Regression with Driscoll-Kraay standard errors   Number of obs     =       669 
Method: Fixed-effects regression                 Number of groups  =        64 
Group variable (i): idall                        F( 21,    13)     = 305474.50 
maximum lag: 2                                   Prob > F          =    0.0000 
                                                 within R-squared  =    0.5553 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
             |             Drisc/Kraay 
  realgrowth |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
   popgrowth |  -.2687311   .1191757    -2.25   0.042    -.5261945   -.0112677 
     educ2_n |   .1333719   .0579798     2.30   0.039     .0081141    .2586297 
     educ3_n |  -.0876136   .0520435    -1.68   0.116    -.2000468    .0248196 
 lag1realgdp |  -.0028657   .0007103    -4.03   0.001    -.0044003   -.0013311 
  lngfcf_gdp |  -.9749396   2.386329    -0.41   0.690     -6.13029    4.180411 
       fdtax |   .2548001   .1085874     2.35   0.035     .0202114    .4893888 
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     fdgrant |  -.0703874   .1164344    -0.60   0.556    -.3219285    .1811538 
       trade |  -.1166722   .1239706    -0.94   0.364    -.3844944    .1511499 
       year2 |  -7.831025   1.198562    -6.53   0.000    -10.42036    -5.24169 
       year3 |  -13.56622   1.562191    -8.68   0.000    -16.94113   -10.19132 
       year4 |  -10.19046   1.692629    -6.02   0.000    -13.84717    -6.53376 
       year5 |  -2.516188   1.882741    -1.34   0.204    -6.583604    1.551227 
       year6 |  -2.521747   2.379971    -1.06   0.309    -7.663363    2.619868 
       year7 |   .4084139   2.693756     0.15   0.882    -5.411092    6.227919 
       year8 |   -1.64442   3.063565    -0.54   0.600     -8.26285    4.974011 
       year9 |  -13.76033   3.860383    -3.56   0.003    -22.10018   -5.420475 
      year10 |   -.170116   3.888515    -0.04   0.966    -8.570743    8.230511 
      year11 |    .333904    4.61999     0.07   0.943    -9.646978    10.31479 
      year12 |  -1.213879   5.051886    -0.24   0.814    -12.12781    9.700057 
      year13 |   3.478123   7.879069     0.44   0.666    -13.54357    20.49982 
      year14 |   5.488471   6.899758     0.80   0.441     -9.41755    20.39449 
       _cons |    33.5163   22.32844     1.50   0.157    -14.72137    81.75396 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 
 
Appendix 5.4.3 FEVD 
. xtfevd realgrowth popgrowth educ2_n educ3_n  lngfcf_gdp reallngdpini fdexp fdgrant 
trade year2  year3 year4 year5 year6 year7 year8 year9 year10 year11 year12 year13 
year14 if realgrowth<=30 & realgrowth>=-13, invariant(educ2_n educ3_n reallngdpini) 
 
panel fixed effects regression with vector decomposition 
 
degrees of freedom fevd    =      576           number of obs       =      661 
mean squared error         = 29.01479           F( 23, 576)         = 23.53302 
root mean squared error    = 5.386537           Prob > F            = 5.37e-64 
Residual Sum of Squares    = 19178.77           R-squared           = .5531296 
Total Sum of Squares       = 42917.98           adj. R-squared      = .4879611 
Estimation Sum of Squares  = 23739.21 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
             |                fevd 
  realgrowth |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
   popgrowth |  -.2419379   .1028971    -2.35   0.019    -.4440373   -.0398386 
  lngfcf_gdp |   .2781031   2.036055     0.14   0.891    -3.720895    4.277101 
       fdexp |   .1471188   .0303256     4.85   0.000     .0875566    .2066811 
     fdgrant |  -.1613122   .0503258    -3.21   0.001    -.2601567   -.0624676 
       trade |  -.0566451   .0395621    -1.43   0.153    -.1343488    .0210585 
       year2 |  -10.98195   1.687535    -6.51   0.000    -14.29642   -7.667474 
       year3 |  -16.76406   1.664407   -10.07   0.000    -20.03311   -13.49502 
       year4 |   -13.6688   1.829267    -7.47   0.000    -17.26165   -10.07595 
       year5 |  -7.020689   1.944688    -3.61   0.000    -10.84023   -3.201145 
       year6 |  -9.630435   1.977851    -4.87   0.000    -13.51511   -5.745756 
       year7 |  -8.571584    1.99276    -4.30   0.000    -12.48555   -4.657622 
       year8 |  -12.62383    2.01884    -6.25   0.000    -16.58901   -8.658641 
       year9 |  -24.54286   1.882814   -13.04   0.000    -28.24088   -20.84484 
      year10 |  -11.16359   2.108688    -5.29   0.000    -15.30524   -7.021933 
      year11 |  -12.65407   2.397021    -5.28   0.000    -17.36204   -7.946106 
      year12 |   -15.7554   2.463256    -6.40   0.000    -20.59346   -10.91734 
      year13 |  -14.16536   2.898872    -4.89   0.000    -19.85901   -8.471714 
      year14 |  -12.95331    3.59975    -3.60   0.000    -20.02355   -5.883071 
     educ2_n |   .1021735   .0498234     2.05   0.041     .0043157    .2000313 
     educ3_n |   .0130987   .0242821     0.54   0.590    -.0345936    .0607911 
reallngdpini |  -3.383575   1.626055    -2.08   0.038    -6.577295    -.189854 
         eta |          1          .        .       .            .           . 
       _cons |   45.27855   12.95102     3.50   0.001     19.84157    70.71553 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 
. xtfevd realgrowth popgrowth educ2_n educ3_n  lngfcf_gdp reallngdpini fdtax fdgrant 
trade year2 year3 year4 year5 year6 year7 year8  year9 year10 year11 year12 year13 
year14 if realgrowth<=30 & realgrowth>=-13, invariant(educ2_n educ3_n reallngdpini) 
 
panel fixed effects regression with vector decomposition 
 
degrees of freedom fevd    =      576           number of obs       =      661 
mean squared error         = 28.78852           F( 23, 576)         = 24.33771 
root mean squared error    = 5.365493           Prob > F            = 6.98e-66 
Residual Sum of Squares    = 19029.21           R-squared           = .5566145 
Total Sum of Squares       = 42917.98           adj. R-squared      = .4919541 
Estimation Sum of Squares  = 23888.77 
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------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
             |                fevd 
  realgrowth |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
   popgrowth |  -.2702019   .1022411    -2.64   0.008    -.4710127    -.069391 
  lngfcf_gdp |  -.4826856   2.088677    -0.23   0.817    -4.585038    3.619666 
       fdtax |    .166246   .0310654     5.35   0.000     .1052307    .2272613 
     fdgrant |  -.1584631   .0475069    -3.34   0.001    -.2517711   -.0651552 
       trade |   -.054764   .0390418    -1.40   0.161    -.1314456    .0219175 
       year2 |  -11.15736   1.671133    -6.68   0.000    -14.43962   -7.875103 
       year3 |  -17.26961   1.659697   -10.41   0.000    -20.52941   -14.00982 
       year4 |  -14.30693   1.821597    -7.85   0.000    -17.88471   -10.72915 
       year5 |  -7.914307   1.941038    -4.08   0.000    -11.72668   -4.101932 
       year6 |  -10.39037    1.96091    -5.30   0.000    -14.24178   -6.538968 
       year7 |  -9.185404    1.94896    -4.71   0.000    -13.01334   -5.357469 
       year8 |  -13.36376   1.976165    -6.76   0.000    -17.24513   -9.482395 
       year9 |  -25.62112   1.881643   -13.62   0.000    -29.31684    -21.9254 
      year10 |  -11.70688   2.056225    -5.69   0.000    -15.74549   -7.668266 
      year11 |  -13.37574   2.337153    -5.72   0.000    -17.96613   -8.785363 
      year12 |  -16.60292    2.39986    -6.92   0.000    -21.31647   -11.88938 
      year13 |  -14.75065   2.857085    -5.16   0.000    -20.36222   -9.139073 
      year14 |  -13.85814   3.546165    -3.91   0.000    -20.82313   -6.893152 
     educ2_n |   .1056802   .0473336     2.23   0.026     .0127127    .1986477 
     educ3_n |   .0179089   .0229693     0.78   0.436    -.0272049    .0630227 
reallngdpini |  -3.942554   1.577674    -2.50   0.013    -7.041249   -.8438596 
         eta |          1          .        .       .            .           . 
       _cons |   51.55832   12.92517     3.99   0.000     26.17212    76.94453 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 
Appendix 5.4.4 IV 
. xtivreg2 realgrowth lag1realgdp popgrowth fdexp (lngfcf_gdp trade educ2_n educ3_n 
fdgrant =  l2.fdgrant l.fdgrant  l2.trade l. 
> educ2_n l.educ3_n l.lngfcf_gdp )  year3 year4 year5 year6 year7 year8 year9 year10 
year11 year12 year13 year14 if realgrowth >=-15 & r 
> ealgrowth <=30,  fe  endog(fdgrant educ2_n educ3_n lngfcf_gdp trade )small 
Warning - collinearities detected 
Vars dropped:       year14 
 
FIXED EFFECTS ESTIMATION 
------------------------ 
Number of groups =        64                    Obs per group: min =         5 
                                                               avg =       8.5 
                                                               max =        10 
Warning - collinearities detected 
Vars dropped:  year14 
 
IV (2SLS) estimation 
-------------------- 
 
Estimates efficient for homoskedasticity only 
Statistics consistent for homoskedasticity only 
 
                                                      Number of obs =      541 
                                                      F( 19,   458) =    20.74 
                                                      Prob > F      =   0.0000 
Total (centered) SS     =  33361.77512                Centered R2   =   0.3669 
Total (uncentered) SS   =  33361.77512                Uncentered R2 =   0.3669 
Residual SS             =  21122.69117                Root MSE      =    6.791 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
  realgrowth |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
  lngfcf_gdp |  -5.008173   4.604825    -1.09   0.277    -14.05738    4.041031 
       trade |   -.138472   .1285538    -1.08   0.282    -.3911004    .1141565 
     educ2_n |   .1365208   .0618982     2.21   0.028     .0148811    .2581604 
     educ3_n |  -.1326677   .0904972    -1.47   0.143     -.310509    .0451735 
     fdgrant |  -.8091767   .2629698    -3.08   0.002    -1.325954   -.2923998 
 lag1realgdp |  -.0033607   .0005323    -6.31   0.000    -.0044068   -.0023145 
   popgrowth |  -.2852369   .1290261    -2.21   0.028    -.5387934   -.0316803 
       fdexp |   .0520936   .0544524     0.96   0.339    -.0549138    .1591011 
       year3 |  -16.09725   8.848705    -1.82   0.070    -33.48634    1.291847 
       year4 |  -13.22861   6.857586    -1.93   0.054    -26.70485     .247619 
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       year5 |  -7.561851   5.669481    -1.33   0.183    -18.70327    3.579569 
       year6 |  -5.794031   5.012661    -1.16   0.248     -15.6447    4.056636 
       year7 |  -1.420696   4.660195    -0.30   0.761    -10.57871    7.737319 
       year8 |  -3.477481   4.522639    -0.77   0.442    -12.36518    5.410215 
       year9 |  -17.53242    5.40573    -3.24   0.001    -28.15553   -6.909311 
      year10 |  -4.360209   3.902767    -1.12   0.264    -12.02976    3.309342 
      year11 |  -2.341687   2.880263    -0.81   0.417    -8.001857    3.318482 
      year12 |    -4.5418   2.438538    -1.86   0.063     -9.33391    .2503109 
      year13 |  -6.693948   2.665563    -2.51   0.012     -11.9322   -1.455698 
      year14 |          0  (omitted) 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Underidentification test (Anderson canon. corr. LM statistic):          44.348 
                                                   Chi-sq(2) P-val =    0.0000 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Weak identification test (Cragg-Donald Wald F statistic):                7.807 
Stock-Yogo weak ID test critical values:                       <not available> 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Sargan statistic (overidentification test of all instruments):           0.873 
                                                   Chi-sq(1) P-val =    0.3502 
-endog- option: 
Endogeneity test of endogenous regressors:                              41.150 
                                                   Chi-sq(5) P-val =    0.0000 
Regressors tested:    fdgrant educ2_n educ3_n lngfcf_gdp trade 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Instrumented:         lngfcf_gdp trade educ2_n educ3_n fdgrant 
Included instruments: lag1realgdp popgrowth fdexp year3 year4 year5 year6 
                      year7 year8 year9 year10 year11 year12 year13 
Excluded instruments: L2.fdgrant L.fdgrant L2.trade L.educ2_n L.educ3_n 
                      L.lngfcf_gdp 
Dropped collinear:    year14 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 
. xtivreg2 realgrowth lag1realgdp popgrowth (lngfcf_gdp trade educ2_n educ3_n fdgrant 
fdtax =  l.fdgrant l.trade l.educ2_n l2.educ 
> 2_n l.lngfcf_gdp l2.fdtax l.educ3_n )  year2 year3 year4 year5 year6 year7 year8 
year9 year10 year11 year12 year13 year14 if realgro 
> wth<=30 & realgrowth >=-15,  fe  endog(fdgrant educ2_n educ3_n lngfcf_gdp trade 
fdgrant fdtax) small 
Warning - collinearities detected 
Vars dropped:       year2 year14 
 
FIXED EFFECTS ESTIMATION 
------------------------ 
Number of groups =        64                    Obs per group: min =         5 
                                                               avg =       8.5 
                                                               max =        10 
Warning - collinearities detected 
Vars dropped:  year2 year14 
 
IV (2SLS) estimation 
-------------------- 
 
Estimates efficient for homoskedasticity only 
Statistics consistent for homoskedasticity only 
 
                                                      Number of obs =      542 
                                                      F( 19,   459) =    15.79 
                                                      Prob > F      =   0.0000 
Total (centered) SS     =  33375.70079                Centered R2   =   0.1076 
Total (uncentered) SS   =  33375.70079                Uncentered R2 =   0.1076 
Residual SS             =   29783.8816                Root MSE      =    8.055 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
  realgrowth |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
  lngfcf_gdp |  -7.802771   5.295762    -1.47   0.141    -18.20972    2.604172 
       trade |   .0477698   .1014644     0.47   0.638    -.1516225    .2471621 
     educ2_n |   .4793432   .1045667     4.58   0.000     .2738544     .684832 
     educ3_n |   .0834982   .0969753     0.86   0.390    -.1070724    .2740688 
     fdgrant |  -.7039298   .3397071    -2.07   0.039    -1.371504   -.0363557 
       fdtax |    .914775    .239395     3.82   0.000     .4443289    1.385221 
 lag1realgdp |  -.0058024   .0009188    -6.31   0.000     -.007608   -.0039967 
   popgrowth |  -.5596328   .1532702    -3.65   0.000     -.860831   -.2584346 
       year2 |          0  (omitted) 
       year3 |  -2.911603   8.581253    -0.34   0.735    -19.77502    13.95181 
       year4 |  -14.05061   7.541552    -1.86   0.063    -28.87086     .769638 
       year5 |  -10.69551   6.665172    -1.60   0.109    -23.79355     2.40252 
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       year6 |  -6.001201   5.715279    -1.05   0.294    -17.23256    5.230155 
       year7 |  -1.460512   5.412405    -0.27   0.787    -12.09668    9.175652 
       year8 |  -3.170562   5.220352    -0.61   0.544    -13.42931     7.08819 
       year9 |  -11.24989   5.082736    -2.21   0.027    -21.23821   -1.261574 
      year10 |  -1.115751   4.004304    -0.28   0.781    -8.984792     6.75329 
      year11 |  -1.473312   3.393034    -0.43   0.664    -8.141118    5.194493 
      year12 |  -4.938078   2.938838    -1.68   0.094    -10.71332    .8371664 
      year13 |   9.008515   5.503278     1.64   0.102    -1.806229    19.82326 
      year14 |          0  (omitted) 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Underidentification test (Anderson canon. corr. LM statistic):          25.009 
                                                   Chi-sq(2) P-val =    0.0000 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Weak identification test (Cragg-Donald Wald F statistic):                3.612 
Stock-Yogo weak ID test critical values:                       <not available> 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Sargan statistic (overidentification test of all instruments):           0.212 
                                                   Chi-sq(1) P-val =    0.6450 
-endog- option: 
Endogeneity test of endogenous regressors:                              80.120 
                                                   Chi-sq(6) P-val =    0.0000 
Regressors tested:    fdgrant educ2_n educ3_n lngfcf_gdp trade fdtax 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Instrumented:         lngfcf_gdp trade educ2_n educ3_n fdgrant fdtax 
Included instruments: lag1realgdp popgrowth year3 year4 year5 year6 year7 year8 
                      year9 year10 year11 year12 year13 
Excluded instruments: L.fdgrant L.trade L.educ2_n L2.educ2_n L.lngfcf_gdp 
                      L2.fdtax L.educ3_n 
Dropped collinear:    year2 year14 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 
Appendix 5.4.5 Size 
A. Individual Country Regressions 
 
. xtscc realgrowth fdexp fdgrant popgrowth educ2_n educ3_n lag1realgdp lngfcf_gdp trade 
year2 year3 year4 year5 year6 year7 year8 year9 year10 year11 year12 year13 year14 if 
realgrowth<=30 & realgrowth>=-15 &id_country==1, fe 
 
Regression with Driscoll-Kraay standard errors   Number of obs     =       132 
Method: Fixed-effects regression                 Number of groups  =        12 
Group variable (i): idall                        F( 21,    10)     =     41.46 
maximum lag: 2                                   Prob > F          =    0.0000 
                                                 within R-squared  =    0.5787 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
             |             Drisc/Kraay 
  realgrowth |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
       fdexp |   .5755361   .5015687     1.15   0.278    -.5420285    1.693101 
     fdgrant |   .6138695   .4901383     1.25   0.239    -.4782266    1.705966 
   popgrowth |  -.5124956   .0885245    -5.79   0.000    -.7097405   -.3152507 
     educ2_n |  -1.095926   .6763451    -1.62   0.136    -2.602917    .4110644 
     educ3_n |   .4964625   .1106678     4.49   0.001     .2498793    .7430458 
 lag1realgdp |  -.0087755   .0056339    -1.56   0.150    -.0213286    .0037776 
  lngfcf_gdp |  -6.163087   4.472417    -1.38   0.198    -16.12825    3.802079 
       trade |   .7173494   .1177055     6.09   0.000     .4550851    .9796137 
       year2 |          0  (omitted) 
       year3 |   8.719219   1.291815     6.75   0.000     5.840875    11.59756 
       year4 |   13.03313   1.468361     8.88   0.000     9.761419    16.30485 
       year5 |    9.30062   1.297905     7.17   0.000     6.408707    12.19253 
       year6 |   6.412858   1.318446     4.86   0.001     3.475178    9.350538 
       year7 |          0  (omitted) 
       year8 |   5.611332   .6067613     9.25   0.000     4.259383     6.96328 
       year9 |          0  (omitted) 
      year10 |   1.762161   .4276627     4.12   0.002     .8092688    2.715052 
      year11 |  -7.728621   1.130355    -6.84   0.000    -10.24721   -5.210034 
      year12 |          0  (omitted) 
      year13 |          0  (omitted) 
      year14 |          0  (omitted) 
       _cons |          0  (omitted) 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
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. xtscc realgrowth fdexp fdgrant popgrowth educ2_n educ3_n lag1realgdp lngfcf_gdp trade 
year2 year3 year4 year5 year6 year7 year8 year9 year10 year11 year12 year13 year14 if 
realgrowth<=30 & realgrowth>=-15 &id_country==2, fe 
 
Regression with Driscoll-Kraay standard errors   Number of obs     =        98 
Method: Fixed-effects regression                 Number of groups  =        14 
Group variable (i): idall                        F( 21,     6)     =  23548.80 
maximum lag: 2                                   Prob > F          =    0.0000 
                                                 within R-squared  =    0.9348 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
             |             Drisc/Kraay 
  realgrowth |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
       fdexp |  -.0912573    .041925    -2.18   0.072    -.1938441    .0113294 
     fdgrant |   -.038051   .0939718    -0.40   0.700    -.2679918    .1918898 
   popgrowth |   1.933757   .7780051     2.49   0.047     .0300469    3.837467 
     educ2_n |   .2180523   .2405229     0.91   0.400    -.3704859    .8065905 
     educ3_n |   .0370647   .0587049     0.63   0.551     -.106581    .1807104 
 lag1realgdp |  -.0036763   .0006999    -5.25   0.002     -.005389   -.0019637 
  lngfcf_gdp |  -2.910686   1.415732    -2.06   0.086    -6.374856    .5534849 
       trade |   .2794505   .0865955     3.23   0.018      .067559     .491342 
       year2 |          0  (omitted) 
       year3 |          0  (omitted) 
       year4 |          0  (omitted) 
       year5 |          0  (omitted) 
       year6 |          0  (omitted) 
       year7 |   17.81899    1.51466    11.76   0.000     14.11275    21.52522 
       year8 |   21.66275   1.627476    13.31   0.000     17.68046    25.64504 
       year9 |   10.51159   2.122943     4.95   0.003     5.316932    15.70624 
      year10 |   15.54685   .6862094    22.66   0.000     13.86776    17.22595 
      year11 |   14.89125   1.356515    10.98   0.000     11.57198    18.21053 
      year12 |   5.664095    2.30563     2.46   0.049     .0224224    11.30577 
      year13 |          0  (omitted) 
      year14 |          0  (omitted) 
       _cons |          0  (omitted) 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 
. xtscc realgrowth fdexp fdgrant popgrowth educ2_n educ3_n lag1realgdp lngfcf_gdp trade 
year2 year3 year4 year5 year6 year7 year8 year9 year10 year11 year12 year13 year14 if 
realgrowth<=30 & realgrowth>=-15 &id_country==3, fe 
 
Regression with Driscoll-Kraay standard errors   Number of obs     =        78 
Method: Fixed-effects regression                 Number of groups  =         7 
Group variable (i): idall                        F( 21,    11)     =  12003.24 
maximum lag: 2                                   Prob > F          =    0.0000 
                                                 within R-squared  =    0.9184 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
             |             Drisc/Kraay 
  realgrowth |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
       fdexp |  -.0402264   .1205211    -0.33   0.745    -.3054915    .2250388 
     fdgrant |  -.1811015   .2056314    -0.88   0.397    -.6336932    .2714903 
   popgrowth |   .4841777   .3716398     1.30   0.219    -.3337959    1.302151 
     educ2_n |   .4154964   .2177222     1.91   0.083    -.0637069    .8946997 
     educ3_n |   .0129972   .1825873     0.07   0.945    -.3888748    .4148692 
 lag1realgdp |  -.0007433   .0004115    -1.81   0.098     -.001649    .0001624 
  lngfcf_gdp |  -.4080374    3.76303    -0.11   0.916    -8.690411    7.874336 
       trade |   .0426601    .174423     0.24   0.811    -.3412424    .4265625 
       year2 |   4.574203   3.104713     1.47   0.169    -2.259224    11.40763 
       year3 |  -7.653497     4.4794    -1.71   0.116    -17.51259    2.205595 
       year4 |  -8.035228   4.759659    -1.69   0.119    -18.51117    2.440711 
       year5 |  -5.674905   4.857831    -1.17   0.267    -16.36692     5.01711 
       year6 |  -17.22582   2.310894    -7.45   0.000    -22.31207   -12.13958 
       year7 |  -11.26605   2.094311    -5.38   0.000     -15.8756   -6.656504 
       year8 |  -9.481471   2.043616    -4.64   0.001    -13.97944   -4.983502 
       year9 |  -27.85451   1.988669   -14.01   0.000    -32.23154   -23.47748 
      year10 |  -13.56333    2.39975    -5.65   0.000    -18.84514   -8.281512 
      year11 |  -13.26625   3.614539    -3.67   0.004     -21.2218   -5.310703 
      year12 |  -20.77867    3.37816    -6.15   0.000    -28.21395   -13.34339 
      year13 |          0  (omitted) 
      year14 |          0  (omitted) 
       _cons |          0  (omitted) 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
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. xtscc realgrowth fdexp fdgrant popgrowth educ2_n educ3_n lag1realgdp lngfcf_gdp trade 
year2 year3 year4 year5 year6 year7 year8 year9 year10 year11 year12 year13 year14 if 
realgrowth<=30 & realgrowth>=-15 &id_country==4, fe 
 
Regression with Driscoll-Kraay standard errors   Number of obs     =       178 
Method: Fixed-effects regression                 Number of groups  =        15 
Group variable (i): idall                        F( 21,    11)     =  13624.77 
maximum lag: 2                                   Prob > F          =    0.0000 
                                                 within R-squared  =    0.8068 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
             |             Drisc/Kraay 
  realgrowth |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
       fdexp |  -.0865165   .0466904    -1.85   0.091    -.1892814    .0162484 
     fdgrant |    .246113   .1523274     1.62   0.134    -.0891575    .5813834 
   popgrowth |   .7705019   .5267736     1.46   0.172    -.3889191    1.929923 
     educ2_n |   .0701899   .0390426     1.80   0.100    -.0157423     .156122 
     educ3_n |    1.94972   .6084913     3.20   0.008     .6104396       3.289 
 lag1realgdp |  -.0035383    .001365    -2.59   0.025    -.0065426    -.000534 
  lngfcf_gdp |  -46.25209   9.731163    -4.75   0.001    -67.67023   -24.83394 
       trade |   .3153281   .0069098    45.63   0.000     .3001197    .3305365 
       year2 |          0  (omitted) 
       year3 |   19.24111   6.450047     2.98   0.012     5.044651    33.43757 
       year4 |   12.95833   4.919671     2.63   0.023     2.130206    23.78645 
       year5 |    17.2022   4.148603     4.15   0.002     8.071186    26.33321 
       year6 |   26.28064   3.893547     6.75   0.000       17.711    34.85028 
       year7 |   33.31304   3.418662     9.74   0.000     25.78861    40.83746 
       year8 |   11.08297   3.656344     3.03   0.011     3.035409    19.13053 
       year9 |          0  (omitted) 
      year10 |  -4.927855   1.334161    -3.69   0.004    -7.864325   -1.991386 
      year11 |          0  (omitted) 
      year12 |   1.254466   1.015833     1.23   0.243    -.9813683      3.4903 
      year13 |  -1.975232   1.826505    -1.08   0.303    -5.995342    2.044879 
      year14 |   1.067686   2.599265     0.41   0.689    -4.653258    6.788629 
       _cons |          0  (omitted) 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 
 
 
. xtscc realgrowth fdexp fdgrant popgrowth educ2_n educ3_n lag1realgdp lngfcf_gdp 
trade  
year2 year3 year4 year5 year6 year7 year8 year9 year10 year11 year12 year13 year14 if 
realgrowth<=30 & realgrowth>=-15 &id_country==5, fe 
 
Regression with Driscoll-Kraay standard errors   Number of obs     =       183 
Method: Fixed-effects regression                 Number of groups  =        16 
Group variable (i): idall                        F( 21,    11)     = 187059.62 
maximum lag: 2                                   Prob > F          =    0.0000 
                                                 within R-squared  =    0.9647 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
             |             Drisc/Kraay 
  realgrowth |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
       fdexp |   .0532338   .0156876     3.39   0.006     .0187056     .087762 
     fdgrant |    .064907   .0700253     0.93   0.374    -.0892177    .2190318 
   popgrowth |   .2395949   .1492968     1.60   0.137    -.0890051     .568195 
     educ2_n |   .0130353   .1361969     0.10   0.925     -.286732    .3128026 
     educ3_n |   .0252643   .0180103     1.40   0.188    -.0143761    .0649048 
 lag1realgdp |  -.0009179   .0003528    -2.60   0.025    -.0016945   -.0001414 
  lngfcf_gdp |  -2.741412   1.366141    -2.01   0.070    -5.748269    .2654448 
       trade |   .4049824   .1589724     2.55   0.027     .0550865    .7548783 
       year2 |  -14.98825   1.732885    -8.65   0.000    -18.80231    -11.1742 
       year3 |  -28.09188   3.247474    -8.65   0.000    -35.23952   -20.94424 
       year4 |  -18.72412   3.930726    -4.76   0.001    -27.37559   -10.07265 
       year5 |  -2.304191   4.084075    -0.56   0.584    -11.29318    6.684798 
       year6 |  -10.60975    5.39472    -1.97   0.075    -22.48345    1.263945 
       year7 |  -11.16754   5.847534    -1.91   0.083    -24.03788    1.702792 
       year8 |  -9.833915   5.657896    -1.74   0.110    -22.28686    2.619029 
       year9 |  -31.31661   5.555066    -5.64   0.000    -43.54323   -19.08999 
      year10 |  -9.569749   6.270069    -1.53   0.155    -23.37008     4.23058 
      year11 |  -21.01815    6.83676    -3.07   0.011    -36.06576   -5.970543 
      year12 |  -22.24656   7.202731    -3.09   0.010    -38.09967   -6.393459 
      year13 |          0  (omitted) 
      year14 |          0  (omitted) 
       _cons |          0  (omitted) 
430 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 
B. Split Dataset 
***Large size country regression using FE with Driscoll-Kraay SEs*** 
 
. xtscc realgrowth fdexp fdgrant popgrowth educ2_n educ3_n lag1realgdp lngfcf_gdp 
trade year2 year3 year4 year5 year6 year7 year8 year9 year10 year11 year12 year13 
year14 if realgrowth<=30 & realgrowth>=-15 &id_country!=1 & id_country!=4, fe ase 
 
Regression with Driscoll-Kraay standard errors   Number of obs     =       359 
Method: Fixed-effects regression                 Number of groups  =        37 
Group variable (i): idall                        F( 21,    12)     = 680434.87 
maximum lag: 2                                   Prob > F          =    0.0000 
                                                 within R-squared  =    0.8689 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
             |             Drisc/Kraay 
  realgrowth |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
       fdexp |   .0840202   .0369872     2.27   0.042      .003432    .1646085 
     fdgrant |  -.2561229   .1264182    -2.03   0.066    -.5315644    .0193186 
   popgrowth |  -.5811108   .3146849    -1.85   0.090     -1.26675    .1045287 
     educ2_n |   .2066917   .2698675     0.77   0.459    -.3812992    .7946825 
     educ3_n |  -.0299326   .0312791    -0.96   0.357    -.0980838    .0382186 
 lag1realgdp |  -.0027635   .0003868    -7.14   0.000    -.0036062   -.0019207 
  lngfcf_gdp |  -7.430558   2.110301    -3.52   0.004    -12.02851   -2.832608 
       trade |   -.532332   .0836566    -6.36   0.000    -.7146041   -.3500599 
       year2 |  -7.849763   1.194008    -6.57   0.000    -10.45128   -5.248242 
       year3 |  -15.61672   1.132764   -13.79   0.000     -18.0848   -13.14864 
       year4 |  -9.806171   1.134051    -8.65   0.000    -12.27706   -7.335285 
       year5 |   2.343709   1.442985     1.62   0.130    -.8002861    5.487704 
       year6 |   3.646532   1.636134     2.23   0.046     .0817029    7.211362 
       year7 |   9.671106   1.875559     5.16   0.000     5.584614     13.7576 
       year8 |   12.33213   1.776456     6.94   0.000     8.461569     16.2027 
       year9 |  -10.51144   1.993768    -5.27   0.000    -14.85549   -6.167393 
      year10 |   10.82622   2.054321     5.27   0.000     6.350238     15.3022 
      year11 |   12.39411   2.415534     5.13   0.000     7.131118    17.65711 
      year12 |   9.327615   2.602644     3.58   0.004     3.656939    14.99829 
      year13 |   11.59176   4.547157     2.55   0.026     1.684351    21.49916 
      year14 |          0  (omitted) 
       _cons |   99.84969   8.345237    11.96   0.000     81.66698    118.0324 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 
. xtscc realgrowth fdtax fdgrant popgrowth educ2_n educ3_n lag1realgdp lngfcf_gdp 
trade year2 year3 year4 year5 year6 year7 year8 year9 year10 year11 year12 year13 
year14 if realgrowth<=30 & realgrowth>=-15 &id_country!=1 & id_country!=4, fe ase 
 
Regression with Driscoll-Kraay standard errors   Number of obs     =       359 
Method: Fixed-effects regression                 Number of groups  =        37 
Group variable (i): idall                        F( 21,    12)     = 808582.92 
maximum lag: 2                                   Prob > F          =    0.0000 
                                                 within R-squared  =    0.8720 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
             |             Drisc/Kraay 
  realgrowth |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
       fdtax |   .1350007   .0514314     2.62   0.022     .0229413    .2470602 
     fdgrant |  -.2137301   .1276412    -1.67   0.120    -.4918364    .0643762 
   popgrowth |  -.5625794   .2965892    -1.90   0.082    -1.208792     .083633 
     educ2_n |   .2249042   .2507943     0.90   0.387    -.3215296     .771338 
     educ3_n |  -.0380791   .0311999    -1.22   0.246    -.1060578    .0298996 
 lag1realgdp |  -.0027342    .000388    -7.05   0.000    -.0035796   -.0018889 
  lngfcf_gdp |  -7.162547   2.094597    -3.42   0.005    -11.72628   -2.598813 
       trade |  -.5177433   .0791643    -6.54   0.000    -.6902274   -.3452592 
       year2 |  -7.721584   1.142108    -6.76   0.000    -10.21002   -5.233144 
       year3 |  -15.40526   1.139999   -13.51   0.000    -17.88911   -12.92142 
       year4 |  -9.968026   .9884921   -10.08   0.000    -12.12176   -7.814286 
       year5 |   2.069389   1.240197     1.67   0.121    -.6327682    4.771545 
       year6 |   3.268657   1.455414     2.25   0.044     .0975822    6.439732 
       year7 |   9.230745   1.654583     5.58   0.000     5.625718    12.83577 
       year8 |    11.7381   1.593569     7.37   0.000     8.266012    15.21019 
       year9 |  -10.80364   1.746935    -6.18   0.000    -14.60989   -6.997399 
      year10 |   10.53574   1.854807     5.68   0.000     6.494467    14.57702 
431 
 
      year11 |   11.89628   2.201454     5.40   0.000     7.099727    16.69284 
      year12 |   8.786697   2.344442     3.75   0.003     3.678598     13.8948 
      year13 |   13.64753   4.954213     2.75   0.017     2.853229    24.44184 
      year14 |          0  (omitted) 
       _cons |   94.09072   10.07466     9.34   0.000     72.13992    116.0415 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 
 
***Small size countries regression using FE with Driscoll-Kraay SEs*** 
 
. xtscc realgrowth fdexp fdgrant popgrowth educ2_n educ3_n lag1realgdp lngfcf_gdp 
trade year2 year3 year4 year5 year6 year7 year8 year9 year10 year11 year12 year13 
year14 if realgrowth<=30 & realgrowth>=-15 &id_country!=2 & id_country!=3 & 
id_country!=5, fe ase 
 
Regression with Driscoll-Kraay standard errors   Number of obs     =       310 
Method: Fixed-effects regression                 Number of groups  =        27 
Group variable (i): idall                        F( 21,    12)     =   3112.14 
maximum lag: 2                                   Prob > F          =    0.0000 
                                                 within R-squared  =    0.5100 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
             |             Drisc/Kraay 
  realgrowth |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
       fdexp |   .2337083   .1966062     1.19   0.258    -.1946598    .6620764 
     fdgrant |   .0565813    .099504     0.57   0.580    -.1602194    .2733819 
   popgrowth |  -.3001621   .1163366    -2.58   0.024    -.5536377   -.0466864 
     educ2_n |   .1335032   .0431114     3.10   0.009     .0395716    .2274348 
     educ3_n |  -.3757673   .1197277    -3.14   0.009    -.6366315    -.114903 
 lag1realgdp |  -.0036612   .0011601    -3.16   0.008    -.0061888   -.0011337 
  lngfcf_gdp |    -11.635   4.748841    -2.45   0.031    -21.98184   -1.288168 
       trade |   .1777573   .0816095     2.18   0.050    -.0000547    .3555692 
       year2 |   34.85039   20.50873     1.70   0.115    -9.834302    79.53508 
       year3 |   35.56277   21.17681     1.68   0.119    -10.57753    81.70307 
       year4 |   38.06877   20.95849     1.82   0.094    -7.595847     83.7334 
       year5 |    41.9361   21.11313     1.99   0.070     -4.06545    87.93766 
       year6 |   45.67452   21.60847     2.11   0.056    -1.406298    92.75533 
       year7 |   48.61747    21.7655     2.23   0.045     1.194521    96.04042 
       year8 |   38.97263   21.51538     1.81   0.095    -7.905349    85.85061 
       year9 |   34.21051   21.08101     1.62   0.131    -11.72106    80.14208 
      year10 |   38.91541   21.04862     1.85   0.089    -6.945592    84.77641 
      year11 |   40.41275   21.45298     1.88   0.084    -6.329277    87.15477 
      year12 |   45.09509   21.57569     2.09   0.059    -1.914293    92.10448 
      year13 |   43.78691   21.97202     1.99   0.070    -4.086016    91.65984 
      year14 |    47.3577   22.54739     2.10   0.058    -1.768833    96.48423 
       _cons |          0  (omitted) 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 
 
. xtscc realgrowth fdtax fdgrant popgrowth educ2_n educ3_n lag1realgdp lngfcf_gdp 
trade year2 year3 year4 year5 year6 year7 year8 year9 year10 year11 year12 year13 
year14 if realgrowth<=30 & realgrowth>=-15 &id_country!=2 & id_country!=3 & 
id_country!=5, fe ase 
 
Regression with Driscoll-Kraay standard errors   Number of obs     =       310 
Method: Fixed-effects regression                 Number of groups  =        27 
Group variable (i): idall                        F( 21,    12)     = 242423.01 
maximum lag: 2                                   Prob > F          =    0.0000 
                                                 within R-squared  =    0.5071 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
             |             Drisc/Kraay 
  realgrowth |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
       fdtax |   .0781224    .177126     0.44   0.667     -.307802    .4640468 
     fdgrant |  -.0844877   .1154362    -0.73   0.478    -.3360016    .1670262 
   popgrowth |    -.29975   .1142603    -2.62   0.022    -.5487018   -.0507982 
     educ2_n |   .1310128   .0440544     2.97   0.012     .0350264    .2269992 
     educ3_n |  -.3291449   .1724988    -1.91   0.081    -.7049875    .0466977 
 lag1realgdp |  -.0034803   .0011637    -2.99   0.011    -.0060158   -.0009449 
  lngfcf_gdp |  -11.44961    5.02613    -2.28   0.042     -22.4006   -.4986101 
       trade |    .179901   .0861477     2.09   0.059    -.0077987    .3676007 
       year2 |   44.97715   17.79455     2.53   0.027     6.206158    83.74814 
       year3 |   46.29892   18.40204     2.52   0.027      6.20432    86.39352 
       year4 |   48.35869   18.45874     2.62   0.022     8.140549    88.57683 
       year5 |   51.81333   18.78428     2.76   0.017     10.88589    92.74077 
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       year6 |   55.55716   19.13273     2.90   0.013     13.87052     97.2438 
       year7 |   58.40693   19.47359     3.00   0.011     15.97761    100.8362 
       year8 |   48.44906   19.57185     2.48   0.029     5.805669    91.09245 
       year9 |    43.5852   19.34799     2.25   0.044     1.429545    85.74086 
      year10 |   49.06009   18.87406     2.60   0.023     7.937045    90.18314 
      year11 |   50.14728   19.45411     2.58   0.024     7.760409    92.53415 
      year12 |   54.19062   20.17942     2.69   0.020     10.22345    98.15779 
      year13 |   52.50679   20.54315     2.56   0.025     7.747105    97.26647 
      year14 |   56.74734   21.03895     2.70   0.019      10.9074    102.5873 
       _cons |          0  (omitted) 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 
C. Using size as a dummy variable and interactions of size with FD measures 
. xtscc realgrowth popgrowth educ2_n educ3_n lag1realgdp lngfcf_gdp fdexp fdgrant 
trade size expsize1 grantsize1 year2 year3 year4 year5 year6 year7 year8 year9 year10 
year11 year12 year13 year14 if realgrowth<=30 & realgrowth>=-15, fe ase 
 
Regression with Driscoll-Kraay standard errors   Number of obs     =       669 
Method: Fixed-effects regression                 Number of groups  =        64 
Group variable (i): idall                        F( 24,    13)     =  28367.67 
maximum lag: 2                                   Prob > F          =    0.0000 
                                                 within R-squared  =    0.5443 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
             |             Drisc/Kraay 
  realgrowth |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
   popgrowth |  -.2263604   .1275028    -1.78   0.099    -.5018135    .0490928 
     educ2_n |    .095761   .0597901     1.60   0.133    -.0334078    .2249297 
     educ3_n |  -.1250174   .0515856    -2.42   0.031    -.2364614   -.0135735 
 lag1realgdp |  -.0025346   .0007077    -3.58   0.003    -.0040635   -.0010056 
  lngfcf_gdp |   -.379786   2.621335    -0.14   0.887    -6.042837    5.283265 
       fdexp |   .2978049   .2644556     1.13   0.280    -.2735167    .8691264 
     fdgrant |   .0783662    .199415     0.39   0.701    -.3524437    .5091761 
       trade |  -.1118831   .1253271    -0.89   0.388    -.3826358    .1588697 
        size |          0  (omitted) 
    expsize1 |  -.0985313   .2093502    -0.47   0.646    -.5508048    .3537422 
  grantsize1 |  -.2492124   .1722478    -1.45   0.172    -.6213311    .1229063 
       year2 |  -9.159446   1.827156    -5.01   0.000    -13.10678   -5.212115 
       year3 |  -14.20511   1.946895    -7.30   0.000    -18.41112   -9.999095 
       year4 |  -10.75572   2.246409    -4.79   0.000    -15.60879   -5.902652 
       year5 |  -2.912309   2.665276    -1.09   0.294    -8.670288     2.84567 
       year6 |  -3.660097   3.193385    -1.15   0.272    -10.55898    3.238791 
       year7 |  -1.157297   3.465084    -0.33   0.744    -8.643156    6.328562 
       year8 |  -3.098277   3.871526    -0.80   0.438     -11.4622    5.265647 
       year9 |  -15.14251   4.740648    -3.19   0.007    -25.38406   -4.900966 
      year10 |  -2.288465   4.399895    -0.52   0.612    -11.79386    7.216929 
      year11 |  -1.777419   5.248424    -0.34   0.740    -13.11595    9.561112 
      year12 |  -3.302042   5.821673    -0.57   0.580      -15.879    9.274918 
      year13 |   .2244923   8.406606     0.03   0.979    -17.93688    18.38586 
      year14 |   3.296984   7.310172     0.45   0.659    -12.49568    19.08965 
       _cons |   32.89683   20.96103     1.57   0.141    -12.38672    78.18039 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 
 
. xtscc realgrowth popgrowth educ2_n educ3_n lag1realgdp lngfcf_gdp fdtax fdgrant 
trade size revsize1 grantsize1 year2 year3 year4 year5 year6 year7 year8 year9 year10 
year11 year12 year13 year14 if realgrowth<=30 & realgrowth>=-15, fe ase 
 
Regression with Driscoll-Kraay standard errors   Number of obs     =       669 
Method: Fixed-effects regression                 Number of groups  =        64 
Group variable (i): idall                        F( 24,    13)     =  74746.29 
maximum lag: 2                                   Prob > F          =    0.0000 
                                                 within R-squared  =    0.5602 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
             |             Drisc/Kraay 
  realgrowth |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
   popgrowth |  -.2898318    .102954    -2.82   0.015    -.5122504   -.0674132 
     educ2_n |   .1245263   .0576741     2.16   0.050    -.0000711    .2491237 
     educ3_n |  -.0422192    .043382    -0.97   0.348    -.1359403    .0515019 
 lag1realgdp |  -.0029169   .0006674    -4.37   0.001    -.0043587    -.001475 
  lngfcf_gdp |  -1.897798   2.510362    -0.76   0.463    -7.321106    3.525511 
       fdtax |   .4013102   .1353498     2.96   0.011     .1089049    .6937156 
433 
 
     fdgrant |   .1157542   .0910673     1.27   0.226    -.0809849    .3124932 
       trade |  -.1167944   .1238874    -0.94   0.363    -.3844368     .150848 
        size |          0  (omitted) 
    revsize1 |  -.1544337   .1175132    -1.31   0.212    -.4083056    .0994382 
  grantsize1 |  -.2729436   .1152288    -2.37   0.034    -.5218802    -.024007 
       year2 |  -8.892648   1.562567    -5.69   0.000    -12.26837   -5.516926 
       year3 |  -14.93401   1.835953    -8.13   0.000    -18.90034   -10.96767 
       year4 |  -11.77138   2.042284    -5.76   0.000    -16.18347   -7.359295 
       year5 |  -4.223847   2.305985    -1.83   0.090    -9.205624    .7579306 
       year6 |  -4.350775   2.853373    -1.52   0.151    -10.51511    1.813563 
       year7 |  -1.390907   3.146105    -0.44   0.666    -8.187653    5.405839 
       year8 |  -3.323831   3.407153    -0.98   0.347    -10.68454    4.036876 
       year9 |  -15.67975   4.067994    -3.85   0.002    -24.46812   -6.891387 
      year10 |  -1.893297   4.163053    -0.45   0.657    -10.88703    7.100431 
      year11 |  -1.531207   4.967325    -0.31   0.763    -12.26246    9.200045 
      year12 |  -3.225434   5.383189    -0.60   0.559    -14.85511    8.404239 
      year13 |   1.013951   7.998459     0.13   0.901    -16.26567    18.29357 
      year14 |   3.538467   7.108391     0.50   0.627    -11.81828    18.89521 
       _cons |   30.91281   20.33035     1.52   0.152    -13.00825    74.83387 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 
. xtfevd realgrowth popgrowth educ2_n educ3_n  lngfcf_gdp reallngdpini fdexp fdgrant 
trade  size expsize grantsize year2 year3 year4 year5 year6 year7 year8 year9 year10 
year11 year12 year13 year14 if realgrowth<=30 & realgrowth>=-13, invariant(educ2_n 
educ3_n reall 
> ngdpini size expsize grantsize) 
 
panel fixed effects regression with vector decomposition 
 
degrees of freedom fevd    =      573           number of obs       =      661 
mean squared error         = 28.70954           F( 26, 573)         = 23.57837 
root mean squared error    = 5.358128           Prob > F            = 5.40e-70 
Residual Sum of Squares    =    18977           R-squared           = .5578309 
Total Sum of Squares       = 42917.98           adj. R-squared      = .4906953 
Estimation Sum of Squares  = 23940.98 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
             |                fevd 
  realgrowth |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
   popgrowth |  -.2405992   .1025758    -2.35   0.019    -.4420696   -.0391287 
  lngfcf_gdp |  -.3857742   2.062612    -0.19   0.852    -4.436976    3.665428 
       fdexp |   .2435635   .0675948     3.60   0.000     .1107998    .3763273 
     fdgrant |   .0152017   .1116782     0.14   0.892    -.2041468    .2345502 
       trade |  -.0523833   .0463228    -1.13   0.259    -.1433666    .0385999 
       year2 |  -12.31905   1.798757    -6.85   0.000    -15.85201   -8.786091 
       year3 |  -17.98576   1.695818   -10.61   0.000    -21.31654   -14.65499 
       year4 |   -15.1698   1.891688    -8.02   0.000    -18.88529   -11.45432 
       year5 |  -8.586126   1.984848    -4.33   0.000    -12.48459   -4.687661 
       year6 |  -11.47843   2.026933    -5.66   0.000    -15.45956   -7.497309 
       year7 |  -10.51938   2.104469    -5.00   0.000    -14.65279   -6.385963 
       year8 |  -14.42698   2.143296    -6.73   0.000    -18.63666   -10.21731 
       year9 |  -26.42854   2.104419   -12.56   0.000    -30.56186   -22.29523 
      year10 |  -13.21872   2.328193    -5.68   0.000    -17.79155   -8.645885 
      year11 |  -14.78765   2.656398    -5.57   0.000    -20.00511   -9.570182 
      year12 |  -17.97204   2.777257    -6.47   0.000    -23.42689    -12.5172 
      year13 |  -16.31202   3.746363    -4.35   0.000     -23.6703    -8.95374 
      year14 |   -14.8596   3.814777    -3.90   0.000    -22.35225   -7.366945 
     educ2_n |   .0965985   .0426241     2.27   0.024     .0128799     .180317 
     educ3_n |  -.0097203   .0345983    -0.28   0.779    -.0776752    .0582346 
reallngdpini |     .06303   3.918057     0.02   0.987    -7.632475    7.758535 
        size |   8.206552   4.674544     1.76   0.080    -.9747802    17.38788 
    expsize1 |  -.0432681   .0466846    -0.93   0.354    -.1349619    .0484258 
  grantsize1 |  -.1089168   .1115208    -0.98   0.329    -.3279563    .1101228 
         eta |          1          .        .       .            .           . 
       _cons |   10.82552   32.28197     0.34   0.737     -52.5799    74.23094 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 
 
. xtfevd realgrowth popgrowth educ2_n educ3_n  lngfcf_gdp reallngdpini fdtax fdgrant 
trade size revsize grantsize year3 year4 year5 year6 year7 year8 year9 year10 year11 
year12 year13 year14 if realgrowth<=30 & realgrowth>=-13, invariant(educ2_n educ3_n 
reallngdpini 
>  size revsize grantsize) 
 
panel fixed effects regression with vector decomposition 
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degrees of freedom fevd    =      574           number of obs       =      661 
mean squared error         = 31.13122           F( 25, 574)         = 18.68027 
root mean squared error    = 5.579535           Prob > F            = 2.13e-55 
Residual Sum of Squares    = 20577.73           R-squared           = .5205335 
Total Sum of Squares       = 42917.98           adj. R-squared      = .4486971 
Estimation Sum of Squares  = 22340.25 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
             |                fevd 
  realgrowth |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
   popgrowth |  -.2870534   .1065427    -2.69   0.007    -.4963146   -.0777923 
  lngfcf_gdp |  -1.649795   2.210767    -0.75   0.456    -5.991973    2.692384 
       fdtax |    .145189   .0621248     2.34   0.020     .0231695    .2672086 
     fdgrant |  -.1856172   .1051678    -1.76   0.078    -.3921779    .0209435 
       trade |  -.0555923    .048356    -1.15   0.251    -.1505686    .0393841 
       year3 |  -10.35463    1.44841    -7.15   0.000    -13.19946     -7.5098 
       year4 |  -7.244845   1.686295    -4.30   0.000    -10.55691   -3.932783 
       year5 |  -.6515512   1.796191    -0.36   0.717    -4.179461    2.876358 
       year6 |  -2.874941   1.829639    -1.57   0.117    -6.468544    .7186615 
       year7 |  -1.605052    1.95231    -0.82   0.411    -5.439595    2.229491 
       year8 |   -5.76399   2.019903    -2.85   0.004    -9.731292   -1.796687 
       year9 |  -17.99416   1.874046    -9.60   0.000    -21.67499   -14.31334 
      year10 |  -4.038084   2.286762    -1.77   0.078    -8.529526    .4533581 
      year11 |  -5.582322   2.666107    -2.09   0.037    -10.81884    -.345808 
      year12 |  -8.670562     2.7934    -3.10   0.002    -14.15709   -3.184029 
      year13 |  -6.435834   3.740471    -1.72   0.086    -13.78251    .9108449 
      year14 |  -5.805238   3.973366    -1.46   0.145    -13.60935    1.998872 
     educ2_n |   .1827887   .0452807     4.04   0.000     .0938527    .2717247 
     educ3_n |  -.0044291   .0352845    -0.13   0.900    -.0737316    .0648734 
reallngdpini |  -3.374455    3.91626    -0.86   0.389     -11.0664    4.317493 
        size |   2.164532   4.290235     0.50   0.614    -6.261943    10.59101 
    revsize1 |  -.0001439   .0422767    -0.00   0.997    -.0831797     .082892 
  grantsize1 |   .0522301   .1088688     0.48   0.632    -.1615998      .26606 
         eta |          1          .        .       .            .           . 
       _cons |    39.9461   31.07125     1.29   0.199     -21.0811    100.9733 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 
 
. xtivreg2 realgrowth lag1realgdp popgrowth fdexp expsize1 size1 (lngfcf_gdp trade 
educ2_n educ3_n fdgrant =  l2.fdgrant l.grantle 
> xp  l2.trade l.educ2_n l.educ3_n l.lngfcf_gdp l.grantsize1  ) year3 year4 year5 
year6 year7 year8 year9 year10 year11 year12 year13 ye 
> ar14 if realgrowth >=-15 & realgrowth <=30,  fe  endog(fdgrant educ2_n educ3_n 
lngfcf_gdp trade ) small 
Warning - collinearities detected 
Vars dropped:       size1 year14 
 
FIXED EFFECTS ESTIMATION 
------------------------ 
Number of groups =        64                    Obs per group: min =         5 
                                                               avg =       8.5 
                                                               max =        10 
Warning - collinearities detected 
Vars dropped:  size1 year14 
 
IV (2SLS) estimation 
-------------------- 
 
Estimates efficient for homoskedasticity only 
Statistics consistent for homoskedasticity only 
 
                                                      Number of obs =      541 
                                                      F( 20,   457) =    17.36 
                                                      Prob > F      =   0.0000 
Total (centered) SS     =  33361.77512                Centered R2   =   0.2163 
Total (uncentered) SS   =  33361.77512                Uncentered R2 =   0.2163 
Residual SS             =  26144.86178                Root MSE      =    7.564 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
  realgrowth |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
  lngfcf_gdp |  -3.886603    5.06258    -0.77   0.443    -13.83543     6.06222 
       trade |   .1343126   .1493284     0.90   0.369    -.1591429    .4277682 
     educ2_n |   .0202362   .0627702     0.32   0.747    -.1031178    .1435902 
     educ3_n |  -.0435968   .0946454    -0.46   0.645     -.229591    .1423973 
     fdgrant |  -1.807873   .3133201    -5.77   0.000    -2.423599   -1.192146 
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 lag1realgdp |  -.0021646   .0006018    -3.60   0.000    -.0033472   -.0009819 
   popgrowth |  -.2420516   .1400952    -1.73   0.085    -.5173622     .033259 
       fdexp |  -1.634049   .3001858    -5.44   0.000    -2.223965   -1.044133 
    expsize1 |   1.902566    .321508     5.92   0.000     1.270749    2.534383 
       size1 |          0  (omitted) 
       year3 |   9.453231   10.34849     0.91   0.361    -10.88329    29.78975 
       year4 |  -.4965948   7.647085    -0.06   0.948    -15.52441    14.53122 
       year5 |   .1001368   6.229653     0.02   0.987    -12.14218    12.34246 
       year6 |  -1.489954   5.216088    -0.29   0.775    -11.74045    8.760537 
       year7 |   1.254286   4.654348     0.27   0.788    -7.892292    10.40086 
       year8 |  -.6066338    4.42314    -0.14   0.891     -9.29885    8.085582 
       year9 |  -15.01686   5.495326    -2.73   0.007     -25.8161   -4.217621 
      year10 |  -1.700058   4.034359    -0.42   0.674    -9.628253    6.228138 
      year11 |  -4.177566   2.776791    -1.50   0.133    -9.634428    1.279296 
      year12 |  -10.13566   2.523682    -4.02   0.000    -15.09512   -5.176197 
      year13 |  -13.77155   3.218045    -4.28   0.000    -20.09555   -7.447552 
      year14 |          0  (omitted) 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Underidentification test (Anderson canon. corr. LM statistic):          51.507 
                                                   Chi-sq(3) P-val =    0.0000 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Weak identification test (Cragg-Donald Wald F statistic):                7.868 
Stock-Yogo weak ID test critical values:                       <not available> 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Sargan statistic (overidentification test of all instruments):           1.822 
                                                   Chi-sq(2) P-val =    0.4021 
-endog- option: 
Endogeneity test of endogenous regressors:                              93.423 
                                                   Chi-sq(5) P-val =    0.0000 
Regressors tested:    fdgrant educ2_n educ3_n lngfcf_gdp trade 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Instrumented:         lngfcf_gdp trade educ2_n educ3_n fdgrant 
Included instruments: lag1realgdp popgrowth fdexp expsize1 year3 year4 year5 
                      year6 year7 year8 year9 year10 year11 year12 year13 
Excluded instruments: L2.fdgrant L.fdgrant L2.trade L.educ2_n L.educ3_n 
                      L.lngfcf_gdp L.grantsize1 
Dropped collinear:    size1 year14 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 
.  
. xtivreg2 realgrowth lag1realgdp popgrowth revsize grantsize (lngfcf_gdp trade 
educ2_n educ3_n fdgrant fdtax =  l.fdgrant l2.fdgrant l2.trade l2.educ2_n 
l.lngfcf_gdp l2.fdtax l.fdtax l.educ3_n) year4 year5 year6 year7 year8 year9 year10 
year11 year12 year13 
>  year14 if realgrowth >=-15,  fe  endog(fdgrant educ2_n educ3_n lngfcf_gdp trade 
fdgrant fdtax) small 
 
FIXED EFFECTS ESTIMATION 
------------------------ 
Number of groups =        64                    Obs per group: min =         5 
                                                               avg =       8.5 
                                                               max =        10 
 
IV (2SLS) estimation 
-------------------- 
 
Estimates efficient for homoskedasticity only 
Statistics consistent for homoskedasticity only 
 
                                                      Number of obs =      541 
                                                      F( 21,   456) =    16.45 
                                                      Prob > F      =   0.0000 
Total (centered) SS     =  33361.77512                Centered R2   =   0.2646 
Total (uncentered) SS   =  33361.77512                Uncentered R2 =   0.2646 
Residual SS             =  24535.47696                Root MSE      =    7.335 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
  realgrowth |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
  lngfcf_gdp |   -8.42234   5.259897    -1.60   0.110    -18.75898    1.914303 
       trade |  -.1071922   .0957928    -1.12   0.264    -.2954423    .0810579 
     educ2_n |   .3826296   .1350989     2.83   0.005      .117136    .6481233 
     educ3_n |   .1259205   .1523008     0.83   0.409     -.173378    .4252189 
     fdgrant |  -.6400543    .723555    -0.88   0.377     -2.06197    .7818614 
       fdtax |   1.181298   .6814852     1.73   0.084    -.1579433    2.520539 
 lag1realgdp |  -.0055771   .0009926    -5.62   0.000    -.0075278   -.0036265 
   popgrowth |  -.5911663   .1891335    -3.13   0.002    -.9628476    -.219485 
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    revsize1 |  -.9015162   .6440265    -1.40   0.162    -2.167144    .3641118 
  grantsize1 |   .4579035     .72872     0.63   0.530    -.9741625     1.88997 
       year4 |   3.128261   3.043765     1.03   0.305    -2.853284    9.109806 
       year5 |   9.649389   3.559493     2.71   0.007     2.654345    16.64443 
       year6 |   15.13252   3.933165     3.85   0.000     7.403145     22.8619 
       year7 |   20.43093   4.476676     4.56   0.000     11.63346    29.22841 
       year8 |   17.81939   4.377438     4.07   0.000      9.21694    26.42185 
       year9 |    8.29451   4.048675     2.05   0.041     .3381348    16.25088 
      year10 |   19.99957   4.438077     4.51   0.000     11.27796    28.72119 
      year11 |   21.79206   5.557154     3.92   0.000     10.87125    32.71287 
      year12 |   20.11754   5.932693     3.39   0.001     8.458732    31.77635 
      year13 |    23.1472   6.727873     3.44   0.001     9.925714    36.36868 
      year14 |   20.94616   6.522755     3.21   0.001     8.127776    33.76455 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Underidentification test (Anderson canon. corr. LM statistic):          18.487 
                                                   Chi-sq(3) P-val =    0.0003 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Weak identification test (Cragg-Donald Wald F statistic):                2.288 
Stock-Yogo weak ID test critical values:                       <not available> 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Sargan statistic (overidentification test of all instruments):           0.158 
                                                   Chi-sq(2) P-val =    0.9241 
-endog- option: 
Endogeneity test of endogenous regressors:                              43.120 
                                                   Chi-sq(6) P-val =    0.0000 
Regressors tested:    fdgrant educ2_n educ3_n lngfcf_gdp trade fdtax 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Instrumented:         lngfcf_gdp trade educ2_n educ3_n fdgrant fdtax 
Included instruments: lag1realgdp popgrowth revsize1 grantsize1 year4 year5 
                      year6 year7 year8 year9 year10 year11 year12 year13 year14 
Excluded instruments: L.fdgrant L2.fdgrant L2.trade L2.educ2_n L.lngfcf_gdp 
                      L2.fdtax L.fdtax L.educ3_n 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 
 
Appendix 5.4.6 Alternative Estimators 
A. GSL 
. xtgls realgrowth popgrowth educ2_n educ3_n lag1realgdp lngfcf_gdp fdexp fdgrant 
trade year2 year3 year4 year5 year6 year7 year8 year9 year10 year11 year12 year13 
year14 if realgrowth<=30 & realgrowth>=-15, panels (correlated) 
 
panels must be balanced 
r(459); 
 
B. PCSE 
xtpcse realgrowth popgrowth educ2_n educ3_n lag1realgdp lngfcf_gdp fdexp fdgrant 
trade year1 year2 year3 year4 year5 year6 year7 year8 year9 year10 year11 year12 if 
realgrowth<=30 & realgrowth>=-15, corr(ar1) 
 
Number of gaps in sample:  12 
(note: computations for rho restarted at each gap) 
(note: the number of observations per panel, e(n_sigma) = 4, 
       used to compute the disturbance of covariance matrix e(Sigma) 
       is less than half of the average number of observations per panel, 
       e(n_avg) = 10.453125; you may want to consider the pairwise option) 
 
Prais-Winsten regression, correlated panels corrected standard errors (PCSEs) 
 
Group variable:   idall                         Number of obs      =       669 
Time variable:    year                          Number of groups   =        64 
Panels:           correlated (unbalanced)       Obs per group: min =         7 
Autocorrelation:  common AR(1)                                 avg =  10.45313 
Sigma computed by casewise selection                           max =        12 
Estimated covariances      =      2080          R-squared          =    0.4961 
Estimated autocorrelations =         1          Wald chi2(20)      =  2.74e+06 
Estimated coefficients     =        21          Prob > chi2        =    0.0000 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
             |           Panel-corrected 
  realgrowth |      Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
   popgrowth |  -.2689364   .2169682    -1.24   0.215    -.6941863    .1563135 
     educ2_n |   .0811141    .049207     1.65   0.099    -.0153298     .177558 
     educ3_n |    .043049   .0310735     1.39   0.166    -.0178539    .1039519 
 lag1realgdp |  -.0006326   .0003199    -1.98   0.048    -.0012595   -5.72e-06 
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  lngfcf_gdp |  -2.531669   1.969058    -1.29   0.199    -6.390952    1.327613 
       fdexp |   .0756925   .0374114     2.02   0.043     .0023674    .1490176 
     fdgrant |  -.0718231   .0430732    -1.67   0.095    -.1562449    .0125988 
       trade |  -.0129411   .0374241    -0.35   0.729     -.086291    .0604087 
       year1 |   13.43242   5.456437     2.46   0.014     2.737997    24.12684 
       year2 |   2.665406   5.051152     0.53   0.598    -7.234671    12.56548 
       year3 |  -1.494598   4.130072    -0.36   0.717    -9.589389    6.600194 
       year4 |   1.997925    4.33191     0.46   0.645    -6.492463    10.48831 
       year5 |   8.527806   4.307131     1.98   0.048     .0859838    16.96963 
       year6 |   5.769288   4.072119     1.42   0.157    -2.211919    13.75049 
       year7 |   6.981455   3.911506     1.78   0.074    -.6849553    14.64787 
       year8 |   3.241208   3.863124     0.84   0.401    -4.330376    10.81279 
       year9 |  -9.855975   3.989276    -2.47   0.013    -17.67481   -2.037138 
      year10 |   2.664547   3.851306     0.69   0.489    -4.883874    10.21297 
      year11 |   .9364599   3.724219     0.25   0.801    -6.362875    8.235794 
      year12 |  -1.604839   3.691338    -0.43   0.664    -8.839728    5.630051 
       _cons |   10.37417   9.583152     1.08   0.279    -8.408459    29.15681 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
         rho |   .0549704 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 
. 
Appendix 5.5 Dynamic 
Appendix 5.5.1 Baseline specification, using FDexp and FDgrant 
 
. xtabond2 realgrowth l.realgrowth reallngdpini popgrowth l.educ2_n l.educ3_n 
lngfcf_gdp fdexp fdgrant l.trade year3 year4 year5 year6 year7 year8 year9 year10 
year11 year12 year13 year14  if realgrowth <=30, gmm( l.realgrowth, laglimits(2 
4)collapse) gmm(lngfcf_gdp, laglimits(2 3) collapse)  iv( popgrowth l.educ2_n l.educ3_n 
fdgrant fdexp l.trade year3-year14) two robust small 
Favoring speed over space. To switch, type or click on mata: mata set matafavor 
space, perm. 
 
Dynamic panel-data estimation, two-step system GMM 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Group variable: idall                           Number of obs      =       667 
Time variable : year                            Number of groups   =        64 
Number of instruments = 26                      Obs per group: min =         7 
F(21, 63)     =     60.70                                      avg =     10.42 
Prob > F      =     0.000                                      max =        12 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
             |              Corrected 
  realgrowth |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
  realgrowth | 
         L1. |  -.0215056    .257595    -0.08   0.934    -.5362681     .493257 
             | 
reallngdpini |  -14.23625   2.348011    -6.06   0.000    -18.92837   -9.544124 
   popgrowth |   .0322902   .1460944     0.22   0.826    -.2596561    .3242365 
             | 
     educ2_n | 
         L1. |  -.2424439   .0554968    -4.37   0.000    -.3533455   -.1315423 
             | 
     educ3_n | 
         L1. |   .1527514   .0318387     4.80   0.000     .0891268     .216376 
             | 
  lngfcf_gdp |   9.449319   4.546604     2.08   0.042     .3636563    18.53498 
       fdexp |   .1291647   .0411546     3.14   0.003     .0469237    .2114056 
     fdgrant |   .0390249   .0367483     1.06   0.292    -.0344107    .1124605 
             | 
       trade | 
         L1. |   .1277195   .0378302     3.38   0.001     .0521218    .2033172 
             | 
       year3 |  -12.37479   2.375815    -5.21   0.000    -17.12248   -7.627101 
       year4 |   -5.70202   3.259109    -1.75   0.085    -12.21483    .8107892 
       year5 |  -.9707039   2.739709    -0.35   0.724    -6.445575    4.504167 
       year6 |  -6.530602   1.641922    -3.98   0.000    -9.811722   -3.249482 
       year7 |  -7.205479   2.112292    -3.41   0.001    -11.42656     -2.9844 
       year8 |  -11.67449   2.167961    -5.39   0.000    -16.00682   -7.342166 
       year9 |  -25.28787   2.344321   -10.79   0.000    -29.97262   -20.60311 
      year10 |  -9.884496   6.053253    -1.63   0.107    -21.98096    2.211966 
      year11 |  -13.30136   2.647067    -5.02   0.000    -18.59111   -8.011622 
      year12 |  -18.10939   2.723987    -6.65   0.000    -23.55284   -12.66593 
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      year13 |  -16.02542    3.76306    -4.26   0.000    -23.54529    -8.50554 
      year14 |  -14.85026   3.901311    -3.81   0.000    -22.64641   -7.054114 
       _cons |    89.5537   20.36747     4.40   0.000     48.85256    130.2548 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Instruments for first differences equation 
  Standard 
    D.(popgrowth L.educ2_n L.educ3_n fdgrant fdexp L.trade year3 year4 
    year5 year6 year7 year8 year9 year10 year11 year12 year13 year14) 
  GMM-type (missing=0, separate instruments for each period unless collapsed) 
    L(2/3).lngfcf_gdp collapsed 
    L(2/4).L.realgrowth collapsed 
Instruments for levels equation 
  Standard 
    popgrowth L.educ2_n L.educ3_n fdgrant fdexp L.trade year3 year4 year5 
    year6 year7 year8 year9 year10 year11 year12 year13 year14 
    _cons 
  GMM-type (missing=0, separate instruments for each period unless collapsed) 
    DL.lngfcf_gdp collapsed 
    DL.L.realgrowth collapsed 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Arellano-Bond test for AR(1) in first differences: z =  -2.61  Pr > z =  0.009 
Arellano-Bond test for AR(2) in first differences: z =   0.94  Pr > z =  0.346 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Sargan test of overid. restrictions: chi2(4)    =   2.25  Prob > chi2 =  0.689 
  (Not robust, but not weakened by many instruments.) 
Hansen test of overid. restrictions: chi2(4)    =   2.77  Prob > chi2 =  0.596 
  (Robust, but weakened by many instruments.) 
 
Difference-in-Hansen tests of exogeneity of instrument subsets: 
  GMM instruments for levels 
    Hansen test excluding group:     chi2(2)    =   0.05  Prob > chi2 =  0.976 
    Difference (null H = exogenous): chi2(2)    =   2.73  Prob > chi2 =  0.256 
  gmm(L.realgrowth, collapse lag(2 4)) 
    Hansen test excluding group:     chi2(0)    =   0.00  Prob > chi2 =      . 
    Difference (null H = exogenous): chi2(4)    =   2.77  Prob > chi2 =  0.596 
  gmm(lngfcf_gdp, collapse lag(2 3)) 
    Hansen test excluding group:     chi2(1)    =   1.46  Prob > chi2 =  0.227 
    Difference (null H = exogenous): chi2(3)    =   1.32  Prob > chi2 =  0.725 
 
 
Appendix 5.5.2 Baseline specification using FDtax and FDgrant 
 
. xtabond2 realgrowth l.realgrowth reallngdpini popgrowth l.educ2_n l.educ3_n 
lngfcf_gdp fdtax fdgrant l.trade year3 year4 year5 year6 year7 year8 year9 year10 
year11 year12 year13 year14  if realgrowth <=30, gmm( l.realgrowth, laglimits(2 
3)collapse) gmm(lngfcf_gdp, laglimits(2 4) collapse)  iv( popgrowth l.educ2_n l.educ3_n 
fdgrant fdtax l.trade  year3-year14) two robust small 
Favoring speed over space. To switch, type or click on mata: mata set matafavor 
space, perm. 
 
Dynamic panel-data estimation, two-step system GMM 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Group variable: idall                           Number of obs      =       667 
Time variable : year                            Number of groups   =        64 
Number of instruments = 26                      Obs per group: min =         7 
F(21, 63)     =     63.68                                      avg =     10.42 
Prob > F      =     0.000                                      max =        12 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
             |              Corrected 
  realgrowth |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
  realgrowth | 
         L1. |  -.1419756   .2603648    -0.55   0.587    -.6622731    .3783219 
             | 
reallngdpini |  -15.73245   2.480122    -6.34   0.000    -20.68858   -10.77632 
   popgrowth |  -.0115606   .1772633    -0.07   0.948    -.3657931    .3426719 
             | 
     educ2_n | 
         L1. |  -.2266404   .0585138    -3.87   0.000     -.343571   -.1097099 
             | 
     educ3_n | 
         L1. |   .1500531   .0301169     4.98   0.000     .0898693     .210237 
             | 
  lngfcf_gdp |   8.157901   3.800084     2.15   0.036     .5640378    15.75176 
       fdtax |   .1859658   .0462113     4.02   0.000       .09362    .2783116 
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     fdgrant |   .0205592   .0414437     0.50   0.622    -.0622594    .1033779 
             | 
       trade | 
         L1. |   .1276025   .0391622     3.26   0.002      .049343     .205862 
             | 
       year3 |  -13.75813   2.361802    -5.83   0.000    -18.47781   -9.038441 
       year4 |  -7.847596   3.608922    -2.17   0.033    -15.05945   -.6357411 
       year5 |  -2.174529   3.085238    -0.70   0.484    -8.339884    3.990827 
       year6 |  -6.615933   1.760505    -3.76   0.000    -10.13402   -3.097844 
       year7 |  -7.922245   2.128078    -3.72   0.000    -12.17487   -3.669621 
       year8 |   -13.2305   2.293328    -5.77   0.000    -17.81335    -8.64765 
       year9 |  -27.13567   2.809651    -9.66   0.000    -32.75031   -21.52103 
      year10 |  -13.33582   6.510628    -2.05   0.045    -26.34627   -.3253692 
      year11 |  -14.66722   3.106959    -4.72   0.000    -20.87598   -8.458455 
      year12 |  -20.31179   3.017584    -6.73   0.000    -26.34195   -14.28163 
      year13 |  -17.87656   4.067021    -4.40   0.000    -26.00385   -9.749266 
      year14 |  -17.48385   4.208439    -4.15   0.000    -25.89375   -9.073956 
       _cons |   106.4017   21.63519     4.92   0.000     63.16719    149.6361 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Instruments for first differences equation 
  Standard 
    D.(popgrowth L.educ2_n L.educ3_n fdgrant fdtax L.trade year3 year4 
    year5 year6 year7 year8 year9 year10 year11 year12 year13 year14) 
  GMM-type (missing=0, separate instruments for each period unless collapsed) 
    L(2/4).lngfcf_gdp collapsed 
    L(2/3).L.realgrowth collapsed 
Instruments for levels equation 
  Standard 
    popgrowth L.educ2_n L.educ3_n fdgrant fdtax L.trade year3 year4 year5 
    year6 year7 year8 year9 year10 year11 year12 year13 year14 
    _cons 
  GMM-type (missing=0, separate instruments for each period unless collapsed) 
    DL.lngfcf_gdp collapsed 
    DL.L.realgrowth collapsed 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Arellano-Bond test for AR(1) in first differences: z =  -2.24  Pr > z =  0.025 
Arellano-Bond test for AR(2) in first differences: z =   0.52  Pr > z =  0.604 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Sargan test of overid. restrictions: chi2(4)    =   4.55  Prob > chi2 =  0.337 
  (Not robust, but not weakened by many instruments.) 
Hansen test of overid. restrictions: chi2(4)    =   4.26  Prob > chi2 =  0.372 
  (Robust, but weakened by many instruments.) 
 
Difference-in-Hansen tests of exogeneity of instrument subsets: 
  GMM instruments for levels 
    Hansen test excluding group:     chi2(2)    =   0.38  Prob > chi2 =  0.828 
    Difference (null H = exogenous): chi2(2)    =   3.89  Prob > chi2 =  0.143 
  gmm(L.realgrowth, collapse lag(2 3)) 
    Hansen test excluding group:     chi2(1)    =   3.72  Prob > chi2 =  0.054 
    Difference (null H = exogenous): chi2(3)    =   0.54  Prob > chi2 =  0.909 
  gmm(lngfcf_gdp, collapse lag(2 4)) 
    Hansen test excluding group:     chi2(0)    =   0.00  Prob > chi2 =      . 
    Difference (null H = exogenous): chi2(4)    =   4.26  Prob > chi2 =  0.372 
 
 
Appendix 5.5.3 Baseline augmented with size, using FDexp and FDgrant 
 
. xtabond2 realgrowth l.realgrowth reallngdpini popgrowth l.educ2_n l.educ3_n 
lngfcf_gdp i.size1 i.size1#c.fdgrant i.size1#c.fdexp  l.trade year3 year4 year5 year6 
year7 year8 year9 year10 year11 year12 year13 year14  if realgrowth <=30, gmm( 
l.realgrowth, laglimits(3 4)collapse) gmm(lngfcf_gdp, laglimits(2 4) collapse)  iv( 
popgrowth l.educ2_n l.educ3_n fdgrant fdexp size1 l.trade year3-year14) two robust 
small 
Favoring speed over space. To switch, type or click on mata: mata set matafavor 
space, perm. 
 
Dynamic panel-data estimation, two-step system GMM 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Group variable: idall                           Number of obs      =       667 
Time variable : year                            Number of groups   =        64 
Number of instruments = 27                      Obs per group: min =         7 
F(25, 63)     =     62.49                                      avg =     10.42 
Prob > F      =     0.000                                      max =        12 
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
                  |              Corrected 
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       realgrowth |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
------------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
       realgrowth | 
              L1. |   .0373983   .1724843     0.22   0.829     -.307284    .3820806 
                  | 
     reallngdpini |  -12.17918   4.889815    -2.49   0.015    -21.95069   -2.407661 
        popgrowth |   .0852375   .1234282     0.69   0.492    -.1614142    .3318892 
                  | 
          educ2_n | 
              L1. |  -.1748466   .1054819    -1.66   0.102    -.3856354    .0359421 
                  | 
          educ3_n | 
              L1. |   .1358595    .044518     3.05   0.003     .0468974    .2248215 
                  | 
       lngfcf_gdp |   12.16556   6.776653     1.80   0.077    -1.376502    25.70762 
                  | 
            size1 | 
               0  |          0  (empty) 
               1  |   37.88208   55.46126     0.68   0.497    -72.94841    148.7126 
                  | 
  size1#c.fdgrant | 
               0  |   .4521887    .592118     0.76   0.448    -.7310648    1.635442 
               1  |  -.1150694   .2333368    -0.49   0.624    -.5813558    .3512169 
                  | 
    size1#c.fdexp | 
               0  |   .4016541   .5818887     0.69   0.493    -.7611576    1.564466 
               1  |   .1703354   .0953787     1.79   0.079    -.0202638    .3609345 
                  | 
            trade | 
              L1. |   .1203079   .0510279     2.36   0.022     .0183368     .222279 
                  | 
            year3 |  -12.36339   2.604463    -4.75   0.000    -17.56799   -7.158783 
            year4 |  -6.570524   4.296892    -1.53   0.131    -15.15718    2.016129 
            year5 |  -1.505164   4.509664    -0.33   0.740    -10.51701    7.506682 
            year6 |  -7.603831   3.754831    -2.03   0.047    -15.10726   -.1004005 
            year7 |  -8.411591   4.080871    -2.06   0.043    -16.56656   -.2566209 
            year8 |  -13.28055   3.903757    -3.40   0.001    -21.08159   -5.479516 
            year9 |  -26.06301   4.046162    -6.44   0.000    -34.14862    -17.9774 
           year10 |   -9.56338   5.461167    -1.75   0.085    -20.47665    1.349891 
           year11 |  -14.11013   3.599098    -3.92   0.000    -21.30236    -6.91791 
           year12 |  -18.65042   3.763606    -4.96   0.000    -26.17139   -11.12945 
           year13 |  -15.92152   3.831725    -4.16   0.000    -23.57861   -8.264427 
           year14 |  -14.81515   3.928584    -3.77   0.000     -22.6658   -6.964505 
            _cons |    27.6023   88.83317     0.31   0.757    -149.9166    205.1212 
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Instruments for first differences equation 
  Standard 
    D.(popgrowth L.educ2_n L.educ3_n fdgrant fdexp size1 L.trade year3 
    year4 year5 year6 year7 year8 year9 year10 year11 year12 year13 year14) 
  GMM-type (missing=0, separate instruments for each period unless collapsed) 
    L(2/4).lngfcf_gdp collapsed 
    L(3/4).L.realgrowth collapsed 
Instruments for levels equation 
  Standard 
    popgrowth L.educ2_n L.educ3_n fdgrant fdexp size1 L.trade year3 year4 
    year5 year6 year7 year8 year9 year10 year11 year12 year13 year14 
    _cons 
  GMM-type (missing=0, separate instruments for each period unless collapsed) 
    DL.lngfcf_gdp collapsed 
    DL2.L.realgrowth collapsed 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Arellano-Bond test for AR(1) in first differences: z =  -2.92  Pr > z =  0.003 
Arellano-Bond test for AR(2) in first differences: z =   1.51  Pr > z =  0.130 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Sargan test of overid. restrictions: chi2(1)    =   2.89  Prob > chi2 =  0.259 
  (Not robust, but not weakened by many instruments.) 
Hansen test of overid. restrictions: chi2(1)    =   1.98  Prob > chi2 =  0.359 
  (Robust, but weakened by many instruments. 
 
 
.  
. margins, dydx (fdexp fdgrant) at (size1= (0,1)) vsquish force level(90) 
Warning: cannot perform check for estimable functions. 
(note: default prediction is a function of possibly stochastic quantities other than 
e(b)) 
 
Average marginal effects                          Number of obs   =        667 
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Model VCE    : Corrected 
 
Expression   : Fitted Values, predict() 
dy/dx w.r.t. : fdgrant fdexp 
1._at        : size1           =           0 
2._at        : size1           =           1 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
             |            Delta-method 
             |      dy/dx   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [90% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
  fdgrant    | 
         _at | 
          1  |   .4521887    .592118     0.76   0.445    -.5217588    1.426136 
          2  |  -.1150694   .2333368    -0.49   0.622    -.4988743    .2687354 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
  fdexp      | 
         _at | 
          1  |   .4016541   .5818887     0.69   0.490    -.5554676    1.358776 
          2  |   .1703354   .0953787     1.79   0.074     .0134514    .3272194 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
.  
. marginsplot 
 
  Variables that uniquely identify margins: size1 _deriv 
 
Appendix 5.5.4 Baseline augmented with size, using FDtax and FDgrant 
 
. xtabond2 realgrowth l.realgrowth reallngdpini popgrowth l.educ2_n l.educ3_n 
lngfcf_gdp i.size1 i.size1#c.fdgrant i.size1#c.fdtax  l.trade year3 year4 year5 year6 
year7 year8 year9 year10 year11 year12 year13 year14  if realgrowth <=30, gmm( 
l.realgrowth, laglimits(2 4)collapse) gmm(lngfcf_gdp, laglimits(2 4) collapse)  iv( 
popgrowth l.educ2_n l.educ3_n fdgrant fdtax size1 l.trade year3-year14) two robust 
small 
Favoring speed over space. To switch, type or click on mata: mata set matafavor 
space, perm. 
 
Dynamic panel-data estimation, two-step system GMM 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Group variable: idall                           Number of obs      =       667 
Time variable : year                            Number of groups   =        64 
Number of instruments = 28                      Obs per group: min =         7 
F(25, 63)     =     73.71                                      avg =     10.42 
Prob > F      =     0.000                                      max =        12 
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
                  |              Corrected 
       realgrowth |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
------------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
       realgrowth | 
              L1. |   .3823445   .5526201     0.69   0.492    -.7219787    1.486668 
                  | 
     reallngdpini |  -18.55774   5.041193    -3.68   0.000    -28.63176   -8.483721 
        popgrowth |   .2552381   .2861188     0.89   0.376    -.3165247    .8270009 
                  | 
          educ2_n | 
              L1. |  -.1758276   .1254084    -1.40   0.166    -.4264363    .0747811 
                  | 
          educ3_n | 
              L1. |    .171339   .0439164     3.90   0.000      .083579     .259099 
                  | 
       lngfcf_gdp |   10.58582   6.523998     1.62   0.110    -2.451354    23.62299 
                  | 
            size1 | 
               0  |          0  (empty) 
               1  |   23.10664   50.80697     0.45   0.651    -78.42299    124.6363 
                  | 
  size1#c.fdgrant | 
               0  |   .2666893   .5016275     0.53   0.597    -.7357333    1.269112 
               1  |  -.1516315   .2068613    -0.73   0.466    -.5650108    .2617478 
                  | 
    size1#c.fdtax | 
               0  |   .2443569    .553973     0.44   0.661    -.8626697    1.351383 
               1  |   .3091209   .1091939     2.83   0.006     .0909143    .5273275 
                  | 
            trade | 
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              L1. |   .1772831   .0579398     3.06   0.003     .0614996    .2930666 
                  | 
            year3 |  -9.742817   5.203112    -1.87   0.066    -20.14041    .6547715 
            year4 |   -4.33805    5.88765    -0.74   0.464    -16.10358    7.427479 
            year5 |  -1.564677   4.143214    -0.38   0.707    -9.844229    6.714875 
            year6 |   -9.46046   3.562573    -2.66   0.010    -16.57969   -2.341225 
            year7 |  -9.480268   3.593854    -2.64   0.010    -16.66201   -2.298525 
            year8 |  -14.77176   3.418559    -4.32   0.000     -21.6032   -7.940312 
            year9 |  -26.44201   3.760747    -7.03   0.000    -33.95726   -18.92676 
           year10 |  -2.695064   11.12062    -0.24   0.809    -24.91785    19.52773 
           year11 |  -13.37479    4.15353    -3.22   0.002    -21.67496   -5.074622 
           year12 |  -18.71778    4.36107    -4.29   0.000    -27.43268   -10.00288 
           year13 |  -13.02813   6.652308    -1.96   0.055    -26.32171    .2654461 
           year14 |  -12.51652   6.766893    -1.85   0.069    -26.03907    1.006039 
            _cons |   87.17293   70.33607     1.24   0.220     -53.3825    227.7284 
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Instruments for first differences equation 
  Standard 
    D.(popgrowth L.educ2_n L.educ3_n fdgrant fdtax size1 L.trade year3 
    year4 year5 year6 year7 year8 year9 year10 year11 year12 year13 year14) 
  GMM-type (missing=0, separate instruments for each period unless collapsed) 
    L(2/4).lngfcf_gdp collapsed 
    L(2/4).L.realgrowth collapsed 
Instruments for levels equation 
  Standard 
    popgrowth L.educ2_n L.educ3_n fdgrant fdtax size1 L.trade year3 year4 
    year5 year6 year7 year8 year9 year10 year11 year12 year13 year14 
    _cons 
  GMM-type (missing=0, separate instruments for each period unless collapsed) 
    DL.lngfcf_gdp collapsed 
    DL.L.realgrowth collapsed 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Arellano-Bond test for AR(1) in first differences: z =  -1.83  Pr > z =  0.067 
Arellano-Bond test for AR(2) in first differences: z =   1.30  Pr > z =  0.195 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Sargan test of overid. restrictions: chi2(2)    =   0.68  Prob > chi2 =  0.710 
  (Not robust, but not weakened by many instruments.) 
Hansen test of overid. restrictions: chi2(2)    =   0.64  Prob > chi2 =  0.725 
  (Robust, but weakened by many instruments.) 
 
Difference-in-Hansen tests of exogeneity of instrument subsets: 
  GMM instruments for levels 
    Hansen test excluding group:     chi2(0)    =   0.06  Prob > chi2 =      . 
    Difference (null H = exogenous): chi2(2)    =   0.58  Prob > chi2 =  0.748 
 
 
. margins, dydx (fdtax fdgrant) at (size1= (0,1)) vsquish force level(90) 
Warning: cannot perform check for estimable functions. 
(note: default prediction is a function of possibly stochastic quantities other than 
e(b)) 
 
Average marginal effects                          Number of obs   =        667 
Model VCE    : Corrected 
 
Expression   : Fitted Values, predict() 
dy/dx w.r.t. : fdgrant fdtax 
1._at        : size1           =           0 
2._at        : size1           =           1 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
             |            Delta-method 
             |      dy/dx   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [90% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
  fdgrant    | 
         _at | 
          1  |   .2666893   .5016275     0.53   0.595    -.5584145    1.091793 
          2  |  -.1516315   .2068613    -0.73   0.464     -.491888    .1886251 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
  fdtax      | 
         _at | 
          1  |   .2443569    .553973     0.44   0.659    -.6668476    1.155561 
          2  |   .3091209   .1091939     2.83   0.005     .1295129    .4887288 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 
.  
. marginsplot 
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  Variables that uniquely identify margins: size1 _deriv 
 
 
Appendix 5.5.5 Claiming FD measures as Endogenous (FDexp and FDgrant 
Endogenous) 
. xtabond2 realgrowth l.realgrowth reallngdpini popgrowth l.educ2_n l.educ3_n 
lngfcf_gdp fdexp l.fdgrant l.trade year3 year4 year5 year6 year 7 year8 year9 year10 
year11 year12 year13 year14  if realgrowth <=30, gmm( l.realgrowth, laglimits(2 
4)collapse) gmm(lngfcf_gdp, laglimits(2 3)collapse)  iv( popgrowth l.educ2_n l.educ3_n 
l.fdgrant fdexp l.trade year3-year14) two robust small 
Favoring speed over space. To switch, type or click on mata: mata set matafavor 
space, perm. 
 
Dynamic panel-data estimation, two-step system GMM 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Group variable: idall                           Number of obs      =       652 
Time variable : year                            Number of groups   =        64 
Number of instruments = 26                      Obs per group: min =         6 
F(21, 63)     =     70.19                                      avg =     10.19 
Prob > F      =     0.000                                      max =        12 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
             |              Corrected 
  realgrowth |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
  realgrowth | 
         L1. |   .1032034   .3189545     0.32   0.747    -.5341763    .7405831 
             | 
reallngdpini |  -5.693756   2.255108    -2.52   0.014    -10.20023   -1.187282 
   popgrowth |   .0458669   .1760366     0.26   0.795    -.3059142     .397648 
             | 
     educ2_n | 
         L1. |  -.0965311    .056026    -1.72   0.090    -.2084902     .015428 
             | 
     educ3_n | 
         L1. |   .0492029   .0281383     1.75   0.085    -.0070271    .1054329 
             | 
  lngfcf_gdp |   9.901963   5.366851     1.85   0.070    -.8228331    20.62676 
       fdexp |   .0295339   .0492401     0.60   0.551    -.0688646    .1279323 
             | 
     fdgrant | 
         L1. |  -.0166783   .0418949    -0.40   0.692    -.1003985     .067042 
             | 
       trade | 
         L1. |   .0243971   .0314929     0.77   0.441    -.0385364    .0873307 
             | 
       year3 |  -10.28672    3.28146    -3.13   0.003    -16.84419   -3.729247 
       year4 |  -2.688172   4.827677    -0.56   0.580    -12.33552    6.959172 
       year5 |   2.717779   4.474418     0.61   0.546    -6.223633    11.65919 
       year6 |  -2.953065   2.892719    -1.02   0.311    -8.733702    2.827573 
       year7 |  -1.432791   3.542712    -0.40   0.687    -8.512336    5.646754 
       year8 |  -6.821999   2.826293    -2.41   0.019     -12.4699   -1.174102 
       year9 |  -19.79108   4.084067    -4.85   0.000    -27.95244   -11.62972 
      year10 |  -3.028997    8.41443    -0.36   0.720    -19.84389     13.7859 
      year11 |  -6.420718   4.263123    -1.51   0.137    -14.93989    2.098454 
      year12 |  -10.08665   4.081271    -2.47   0.016    -18.24242    -1.93088 
      year13 |  -8.575476    4.76724    -1.80   0.077    -18.10204    .9510931 
      year14 |  -6.069059   5.377954    -1.13   0.263    -16.81604    4.677925 
       _cons |   25.52211   23.78519     1.07   0.287     -22.0088    73.05301 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Instruments for first differences equation 
  Standard 
    D.(popgrowth L.educ2_n L.educ3_n L.fdgrant fdexp L.trade year3 year4 
    year5 year6 year7 year8 year9 year10 year11 year12 year13 year14) 
  GMM-type (missing=0, separate instruments for each period unless collapsed) 
    L(2/3).lngfcf_gdp collapsed 
    L(2/4).L.realgrowth collapsed 
Instruments for levels equation 
  Standard 
    popgrowth L.educ2_n L.educ3_n L.fdgrant fdexp L.trade year3 year4 
    year5 year6 year7 year8 year9 year10 year11 year12 year13 year14 
    _cons 
  GMM-type (missing=0, separate instruments for each period unless collapsed) 
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    DL.lngfcf_gdp collapsed 
    DL.L.realgrowth collapsed 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Arellano-Bond test for AR(1) in first differences: z =  -2.26  Pr > z =  0.024 
Arellano-Bond test for AR(2) in first differences: z =   1.20  Pr > z =  0.232 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Sargan test of overid. restrictions: chi2(4)    =   2.28  Prob > chi2 =  0.685 
  (Not robust, but not weakened by many instruments.) 
Hansen test of overid. restrictions: chi2(4)    =   3.67  Prob > chi2 =  0.452 
  (Robust, but weakened by many instruments.) 
 
Difference-in-Hansen tests of exogeneity of instrument subsets: 
  GMM instruments for levels 
    Hansen test excluding group:     chi2(2)    =   1.68  Prob > chi2 =  0.432 
    Difference (null H = exogenous): chi2(2)    =   1.99  Prob > chi2 =  0.369 
  gmm(L.realgrowth, collapse lag(2 4)) 
    Hansen test excluding group:     chi2(0)    =   0.00  Prob > chi2 =      . 
    Difference (null H = exogenous): chi2(4)    =   3.67  Prob > chi2 =  0.452 
  gmm(lngfcf_gdp, collapse lag(2 3)) 
    Hansen test excluding group:     chi2(1)    =   0.55  Prob > chi2 =  0.460 
    Difference (null H = exogenous): chi2(3)    =   3.13  Prob > chi2 =  0.373 
 
 
Appendix 5.5.6 Claiming FD measures as Endogenous (FDtax Endogenous and 
FDgrant Endogenous) 
. xtabond2 realgrowth l.realgrowth reallngdpini popgrowth l.educ2_n l.educ3_n 
lngfcf_gdp l.fdtax l.fdgrant l.trade year3 year4 year5 year6 year7 year8 year9 year10 
year11 year12 year13 year14  if realgrowth <=30, gmm( l.realgrowth, laglimits(2 
3)collapse) gmm(lngfcf_gdp, laglimits(3 4) collapse)  iv( popgrowth l.educ2_n l.educ3_n 
l.fdgrant l.fdtax l.trade  year3-year14) two robust small 
Favoring speed over space. To switch, type or click on mata: mata set matafavor 
space, perm. 
 
Dynamic panel-data estimation, two-step system GMM 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Group variable: idall                           Number of obs      =       666 
Time variable : year                            Number of groups   =        64 
Number of instruments = 25                      Obs per group: min =         7 
F(21, 63)     =     87.88                                      avg =     10.41 
Prob > F      =     0.000                                      max =        12 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
             |              Corrected 
  realgrowth |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
  realgrowth | 
         L1. |  -.3027681   .1972632    -1.53   0.130    -.6969671    .0914309 
             | 
reallngdpini |  -13.04213   3.642065    -3.58   0.001    -20.32021   -5.764043 
   popgrowth |  -.0939538   .1772605    -0.53   0.598    -.4481807    .2602732 
             | 
     educ2_n | 
         L1. |  -.0232202   .0578655    -0.40   0.690    -.1388552    .0924148 
             | 
     educ3_n | 
         L1. |   .0897993   .0386479     2.32   0.023     .0125677     .167031 
             | 
  lngfcf_gdp |  -3.997402   6.279436    -0.64   0.527    -16.54585    8.551049 
             | 
       fdtax | 
         L1. |   .1888687   .0517834     3.65   0.001     .0853878    .2923496 
             | 
     fdgrant | 
         L1. |  -.1230401   .0409497    -3.00   0.004    -.2048716   -.0412087 
             | 
       trade | 
         L1. |   .1086342    .065201     1.67   0.101    -.0216597    .2389281 
             | 
       year3 |  -13.95839   1.986873    -7.03   0.000    -17.92884   -9.987945 
       year4 |  -10.46889   2.995705    -3.49   0.001    -16.45533   -4.482453 
       year5 |  -4.394976   2.769914    -1.59   0.118    -9.930206    1.140255 
       year6 |  -6.485301    2.29128    -2.83   0.006    -11.06406   -1.906543 
       year7 |  -6.395599   2.838496    -2.25   0.028    -12.06788   -.7233177 
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       year8 |  -11.80352    2.53156    -4.66   0.000    -16.86244   -6.744601 
       year9 |  -29.92556   3.034553    -9.86   0.000    -35.98963   -23.86149 
      year10 |  -17.04467   5.931841    -2.87   0.006    -28.89851   -5.190833 
      year11 |  -15.11248   3.000875    -5.04   0.000    -21.10925   -9.115706 
      year12 |  -20.34659   3.111476    -6.54   0.000    -26.56438    -14.1288 
      year13 |  -22.79989   3.799303    -6.00   0.000    -30.39219   -15.20759 
      year14 |  -16.55434   3.392325    -4.88   0.000    -23.33336    -9.77532 
       _cons |   124.2355   38.61626     3.22   0.002     47.06707    201.4039 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Instruments for first differences equation 
  Standard 
    D.(popgrowth L.educ2_n L.educ3_n L.fdgrant L.fdtax L.trade year3 year4 
    year5 year6 year7 year8 year9 year10 year11 year12 year13 year14) 
  GMM-type (missing=0, separate instruments for each period unless collapsed) 
    L(3/4).lngfcf_gdp collapsed 
    L(2/3).L.realgrowth collapsed 
Instruments for levels equation 
  Standard 
    popgrowth L.educ2_n L.educ3_n L.fdgrant L.fdtax L.trade year3 year4 
    year5 year6 year7 year8 year9 year10 year11 year12 year13 year14 
    _cons 
  GMM-type (missing=0, separate instruments for each period unless collapsed) 
    DL2.lngfcf_gdp collapsed 
    DL.L.realgrowth collapsed 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Arellano-Bond test for AR(1) in first differences: z =  -2.01  Pr > z =  0.044 
Arellano-Bond test for AR(2) in first differences: z =  -0.56  Pr > z =  0.574 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Sargan test of overid. restrictions: chi2(3)    =   1.49  Prob > chi2 =  0.685 
  (Not robust, but not weakened by many instruments.) 
Hansen test of overid. restrictions: chi2(3)    =   1.94  Prob > chi2 =  0.585 
  (Robust, but weakened by many instruments.) 
 
Difference-in-Hansen tests of exogeneity of instrument subsets: 
  GMM instruments for levels 
    Hansen test excluding group:     chi2(1)    =   0.24  Prob > chi2 =  0.622 
    Difference (null H = exogenous): chi2(2)    =   1.70  Prob > chi2 =  0.428 
  gmm(L.realgrowth, collapse lag(2 3)) 
    Hansen test excluding group:     chi2(0)    =   0.00  Prob > chi2 =      . 
    Difference (null H = exogenous): chi2(3)    =   1.94  Prob > chi2 =  0.585 
  gmm(lngfcf_gdp, collapse lag(3 4)) 
    Hansen test excluding group:     chi2(0)    =   0.00  Prob > chi2 =      . 
    Difference (null H = exogenous): chi2(3)    =   1.94  Prob > chi2 =  0.585 
 
 
Appendix 5.5.7 Endogenous and Size, using FDexp and FDgrant 
 
. xtabond2 realgrowth l.realgrowth reallngdpini popgrowth l.educ2_n l.educ3_n 
lngfcf_gdp i.size1 i.size1#c.l.fdgrant i.size1#c.fdexp  l.trade year3 year4 year5 year6 
year7 year8 year9 year10 year11 year12 year13 year14  if realgrowth <=30, gmm( 
l.realgrowth, laglimits(2 4)collapse) gmm (lngfcf_gdp, laglimits(1 4) collapse)  iv( 
popgrowth l.educ2_n l.educ3_n fdexp l.fdgrant size1 l.trade year3-year14) two robust 
small 
Favoring speed over space. To switch, type or click on mata: mata set matafavor 
space, perm. 
 
Dynamic panel-data estimation, two-step system GMM 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Group variable: idall                           Number of obs      =       652 
Time variable : year                            Number of groups   =        64 
Number of instruments = 29                      Obs per group: min =         6 
F(24, 63)     =    151.78                                      avg =     10.19 
Prob > F      =     0.000                                      max =        12 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
                   |              Corrected 
        realgrowth |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
        realgrowth | 
               L1. |   .2928349   .4724772     0.62   0.538    -.6513354    1.237005 
                   | 
      reallngdpini |  -3.838237   3.859826    -0.99   0.324    -11.55148    3.875011 
         popgrowth |   .1148845   .2199439     0.52   0.603    -.3246383    .5544072 
                   | 
           educ2_n | 
               L1. |  -.0896585   .0495181    -1.81   0.075    -.1886126    .0092955 
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                   | 
           educ3_n | 
               L1. |   .0205055   .0321537     0.64   0.526    -.0437486    .0847596 
                   | 
        lngfcf_gdp |   2.581694   4.775868     0.54   0.591    -6.962116    12.12551 
             size1 |  -4.241406    12.5932    -0.34   0.737    -29.40692     20.9241 
                   | 
  size1#cL.fdgrant | 
                0  |    .006327   .0964826     0.07   0.948    -.1864781    .1991321 
                1  |  -.2872746   .1013186    -2.84   0.006    -.4897436   -.0848057 
                   | 
     size1#c.fdexp | 
                0  |   -.063121   .1626192    -0.39   0.699    -.3880895    .2618475 
                1  |   .1474027   .0721642     2.04   0.045     .0031942    .2916113 
                   | 
             trade | 
               L1. |   .0273199   .0468606     0.58   0.562    -.0663235    .1209632 
                   | 
             year3 |  -9.126625   5.077475    -1.80   0.077    -19.27315    1.019899 
             year4 |  -2.662913   7.507797    -0.35   0.724    -17.66605    12.34022 
             year5 |   1.680633   5.900937     0.28   0.777    -10.11145    13.47272 
             year6 |  -5.676941   3.910432    -1.45   0.152    -13.49132    2.137433 
             year7 |  -4.443733   4.926093    -0.90   0.370    -14.28774    5.400279 
             year8 |  -8.451371   4.854192    -1.74   0.087     -18.1517    1.248958 
             year9 |  -21.76865   5.376378    -4.05   0.000    -32.51249   -11.02482 
            year10 |  -2.837716   12.56975    -0.23   0.822    -27.95635    22.28092 
            year11 |  -8.301734   5.891301    -1.41   0.164    -20.07456    3.471091 
            year12 |  -11.59128   5.883897    -1.97   0.053    -23.34931    .1667506 
            year13 |  -7.916721   7.150201    -1.11   0.272    -22.20526    6.371815 
            year14 |  -6.908704   7.259222    -0.95   0.345     -21.4151    7.597693 
             _cons |   40.27425   30.11216     1.34   0.186    -19.90009    100.4486 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Instruments for first differences equation 
  Standard 
    D.(popgrowth L.educ2_n L.educ3_n fdexp L.fdgrant size1 L.trade year3 
    year4 year5 year6 year7 year8 year9 year10 year11 year12 year13 year14) 
  GMM-type (missing=0, separate instruments for each period unless collapsed) 
    L(1/4).lngfcf_gdp collapsed 
    L(2/4).L.realgrowth collapsed 
Instruments for levels equation 
  Standard 
    popgrowth L.educ2_n L.educ3_n fdexp L.fdgrant size1 L.trade year3 
    year4 year5 year6 year7 year8 year9 year10 year11 year12 year13 year14 
    _cons 
  GMM-type (missing=0, separate instruments for each period unless collapsed) 
    D.lngfcf_gdp collapsed 
    DL.L.realgrowth collapsed 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Arellano-Bond test for AR(1) in first differences: z =  -1.90  Pr > z =  0.058 
Arellano-Bond test for AR(2) in first differences: z =   1.18  Pr > z =  0.237 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Sargan test of overid. restrictions: chi2(4)    =   6.85  Prob > chi2 =  0.254 
  (Not robust, but not weakened by many instruments.) 
Hansen test of overid. restrictions: chi2(4)    =   4.78  Prob > chi2 =  0.410 
  (Robust, but weakened by many instruments.) 
 
Difference-in-Hansen tests of exogeneity of instrument subsets: 
  GMM instruments for levels 
    Hansen test excluding group:     chi2(2)    =   4.19  Prob > chi2 =  0.123 
    Difference (null H = exogenous): chi2(2)    =   0.59  Prob > chi2 =  0.743 
  gmm(L.realgrowth, collapse lag(2 4)) 
    Hansen test excluding group:     chi2(0)    =   0.00  Prob > chi2 =      . 
    Difference (null H = exogenous): chi2(4)    =   4.78  Prob > chi2 =  0.310 
 
. margins, dydx (fdexp l.fdgrant) at (size1= (0,1)) vsquish force level(90) 
Warning: cannot perform check for estimable functions. 
(note: default prediction is a function of possibly stochastic quantities other than 
e(b)) 
 
Average marginal effects                          Number of obs   =        652 
Model VCE    : Corrected 
 
Expression   : Fitted Values, predict() 
dy/dx w.r.t. : L.fdgrant fdexp 
1._at        : size1           =           0 
2._at        : size1           =           1 
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------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
             |            Delta-method 
             |      dy/dx   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [90% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
  L.fdgrant  | 
         _at | 
          1  |    .006327   .0965596     0.07   0.948    -.1524994    .1651534 
          2  |  -.2872746   .1013995    -2.83   0.005    -.4540619   -.1204874 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
  fdexp      | 
         _at | 
          1  |   -.063121    .162749    -0.39   0.698    -.3308193    .2045773 
          2  |   .1474027   .0722218     2.04   0.041     .0286085     .266197 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 
. marginsplot 
 
  Variables that uniquely identify margins: size1 _deriv 
 
 
 
Appendix 5.5.8 Endogenous and Size, using FDtax and FDgrant 
 
. xtabond2 realgrowth l.realgrowth reallngdpini popgrowth l.educ2_n l.educ3_n 
lngfcf_gdp  i.size1 i.size1#c.l.fdgrant i.size1#c.l.fdtax  l.trade year3 year4 year5 
year6 year7 year8 year9 year10 year11 year12 year13 year14  if realgrowth <=30, gmm( 
l.realgrowth, laglimits(2 4)collapse) gmm(lngfcf_gdp, laglimits(2 4) collapse) iv( 
popgrowth l.educ2_n l.educ3_n size1 l.fdtax l.fdgrant l.trade year3-year14) two robust 
small 
Favoring speed over space. To switch, type or click on mata: mata set matafavor 
space, perm. 
 
Dynamic panel-data estimation, two-step system GMM 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Group variable: idall                           Number of obs      =       666 
Time variable : year                            Number of groups   =        64 
Number of instruments = 28                      Obs per group: min =         7 
F(25, 63)     =     85.85                                      avg =     10.41 
Prob > F      =     0.000                                      max =        12 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
                   |              Corrected 
        realgrowth |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
        realgrowth | 
               L1. |    .405286   .5324463     0.76   0.449    -.6587231    1.469295 
                   | 
      reallngdpini |   4.568156   9.092159     0.50   0.617    -13.60107    22.73739 
         popgrowth |   .0664533   .3088452     0.22   0.830    -.5507247    .6836312 
                   | 
           educ2_n | 
               L1. |  -.2000428   .0831692    -2.41   0.019    -.3662432   -.0338424 
                   | 
           educ3_n | 
               L1. |  -.0163576   .0446055    -0.37   0.715    -.1054946    .0727793 
                   | 
        lngfcf_gdp |   14.24668   5.935662     2.40   0.019     2.385207    26.10815 
                   | 
             size1 | 
                0  |          0  (empty) 
                1  |   3.137881   74.42495     0.04   0.967    -145.5885    151.8643 
                   | 
  size1#cL.fdgrant | 
                0  |    .146985   .7544521     0.19   0.846    -1.360667    1.654637 
                1  |  -.1712161   .0999803    -1.71   0.092    -.3710107    .0285785 
                   | 
    size1#cL.fdtax | 
                0  |  -.0559733   .8144099    -0.07   0.945    -1.683442    1.571495 
                1  |  -.0820085   .2037567    -0.40   0.689    -.4891839    .3251668 
                   | 
             trade | 
               L1. |  -.0455669   .0531971    -0.86   0.395    -.1518728     .060739 
                   | 
             year3 |  -7.613172   6.182476    -1.23   0.223    -19.96787    4.741521 
             year4 |   3.726124   9.449855     0.39   0.695    -15.15791    22.61015 
             year5 |   8.948533   8.507262     1.05   0.297    -8.051873    25.94894 
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             year6 |    1.03593    5.57349     0.19   0.853     -10.1018    12.17366 
             year7 |   3.142342   7.323405     0.43   0.669    -11.49231      17.777 
             year8 |   -2.10449   8.053057    -0.26   0.795    -18.19724    13.98826 
             year9 |  -13.62786   10.24481    -1.33   0.188    -34.10047    6.844757 
            year10 |    6.72417   17.72619     0.38   0.706     -28.6988    42.14714 
            year11 |  -.3507409   10.63559    -0.03   0.974    -21.60428     20.9028 
            year12 |  -2.424127   11.65382    -0.21   0.836    -25.71243    20.86417 
            year13 |  -.1677367   14.20193    -0.01   0.991    -28.54802    28.21255 
            year14 |    1.31292   10.61025     0.12   0.902    -19.88998    22.51582 
             _cons |  -62.74202   145.1978    -0.43   0.667    -352.8966    227.4126 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Instruments for first differences equation 
  Standard 
    D.(popgrowth L.educ2_n L.educ3_n size1 L.fdtax L.fdgrant L.trade year3 
    year4 year5 year6 year7 year8 year9 year10 year11 year12 year13 year14) 
  GMM-type (missing=0, separate instruments for each period unless collapsed) 
    L(2/4).lngfcf_gdp collapsed 
    L(2/4).L.realgrowth collapsed 
Instruments for levels equation 
  Standard 
    popgrowth L.educ2_n L.educ3_n size1 L.fdtax L.fdgrant L.trade year3 
    year4 year5 year6 year7 year8 year9 year10 year11 year12 year13 year14 
    _cons 
  GMM-type (missing=0, separate instruments for each period unless collapsed) 
    DL.lngfcf_gdp collapsed 
    DL.L.realgrowth collapsed 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Arellano-Bond test for AR(1) in first differences: z =  -1.97  Pr > z =  0.049 
Arellano-Bond test for AR(2) in first differences: z =   1.26  Pr > z =  0.209 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Sargan test of overid. restrictions: chi2(2)    =   1.41  Prob > chi2 =  0.493 
  (Not robust, but not weakened by many instruments.) 
Hansen test of overid. restrictions: chi2(2)    =   2.33  Prob > chi2 =  0.312 
  (Robust, but weakened by many instruments.) 
 
Difference-in-Hansen tests of exogeneity of instrument subsets: 
  GMM instruments for levels 
    Hansen test excluding group:     chi2(0)    =   0.49  Prob > chi2 =      . 
    Difference (null H = exogenous): chi2(2)    =   1.84  Prob > chi2 =  0.399 
 
 
. margins, dydx (l.fdtax l.fdgrant) at (size1= (0,1)) vsquish force level(90) 
Warning: cannot perform check for estimable functions. 
(note: default prediction is a function of possibly stochastic quantities other than 
e(b)) 
 
Average marginal effects                          Number of obs   =        666 
Model VCE    : Corrected 
 
Expression   : Fitted Values, predict() 
dy/dx w.r.t. : L.fdgrant L.fdtax 
1._at        : size1           =           0 
2._at        : size1           =           1 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
             |            Delta-method 
             |      dy/dx   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [90% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
  L.fdgrant  | 
         _at | 
          1  |    .146985   .7544521     0.19   0.846    -1.093978    1.387948 
          2  |  -.1712161   .0999803    -1.71   0.087     -.335669   -.0067632 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
  L.fdtax    | 
         _at | 
          1  |  -.0559733   .8144099    -0.07   0.945    -1.395558    1.283612 
          2  |  -.0820085   .2037567    -0.40   0.687    -.4171585    .2531415 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 
. marginsplot 
 
  Variables that uniquely identify margins: size1 _deriv 
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Appendix 5.5.9 Using Weights 
. xtabond2 realgrowth l.realgrowth reallngdpini popgrowth l.educ2_n l.educ3_n 
lngfcf_gdp fdexp fdgrant l.trade year3 year4 year5 year6 year7 year8 year9 year10 
year11 year12 year13 year14  if realgrowth <=30 [pweight= id_region ], gmm( 
l.realgrowth, laglimits(2 4)collapse) gmm(lngfcf_gdp, laglimits(2 3) collapse)  iv( 
popgrowth l.educ2_n l.educ3_n fdgrant fdexp l.trade year3-year14) two robust small 
Favoring speed over space. To switch, type or click on mata: mata set matafavor 
space, perm. 
(sum of weights is 4867) 
 
Dynamic panel-data estimation, two-step system GMM 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Group variable: idall                           Number of obs      =       667 
Time variable : year                            Number of groups   =        64 
Number of instruments = 26                      Obs per group: min =         7 
F(21, 63)     =     59.02                                      avg =     10.42 
Prob > F      =     0.000                                      max =        12 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
             |              Corrected 
  realgrowth |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
  realgrowth | 
         L1. |   .2358873   .5788393     0.41   0.685    -.9208307    1.392605 
             | 
reallngdpini |  -14.59519   3.334197    -4.38   0.000    -21.25805    -7.93233 
   popgrowth |   .1100485   .2286843     0.48   0.632    -.3469406    .5670377 
             | 
     educ2_n | 
         L1. |  -.2481736     .06942    -3.57   0.001    -.3868984   -.1094487 
             | 
     educ3_n | 
         L1. |   .1667282   .0479542     3.48   0.001     .0708993    .2625571 
             | 
  lngfcf_gdp |   3.346348   6.608682     0.51   0.614    -9.860049    16.55274 
       fdexp |     .12366   .0430334     2.87   0.006     .0376647    .2096554 
     fdgrant |   .0582895    .041621     1.40   0.166    -.0248835    .1414624 
             | 
       trade | 
         L1. |   .1565931   .0510554     3.07   0.003      .054567    .2586192 
             | 
       year3 |  -8.327504   7.459176    -1.12   0.268    -23.23348     6.57847 
       year4 |   .0667575    8.60825     0.01   0.994    -17.13546    17.26897 
       year5 |   4.901335   7.326184     0.67   0.506    -9.738874    19.54154 
       year6 |  -2.158495   3.508141    -0.62   0.541    -9.168956    4.851966 
       year7 |   -2.48412   4.970796    -0.50   0.619    -12.41746    7.449224 
       year8 |  -7.448378   5.234908    -1.42   0.160    -17.90951    3.012751 
       year9 |  -20.85893   5.956501    -3.50   0.001    -32.76205   -8.955811 
      year10 |  -1.120793   15.55693    -0.07   0.943    -32.20885    29.96726 
      year11 |  -9.147094   6.946319    -1.32   0.193    -23.02821    4.734017 
      year12 |  -13.42175   8.136695    -1.65   0.104    -29.68164    2.838137 
      year13 |  -11.74617   9.634127    -1.22   0.227    -30.99844    7.506092 
      year14 |  -9.756257   10.54478    -0.93   0.358    -30.82832    11.31581 
       _cons |   102.3549   24.63087     4.16   0.000     53.13401    151.5757 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Instruments for first differences equation 
  Standard 
    D.(popgrowth L.educ2_n L.educ3_n fdgrant fdexp L.trade year3 year4 
    year5 year6 year7 year8 year9 year10 year11 year12 year13 year14) 
  GMM-type (missing=0, separate instruments for each period unless collapsed) 
    L(2/3).lngfcf_gdp collapsed 
    L(2/4).L.realgrowth collapsed 
Instruments for levels equation 
  Standard 
    popgrowth L.educ2_n L.educ3_n fdgrant fdexp L.trade year3 year4 year5 
    year6 year7 year8 year9 year10 year11 year12 year13 year14 
    _cons 
  GMM-type (missing=0, separate instruments for each period unless collapsed) 
    DL.lngfcf_gdp collapsed 
    DL.L.realgrowth collapsed 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Arellano-Bond test for AR(1) in first differences: z =  -1.47  Pr > z =  0.141 
Arellano-Bond test for AR(2) in first differences: z =   1.02  Pr > z =  0.308 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
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Sargan test of overid. restrictions: chi2(4)    =   6.88  Prob > chi2 =  0.248 
  (Not robust, but not weakened by many instruments.) 
Hansen test of overid. restrictions: chi2(4)    =   6.51  Prob > chi2 =  0.264 
  (Robust, but weakened by many instruments.) 
 
Difference-in-Hansen tests of exogeneity of instrument subsets: 
  GMM instruments for levels 
    Hansen test excluding group:     chi2(2)    =   2.86  Prob > chi2 =  0.240 
    Difference (null H = exogenous): chi2(2)    =   3.65  Prob > chi2 =  0.161 
  gmm(L.realgrowth, collapse lag(2 4)) 
    Hansen test excluding group:     chi2(0)    =   0.00  Prob > chi2 =      . 
    Difference (null H = exogenous): chi2(4)    =   6.51  Prob > chi2 =  0.164 
  gmm(lngfcf_gdp, collapse lag(2 3)) 
    Hansen test excluding group:     chi2(1)    =   2.19  Prob > chi2 =  0.139 
    Difference (null H = exogenous): chi2(3)    =   4.32  Prob > chi2 =  0.229 
 
 
 
. xtabond2 realgrowth l.realgrowth reallngdpini popgrowth l.educ2_n l.educ3_n 
lngfcf_gdp fdexp fdgrant l.trade year3 year4 year5 year6 year7 year8 year9  
> year10 year11 year12 year13 year14  if realgrowth <=30, gmm( l.realgrowth, 
laglimits(2 4)collapse) gmm(lngfcf_gdp, laglimits(2 3) collapse)  iv( popgrowth  
> l.educ2_n l.educ3_n fdgrant fdexp l.trade year3-year14) two robust small 
Favoring speed over space. To switch, type or click on mata: mata set matafavor 
space, perm. 
 
Dynamic panel-data estimation, two-step system GMM 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Group variable: idall                           Number of obs      =       667 
Time variable : year                            Number of groups   =        64 
Number of instruments = 26                      Obs per group: min =         7 
F(21, 63)     =     60.70                                      avg =     10.42 
Prob > F      =     0.000                                      max =        12 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
             |              Corrected 
  realgrowth |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
  realgrowth | 
         L1. |  -.0215056    .257595    -0.08   0.934    -.5362681     .493257 
             | 
reallngdpini |  -14.23625   2.348011    -6.06   0.000    -18.92837   -9.544124 
   popgrowth |   .0322902   .1460944     0.22   0.826    -.2596561    .3242365 
             | 
     educ2_n | 
         L1. |  -.2424439   .0554968    -4.37   0.000    -.3533455   -.1315423 
             | 
     educ3_n | 
         L1. |   .1527514   .0318387     4.80   0.000     .0891268     .216376 
             | 
  lngfcf_gdp |   9.449319   4.546604     2.08   0.042     .3636563    18.53498 
       fdexp |   .1291647   .0411546     3.14   0.003     .0469237    .2114056 
     fdgrant |   .0390249   .0367483     1.06   0.292    -.0344107    .1124605 
             | 
       trade | 
         L1. |   .1277195   .0378302     3.38   0.001     .0521218    .2033172 
             | 
       year3 |  -12.37479   2.375815    -5.21   0.000    -17.12248   -7.627101 
       year4 |   -5.70202   3.259109    -1.75   0.085    -12.21483    .8107892 
       year5 |  -.9707039   2.739709    -0.35   0.724    -6.445575    4.504167 
       year6 |  -6.530602   1.641922    -3.98   0.000    -9.811722   -3.249482 
       year7 |  -7.205479   2.112292    -3.41   0.001    -11.42656     -2.9844 
       year8 |  -11.67449   2.167961    -5.39   0.000    -16.00682   -7.342166 
       year9 |  -25.28787   2.344321   -10.79   0.000    -29.97262   -20.60311 
      year10 |  -9.884496   6.053253    -1.63   0.107    -21.98096    2.211966 
      year11 |  -13.30136   2.647067    -5.02   0.000    -18.59111   -8.011622 
      year12 |  -18.10939   2.723987    -6.65   0.000    -23.55284   -12.66593 
      year13 |  -16.02542    3.76306    -4.26   0.000    -23.54529    -8.50554 
      year14 |  -14.85026   3.901311    -3.81   0.000    -22.64641   -7.054114 
       _cons |    89.5537   20.36747     4.40   0.000     48.85256    130.2548 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Instruments for first differences equation 
  Standard 
    D.(popgrowth L.educ2_n L.educ3_n fdgrant fdexp L.trade year3 year4 
    year5 year6 year7 year8 year9 year10 year11 year12 year13 year14) 
  GMM-type (missing=0, separate instruments for each period unless collapsed) 
    L(2/3).lngfcf_gdp collapsed 
    L(2/4).L.realgrowth collapsed 
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Instruments for levels equation 
  Standard 
    popgrowth L.educ2_n L.educ3_n fdgrant fdexp L.trade year3 year4 year5 
    year6 year7 year8 year9 year10 year11 year12 year13 year14 
    _cons 
  GMM-type (missing=0, separate instruments for each period unless collapsed) 
    DL.lngfcf_gdp collapsed 
    DL.L.realgrowth collapsed 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Arellano-Bond test for AR(1) in first differences: z =  -2.61  Pr > z =  0.009 
Arellano-Bond test for AR(2) in first differences: z =   0.94  Pr > z =  0.346 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Sargan test of overid. restrictions: chi2(4)    =   2.25  Prob > chi2 =  0.689 
  (Not robust, but not weakened by many instruments.) 
Hansen test of overid. restrictions: chi2(4)    =   2.77  Prob > chi2 =  0.596 
  (Robust, but weakened by many instruments.) 
 
Difference-in-Hansen tests of exogeneity of instrument subsets: 
  GMM instruments for levels 
    Hansen test excluding group:     chi2(2)    =   0.05  Prob > chi2 =  0.976 
    Difference (null H = exogenous): chi2(2)    =   2.73  Prob > chi2 =  0.256 
  gmm(L.realgrowth, collapse lag(2 4)) 
    Hansen test excluding group:     chi2(0)    =   0.00  Prob > chi2 =      . 
    Difference (null H = exogenous): chi2(4)    =   2.77  Prob > chi2 =  0.596 
  gmm(lngfcf_gdp, collapse lag(2 3)) 
    Hansen test excluding group:     chi2(1)    =   1.46  Prob > chi2 =  0.227 
    Difference (null H = exogenous): chi2(3)    =   1.32  Prob > chi2 =  0.725 
 
 
 
Appendix 5.6 Sensitivity Analysis 
Appendix 5.6.1 Optimal Size 
A. FE with Driscoll-Kraay SEs 
. xtscc realgrowth popgrowth educ2_n educ3_n lag1realgdp lngfcf_gdp fdexp fdgrant 
trade fdexp2 fdgrant2 year2 year3 year4 year5 year6 year7 year8 year9 year10 year11 
year12 year13 year14 if realgrowth<=30 & realgrowth>=-15, fe 
 
Regression with Driscoll-Kraay standard errors   Number of obs     =       669 
Method: Fixed-effects regression                 Number of groups  =        64 
Group variable (i): idall                        F( 23,    13)     =  87533.66 
maximum lag: 2                                   Prob > F          =    0.0000 
                                                 within R-squared  =    0.5593 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
             |             Drisc/Kraay 
  realgrowth |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
   popgrowth |   -.198711   .1225142    -1.62   0.129    -.4633868    .0659648 
     educ2_n |   .1001557    .060113     1.67   0.120    -.0297105     .230022 
     educ3_n |  -.1184599   .0520941    -2.27   0.041    -.2310025   -.0059174 
 lag1realgdp |  -.0023977   .0007995    -3.00   0.010    -.0041248   -.0006705 
  lngfcf_gdp |  -.5173298   2.237293    -0.23   0.821    -5.350707    4.316047 
       fdexp |   .6411635   .1149617     5.58   0.000     .3928038    .8895232 
     fdgrant |  -.1033778   .2265737    -0.46   0.656    -.5928604    .3861048 
       trade |  -.0887034    .135456    -0.65   0.524    -.3813383    .2039315 
      fdexp2 |  -.0047616   .0012529    -3.80   0.002    -.0074684   -.0020547 
    fdgrant2 |   .0008738   .0027308     0.32   0.754    -.0050258    .0067734 
       year2 |  -9.341347   1.940095    -4.81   0.000    -13.53267   -5.150027 
       year3 |  -15.02422   2.160188    -6.96   0.000    -19.69103   -10.35742 
       year4 |  -12.92551   2.782294    -4.65   0.000    -18.93629    -6.91473 
       year5 |  -5.080208   3.203886    -1.59   0.137    -12.00178    1.841368 
       year6 |  -5.984165   3.868662    -1.55   0.146     -14.3419     2.37357 
       year7 |  -3.539861   4.126774    -0.86   0.407    -12.45521    5.375494 
       year8 |  -5.689935   4.461562    -1.28   0.225    -15.32855    3.948684 
       year9 |  -18.00336   5.366733    -3.35   0.005    -29.59748   -6.409238 
      year10 |  -5.357159   5.304444    -1.01   0.331    -16.81672    6.102396 
      year11 |  -4.982377   6.166653    -0.81   0.434    -18.30462    8.339868 
      year12 |  -6.045656   6.549752    -0.92   0.373    -20.19553    8.104223 
      year13 |  -3.793933   9.009246    -0.42   0.681    -23.25722    15.66936 
      year14 |   .0137467   8.528404     0.00   0.999    -18.41075    18.43824 
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       _cons |   27.00123   17.27028     1.56   0.142    -10.30894    64.31141 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 
. testparm fdexp fdexp2 
 
 ( 1)  fdexp = 0 
 ( 2)  fdexp2 = 0 
 
       F(  2,    13) =   15.78 
            Prob > F =    0.0003 
 
. testparm fdgrant fdgrant2 
 
 ( 1)  fdgrant = 0 
 ( 2)  fdgrant2 = 0 
 
       F(  2,    13) =    0.12 
            Prob > F =    0.8866 
 
. xtscc realgrowth popgrowth educ2_n educ3_n lag1realgdp lngfcf_gdp fdtax fdgrant 
trade fdtax2 fdgrant2 year2 year3 year4 year5 year6 year7 year8 year9 year10 year11 
year12 year13 year14 if realgrowth<=30 & realgrowth>=-15, fe 
 
Regression with Driscoll-Kraay standard errors   Number of obs     =       669 
Method: Fixed-effects regression                 Number of groups  =        64 
Group variable (i): idall                        F( 23,    13)     = 162081.36 
maximum lag: 2                                   Prob > F          =    0.0000 
                                                 within R-squared  =    0.5830 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
             |             Drisc/Kraay 
  realgrowth |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
   popgrowth |  -.2540886   .0959436    -2.65   0.020    -.4613622   -.0468151 
     educ2_n |   .1330534    .052822     2.52   0.026     .0189384    .2471684 
     educ3_n |  -.0182939   .0478258    -0.38   0.708    -.1216153    .0850275 
 lag1realgdp |  -.0028191   .0007592    -3.71   0.003    -.0044593    -.001179 
  lngfcf_gdp |  -2.372337   2.326314    -1.02   0.326    -7.398031    2.653358 
       fdtax |   .7184224   .0884748     8.12   0.000     .5272843    .9095605 
     fdgrant |  -.0173847    .174387    -0.10   0.922    -.3941249    .3593555 
       trade |   -.085768   .1298386    -0.66   0.520    -.3662671    .1947312 
      fdtax2 |  -.0052033   .0014349    -3.63   0.003    -.0083032   -.0021033 
    fdgrant2 |  -.0001513   .0017866    -0.08   0.934    -.0040111    .0037084 
       year2 |  -9.173724   1.834139    -5.00   0.000    -13.13614   -5.211309 
       year3 |  -16.02809    2.01495    -7.95   0.000    -20.38112   -11.67505 
       year4 |  -14.23312   2.673236    -5.32   0.000    -20.00829   -8.457942 
       year5 |  -6.961606   3.123205    -2.23   0.044    -13.70888   -.2143321 
       year6 |  -7.111706    3.77798    -1.88   0.082    -15.27354    1.050123 
       year7 |  -3.925779   3.876667    -1.01   0.330    -12.30081     4.44925 
       year8 |  -6.150404   4.144424    -1.48   0.162    -15.10389     2.80308 
       year9 |  -19.19862   5.022845    -3.82   0.002    -30.04981   -8.347419 
      year10 |  -5.302528    5.15525    -1.03   0.322    -16.43977    5.834712 
      year11 |  -5.062523   5.951977    -0.85   0.410    -17.92099    7.795942 
      year12 |  -6.327666   6.287648    -1.01   0.333     -19.9113    7.255973 
      year13 |  -3.758737   8.919442    -0.42   0.680    -23.02802    15.51055 
      year14 |   .0838673   8.068103     0.01   0.992    -17.34621    17.51394 
       _cons |   25.06251   16.32119     1.54   0.149    -10.19728    60.32229 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 
testparm fdtax fdtax2 
 
 ( 1)  fdtax = 0 
 ( 2)  fdtax2 = 0 
 
       F(  2,    13) =   39.89 
            Prob > F =    0.0000 
 
. testparm fdgrant fdgrant2 
 
 ( 1)  fdgrant = 0 
 ( 2)  fdgrant2 = 0 
 
       F(  2,    13) =    0.06 
            Prob > F =    0.9376 
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B. FEVD 
. xtfevd realgrowth popgrowth educ2_n educ3_n  lngfcf_gdp reallngdpini fdexp fdgrant 
trade fdexp2 fdgrant2 year2 year3 year4 year5 year6 year7 year8 year9 year10 year11 
year12 year13 year14 if realgrowth<=30 & realgrowth>=-13, invariant(educ2_n educ3_n 
reallngdpini) 
 
panel fixed effects regression with vector decomposition 
 
degrees of freedom fevd    =      574           number of obs       =      661 
mean squared error         = 27.41468           F( 25, 574)         = 23.66684 
root mean squared error    = 5.235903           Prob > F            = 2.65e-68 
Residual Sum of Squares    =  18121.1           R-squared           = .5777736 
Total Sum of Squares       = 42917.98           adj. R-squared      = .5145132 
Estimation Sum of Squares  = 24796.88 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
             |                fevd 
  realgrowth |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
   popgrowth |  -.1906312   .1005503    -1.90   0.058    -.3881226    .0068602 
  lngfcf_gdp |   -.129356   2.106047    -0.06   0.951    -4.265854    4.007142 
       fdexp |   .6815049   .1102378     6.18   0.000     .4649861    .8980236 
     fdgrant |   -.068517   .1078979    -0.64   0.526    -.2804398    .1434058 
       trade |  -.0322918   .0390797    -0.83   0.409    -.1090486    .0444649 
      fdexp2 |  -.0056519   .0011459    -4.93   0.000    -.0079026   -.0034012 
    fdgrant2 |  -.0001639    .001089    -0.15   0.880    -.0023028     .001975 
       year2 |  -11.95107    1.71102    -6.98   0.000     -15.3117   -8.590448 
       year3 |  -18.69567   1.632928   -11.45   0.000    -21.90292   -15.48843 
       year4 |  -17.33311   1.844936    -9.39   0.000    -20.95675   -13.70946 
       year5 |  -10.58136   1.934019    -5.47   0.000    -14.37998   -6.782745 
       year6 |  -13.46657   2.001244    -6.73   0.000    -17.39722   -9.535915 
       year7 |  -12.46723   2.071747    -6.02   0.000    -16.53636   -8.398098 
       year8 |  -16.56103   2.087664    -7.93   0.000    -20.66142   -12.46064 
       year9 |  -28.80104   2.024002   -14.23   0.000     -32.7764   -24.82569 
      year10 |   -15.7831   2.216271    -7.12   0.000    -20.13609   -11.43011 
      year11 |  -17.36217   2.501773    -6.94   0.000    -22.27592   -12.44842 
      year12 |   -19.8833   2.528844    -7.86   0.000    -24.85022   -14.91639 
      year13 |  -19.65344   3.057341    -6.43   0.000    -25.65838    -13.6485 
      year14 |  -17.24099   3.611802    -4.77   0.000    -24.33495   -10.14703 
     educ2_n |   .0288144    .054925     0.52   0.600     -.079064    .1366928 
     educ3_n |   .0145384   .0238332     0.61   0.542    -.0322726    .0613494 
reallngdpini |   -3.53224   1.612384    -2.19   0.029    -6.699131   -.3653486 
         eta |          1          .        .       .            .           . 
       _cons |   39.99153   13.12356     3.05   0.002     14.21548    65.76758 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 
. testparm fdgrant fdgrant2 
 ( 1)  fdgrant = 0 
 ( 2)  fdgrant2 = 0 
       F(  2,   574) =    0.98 
            Prob > F =    0.3763 
 
. testparm fdexp fdexp2 
 ( 1)  fdexp = 0 
 ( 2)  fdexp2 = 0 
       F(  2,   574) =   25.51 
            Prob > F =    0.0000 
 
. xtfevd realgrowth popgrowth educ2_n educ3_n  lngfcf_gdp reallngdpini fdtax fdgrant 
trade fdtax2 fdgrant2 year2 year3 year4 year5 year6 year7 year8 year9 year10 year11 
year12 year13 year14 if realgrowth<=30 & realgrowth>=-13, invariant(educ2_n educ3_n 
reallngdpini) 
 
panel fixed effects regression with vector decomposition 
 
degrees of freedom fevd    =      574           number of obs       =      661 
mean squared error         = 27.10927           F( 25, 574)         =  26.9489 
root mean squared error    = 5.206656           Prob > F            = 3.75e-76 
Residual Sum of Squares    = 17919.23           R-squared           = .5824774 
Total Sum of Squares       = 42917.98           adj. R-squared      = .5199218 
Estimation Sum of Squares  = 24998.76 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
             |                fevd 
  realgrowth |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
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-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
   popgrowth |  -.2457157    .099645    -2.47   0.014     -.441429   -.0500024 
  lngfcf_gdp |   -1.55114   2.147745    -0.72   0.470    -5.769537    2.667257 
       fdtax |   .6323086   .0816183     7.75   0.000     .4720017    .7926156 
     fdgrant |  -.0286904   .1012135    -0.28   0.777    -.2274844    .1701036 
       trade |  -.0292962   .0379619    -0.77   0.441    -.1038575     .045265 
      fdtax2 |  -.0051969   .0008613    -6.03   0.000    -.0068886   -.0035051 
    fdgrant2 |  -.0010266    .001062    -0.97   0.334    -.0031124    .0010592 
       year2 |  -12.11531   1.661276    -7.29   0.000    -15.37823   -8.852387 
       year3 |  -19.55209   1.621788   -12.06   0.000    -22.73745   -16.36673 
       year4 |   -18.0773   1.803087   -10.03   0.000    -21.61875   -14.53584 
       year5 |  -11.99898   1.913218    -6.27   0.000    -15.75674   -8.241214 
       year6 |  -14.50997   1.934453    -7.50   0.000    -18.30944    -10.7105 
       year7 |  -13.01092   1.930252    -6.74   0.000    -16.80214   -9.219704 
       year8 |   -17.3858   1.948929    -8.92   0.000     -21.2137   -13.55789 
       year9 |  -30.52404    1.92071   -15.89   0.000    -34.29652   -26.75157 
      year10 |  -16.23704   2.036659    -7.97   0.000    -20.23725   -12.23683 
      year11 |    -18.074   2.310298    -7.82   0.000    -22.61167   -13.53633 
      year12 |  -20.96434   2.371176    -8.84   0.000    -25.62158    -16.3071 
      year13 |  -21.15489   2.805745    -7.54   0.000    -26.66567   -15.64411 
      year14 |   -18.4427   3.482923    -5.30   0.000    -25.28352   -11.60187 
     educ2_n |   .0581542   .0473332     1.23   0.220    -.0348132    .1511215 
     educ3_n |   .0130512   .0222232     0.59   0.557    -.0305975    .0566999 
reallngdpini |  -4.560088   1.565154    -2.91   0.004    -7.634215   -1.485961 
         eta |          1          .        .       .            .           . 
       _cons |   53.13847   12.76808     4.16   0.000     28.06061    78.21633 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 
. testparm fdtax fdtax2 
 ( 1)  fdtax = 0 
 ( 2)  fdtax2 = 0 
       F(  2,   574) =   34.48 
            Prob > F =    0.0000 
 
C. IV 
 
. xtivreg2 realgrowth lag1realgdp popgrowth fdexp fdexp2 (lngfcf_gdp trade educ2_n 
educ3_n fdgrant2 fdgrant = l.fdgrant2 l2.fdgrant2 l2.fdgrant l.fdgrant  l2.trade 
l.educ2_n l.educ3_n l.lngfcf_gdp ) year3 year4 year5 year6 year7 year8 year9 year10 
year11 year12 year13 year14 if realgrowth >=-15 & realgrowth <=30,  fe  endog(fdgrant 
educ2_n educ3_n lngfcf_gdp trade fdgrant2 )small Warning - collinearities detected Vars 
dropped:       year14 
 
FIXED EFFECTS ESTIMATION 
------------------------ 
Number of groups =        64                    Obs per group: min =         5 
                                                               avg =       8.5 
                                                               max =        10 
Warning - collinearities detected 
Vars dropped:  year14 
 
IV (2SLS) estimation 
-------------------- 
 
Estimates efficient for homoskedasticity only 
Statistics consistent for homoskedasticity only 
 
                                                      Number of obs =      541 
                                                      F( 21,   456) =    20.54 
                                                      Prob > F      =   0.0000 
Total (centered) SS     =  33361.77512                Centered R2   =   0.3873 
Total (uncentered) SS   =  33361.77512                Uncentered R2 =   0.3873 
Residual SS             =  20440.47747                Root MSE      =    6.695 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
  realgrowth |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
  lngfcf_gdp |  -.1033773   5.782591    -0.02   0.986    -11.46721    11.26046 
       trade |   .1213971   .1984709     0.61   0.541     -.268634    .5114281 
     educ2_n |   .1601445   .0598899     2.67   0.008     .0424501    .2778389 
     educ3_n |  -.0395555   .0894342    -0.44   0.658    -.2153098    .1361988 
    fdgrant2 |    .006393    .010865     0.59   0.557    -.0149587    .0277447 
     fdgrant |  -1.428705   .7542744    -1.89   0.059     -2.91099    .0535801 
 lag1realgdp |  -.0029946   .0006713    -4.46   0.000    -.0043137   -.0016754 
   popgrowth |  -.3255925   .1378041    -2.36   0.019    -.5964024   -.0547826 
       fdexp |   .7860238   .4932965     1.59   0.112    -.1833927     1.75544 
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      fdexp2 |  -.0076939   .0046152    -1.67   0.096    -.0167636    .0013759 
       year3 |   5.996668   15.41725     0.39   0.697      -24.301    36.29434 
       year4 |  -.1057988   10.35349    -0.01   0.992    -20.45227    20.24067 
       year5 |   2.715491   8.257567     0.33   0.742    -13.51211     18.9431 
       year6 |   1.972557   6.062706     0.33   0.745    -9.941752    13.88687 
       year7 |   4.731118   4.976285     0.95   0.342    -5.048177    14.51041 
       year8 |   2.652911    5.01399     0.53   0.597    -7.200481     12.5063 
       year9 |  -8.561766   6.699484    -1.28   0.202    -21.72746    4.603927 
      year10 |    1.51202   4.783017     0.32   0.752     -7.88747    10.91151 
      year11 |   .1621441   2.769305     0.06   0.953    -5.280038    5.604326 
      year12 |  -2.232888   2.452859    -0.91   0.363    -7.053197    2.587421 
      year13 |  -8.028426   2.729791    -2.94   0.003    -13.39296   -2.663896 
      year14 |          0  (omitted) 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Underidentification test (Anderson canon. corr. LM statistic):          12.786 
                                                   Chi-sq(3) P-val =    0.0051 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Weak identification test (Cragg-Donald Wald F statistic):                1.563 
Stock-Yogo weak ID test critical values:                       <not available> 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Sargan statistic (overidentification test of all instruments):           2.814 
                                                   Chi-sq(2) P-val =    0.2449 
-endog- option: 
Endogeneity test of endogenous regressors:                              50.362 
                                                   Chi-sq(6) P-val =    0.0000 
Regressors tested:    fdgrant educ2_n educ3_n lngfcf_gdp trade fdgrant2 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Instrumented:         lngfcf_gdp trade educ2_n educ3_n fdgrant2 fdgrant 
Included instruments: lag1realgdp popgrowth fdexp fdexp2 year3 year4 year5 
                      year6 year7 year8 year9 year10 year11 year12 year13 
Excluded instruments: L.fdgrant2 L2.fdgrant2 L2.fdgrant L.fdgrant 
                      L2.trade L.educ2_n L.educ3_n L.lngfcf_gdp 
Dropped collinear:    year14 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 
 
. xtivreg2 realgrowth lag1realgdp popgrowth (lngfcf_gdp trade educ2_n educ3_n fdgrant 
fdtax fdtax2 fdgrant2 = l.fdgrant2 l.fdtax l.fdgrant l.trade l.educ2_n l2.educ2_n 
l.lngfcf_gdp l2.fdtax l.educ3_n ) year4 year5 year6 year7 year8 year9 year10 year11 
year12 year13 year14 if realgrowth<=30 & realgrowth >=-15,  fe  endog(fdgrant educ2_n 
educ3_n lngfcf_gdp trade fdgrant fdtax fdtax2 fdgrant2) small 
 
FIXED EFFECTS ESTIMATION 
------------------------ 
Number of groups =        64                    Obs per group: min =         5 
                                                               avg =       8.5 
                                                               max =        10 
 
IV (2SLS) estimation 
-------------------- 
 
Estimates efficient for homoskedasticity only 
Statistics consistent for homoskedasticity only 
 
                                                      Number of obs =      542 
                                                      F( 21,   457) =    11.92 
                                                      Prob > F      =   0.0000 
Total (centered) SS     =  33375.70079                Centered R2   =  -0.0914 
Total (uncentered) SS   =  33375.70079                Uncentered R2 =  -0.0914 
Residual SS             =  36425.42484                Root MSE      =    8.928 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
  realgrowth |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
  lngfcf_gdp |  -9.139434   7.597046    -1.20   0.230    -24.06891    5.790041 
       trade |  -.0092173   .2453016    -0.04   0.970    -.4912762    .4728416 
     educ2_n |   .5257241   .1980942     2.65   0.008     .1364356    .9150126 
     educ3_n |   .0627073   .1633208     0.38   0.701    -.2582456    .3836601 
     fdgrant |  -.5312973   1.682389    -0.32   0.752    -3.837475     2.77488 
       fdtax |   .7671649   .7252065     1.06   0.291     -.657988    2.192318 
      fdtax2 |   .0034086   .0095068     0.36   0.720     -.015274    .0220911 
    fdgrant2 |   -.001702   .0205153    -0.08   0.934    -.0420181     .038614 
 lag1realgdp |  -.0062373   .0020731    -3.01   0.003    -.0103112   -.0021634 
   popgrowth |  -.5904861   .2208572    -2.67   0.008    -1.024508   -.1564645 
       year4 |  -10.75428    5.24254    -2.05   0.041    -21.05675   -.4518019 
       year5 |  -6.622879   5.549429    -1.19   0.233    -17.52844    4.282684 
       year6 |   -.751315   8.395117    -0.09   0.929    -17.24914    15.74651 
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       year7 |   4.191678   10.07343     0.42   0.678    -15.60432    23.98767 
       year8 |   2.617504   9.625094     0.27   0.786    -16.29743    21.53244 
       year9 |  -5.178494   10.76145    -0.48   0.631    -26.32656    15.96957 
      year10 |   5.028532   11.41176     0.44   0.660    -17.39751    27.45457 
      year11 |   5.360189   14.99346     0.36   0.721    -24.10449    34.82487 
      year12 |   1.672231   15.12511     0.11   0.912    -28.05116    31.39562 
      year13 |   20.31775   26.96984     0.75   0.452    -32.68252    73.31802 
      year14 |   7.336661   17.25309     0.43   0.671    -26.56857    41.24189 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Underidentification test (Anderson canon. corr. LM statistic):           4.490 
                                                   Chi-sq(2) P-val =    0.1059 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Weak identification test (Cragg-Donald Wald F statistic):                0.480 
Stock-Yogo weak ID test critical values:                       <not available> 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Sargan statistic (overidentification test of all instruments):           0.034 
                                                   Chi-sq(1) P-val =    0.8529 
-endog- option: 
Endogeneity test of endogenous regressors:                              81.567 
                                                   Chi-sq(8) P-val =    0.0000 
Regressors tested:    fdgrant educ2_n educ3_n lngfcf_gdp trade fdtax 
                      fdtax2 fdgrant2 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Instrumented:         lngfcf_gdp trade educ2_n educ3_n fdgrant fdtax 
                      fdtax2 fdgrant2 
Included instruments: lag1realgdp popgrowth year4 year5 year6 year7 year8 year9 
                      year10 year11 year12 year13 year14 
Excluded instruments: L.fdgrant2 L.fdtax L.fdgrant L.trade L.educ2_n 
                      L2.educ2_n L.lngfcf_gdp L2.fdtax L.educ3_n 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 
D. Dynamic Baseline Specification 
 
. xtabond2 realgrowth l.realgrowth reallngdpini popgrowth l.educ2_n l.educ3_n 
lngfcf_gdp fdtax fdtax2 fdgrant l.trade year2 year3  
> year4 year5 year6 year7 year8 year9 year10 year11 year12 year13 year14  if 
realgrowth <=30, gmm( l.realgrowth, laglimits(2 3)collapse) 
>  gmm(lngfcf_gdp, laglimits(2 4) collapse)  iv( popgrowth l.educ2_n l.educ3_n 
fdgrant fdtax fdtax2 fdgrant2 l.trade  year2-year 
> 14) two robust small 
Favoring speed over space. To switch, type or click on mata: mata set matafavor 
space, perm. 
year11 dropped due to collinearity 
Warning: Two-step estimated covariance matrix of moments is singular. 
  Using a generalized inverse to calculate optimal weighting matrix for two-step 
estimation. 
  Difference-in-Sargan/Hansen statistics may be negative. 
 
Dynamic panel-data estimation, two-step system GMM 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Group variable: idall                           Number of obs      =       667 
Time variable : year                            Number of groups   =        64 
Number of instruments = 28                      Obs per group: min =         7 
F(22, 63)     =     74.07                                      avg =     10.42 
Prob > F      =     0.000                                      max =        12 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
             |              Corrected 
  realgrowth |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
  realgrowth | 
         L1. |  -.1157926   .2244159    -0.52   0.608     -.564252    .3326668 
             | 
reallngdpini |  -14.67169   2.048484    -7.16   0.000    -18.76526   -10.57812 
   popgrowth |   .0163364   .1220877     0.13   0.894    -.2276363    .2603091 
             | 
     educ2_n | 
         L1. |  -.2423469   .0468948    -5.17   0.000    -.3360587   -.1486352 
             | 
     educ3_n | 
         L1. |   .1304509   .0247167     5.28   0.000     .0810584    .1798434 
             | 
  lngfcf_gdp |   7.220434   4.651214     1.55   0.126    -2.074275    16.51514 
       fdtax |   .5547213   .1046631     5.30   0.000     .3455687    .7638738 
      fdtax2 |  -.0042461   .0010227    -4.15   0.000    -.0062898   -.0022023 
     fdgrant |   .0553721   .0402531     1.38   0.174    -.0250673    .1358115 
             | 
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       trade | 
         L1. |   .1298575   .0331746     3.91   0.000     .0635634    .1961516 
             | 
       year2 |   15.20275   2.810111     5.41   0.000     9.587193    20.81831 
       year3 |   1.556475   1.142458     1.36   0.178    -.7265458    3.839496 
       year4 |   6.095721   1.490798     4.09   0.000     3.116598    9.074843 
       year5 |    11.7643   1.081126    10.88   0.000     9.603842    13.92476 
       year6 |   7.606946   1.929089     3.94   0.000      3.75197    11.46192 
       year7 |   6.604564   1.348951     4.90   0.000     3.908901    9.300227 
       year8 |   1.628844   1.453549     1.12   0.267    -1.275841    4.533529 
       year9 |   -13.3573   .9579401   -13.94   0.000    -15.27159   -11.44301 
      year10 |   1.984235   3.416297     0.58   0.563     -4.84269    8.811159 
      year12 |    -4.9918   .8278388    -6.03   0.000    -6.646104   -3.337496 
      year13 |  -3.956444   1.376828    -2.87   0.006    -6.707816   -1.205072 
      year14 |   -3.74277   1.331327    -2.81   0.007    -6.403214   -1.082326 
       _cons |   80.22454   19.74329     4.06   0.000     40.77073    119.6783 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Instruments for first differences equation 
  Standard 
    D.(popgrowth L.educ2_n L.educ3_n fdgrant fdtax fdtax2 fdgrant2 
    L.trade year2 year3 year4 year5 year6 year7 year8 year9 year10 year11 
    year12 year13 year14) 
  GMM-type (missing=0, separate instruments for each period unless collapsed) 
    L(2/4).lngfcf_gdp collapsed 
    L(2/3).L.realgrowth collapsed 
Instruments for levels equation 
  Standard 
    popgrowth L.educ2_n L.educ3_n fdgrant fdtax fdtax2 fdgrant2 
    L.trade year2 year3 year4 year5 year6 year7 year8 year9 year10 year11 
    year12 year13 year14 
    _cons 
  GMM-type (missing=0, separate instruments for each period unless collapsed) 
    DL.lngfcf_gdp collapsed 
    DL.L.realgrowth collapsed 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Arellano-Bond test for AR(1) in first differences: z =  -2.58  Pr > z =  0.010 
Arellano-Bond test for AR(2) in first differences: z =   0.61  Pr > z =  0.543 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Sargan test of overid. restrictions: chi2(5)    =   3.88  Prob > chi2 =  0.567 
  (Not robust, but not weakened by many instruments.) 
Hansen test of overid. restrictions: chi2(5)    =   4.07  Prob > chi2 =  0.539 
  (Robust, but weakened by many instruments.) 
 
Difference-in-Hansen tests of exogeneity of instrument subsets: 
  GMM instruments for levels 
    Hansen test excluding group:     chi2(3)    =   0.08  Prob > chi2 =  0.994 
    Difference (null H = exogenous): chi2(2)    =   3.99  Prob > chi2 =  0.136 
  gmm(L.realgrowth, collapse lag(2 3)) 
    Hansen test excluding group:     chi2(2)    =   2.16  Prob > chi2 =  0.340 
    Difference (null H = exogenous): chi2(3)    =   1.91  Prob > chi2 =  0.590 
  gmm(lngfcf_gdp, collapse lag(2 4)) 
    Hansen test excluding group:     chi2(1)    =   0.18  Prob > chi2 =  0.669 
    Difference (null H = exogenous): chi2(4)    =   3.89  Prob > chi2 =  0.421 
 
. xtabond2 realgrowth l.realgrowth reallngdpini popgrowth l.educ2_n l.educ3_n 
lngfcf_gdp fdexp fdgrant fdexp2 fdgrant2 l.trade y 
> ear2 year3 year4 year5 year6 year7 year8 year9 year10 year11 year12 year13 year14  
if realgrowth <=30, gmm( l.realgrowth, laglimits(2  
> 4)collapse) gmm(lngfcf_gdp, laglimits(2 3) collapse)  iv( popgrowth l.educ2_n 
l.educ3_n fdgrant fdexp fdexp2 fdgrant2 l.trade  
> year2-year14) two robust small 
Favoring speed over space. To switch, type or click on mata: mata set matafavor 
space, perm. 
year11 dropped due to collinearity 
Warning: Two-step estimated covariance matrix of moments is singular. 
  Using a generalized inverse to calculate optimal weighting matrix for two-step 
estimation. 
  Difference-in-Sargan/Hansen statistics may be negative. 
 
Dynamic panel-data estimation, two-step system GMM 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Group variable: idall                           Number of obs      =       667 
Time variable : year                            Number of groups   =        64 
Number of instruments = 28                      Obs per group: min =         7 
F(23, 63)     =     86.52                                      avg =     10.42 
Prob > F      =     0.000                                      max =        12 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
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             |              Corrected 
  realgrowth |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
  realgrowth | 
         L1. |   .0436167   .2713048     0.16   0.873    -.4985427    .5857761 
             | 
reallngdpini |  -12.14422   2.850419    -4.26   0.000    -17.84033   -6.448117 
   popgrowth |   .0611839   .1379818     0.44   0.659    -.2145507    .3369185 
             | 
     educ2_n | 
         L1. |  -.2438132   .0533728    -4.57   0.000    -.3504701   -.1371562 
             | 
     educ3_n | 
         L1. |   .1297924   .0319017     4.07   0.000     .0660419    .1935429 
             | 
  lngfcf_gdp |   8.949275   4.752091     1.88   0.064     -.547021    18.44557 
       fdexp |   .4269111   .0982943     4.34   0.000     .2304857    .6233366 
     fdgrant |  -.0418303    .118442    -0.35   0.725    -.2785177    .1948571 
      fdexp2 |  -.0033171   .0010792    -3.07   0.003    -.0054737   -.0011605 
    fdgrant2 |   .0013986   .0014687     0.95   0.345    -.0015364    .0043335 
             | 
       trade | 
         L1. |   .1175025   .0427232     2.75   0.008      .032127    .2028779 
             | 
       year2 |   13.72487   2.906984     4.72   0.000     7.915723    19.53401 
       year3 |   1.836656   1.013608     1.81   0.075    -.1888774    3.862189 
       year4 |   7.538822   1.617294     4.66   0.000     4.306917    10.77073 
       year5 |   12.48378   1.137344    10.98   0.000     10.21098    14.75658 
       year6 |    6.65623   2.001277     3.33   0.001     2.656997    10.65546 
       year7 |   6.132008   1.285697     4.77   0.000     3.562748    8.701268 
       year8 |   1.803592   1.584676     1.14   0.259    -1.363131    4.970314 
       year9 |  -12.25255   .9061575   -13.52   0.000    -14.06337   -10.44174 
      year10 |   4.356402   4.184277     1.04   0.302    -4.005208    12.71801 
      year12 |  -4.094374   1.091043    -3.75   0.000    -6.274649     -1.9141 
      year13 |  -2.547082   1.697072    -1.50   0.138    -5.938409    .8442454 
      year14 |  -1.619921   1.690332    -0.96   0.342     -4.99778    1.757937 
       _cons |   57.78776   25.57141     2.26   0.027     6.687378    108.8881 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Instruments for first differences equation 
  Standard 
    D.(popgrowth L.educ2_n L.educ3_n fdgrant fdexp fdexp2 fdgrant2 
    L.trade year2 year3 year4 year5 year6 year7 year8 year9 year10 year11 
    year12 year13 year14) 
  GMM-type (missing=0, separate instruments for each period unless collapsed) 
    L(2/3).lngfcf_gdp collapsed 
    L(2/4).L.realgrowth collapsed 
Instruments for levels equation 
  Standard 
    popgrowth L.educ2_n L.educ3_n fdgrant fdexp fdexp2 fdgrant2 
    L.trade year2 year3 year4 year5 year6 year7 year8 year9 year10 year11 
    year12 year13 year14 
    _cons 
  GMM-type (missing=0, separate instruments for each period unless collapsed) 
    DL.lngfcf_gdp collapsed 
    DL.L.realgrowth collapsed 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Arellano-Bond test for AR(1) in first differences: z =  -2.60  Pr > z =  0.009 
Arellano-Bond test for AR(2) in first differences: z =   1.06  Pr > z =  0.288 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Sargan test of overid. restrictions: chi2(4)    =   1.62  Prob > chi2 =  0.805 
  (Not robust, but not weakened by many instruments.) 
Hansen test of overid. restrictions: chi2(4)    =   1.47  Prob > chi2 =  0.832 
  (Robust, but weakened by many instruments.) 
 
Difference-in-Hansen tests of exogeneity of instrument subsets: 
  GMM instruments for levels 
    Hansen test excluding group:     chi2(2)    =   0.09  Prob > chi2 =  0.956 
    Difference (null H = exogenous): chi2(2)    =   1.38  Prob > chi2 =  0.501 
  gmm(L.realgrowth, collapse lag(2 4)) 
    Hansen test excluding group:     chi2(0)    =   0.00  Prob > chi2 =      . 
    Difference (null H = exogenous): chi2(4)    =   1.47  Prob > chi2 =  0.832 
  gmm(lngfcf_gdp, collapse lag(2 3)) 
    Hansen test excluding group:     chi2(1)    =   0.91  Prob > chi2 =  0.339 
    Difference (null H = exogenous): chi2(3)    =   0.56  Prob > chi2 =  0.906 
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E. Dynamic – Endogenous FD measures 
 
. xtabond2 realgrowth l.realgrowth reallngdpini popgrowth l.educ2_n l.educ3_n 
lngfcf_gdp fdexp l.fdgrant l.fdexp2 l.fdgrant2 l.trade year2 year3 year4 year5 year6 
year7 year8 year9 year10 year11 year12 year13 year14  if realgrowth <=30, gmm( 
l.realgrowth, laglimits(2 4)collapse) gmm(lngfcf_gdp, laglimits(3 4) collapse)  iv( 
popgrowth l.educ2_n l.educ3_n l.fdgrant fdexp l.fdgrant2 l.fdexp2 l.trade year2-year14) 
two robust small 
Favoring speed over space. To switch, type or click on mata: mata set matafavor 
space, perm. 
year6 dropped due to collinearity 
Warning: Two-step estimated covariance matrix of moments is singular. 
  Using a generalized inverse to calculate optimal weighting matrix for two-step 
estimation. 
  Difference-in-Sargan/Hansen statistics may be negative. 
 
Dynamic panel-data estimation, two-step system GMM 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Group variable: idall                           Number of obs      =       652 
Time variable : year                            Number of groups   =        64 
Number of instruments = 28                      Obs per group: min =         6 
F(23, 63)     =     70.63                                      avg =     10.19 
Prob > F      =     0.000                                      max =        12 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
             |              Corrected 
  realgrowth |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
  realgrowth | 
         L1. |  -.0232712   .3064143    -0.08   0.940    -.6355912    .5890489 
             | 
reallngdpini |  -13.56606   4.526486    -3.00   0.004    -22.61152   -4.520594 
   popgrowth |    .046976   .1373832     0.34   0.734    -.2275623    .3215144 
             | 
     educ2_n | 
         L1. |   .0145813   .0685469     0.21   0.832    -.1223988    .1515615 
             | 
     educ3_n | 
         L1. |   .0742745   .0393647     1.89   0.064    -.0043897    .1529386 
             | 
  lngfcf_gdp |  -9.617048   7.682723    -1.25   0.215    -24.96974    5.735649 
       fdexp |   .1577248   .0422377     3.73   0.000     .0733195    .2421301 
             | 
     fdgrant | 
         L1. |  -.0588978   .1975887    -0.30   0.767    -.4537474    .3359517 
             | 
      fdexp2 | 
         L1. |   .0010353   .0004286     2.42   0.019     .0001788    .0018919 
             | 
    fdgrant2 | 
         L1. |  -.0011835   .0022125    -0.53   0.595    -.0056049    .0032379 
             | 
       trade | 
         L1. |    .129269   .0837192     1.54   0.128    -.0380304    .2965683 
             | 
       year2 |   6.238643   2.374704     2.63   0.011     1.493176    10.98411 
       year3 |  -4.491915   3.989142    -1.13   0.264    -12.46358    3.479749 
       year4 |  -1.664149   3.727192    -0.45   0.657    -9.112348    5.784051 
       year5 |   3.735068   2.324303     1.61   0.113    -.9096821    8.379818 
       year7 |   .6062976   1.173518     0.52   0.607    -1.738791    2.951386 
       year8 |  -4.997195   2.276533    -2.20   0.032    -9.546483   -.4479064 
       year9 |  -21.09173   2.275749    -9.27   0.000    -25.63945   -16.54401 
      year10 |  -4.880125   6.581363    -0.74   0.461    -18.03193    8.271679 
      year11 |  -7.718016   2.137422    -3.61   0.001    -11.98931   -3.446719 
      year12 |  -12.81088   2.809303    -4.56   0.000    -18.42483   -7.196941 
      year13 |  -11.37695   3.854941    -2.95   0.004    -19.08043   -3.673462 
      year14 |  -8.604567   3.965296    -2.17   0.034    -16.52858   -.6805553 
       _cons |    131.944   41.70563     3.16   0.002     48.60197    215.2861 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Instruments for first differences equation 
  Standard 
    D.(popgrowth L.educ2_n L.educ3_n L.fdgrant fdexp L.fdgrant2 
    L.fdexp2 L.trade year2 year3 year4 year5 year6 year7 year8 year9 year10 
    year11 year12 year13 year14) 
  GMM-type (missing=0, separate instruments for each period unless collapsed) 
    L(3/4).lngfcf_gdp collapsed 
    L(2/4).L.realgrowth collapsed 
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Instruments for levels equation 
  Standard 
    popgrowth L.educ2_n L.educ3_n L.fdgrant fdexp L.fdgrant2 L.fdexp2 
    L.trade year2 year3 year4 year5 year6 year7 year8 year9 year10 year11 
    year12 year13 year14 
    _cons 
  GMM-type (missing=0, separate instruments for each period unless collapsed) 
    DL2.lngfcf_gdp collapsed 
    DL.L.realgrowth collapsed 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Arellano-Bond test for AR(1) in first differences: z =  -1.77  Pr > z =  0.076 
Arellano-Bond test for AR(2) in first differences: z =   0.30  Pr > z =  0.763 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Sargan test of overid. restrictions: chi2(4)    =   2.85  Prob > chi2 =  0.584 
  (Not robust, but not weakened by many instruments.) 
Hansen test of overid. restrictions: chi2(4)    =   5.74  Prob > chi2 =  0.280 
  (Robust, but weakened by many instruments.) 
 
Difference-in-Hansen tests of exogeneity of instrument subsets: 
  GMM instruments for levels 
    Hansen test excluding group:     chi2(2)    =   0.45  Prob > chi2 =  0.798 
    Difference (null H = exogenous): chi2(2)    =   5.29  Prob > chi2 =  0.071 
  gmm(L.realgrowth, collapse lag(2 4)) 
    Hansen test excluding group:     chi2(0)    =   0.00  Prob > chi2 =      . 
    Difference (null H = exogenous): chi2(4)    =   5.74  Prob > chi2 =  0.220 
  gmm(lngfcf_gdp, collapse lag(3 4)) 
    Hansen test excluding group:     chi2(1)    =   0.13  Prob > chi2 =  0.716 
    Difference (null H = exogenous): chi2(3)    =   5.60  Prob > chi2 =  0.133 
 
. xtabond2 realgrowth l.realgrowth reallngdpini popgrowth l.educ2_n l.educ3_n 
lngfcf_gdp l.fdtax l.fdgrant l.fdtax2 l.fdgrant2 l.trade year2 year3 year4 year5 year6 
year7 year8 year9 year10 year11 year12 year13 year14  if realgrowth <=30, gmm( 
l.realgrowth, laglimits(2 4)collapse) gmm(lngfcf_gdp, laglimits(2 4) collapse)  iv( 
popgrowth l.educ2_n l.educ3_n l.fdgrant l.fdtax l.trade l.fdtax2 l.fdgrant2  year2-
year14) two robust small 
Favoring speed over space. To switch, type or click on mata: mata set matafavor 
space, perm. 
year10 dropped due to collinearity 
Warning: Two-step estimated covariance matrix of moments is singular. 
  Using a generalized inverse to calculate optimal weighting matrix for two-step 
estimation. 
  Difference-in-Sargan/Hansen statistics may be negative. 
 
Dynamic panel-data estimation, two-step system GMM 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Group variable: idall                           Number of obs      =       666 
Time variable : year                            Number of groups   =        64 
Number of instruments = 29                      Obs per group: min =         7 
F(23, 63)     =     83.41                                      avg =     10.41 
Prob > F      =     0.000                                      max =        12 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
             |              Corrected 
  realgrowth |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
  realgrowth | 
         L1. |   .2696413   .3610466     0.75   0.458    -.4518528    .9911354 
             | 
reallngdpini |  -.9866165   2.777191    -0.36   0.724    -6.536391    4.563158 
   popgrowth |   .0063276   .1606988     0.04   0.969    -.3148033    .3274585 
             | 
     educ2_n | 
         L1. |   -.090423   .0528053    -1.71   0.092     -.195946       .0151 
             | 
     educ3_n | 
         L1. |   .0190089   .0276496     0.69   0.494    -.0362445    .0742624 
             | 
  lngfcf_gdp |   14.10446   4.648088     3.03   0.003     4.815995    23.39292 
             | 
       fdtax | 
         L1. |  -.0070178   .2369757    -0.03   0.976     -.480576    .4665404 
             | 
     fdgrant | 
         L1. |  -.3999493   .0958296    -4.17   0.000    -.5914496   -.2084491 
             | 
      fdtax2 | 
         L1. |  -.0000139   .0021622    -0.01   0.995    -.0043346    .0043068 
             | 
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    fdgrant2 | 
         L1. |   .0047801   .0011428     4.18   0.000     .0024965    .0070637 
             | 
       trade | 
         L1. |  -.0164008   .0270896    -0.61   0.547     -.070535    .0377334 
             | 
       year2 |   -3.79128   11.27241    -0.34   0.738     -26.3174    18.73484 
       year3 |  -11.99964   7.119756    -1.69   0.097    -26.22734    2.228057 
       year4 |  -1.185613   5.081242    -0.23   0.816    -11.33967    8.968439 
       year5 |   4.057546   5.955268     0.68   0.498    -7.843107     15.9582 
       year6 |   -3.07521   8.435847    -0.36   0.717     -19.9329    13.78248 
       year7 |  -1.570722   7.307869    -0.21   0.831    -16.17433    13.03289 
       year8 |  -6.540273   7.520946    -0.87   0.388    -21.56969    8.489139 
       year9 |  -19.02598   5.624997    -3.38   0.001    -30.26663   -7.785316 
      year11 |  -5.827564   5.533992    -1.05   0.296    -16.88636    5.231235 
      year12 |   -8.21587   5.570113    -1.47   0.145    -19.34685    2.915112 
      year13 |  -6.844053   4.447362    -1.54   0.129     -15.7314     2.04329 
      year14 |  -3.371878   4.212951    -0.80   0.427    -11.79079    5.047033 
       _cons |  -15.83024   23.03077    -0.69   0.494    -61.85356    30.19308 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Instruments for first differences equation 
  Standard 
    D.(popgrowth L.educ2_n L.educ3_n L.fdgrant L.fdtax L.trade L.fdtax2 
    L.fdgrant2 year2 year3 year4 year5 year6 year7 year8 year9 year10 year11 
    year12 year13 year14) 
  GMM-type (missing=0, separate instruments for each period unless collapsed) 
    L(2/4).lngfcf_gdp collapsed 
    L(2/4).L.realgrowth collapsed 
Instruments for levels equation 
  Standard 
    popgrowth L.educ2_n L.educ3_n L.fdgrant L.fdtax L.trade L.fdtax2 
    L.fdgrant2 year2 year3 year4 year5 year6 year7 year8 year9 year10 year11 
    year12 year13 year14 
    _cons 
  GMM-type (missing=0, separate instruments for each period unless collapsed) 
    DL.lngfcf_gdp collapsed 
    DL.L.realgrowth collapsed 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Arellano-Bond test for AR(1) in first differences: z =  -2.58  Pr > z =  0.010 
Arellano-Bond test for AR(2) in first differences: z =   1.54  Pr > z =  0.123 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Sargan test of overid. restrictions: chi2(5)    =   1.63  Prob > chi2 =  0.897 
  (Not robust, but not weakened by many instruments.) 
Hansen test of overid. restrictions: chi2(5)    =   1.94  Prob > chi2 =  0.857 
  (Robust, but weakened by many instruments.) 
 
Difference-in-Hansen tests of exogeneity of instrument subsets: 
  GMM instruments for levels 
    Hansen test excluding group:     chi2(3)    =   0.87  Prob > chi2 =  0.833 
    Difference (null H = exogenous): chi2(2)    =   1.07  Prob > chi2 =  0.585 
  gmm(L.realgrowth, collapse lag(2 4)) 
    Hansen test excluding group:     chi2(1)    =   0.09  Prob > chi2 =  0.765 
    Difference (null H = exogenous): chi2(4)    =   1.85  Prob > chi2 =  0.763 
  gmm(lngfcf_gdp, collapse lag(2 4)) 
    Hansen test excluding group:     chi2(1)    =   0.00  Prob > chi2 =  0.998 
    Difference (null H = exogenous): chi2(4)    =   1.94  Prob > chi2 =  0.747 
 
 
Appendix 5.6.2 Government Consumption 
. xtscc realgrowth popgrowth educ2_n educ3_n lag1realgdp lngfcf_gdp fdexp fdgrant 
trade govcons year2 year3 year4 year5 year6 year7 year8 year9 year10 year11 year12 
year13 year14 if realgrowth<=30 & realgrowth>=-15, fe ase 
 
Regression with Driscoll-Kraay standard errors   Number of obs     =       669 
Method: Fixed-effects regression                 Number of groups  =        64 
Group variable (i): idall                        F( 22,    13)     =2094056.94 
maximum lag: 2                                   Prob > F          =    0.0000 
                                                 within R-squared  =    0.5538 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
             |             Drisc/Kraay 
  realgrowth |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
   popgrowth |  -.2430345   .1235368    -1.97   0.071    -.5099195    .0238505 
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     educ2_n |   .0453335   .0657747     0.69   0.503     -.096764     .187431 
     educ3_n |  -.1307293   .0671955    -1.95   0.074    -.2758964    .0144378 
 lag1realgdp |  -.0023729   .0006377    -3.72   0.003    -.0037506   -.0009951 
  lngfcf_gdp |  -2.334594   2.201467    -1.06   0.308    -7.090574    2.421386 
       fdexp |   .2028512   .0984314     2.06   0.060     -.009797    .4154994 
     fdgrant |  -.0671721   .1368534    -0.49   0.632    -.3628259    .2284817 
       trade |  -.1630131   .1363475    -1.20   0.253    -.4575738    .1315477 
     govcons |  -1.835776   1.058868    -1.73   0.107    -4.123323    .4517701 
       year2 |   -7.99521   1.407772    -5.68   0.000    -11.03652   -4.953904 
       year3 |  -12.15945   2.657626    -4.58   0.001     -17.9009   -6.417999 
       year4 |  -9.216503   2.553286    -3.61   0.003    -14.73254   -3.700463 
       year5 |  -1.488856   2.925208    -0.51   0.619    -7.808384    4.830672 
       year6 |  -2.558545   3.178749    -0.80   0.435    -9.425815    4.308725 
       year7 |  -.1883155   3.335862    -0.06   0.956    -7.395007    7.018376 
       year8 |  -1.045396    4.31694    -0.24   0.812    -10.37158    8.280785 
       year9 |    -11.539   6.062362    -1.90   0.079    -24.63594    1.557933 
      year10 |   1.535178   5.895011     0.26   0.799    -11.20022    14.27057 
      year11 |    1.15841   6.282201     0.18   0.857    -12.41346    14.73028 
      year12 |  -.7005764   6.639016    -0.11   0.918     -15.0433    13.64215 
      year13 |   4.456671   10.66206     0.42   0.683     -18.5773    27.49065 
      year14 |   7.733028   9.896103     0.78   0.449     -13.6462    29.11226 
       _cons |   81.03465   24.16575     3.35   0.005     28.82772    133.2416 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 
. xtscc realgrowth popgrowth educ2_n educ3_n lag1realgdp lngfcf_gdp fdtax fdgrant 
trade govcons year2 year3 year4 year5 year6 year7 year8 year9 year10 year11 year12 
year13 year14 if realgrowth<=30 & realgrowth>=-15, fe 
 
Regression with Driscoll-Kraay standard errors   Number of obs     =       669 
Method: Fixed-effects regression                 Number of groups  =        64 
Group variable (i): idall                        F( 22,    13)     =  17289.81 
maximum lag: 2                                   Prob > F          =    0.0000 
                                                 within R-squared  =    0.5709 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
             |             Drisc/Kraay 
  realgrowth |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
   popgrowth |  -.2879438   .1237681    -2.33   0.037    -.5553286    -.020559 
     educ2_n |   .0622612   .0640643     0.97   0.349    -.0761413    .2006638 
     educ3_n |  -.0761171   .0629351    -1.21   0.248      -.21208    .0598459 
 lag1realgdp |  -.0026789   .0007117    -3.76   0.002    -.0042166   -.0011413 
  lngfcf_gdp |  -3.771302   2.057418    -1.83   0.090    -8.216082    .6734786 
       fdtax |   .2699177   .1233498     2.19   0.048     .0034367    .5363987 
     fdgrant |     -.0381    .145178    -0.26   0.797     -.351738    .2755379 
       trade |  -.1675776   .1427706    -1.17   0.262    -.4760147    .1408595 
     govcons |  -1.970664    1.16331    -1.69   0.114    -4.483842    .5425136 
       year2 |  -7.857487   1.405322    -5.59   0.000     -10.8935   -4.821473 
       year3 |  -12.60961   2.460978    -5.12   0.000    -17.92623   -7.292991 
       year4 |  -10.04041    2.23197    -4.50   0.001    -14.86228   -5.218528 
       year5 |  -2.560739   2.528403    -1.01   0.330     -8.02302    2.901543 
       year6 |  -3.184742   2.983503    -1.07   0.305    -9.630208    3.260724 
       year7 |  -.4976126   3.266412    -0.15   0.881    -7.554268    6.559042 
       year8 |  -1.267828   4.201503    -0.30   0.768    -10.34462    7.808967 
       year9 |  -11.82857   5.792979    -2.04   0.062    -24.34354    .6864023 
      year10 |   1.895434   6.088562     0.31   0.761     -11.2581    15.04897 
      year11 |   1.334042   6.460735     0.21   0.840    -12.62353    15.29161 
      year12 |  -.6522168   6.773278    -0.10   0.925      -15.285    13.98056 
      year13 |     5.9353   11.23881     0.53   0.606    -18.34468    30.21528 
      year14 |    8.24022   10.14458     0.81   0.431    -13.67581    30.15625 
       _cons |   83.04238   25.82075     3.22   0.007     27.26004    138.8247 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 
 
Appendix 5.6.3 Capital City 
. xtscc realgrowth popgrowth educ2_n educ3_n lag1realgdp lngfcf_gdp fdexp fdgrant 
trade expcapital grantcapital year3 year4 year5 ye 
> ar6 year7 year8 year9 year10 year11 year12 year13 year14 if realgrowth<=30 & 
realgrowth>=-15, fe  
 
Regression with Driscoll-Kraay standard errors   Number of obs     =       669 
Method: Fixed-effects regression                 Number of groups  =        64 
Group variable (i): idall                        F( 22,    13)     = 343246.56 
maximum lag: 2                                   Prob > F          =    0.0000 
463 
 
                                                 within R-squared  =    0.5223 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
             |             Drisc/Kraay 
  realgrowth |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
   popgrowth |  -.2361993   .1319107    -1.79   0.097     -.521175    .0487763 
     educ2_n |   .1406253   .0763202     1.84   0.088    -.0242545     .305505 
     educ3_n |  -.1778735   .0807165    -2.20   0.046    -.3522509   -.0034961 
 lag1realgdp |  -.0028944   .0006801    -4.26   0.001    -.0043637   -.0014252 
  lngfcf_gdp |  -.7800883   3.337271    -0.23   0.819    -7.989824    6.429647 
       fdexp |   .2134754   .1017265     2.10   0.056    -.0062914    .4332422 
     fdgrant |  -.0858015   .1348863    -0.64   0.536    -.3772055    .2056025 
       trade |  -.1193263   .1375284    -0.87   0.401    -.4164385    .1777858 
  expcapital |   -.094699   .1391316    -0.68   0.508    -.3952746    .2058766 
grantcapital |  -.0922796   .2189387    -0.42   0.680    -.5652679    .3807087 
       year3 |  -8.114598   1.464671    -5.54   0.000    -11.27883   -4.950369 
       year4 |  -4.297437   1.655367    -2.60   0.022    -7.873641   -.7212338 
       year5 |   3.867668   1.888284     2.05   0.061     -.211722    7.947057 
       year6 |   3.828308   2.541921     1.51   0.156    -1.663178    9.319793 
       year7 |   6.656094   2.890138     2.30   0.038     .4123309    12.89986 
       year8 |   4.862773   3.213498     1.51   0.154    -2.079567    11.80511 
       year9 |  -6.913085   3.857919    -1.79   0.096    -15.24761    1.421443 
      year10 |   5.947931   4.108079     1.45   0.171    -2.927033     14.8229 
      year11 |   6.861683   5.258325     1.30   0.215    -4.498238     18.2216 
      year12 |   5.590695   5.718616     0.98   0.346    -6.763624    17.94501 
      year13 |   9.754142   8.829752     1.10   0.289    -9.321376    28.82966 
      year14 |   12.50393   7.557143     1.65   0.122    -3.822284    28.83015 
       _cons |   34.34019   24.72642     1.39   0.188    -19.07799    87.75836 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 
 
. xtscc realgrowth popgrowth educ2_n educ3_n lag1realgdp lngfcf_gdp fdtax fdgrant 
trade revcapital grantcapital year3 year4 year5 ye 
> ar6 year7 year8 year9 year10 year11 year12 year13 year14 if realgrowth<=30 & 
realgrowth>=-15, fe 
 
Regression with Driscoll-Kraay standard errors   Number of obs     =       669 
Method: Fixed-effects regression                 Number of groups  =        64 
Group variable (i): idall                        F( 22,    13)     =   5143.40 
maximum lag: 2                                   Prob > F          =    0.0000 
                                                 within R-squared  =    0.5378 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
             |             Drisc/Kraay 
  realgrowth |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
   popgrowth |  -.2772035   .1213335    -2.28   0.040    -.5393287   -.0150783 
     educ2_n |   .1604887   .0743235     2.16   0.050    -.0000774    .3210548 
     educ3_n |  -.1198145   .0728976    -1.64   0.124    -.2773002    .0376713 
 lag1realgdp |  -.0032195   .0006875    -4.68   0.000    -.0047047   -.0017343 
  lngfcf_gdp |  -2.017642   2.998299    -0.67   0.513    -8.495073    4.459789 
       fdtax |   .2711192   .1174564     2.31   0.038       .01737    .5248683 
     fdgrant |  -.0723588   .1293211    -0.56   0.585    -.3517401    .2070225 
       trade |  -.1215466   .1346822    -0.90   0.383    -.4125099    .1694166 
  revcapital |   .0114279   .1325379     0.09   0.933    -.2749029    .2977586 
grantcapital |   .0729921   .1939417     0.38   0.713    -.3459934    .4919777 
       year3 |  -8.707094     1.2214    -7.13   0.000    -11.34577    -6.06842 
       year4 |  -5.280121   1.288088    -4.10   0.001    -8.062865   -2.497377 
       year5 |   2.643115    1.49783     1.76   0.101      -.59275     5.87898 
       year6 |   3.110451   2.387463     1.30   0.215     -2.04735    8.268252 
       year7 |   6.284545   2.870543     2.19   0.047     .0831139    12.48598 
       year8 |   4.491954   3.085457     1.46   0.169     -2.17377    11.15768 
       year9 |  -7.500658   3.294877    -2.28   0.040    -14.61881   -.3825078 
      year10 |   6.006523   4.069029     1.48   0.164    -2.784079    14.79713 
      year11 |   6.816921   5.229933     1.30   0.215    -4.481663     18.1155 
      year12 |   5.452037   5.632618     0.97   0.351    -6.716495    17.62057 
      year13 |   10.65802   8.678255     1.23   0.241    -8.090209    29.40625 
      year14 |   12.61684   7.274727     1.73   0.106    -3.099251    28.33294 
       _cons |   33.24289   24.50387     1.36   0.198    -19.69451    86.18028 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 
464 
 
Appendix 5.6.4 EU 
xtscc realgrowth popgrowth educ2_n educ3_n lag1realgdp lngfcf_gdp fdexp fdgrant trade 
expeu granteu year3 year4 year5 year6 year7 year8 year9 year10 year11 year12 year13 
year14 if realgrowth<=30 & realgrowth>=-15, fe 
 
Regression with Driscoll-Kraay standard errors   Number of obs     =       669 
Method: Fixed-effects regression                 Number of groups  =        64 
Group variable (i): idall                        F( 22,    13)     =  14309.98 
maximum lag: 2                                   Prob > F          =    0.0000 
                                                 within R-squared  =    0.5256 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
             |             Drisc/Kraay 
  realgrowth |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
   popgrowth |  -.2329802   .1331926    -1.75   0.104    -.5207252    .0547648 
     educ2_n |   .1196251   .0742928     1.61   0.131    -.0408748    .2801249 
     educ3_n |  -.1730872   .0912415    -1.90   0.080    -.3702025    .0240281 
 lag1realgdp |  -.0026315   .0007565    -3.48   0.004    -.0042658   -.0009972 
  lngfcf_gdp |  -.5253273   2.959396    -0.18   0.862    -6.918714    5.868059 
       fdexp |   .3031406    .091458     3.31   0.006     .1055576    .5007236 
     fdgrant |  -.0385375   .1112461    -0.35   0.735    -.2788701    .2017951 
       trade |  -.1070079   .1384327    -0.77   0.453    -.4060737    .1920578 
       expeu |  -.1233123   .0835566    -1.48   0.164    -.3038253    .0572007 
     granteu |   .0492654   .1032123     0.48   0.641    -.1737112    .2722419 
       year3 |  -8.604505   1.558237    -5.52   0.000    -11.97087   -5.238139 
       year4 |  -3.294832   2.191655    -1.50   0.157    -8.029616    1.439952 
       year5 |   4.913283   2.287927     2.15   0.051    -.0294824    9.856048 
       year6 |   4.671435   2.871564     1.63   0.128    -1.532202    10.87507 
       year7 |   7.444334   3.125063     2.38   0.033     .6930465    14.19562 
       year8 |   5.394674   3.363474     1.60   0.133     -1.87167    12.66102 
       year9 |  -6.332145   3.467009    -1.83   0.091    -13.82216    1.157871 
      year10 |   6.280233    4.43377     1.42   0.180    -3.298345    15.85881 
      year11 |   7.047982   5.682048     1.24   0.237    -5.227335     19.3233 
      year12 |    5.89658   6.007444     0.98   0.344    -7.081713    18.87487 
      year13 |   9.569226   8.737584     1.10   0.293    -9.307176    28.44563 
      year14 |   12.87482   7.378887     1.74   0.105    -3.066298    28.81593 
       _cons |   27.81431   24.30356     1.14   0.273    -24.69035    80.31896 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 
 
. xtscc realgrowth popgrowth educ2_n educ3_n lag1realgdp lngfcf_gdp fdtax fdgrant 
trade taxeu granteu year3 year4 year5 year6 year7  
> year8 year9 year10 year11 year12 year13 year14 if realgrowth<=30 & realgrowth>=-15, 
fe 
 
Regression with Driscoll-Kraay standard errors   Number of obs     =       669 
Method: Fixed-effects regression                 Number of groups  =        64 
Group variable (i): idall                        F( 22,    13)     =  73600.11 
maximum lag: 2                                   Prob > F          =    0.0000 
                                                 within R-squared  =    0.5415 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
             |             Drisc/Kraay 
  realgrowth |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
   popgrowth |  -.2893952   .1141257    -2.54   0.025    -.5359488   -.0428416 
     educ2_n |   .1488297   .0737362     2.02   0.065    -.0104676     .308127 
     educ3_n |  -.0963386   .0949462    -1.01   0.329    -.3014573    .1087801 
 lag1realgdp |  -.0029511   .0007786    -3.79   0.002     -.004633   -.0012691 
  lngfcf_gdp |  -2.064748   2.619126    -0.79   0.445    -7.723025     3.59353 
       fdtax |   .3547782   .0913115     3.89   0.002     .1575118    .5520446 
     fdgrant |  -.0329765   .1011385    -0.33   0.750     -.251473      .18552 
       trade |  -.1104622   .1375152    -0.80   0.436    -.4075458    .1866213 
       taxeu |  -.1191116   .0874655    -1.36   0.196    -.3080693     .069846 
     granteu |   .0595848   .1032358     0.58   0.574    -.1634427    .2826122 
       year3 |  -9.355721   1.440228    -6.50   0.000    -12.46714   -6.244297 
       year4 |  -4.730584   2.318625    -2.04   0.062    -9.739668    .2785003 
       year5 |   3.212943   2.408251     1.33   0.205    -1.989768    8.415654 
       year6 |   3.485304   3.090424     1.13   0.280    -3.191152    10.16176 
       year7 |   6.656717   3.409088     1.95   0.073    -.7081692     14.0216 
       year8 |   4.606536   3.547598     1.30   0.217    -3.057584    12.27066 
       year9 |  -7.364879    3.09251    -2.38   0.033    -14.04584   -.6839162 
      year10 |   6.019647   4.672222     1.29   0.220    -4.074075    16.11337 
      year11 |   6.617479   5.989621     1.10   0.289    -6.322309    19.55727 
      year12 |    5.30545   6.318092     0.84   0.416    -8.343959    18.95486 
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      year13 |   9.977782   9.086196     1.10   0.292    -9.651752    29.60732 
      year14 |   12.51074   7.516451     1.66   0.120    -3.727562    28.74905 
       _cons |   27.54524   23.89533     1.15   0.270    -24.07749    79.16796 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 
 
. xtscc realgrowth popgrowth educ2_n educ3_n lag1realgdp lngfcf_gdp fdexp fdgrant  
granteu year3 year4 year5 year6 year7 year8 year9 
>  year10 year11 year12 year13 year14 if realgrowth<=30 & realgrowth>=-15 & 
id_country!=1, fe 
 
Regression with Driscoll-Kraay standard errors   Number of obs     =       537 
Method: Fixed-effects regression                 Number of groups  =        52 
Group variable (i): idall                        F( 20,    13)     =5948362.87 
maximum lag: 2                                   Prob > F          =    0.0000 
                                                 within R-squared  =    0.6177 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
             |             Drisc/Kraay 
  realgrowth |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
   popgrowth |   1.167538   1.199133     0.97   0.348    -1.423031    3.758107 
     educ2_n |    .186763   .0759487     2.46   0.029     .0226859    .3508401 
     educ3_n |    .001019   .1005137     0.01   0.992    -.2161277    .2181657 
 lag1realgdp |  -.0030219   .0009471    -3.19   0.007    -.0050681   -.0009757 
  lngfcf_gdp |   3.773137   2.161736     1.75   0.104    -.8970091    8.443283 
       fdexp |   .2011882     .09388     2.14   0.052    -.0016273    .4040037 
     fdgrant |   -.163049   .1231129    -1.32   0.208    -.4290182    .1029203 
     granteu |   .0569572   .1147803     0.50   0.628    -.1910104    .3049249 
       year3 |  -12.29891   1.621984    -7.58   0.000    -15.80299   -8.794827 
       year4 |   -13.0465   2.290069    -5.70   0.000     -17.9939    -8.09911 
       year5 |  -2.091411   1.988413    -1.05   0.312    -6.387116    2.204295 
       year6 |  -3.795241   1.837594    -2.07   0.059    -7.765122     .174639 
       year7 |  -.1090134   1.907098    -0.06   0.955    -4.229049    4.011022 
       year8 |  -3.375113   2.192198    -1.54   0.148    -8.111069    1.360843 
       year9 |  -13.94261   3.493968    -3.99   0.002    -21.49087   -6.394352 
      year10 |  -1.134517   2.710169    -0.42   0.682     -6.98948    4.720446 
      year11 |  -1.730694   2.911271    -0.59   0.562    -8.020111    4.558724 
      year12 |  -4.923499    3.40071    -1.45   0.171    -12.27029    2.423288 
      year13 |  -1.583683    5.56893    -0.28   0.781    -13.61462    10.44726 
      year14 |   2.222509   5.465843     0.41   0.691    -9.585728    14.03074 
       _cons |   5.999562   12.72895     0.47   0.645    -21.49966    33.49878 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 
 
. xtscc realgrowth popgrowth educ2_n educ3_n lag1realgdp lngfcf_gdp fdtax fdgrant 
trade year3 year4 year5 year6 year7 year8 year9 year10 year11 year12 year13 year14 if 
realgrowth<=30 & realgrowth>=-15 & id_country!=1, fe 
 
Regression with Driscoll-Kraay standard errors   Number of obs     =       537 
Method: Fixed-effects regression                 Number of groups  =        52 
Group variable (i): idall                        F( 20,    13)     =  2.15e+07 
maximum lag: 2                                   Prob > F          =    0.0000 
                                                 within R-squared  =    0.6350 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
             |             Drisc/Kraay 
  realgrowth |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
   popgrowth |   .8187216   1.054075     0.78   0.451    -1.458469    3.095913 
     educ2_n |   .1692946   .0714761     2.37   0.034       .01488    .3237093 
     educ3_n |  -.0007682   .0885939    -0.01   0.993    -.1921637    .1906274 
 lag1realgdp |   -.003337   .0009687    -3.44   0.004    -.0054298   -.0012442 
  lngfcf_gdp |   2.866984    2.28075     1.26   0.231    -2.060277    7.794245 
       fdtax |   .2387015     .10785     2.21   0.045     .0057058    .4716973 
     fdgrant |  -.0529499   .1524641    -0.35   0.734    -.3823286    .2764288 
       trade |  -.1515545    .151534    -1.00   0.335    -.4789239    .1758149 
       year3 |  -11.33218    1.74641    -6.49   0.000    -15.10507   -7.559296 
       year4 |  -9.073462   2.516101    -3.61   0.003    -14.50917   -3.637756 
       year5 |   2.128926   3.356454     0.63   0.537    -5.122252    9.380104 
       year6 |   2.002726   4.866866     0.41   0.687    -8.511499    12.51695 
       year7 |   6.403802   5.578272     1.15   0.272    -5.647321    18.45493 
       year8 |   3.186127    5.98336     0.53   0.603    -9.740137    16.11239 
       year9 |  -9.745635   5.961113    -1.63   0.126    -22.62384    3.132567 
      year10 |   5.723227   6.994418     0.82   0.428    -9.387294    20.83375 
      year11 |   7.207713   8.785302     0.82   0.427    -11.77178     26.1872 
      year12 |   4.783402   9.681829     0.49   0.630    -16.13292    25.69972 
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      year13 |   9.679319    12.7282     0.76   0.461    -17.81829    37.17693 
      year14 |    12.6853   11.93527     1.06   0.307    -13.09927    38.46988 
       _cons |   20.81547   19.73723     1.05   0.311    -21.82424    63.45517 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 
Appendix 5.6.5 Long Run 
 
A. Baseline 
 
. nlcom _b[fdexp] / (1 - _b[L.realgrowth]) 
 
       _nl_1:  _b[fdexp] / (1 - _b[L.realgrowth]) 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
  realgrowth |      Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
       _nl_1 |   .1264454   .0571474     2.21   0.027     .0144385    .2384522 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 
 
. nlcom _b[fdgrant] / (1 - _b[L.realgrowth]) 
 
       _nl_1:  _b[fdgrant] / (1 - _b[L.realgrowth]) 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
  realgrowth |      Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
       _nl_1 |   .0382033   .0407584     0.94   0.349    -.0416818    .1180884 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 
. nlcom _b[fdtax] / (1 - _b[L.realgrowth]) 
 
       _nl_1:  _b[fdtax] / (1 - _b[L.realgrowth]) 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
  realgrowth |      Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
       _nl_1 |   .1628457   .0565209     2.88   0.004     .0520668    .2736246 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 
. nlcom _b[fdgrant] / (1 - _b[L.realgrowth]) 
 
       _nl_1:  _b[fdgrant] / (1 - _b[L.realgrowth]) 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
  realgrowth |      Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
       _nl_1 |   .0180032   .0377837     0.48   0.634    -.0560514    .0920578 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 
B. Endogenous 
 
. nlcom _b[fdexp] / (1 - _b[L.realgrowth]) 
 
       _nl_1:  _b[fdexp] / (1 - _b[L.realgrowth]) 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
  realgrowth |      Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
       _nl_1 |   .0329326   .0543042     0.61   0.544    -.0735017     .139367 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 
. nlcom _b[l.fdgrant] / (1 - _b[L.realgrowth]) 
 
       _nl_1:  _b[l.fdgrant] / (1 - _b[L.realgrowth]) 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
  realgrowth |      Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
       _nl_1 |  -.0185976   .0443938    -0.42   0.675    -.1056078    .0684126 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 
. nlcom _b[l.fdtax] / (1 - _b[L.realgrowth]) 
 
       _nl_1:  _b[l.fdtax] / (1 - _b[L.realgrowth]) 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
  realgrowth |      Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
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       _nl_1 |   .1449749   .0408592     3.55   0.000     .0648923    .2250576 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 
. nlcom _b[l.fdgrant] / (1 - _b[L.realgrowth]) 
 
       _nl_1:  _b[l.fdgrant] / (1 - _b[L.realgrowth]) 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
  realgrowth |      Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
       _nl_1 |  -.0944451   .0317655    -2.97   0.003    -.1567044   -.0321859 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 
 
 
 
